Slater v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MARVIN A. S.,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
Case No. 1:25-cv-604
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for
Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and
XVI of the Social Security Act.
Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides that,
if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it shall be conclusive. The
Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Plaintiff seeks
review of the Commissioner’s decision.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), authorizing United States Magistrate Judges to
submit proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition of social security appeals,
I recommend that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s jurisdiction is confined to a review of the Commissioner’s decision and of the
record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v. Sec’y of Health and Human
Servs., 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security case is
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limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards and whether
there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting the decision. See Brainard v. Sec’y of
Health and Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de
novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See
Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). Fact finding is the Commissioner’s province,
and those findings are conclusive provided substantial evidence supports them. See 42 U.S.C. §
405(g).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. See Cohen v.
Sec’y of Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992). It is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In
applying this standard, a court must consider the evidence as a whole, while accounting for any
evidence that fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984). The substantial evidence standard contemplates a zone within
which the decision maker can properly rule either way without judicial interference. See Mullen v.
Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). This standard affords the administrative decision maker
considerable latitude and precludes reversal simply because the evidence would have supported a
contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI on March 24, 2023, and March 27, 2023,
respectively, alleging that he became disabled as of February 28, 2023, due to epilepsy, attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), diabetes, high blood pressure, and an enlarged heart.
(PageID.120, 129, 268–71, 275–81.) Plaintiff was 42 years old on his alleged onset date and at the
time he filed his applications. (PageID.120.) He had earned a high school diploma and had past
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work as a salvage worker, security guard, cashier II, and cashier checker. (PageID.73, 316.)
Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and on reconsideration, and he requested a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
On January 24, 2024, ALJ Robert Tjapkes held a video hearing and received testimony
from Plaintiff, his girlfriend, Christine Bissell, and impartial vocational expert (VE) Susan Rowe.
(PageID.81–117.) On March 18, 2024, ALJ Tjapkes issued a written decision finding that Plaintiff
was not disabled from his alleged onset date through the date of decision. (PageID.63–75.) The
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on April 8, 2025. (PageID.21–23.) ALJ
Tjapkes’s ruling thus became the Commissioner’s final decision. See Cook v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
480 F.3d 432, 434 (6th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff timely initiated this civil action for judicial review on
May 29, 2025.
ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ’S DECISION
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating
disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).1 If the Commissioner can make a
1 1. 	An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found
to be “disabled” regardless of medical findings (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b));
2. 	An individual who does not have a “severe impairment” will not be found “disabled” (20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c));
3. 	If an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment which meets the
duration requirement and which “meets or equals” a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of
Subpart P of Regulations No. 4, a finding of “disabled” will be made without consideration
of vocational factors (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d));
4. 	If an individual is capable of performing her past relevant work, a finding of “not disabled”
must be made (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e));
5. 	If an individual’s impairment is so severe as to preclude the performance of past work, other
factors including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity
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dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also provide that, if a claimant suffers from a
nonexertional impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are considered in determining
residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff’s shoulders, and
he can satisfy his burden by demonstrating that his impairments are so severe that he is unable to
perform his previous work, and cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,
perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national
economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner at step five of the sequential evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of
proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which his residual functional capacity (RFC)
is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (ALJ determines RFC at step four, at which point claimant
bears the burden of proof).
After determining that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through
September 30, 2028, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset
date of February 28, 2023, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from severe impairments of
obesity; 	degenerative 	joint 	disease 	of 	the 	left 	shoulder; 	diabetes 	mellitus; 	and 	epilepsy.
(PageID.66.) At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled any impairment identified in the Listing
of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.68.)
must be considered to determine if other work can be performed (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f),
416.920(f)).
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The ALJ then found that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except:
[H]e can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He can perform no work around
hazards, such as unprotected heights or unguarded moving machinery. He cannot
drive commercially. He can occasionally climb ramps and stairs. He can perform
no overhead reaching with the left (non-dominant) upper extremity, but he can
frequently reach in other directions with the left upper extremity.
(PageID.68–69.) At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was able to perform his past
relevant work as a cashier II and cashier checker. (PageID.73.) Alternatively, the ALJ found that
based on testimony from the VE, Plaintiff was able to perform a significant number of jobs existing
in the national economy, including clothing sorter, cafeteria attendant, and sales attendant,
approximately 195,000 of which existed in the national economy. (PageID.74–75.) This represents
a significant number of jobs. See, e.g., Taskila v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 819 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir.
