Wong v. Unifi Aviation, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CONNIE WONG,
Plaintiff,
CASE No. 1:25-CV-363
v.
HON. ROBERT J. JONKER
UNIFI AVIATION, LLC,
Defendant.
__________________________________/
ORDER APPROVING AND ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The Court has reviewed Magistrate Judge Vermaat’s Report and Recommendation in this
matter (ECF No. 19); Plaintiff’s Objection to the Report and Recommendation, as supplemented
(ECF Nos. 20, 21); and Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Objection (ECF No. 22). 	Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where, as here, a party has objected to portions of a Report and
Recommendation, “[t]he district judge . . . 	has a duty to reject the magistrate judge’s
recommendation unless, on de novo reconsideration, he or she finds it justified.” 	12 WRIGHT ,
M ILLER , & M ARCUS , F EDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE § 3070.2, at 381 (2d ed. 1997).
Specifically, the Rules provide that:
The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate
judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to. 	The district
judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition;
receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge
with instructions.
FED R. C IV. P. 72(b)(3). 	De novo review in such circumstances requires at least a review of the
evidence before the Magistrate Judge. 	Hill v. Duriron Co., 656 F.2d 1208, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981).
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The Court has reviewed de novo the claims and evidence presented to the Magistrate Judge; the
Report and Recommendation itself; and Plaintiff’s objections. 	After its review, the Court finds
the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation is factually sound and legally correct.
Plaintiff asserts a variety of employment discrimination claims against Defendant Unifi
Aviation, LLC. 	As set out in Complaint and materials submitted in response to the defense
motion, Plaintiff applied for the position of passenger services agent with Defendant in August
2022. 	When Plaintiff applied, she received assurances regarding job flexibility and travel
benefits. 	Plaintiff specifically claims she was told her job hours would be flexible because other
employees would want to trade and pick up shifts. 	Plaintiff was hired on the spot and completed
the onboarding process via an online vendor. 	As part of this process, the defense says, Plaintiff
electronically signed the arbitration agreement that is the subject of the defense motion. In a
declaration, Plaintiff says that she was urged to hurry and “click through” the onboarding materials
by her employer. 	Accordingly, she says, “I do not recall signing any arbitration agreement.
Any such document would have been buried among numerous onboarding forms with no
meaningful opportunity to review or negotiate its terms.” 	(Decl. ¶ 19, ECF No. 14, PageID.113).
And in an exhibit attached to the declaration, there is a handwritten note, presumably authored by
Plaintiff, that the arbitration agreement was “buried within 10 documents training plus.” 	(ECF.
No. 14-2, PageID.132).
After starting her employment, Plaintiff says she was assigned early shifts that disrupted
her sleep schedule and led to migraines. 	Plaintiff sought to avail herself of the promised
flexibility by posting her shifts for trade. 	But no one responded. 	Plaintiff then attempted to
improve her chances by putting all of her scheduled shifts up for trade, intending to continue to
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work by picking up other employees’ shifts. 	But she says that her employer blocked these efforts
by imposing a 90-day waiting period before Plaintiff would be eligible to trade shifts and then
refused her requests for accommodation. 	Indeed, she says, her employer only doubled down on
scheduling Plaintiff for early shifts. 	Plaintiff says she was unable to work for four consecutive
days due to migraines and was ultimately constructively discharged by her employer.1 	Plaintiff
later reapplied for her former position when the station manager who Plaintiff says was primarily
responsible for the complained of events retired, but she discovered that the defendant had flagged
her as ineligible for rehiring and a promised follow-up went unanswered. 	This lawsuit followed.
On July 16, 2025, the defense moved to enforce the arbitration agreement that it says Plaintiff
signed during the onboarding process. (ECF No. 7). 	Following briefing, the Magistrate Judge
issued a Report and Recommendation that that concludes the defense motion should be granted.
Plaintiff now objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.
