Wells #969625 v. Bonn et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
KYVON DE'ANDRE WELLS,
Plaintiff,
v.
DALE BONN et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-948
Honorable Ray Kent
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In a separate
order, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all
matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 4.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial
review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131,
1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997).
Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a
putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings.
“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless
notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros.,
Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under
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longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a
named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in
that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time
within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless
a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non
directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive
rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s
claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the
proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette
Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court
screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of
the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all
proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent
of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all
proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the
named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently
parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under
the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this
opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a
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consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties
to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1
Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal
law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they
are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying
these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice for failure to state a
claim.
Discussion
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff sues the following Defendants for events which took place at the Ionia
Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan: Warden Dale Bonn, Deputy Warden
Unknown Party #2, Inspector Unknown Party #3, Inspector Unknown Party #4, and Facility
Manager Unknown Party #5.
Plaintiff alleges that, on June 26, 2025, ICF experienced a heat advisory. (Compl., ECF
No. 1, PageID.4.) He claims that the cells do not have proper ventilation. The “Administration
1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a
United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the
United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a
screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c));
Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for
the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning
in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).
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radio[ed] the unit regular [corrections officers],” giving the corrections officers permission to open
the food slots of the cells, but this did not relieve the “extremely uncomfortable temperatures.”
(Id.) Plaintiff asked an unidentified person, “Why do we need to wait for them (Administration) to
call when its 75 degrees plus.” (Id.) “The response was ‘it has to be 90 degrees in order for the
food slots to be open.’” (Id.)
Plaintiff also alleges that he suffers from asthma and that the lack of an emergency call
button in the cell poses a danger to his health. (Id.)
As relief for the events described in Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff seeks compensatory
damages. (Id., PageID.5.)
Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
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relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
Here, Plaintiff lists the Warden, Deputy Warden, two Inspectors, and the Facility Manager
as Defendants; however, Plaintiff makes no factual allegations against any particular named
Defendant.
It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular
defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, to state a claim, a plaintiff must make
sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). The Sixth Circuit “has
consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations
of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant
did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir.
2008) (citing Terrance v. Northville Reg’l Psych. Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2002)). Where
a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject
to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Frazier v.
Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claims where the
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complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were
personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery,
No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal
involvement against each defendant) (citing Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th
Cir. 1998)); Rodriguez v. Jabe, 904 F.2d 708 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against those
individuals are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them
which would suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries.”).
Plaintiff makes factual allegations against the “Administration,” but that is insufficient to
implicate any named Defendant. “Summary reference to a single, five-headed ‘Defendants’ [or
officers or staff] does not support a reasonable inference that each Defendant is liable . . . .” Boxill
v. O’Grady, 935 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against
the named Defendants fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and will be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold any Defendant liable in his or her supervisory role,
he may not do so. Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of
their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
676; Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556
F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active
unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v.
Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can
supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310
F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may
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not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act
based upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th
Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
The Sixth Circuit has summarized the minimum required to constitute active conduct by a
supervisory official:
“[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending
individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific
incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee,
199 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have
interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that
the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in
the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.”
Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300,
and citing Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008)); see also Copeland v.
Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375–76 (1976),
and Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)); Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d
1331, 1340 (6th Cir. 1993); Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989).
Here, Plaintiff fails to provide the court with any well-pleaded factual allegations that
would suggest that any named Defendant authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in any
unconstitutional conduct. Accordingly, on this basis as well, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint for failure to state a claim. m
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must
next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28
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U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the
same reasons the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court also
concludes that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be
taken in good faith.
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: 	May 7, 2026 	/s/ Ray Kent
Ray Kent
United States Magistrate Judge
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