2016) (“[s]ix thousand jobs in the United States fits comfortably within what this court and others
have deemed ‘significant’”). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises three issues in his appeal: (1) the ALJ violated 20 C.F.R. § 1404.1520c [and
20 C.F.R. § 416.920c] during the evaluation of the evidence because he failed to properly consider
the mandatory factors of supportability and consistency; (2) the ALJ committed reversable error
by failing to find that Plaintiff met medical Listing 11.02; and (3) the ALJ committed reversible
error by relying upon an inaccurate hypothetical question. (ECF No. 13 at PageID.641.)
I. 	Opinion Evidence
The ALJ evaluated the medical opinions pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and 416.920c.
Under that regulation, the ALJ “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including
controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s),” even an
opinion from a treating source. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a) and 416.920c(a). Instead, an ALJ will
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articulate his or her determination of the persuasiveness of a medical opinion “in a single analysis
using the factors listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this section, as appropriate.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520c(b)(1) and 416.920c(b)(1). Those factors include: (1) supportability; (2) consistency;
(3) relationship with the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors which tend to support
or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)–(5) and 416.920c(c)(1)–(5). In general,
the ALJ must explain his or her consideration of the supportability and consistency factors, but is
not required to explain how the remaining factors were considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2)
and (3) and 416.920c(b)(2) and (3). The regulations explain “supportability” and “consistency” as
follows:
(1) 	Supportability. 	The 	more 	relevant 	the 	objective 	medical 	evidence 	and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her
medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive
the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.
(2) Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative
medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical
sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) will be.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)–(2) and 416.920c(c)(1)–2.
More specifically, “supportability relates to the extent to which a medical source has
articulated support for the medical source’s own opinion, while consistency relates to the
relationship between a medical source’s opinion and other evidence within the record.” Cook v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:20-cv-1197, 2021 WL 1565832, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2021), report
and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1565162 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2021); see 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520c(1)–(2), 416.920c(1)–(2); Conklin v. Kijakazi, No. 21-CV-8486, 2023 WL 104829, at
*12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2023) (stating that “supportability” “has to do with the fit between the
medical opinion offered by the source and the underlying evidence and explanations ‘presented’
by that source to support her opinion,” and “[c]onsistency is an all-encompassing inquiry focused
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on how well a medical source is supported, or not supported, by the entire record, not just what a
medical source had available to them” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to comply with the foregoing regulation in evaluating
the 	medical 	opinions 	of 	his 	providers, 	Charles 	Asbury, 	D.O., 	and 	Jeremy 	Kaley, 	N.P.
(PageID.595–603.) The ALJ assessed these opinions as follows:
The opinions of physician, Charles Asbury, D.O., are not persuasive. On September
7, 2023, Dr. Asbury stated that the claimant was not medically cleared to return to
work due to continued breakthrough grand mal seizures (Ex. 7F).
Dr. Asbury’s opinions are not persuasive because they address an issue reserved to
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.
The opinions of family nurse practitioner, Jeremy Kaley, are not persuasive. On
September 14, 2023, Mr. Kaley opined that the claimant was unable to perform all
work duties due to frequency of breakthrough seizures even though the claimant
adhered to medication regimen (Ex. 8F). The claimant was unable to perform all
light and sedentary work (Id.). Mr. Kaley stated that the claimant became
incapacitated during breakthrough seizures (Id.). Extreme temperatures, noise, and
odors could lower seizure threshold allowing for increase in seizure frequency (Id.).
Overall, Mr. Kaley expressly stated that the claimant was unable to perform all light
and sedentary work at that time due to the severity of his seizure disorder (Id.).
Mr. Kaley’s opinions are inconsistent with and unsupported by the medical
evidence of record. For example, although the claimant’s representative asserted
that the claimant adhered to prescribed medical treatment concerning epilepsy (Ex.
30E/2), the medical evidence of record illustrated some non-compliance with
prescribed epilepsy treatment (Ex. 10F/1). The claimant told the emergency
department medical staff on July 2, 2023, that he skipped taking Keppra in the
morning (Id.). On August 22, 2023, the claimant reportedly experienced three
recent seizures for which he sought emergency department care and reported that
at least one or two of those incidents were not related to missing doses of
medication (Ex. 6F/6). The claimant’s reported emergency department visits were
not specified at that time (Id.). The claimant appeared to be in no acute distress
during several medical appointments (Ex. 1F/9, 13, 2F/7, 3F/34, 49, 10F/3, and 8).
Moreover, Mr. Kaley’s opinions are less persuasive because those opinions
addressed 	an 	issue 	reserved 	to 	the 	Commissioner 	of 	the 	Social 	Security
Administration. Mr. Kaley’s opinions are not supported by the opinions articulated
by the state agency medical consultants (Ex. 2A/4-7 and 6A/5-7). Therefore, Mr.
Kaley’s opinions are not persuasive.
(PageID.72.)