Plaintiff’s objections fall into two general buckets. 	In the first bucket, Plaintiff contests
the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that there was a valid agreement to arbitrate formed between
the parties, and she further argues there is at least a genuine issue of material fact on the point that
should have resulted in an evidentiary hearing. 	In the second bucket, for various reasons,
Plaintiff says that even if there is a valid agreement to arbitrate, the Court should find it is
unenforceable in this case. 	For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes Plaintiffs objections
lack merit.
1 Plaintiff alleges the Magistrate Judge misstated the record when he described Plaintiff as missing
work rather than being unable to work. 	Plaintiff says she performed her scheduled shifts and that
this work led to a migraine spanning four days. 	During this time, she says she was unable to work
but did not actually miss any work because of her work schedule. 	(ECF No. 20, PageID.185).
To the extent there was any factual misstatement here, it is not material to the issues for decision
in the motion to compel.
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The Magistrate Judge correctly held that the Federal Arbitration Agreement (FAA) applies
to this case, and that courts generally recognize a strong presumption in favor of arbitration.
Notwithstanding this general principle, Plaintiff says the motion to compel arbitration must be
denied because there was no agreement to arbitrate. 	“Although the Federal Arbitration Act
requires a court to summarily compel arbitration upon a party’s request, the court may do so only
if the opposing side has not put the making of the arbitration contract ‘in issue.”’ 	Boykin v. Fam.
Dollar Stores of Michigan, LLC, 3 F.4th 832, 835 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4). 	Courts
apply Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether contract formation
has been placed “in issue.” 	Id. at 838-39. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff must show a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to contract formation. 	The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that
Plaintiff has failed to do so here, and that no evidentiary hearing is needed.
Defendant argues, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that Michigan law applies to this action
and that Michigan law permits electronic signatures on employment agreements. 	See Boykin, 3
F.4th at 839 (citing Hall v. Pac. Sunwear Stores Corp., 2016 WL 1366413, at *5-*6 (E.D. Mich.
Apr. 6, 2016)); see also Martyn v. J.W. Korth & Co., No. 1:11-CV-407, 2011 WL 2144618, at *2
(W.D. Mich. June 1, 2011) (Bell, J.). 	In this case, Defendant has “the initial duty to present
evidence that would allow a trier of fact to find all required elements of a contract” including
Plaintiff’s acceptance. 	Boykin, 3 F.4th at 839. 	Defendant did so here by producing the
declaration of Gregory O’Donoghue, Defendant’s human resources manager, who states that
Defendant required all newly hired employees—including Plaintiff—to complete an on-boarding
process through a third-party digital portal, and that as part of that process, Plaintiff was required
to review and assent to various policies, and accept the Mutual Arbitration Agreement at issue in
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this case. 	Mr. O’Donoghue further states that on August 15, 2022, Plaintiff reviewed and signed
the arbitration agreement. 	(ECF No. 7-2, PageID.70). 	Accordingly, the burden shifted to
Plaintiff to present “’specific facts, as opposed to general allegations,’ that would allow a rational
trier of fact to find that [s]he did not acknowledge the agreement or learn about the arbitration
condition of employment in other ways.” 	See Boykin, 3 F.4th at 839 (citing Viet v. Le, 951 F.3d
818, 823 (6th Cir. 2020)).
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff has not met her burden.
Plaintiff’s objections are unpersuasive because Plaintiff’s sworn statement that she does not recall
signing the arbitration agreement is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to contract formation. 	Id. (“[a] party thus cannot expect to obtain a trial . . . simply by
testifying that the party does not ‘remember’ signing an arbitration contract or receiving
information about arbitration.”); see also Hammond v. Floor and Decor Outlets of America, No.
3:19-cv-1099, 2020 WL 6459642, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 3, 2020) (collecting cases and
concluding employee’s statement that he “do[e]s not believe” and “do[es] not recall” entering and
reviewing arbitration agreement were insufficient to create issue of fact on contract formation).
In her objections, Plaintiff states for the first time not only that she did not recall signing
the agreement, but also that she did not see the arbitration agreement. (ECF No. 20, PageID.186).
On this record, this is not enough to create an issue of fact for trial either. 	For one thing,
arguments raised for the first time in objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation
are generally considered to be forfeited. Odell v. Kalitta Air, LLC, 107 F.4th 523, 533 (6th Cir.
