Serne v. Kalamazoo County Sheriff Department

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
RICHARD T. SERNE,
Plaintiff,
v.
KALAMAZOO COUNTY SHERIFF
DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1102
Honorable Phillip J. Green
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a Kalamazoo County Jail detainee under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. In a separate order, the Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed
in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under
the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 6, PageID.38.)
This case is presently before this Court for preliminary review under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is
required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re
Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the
named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s
relationship to the proceedings.
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“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in
litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by
formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344,
347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice,
is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350.
“[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only
upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time
within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That
is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to
function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil
action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA,
by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service,
creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the
plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty.
Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district
court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was
made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party
to this appeal.”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting
all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that
“[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may
conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .”
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28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendant has not yet been served, the
undersigned concludes that Defendant is not presently a party whose consent is
required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA,
in the same way Defendant is not a party who will be served with or given notice of
this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does
not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been
served, they were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered
judgment.”).1
Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought
under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must
read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or
wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir.
2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to
proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context
matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy
Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500,
503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of
“parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to
its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of
‘parties’ in other contexts”).
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standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint2 for failure to state
a claim.
Discussion
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the Kalamazoo County Jail in Kalamazoo,
Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff
sues the Kalamazoo County Sheriff Department. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 6,
PageID.35.)
In Plaintiff’s amended complaint, he states that he has “been incarcerated
awaiting trial as of March 31st of 2025.”3 (Id., PageID.37.) Plaintiff further states
that at an unspecified time, he “was moved to protective custody against [his] wishes,”
and he has “asked to be moved countless times.” (Id.)
Additionally, Plaintiff states that he has been “assaulted twice while in this
custody and . . . had to have X-rays and [an] MRI and other medication.” (Id.)
Plaintiff “asked numerous times for charges to be filed but . . . ha[s] heard no
response.” (Id.) Plaintiff believes that this is because “the jail . . . would rather not
2 Plaintiff and nineteen other county detainees originally filed a complaint on
September 9, 2025. See Evans et al. v. Kalamazoo Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t et al., No. 1:24-
cv-1064 (W.D. Mich.). In an order entered on September 15, 2025, the Court severed
Plaintiffs’ claims into twenty related cases. The above-captioned action is the result
of this severance. In the September 15, 2025, order, the Court also directed each
Plaintiff to file an amended complaint in his own case. In response, Plaintiff filed an
amended complaint (ECF No. 6), which is the operative complaint in this action.
3 In this opinion, the Court corrects the capitalization in quotations from Plaintiff’s
amended complaint.
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have assault charges while in its protective custody.” (Id. (phrasing in original
retained).)
Plaintiff alleges that “for seven months,” he has “been locked down for 23 hours
a day with no recreation, fresh air, sunlight, razors for shaving, commissary, and no
access to the law library.” (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that the one hour “to use a phone
is also denied or not given until after business hours.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that as a
result, the majority of his communication with his attorneys has been via mail. (Id.)
Plaintiff further states that for one of his cases, he has not heard from his attorneys
“for over 5 months.” (Id.) As relief, Plaintiff asks the Court to determine “what would
be a remedy.” (Id., PageID.38.)
Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations,
a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must
determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability
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requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-
pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin,
630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of
a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996).
Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive
rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific
constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
A. 	Defendant Kalamazoo County Sheriff Department
Plaintiff names the Kalamazoo County Sheriff Department as the sole
Defendant. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 6, PageID.35.) However, the Kalamazoo County
Sheriff Department does not exist as a separate entity; it is simply an agent of the
county. See Vine v. Cnty. of Ingham, 884 F. Supp. 1153, 1158 (W.D. Mich. 1995)
(citing Hughson v. Cnty. of Antrim, 707 F. Supp. 304, 306 (W.D. Mich. 1988); Bayer
v. Almstadt, 185 N.W.2d 40, 41 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970)). Accordingly, for this reason
alone, Defendant Kalamazoo County Sheriff Department will be dismissed for failure
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to state a claim. Moreover, construing Plaintiff’s pro se complaint with all required
liberality, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), even if the Court assumes that
Plaintiff intended to sue Kalamazoo County, rather than the Kalamazoo County
Sheriff Department, as explained below, he fails to state a claim. See infra Section
II.B.
B. 	Kalamazoo County
Kalamazoo County may not be held vicariously liable for the actions of its
employees under § 1983. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011); City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 694 (1978). Instead, a county is liable only when its official policy or custom
causes the injury. Connick, 563 U.S. at 60. This policy or custom must be the moving
force behind the alleged constitutional injury, and the plaintiff must identify the
policy or custom, connect it to the governmental entity, and show that his injury was
incurred because of the policy or custom. See Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629,
639 (6th Cir. 2005); Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003). “Governmental
entities cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a
direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged violation of
constitutional rights.” Watson v. Gill, 40 F. App’x 88, 89 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Monell,
436 U.S. at 692).
A policy includes a “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adopted and promulgated” by the sheriff’s department. See Monell, 436 U.S.
at 690. Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
explained that a custom “for the purposes of Monell liability must be so permanent
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and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Doe v.
Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 1996). “In short, a ‘custom’ is a ‘legal
institution’ not memorialized by written law.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that, at an unspecified time, he “was moved to protective
custody against [his] wishes,” and he has “asked to be moved countless times.” (Am.
Compl., ECF No. 6, PageID.37.) Plaintiff further alleges that he has been detained
“with no recreation, fresh air, sunlight, razors for shaving, commissary, and no access
to the law library” for seven months. (Id.) Further, Plaintiff states that he has been
“assaulted twice while in this custody and have had to have X-rays and [an] MRI and
other medication.” (Id.) Plaintiff “asked numerous times for charges to be filed but .
. . ha[s] heard no response.” (Id.)
The Court does not minimize Plaintiff’s experience; however, Plaintiff alleges
no facts about who is responsible for this type of detention. (See generally id.) That
is, Plaintiff does not indicate whether individual corrections officers at the jail are
choosing to impose these conditions on him or whether these are facility-wide
conditions that are imposed on all inmates. Because Plaintiff alleges no facts about
who is responsible for this type of detention, Plaintiff necessarily fails to allege the
existence of a custom or policy, let alone that any policy or custom was the moving
force behind his alleged constitutional injuries. Cf. Rayford v. City of Toledo, No. 86-
3260, 1987 WL 36283, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1987); see also Bilder v. City of Akron,
No. 92-4310, 1993 WL 394595, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 6, 1993) (affirming dismissal of §
1983 action when plaintiff allegation of policy or custom was conclusory, and plaintiff
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failed to allege facts tending to support the allegation). Plaintiff therefore fails to
state a claim against Kalamazoo County.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that
Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court
must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are
properly dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue Plaintiff might raise on
appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: October 27, 2025 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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