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Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the ALJ did not err in evaluating Dr. Asbury’s and NP
Kaley’s opinions. First, as the ALJ correctly indicated, Dr. Asbury’s brief statement that Plaintiff
was not medically cleared to return to work due to breakthrough seizures addressed an issue
reserved to the Commissioner—whether Plaintiff could work. “Statements that you are or are not
disabled, blind, able to work, or able to perform regular or continuing work” are “inherently neither
valuable nor persuasive.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520b(c)(3)(i), 416.920b(c)(3)(i); see Gross v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 247 F. Supp. 3d 824, 827 (E.D. Mich. 2017) (ALJ’s decision to discount treating
physician’s opinion “that Plaintiff could not return to work is an issue reserved to the
Commissioner and therefore not entitled to special deference”). Thus, per the regulations, the ALJ
was not required to address supportability and consistency of Dr. Asbury’s opinion.
As to NP Kaley’s opinion, the ALJ sufficiently articulated his consideration of the
supportability and consistency factors as required by the regulation and cited evidence pertaining
to both factors. First, as to supportability, the ALJ cited NP Kaley’s treatment notes, including a
note from a February 28, 2023 visit following a recent seizure, in which NP Kaley prescribed
Plaintiff 10 days of Keppra and referred him to neurology, and a note from a March 28, 2023
telephone visit concerning hypertension, in which NP Kaley reported that Plaintiff “sounds alert,
calm, coherent, and in no acute distress.” (PageID.72, 513, 528.) Earlier in his RFC discussion,
the ALJ noted that, during this appointment, Plaintiff reported that he had been “seizure-free since
starting [Keppra]” following the February 28, 2023 appointment. (PageID.70, 511.) As for
consistency, the ALJ cited emergency room records from June and September 2022 reflecting
treatment for a rash and left shoulder pain, during which Plaintiff did not mention seizures
(PageID.72, 441, 446); emergency room records concerning Plaintiff’s February 2023 seizure in
which Plaintiff reported that it had been a year since his last seizure, and he was not taking seizure
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medication (PageID.72, 455); emergency room records regarding Plaintiff’s July 2, 2023 seizure
in which he reported that he had not taken his medication that morning (PageID.72, 610, 617); and
Dr. Asbury’s August 22, 2023 treatment note stating that Plaintiff had experienced three recent
seizures for which he sought emergency care and had not taken his medication in at least one or
two of those incidents. (PageID.72, 582.) Finally, the ALJ found NP Kaley’s opinion inconsistent
with State agency medical consultants’ opinions. Therefore, the ALJ’s discussion satisfied the
regulation.
To the extent Plaintiff argues that “an ALJ must support giving greater weight to the to the
opinions of non-examining physicians with substantial evidence” (ECF No. 13 at PageID.644),
the argument lacks merit. First, under the current regulations, ALJs no longer weigh medical
opinions. Rather, as set forth above, ALJs now evaluate medical opinions for their persuasiveness.
The regulation provides that the ALJ “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight,
including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s).”
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a) and 416.920c(a). For this reason, Plaintiff’s citation of Miller v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 811 F.3d 825 (6th Cir. 2016), is misplaced because it was
decided under the prior regulations.2
In sum, the ALJ properly evaluated the medical opinions of Plaintiff’s medical providers
in accordance with the applicable regulation.
2 Plaintiff cites the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ferguson v. O’Malley, 95 F.4th 1194 (9th Cir. 2024),
for the proposition that an ALJ must provide “clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting the
claimant’s testimony about the severity of his impairments. (ECF No. 13 at PageID.644.)
Plaintiff’s argument is unconvincing because that is not the standard in the Sixth Circuit.
Moreover, it is immaterial as Plaintiff has not challenged the ALJ’s findings regarding his
subjective symptoms as an issue in his brief.
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II. 	Listing 11.02
Plaintiff next claims that the ALJ erred in finding that he did not meet Listing 11.02 for
epilepsy. At step three, the claimant bears the burden to establish that his impairments meet a listed
impairment. See Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 548 (6th Cir. 2004). The Listing of
Impairments, located at Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the regulations, describes impairments the
Social Security Administration considers to be “severe enough to prevent an individual from doing
any gainful activity, regardless of his or her age, education, or work experience.” 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1525(a), 416.925(a). “For a claimant to show that his impairment matches a listing, it must
meet all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria,
no matter how severely, does not qualify.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (emphasis
in original).
In his step three finding, the ALJ stated he considered Listing 11.02 but did not find that
Plaintiff’s symptoms met the requirements of the listing. The ALJ further noted that the medical
evidence demonstrated some noncompliance with prescribed epilepsy medication, specifically the
July 2, 2023 incident in which Plaintiff told the emergency department medical staff that he
skipped his Keppra in the morning. (ECF No. 68.)