2024). 	Moreover, unlike the earlier declaration, the statement in Plaintiff’s objections is not
sworn. 	Furthermore, read in context, it appears Plaintiff is simply referencing her contention of
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a “clickthrough” culture and the statements her employer made to hurry through the onboarding
and not claiming that she was not presented with the arbitration agreement at all. 	Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s objections are without merit.
Plaintiff also contests contract formation based on her statements about being rushed
through the onboarding process. 	See Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370,
381 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that in evaluating whether a plaintiff has knowingly and voluntarily
waived right to pursue employment in federal court, courts will consider the amount of time the
plaintiff had to consider the agreement and opportunity to consent with a lawyer). These
contentions also do not create an issue of fact as to contractual formation. Just above Plaintiff’s
electronic signature, the arbitration agreement specified:
I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I (1) HAVE CAREFULLY READ
THIS AGREEMENT, (2) HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY
TO CONSULT WITH LEGAL COUNSEL AND HAVE DONE
SO TO THE FULL EXTENT THAT I DESIRE, (3) HAVE
HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO AND HAVE NEGOTIATED
THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT,
AND (4) UNDERSTAND THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS
OF THIS AGREEMENT.
(ECF No. 7-2, PageID.70).
Nevertheless, Plaintiff says that after being hired, she was “immediately instructed to
complete onboarding and computer-base training before starting work on the floor.” 	(Decl. ¶ 10,
ECF No. 14, PageID.112). 	She “was required to sign numerous Human Resources (“HR”)
documents quickly and complete multiple training modules under strict time deadlines.” 	(Id. at
¶ 11). 	Furthermore, “[e]mployees were repeatedly told to ‘click through’ training materials
rapidly because it was impossible to finish on time if we had read everything on the screen” and
“[i]f we did not finish on time, our station, as a whole, would receive bad marks or would be
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penalized from headquarters.” 	(Id. at ¶¶ 12-13). 	Plaintiff also claims that “[i]ndividual
employees were also threatened with write-ups or termination if they did not finish all their
computer training on time.” (Id. at ¶ 14). 	But Plaintiff does not say that she personally was
threatened, nor that any threat related to the onboarding process specifically. 	Nor does Plaintiff
contend she sought and was denied additional time to review the materials. 	On this record, this
is not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact as to contract formation. 	See Hammond,
2020 WL 6459642, at *9 (collecting cases and concluding contention that employee was rushed
through onboarding failed create issue for hearing); Schnaudt v. Johncol, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-2619,
2016 WL 5394195, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2016) (concluding that being rushed into a signing
does not invalidate contract); Bryant v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., No. 5:02-cv-51, ECF No. 49
(W.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2003) (Enslen, J.) (citing Dombrowski v. City of Omer, 502 N.W.2d 707, 710
(Mich. Ct. App. 1993) for the proposition that “[a]s long as Defendant did not prevent Plaintiffs
from reading the Note or any other document by some stratagem, trick, or artifice, Plaintiffs bear
the full consequences of their failure to read the document.”)
But even if there was an agreement to arbitrate, Plaintiff says the Court should conclude
that it is not enforceable. 	Plaintiff’s objections make myriad arguments that largely rehash those
already considered, and rejected, by Magistrate Judge. 	The Magistrate Judge properly analyzed
Plaintiffs’ claims here, and nothing in Plaintiffs’ objections changes the fundamental analysis.
Plaintiff largely objects to the take-it-or-leave it nature of the agreement and the various terms she
assented to by signing it. 	None of Plaintiff’s arguments are persuasive. 	They do not demonstrate
the agreement is unconscionable.
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ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 19) is APPROVED AND ADOPTED as the opinion of the Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration (ECF No.
7) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED under 9 U.S.C. § 4 that plaintiff proceed with her claims
as provided in the arbitration agreement, and under 9 U.S.C. § 3 that this matter is STAYED
pending completion of the arbitration. The parties shall file a status report with the Court every 90
days, and upon completion of the arbitration process.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 	January 13, 2026 	/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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