To meet Listing 11.02, a claimant must show that his seizures are “documented by a
detailed description of a typical seizure and characterized by:”
A. Generalized tonic-clonic seizures, occurring at least once a month for at least 3
consecutive months despite adherence to prescribed treatment; or
B. Dyscognitive seizures, occurring at least once a week for at least 3 consecutive
months despite adherence to prescribed treatment; or
C. Generalized tonic-clonic seizures, occurring at least once every two months for
at least 4 consecutive months, despite adherence to prescribed treatment; and a
marked limitation in one of the following:
1. Physical functioning; or
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2. Understanding, remembering, or applying information; or
3. Interacting with others; or
4. Concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; or
5. Adapting or managing oneself; or
D. Dyscognitive seizures, occurring at least once every 2 weeks for at least 3
consecutive months despite adherence to prescribed treatment; and a marked
limitation in one of the following:
1. Physical functioning; or
2. Understanding, remembering, or applying information; or
3. Interacting with others; or
4. Concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; or
5. Adapting or managing oneself.
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 11.02.
Plaintiff fails to raise a “substantial question” as to whether he meets Listing 11.02 to
warrant remand. Smith-Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 579 F. App’x 426, 432 (6th Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to consider medical evidence, including the seizures reported
in Plaintiff’s seizure log as of June 1, 2022, in deciding whether the frequency requirement was
met. (ECF No. 13 at PageID.642.) Not so. The seizure log (PageID.416) lists seven seizure events,
three of which occurred before Plaintiff began taking Keppra following the February 24, 2023
seizure. The last seizure, which occurred on December 23, 2023, did not occur with any other
seizures. The only three seizures that could possibly satisfy the frequency requirement are the May
11, June 15, and July 2, 2023 seizures, but as the ALJ found, Plaintiff admitted that he had not
taken his seizure medicine the morning of July 2, so he was noncompliant. In fact, Plaintiff told
Dr. Asbury on August 22, 2023 that he had missed his medication for “[a]t least one or two” of
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the previous three seizure events, so it is entirely possible that Plaintiff missed his medication for
the May or June event as well.3 (PageID.582.)
In his reply, Plaintiff faults the ALJ for not inquiring at the hearing about the circumstances
of noncompliance to determine whether Plaintiff had “good reason” for failing to take his
medication. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpart P, App. 1 § 11.00H(4)(d). But Plaintiff cites no basis
in the medical record to establish good reason for noncompliance as it relates to the July 2, 2023
seizure. Furthermore, the agency states in the regulation that in determining “good reason,” it
follows guidelines such as those set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1530(c) and 416.930(c), but Plaintiff
cites no circumstance in the record comparable to the examples given in those regulations. Thus,
Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of establishing that he meets Listing 11.02. See Thacker v. Soc.
Sec. Admin., 93 F. App’x 725, 727–28 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Buress v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 835 F.2d 139, 140 (6th Cir. 1987)).
III. 	Hypothetical Questions to VE
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s hypothetical questions to the VE were deficient because
they failed to account for breakthrough seizures and side effects of sedation and dizziness. (ECF
No. 13 at PageID.645.) This argument lacks merit because it is well settled that a hypothetical
question to a VE need not include unsubstantiated complaints. See Casey v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1235 (6th Cir. 1993). Thus, “[a]n ALJ is only required to
incorporate into a hypothetical question those limitations he finds credible.” Lee v. Comm’r of Soc.
3 In his reply, Plaintiff points out that he suffered a seizure on July 18, 2024, and returned to the
emergency room on August 8, 2024, apparently because he could not afford his seizure medication.
(ECF. No. 19 at PageID.674.) But as the Appeals Council pointed out, the ALJ decided Plaintiff’s
case through March 18, 2024, and the evidence Plaintiff cites post-dates the ALJ’s decision. Thus,
it “does not relate to the period at issue” and “does not affect the decision about whether [Plaintiff]
w[as] disabled beginning on or before March 18, 2024.” (PageID.20.)
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Sec., 529 F. App’x 706, 715 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Carrelli v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 390 F. App’x
429, 438 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that “it is . . . ‘well established that an ALJ may pose hypothetical
questions to a vocational expert and is required to incorporate only those limitations accepted as
credible by the finder of fact’”) (quoting Casey, 987 F.2d at 1235). The hypothetical questions the
ALJ posed to the VE were accurate and were not required to include limitations he found
unsubstantiated. Moreover, the ALJ accounted for Plaintiff’s epilepsy by limiting him to no
commercial driving and exposure to unprotected heights. (PageID.71.) Accordingly, this claim of
error lacks merit.
In sum, the ALJ’s decision shows that he considered the record as a whole, made findings
supported by substantial evidence, and properly applied the applicable regulations. Thus, the
decision should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
Dated: February 26, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within that time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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