Heard #252329 v. Stephens

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LAMONT HEARD #252329,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Jane M. Beckering
v. 	Case No. 1:24-cv-1041
MICHELLE STEPHENS,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Lamont Heard, a prisoner currently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at Lakeland Correctional Facility (LCF), has sued Defendant Michelle
Stephens, an MDOC employee who works in the LCF mail room, for violating his First
Amendment rights by rejecting computer coding/programming books sent to Heard at LCF.
Presently before me are Heard’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 32) and Stephens’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 42.) For the following reasons, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B), I recommend that the Court GRANT Stephens’s Motion, DENY Heard’s Motion,
and dismiss this action with prejudice.
I. 	Background
Heard has been incarcerated with the MDOC since 1996. He wishes to pursue a career in
computer programming following his release from MDOC custody. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.2.) To
assist Heard in achieving this ambition, a friend purchased several computer programming books
from Amazon.com and had them sent to Heard at LCF. (ECF No. 43-7 at PageID.284.) While the
favor seemed harmless, the MDOC’s policy on use of computer equipment, software, and services
provides that “[i]n a correctional facility, offenders shall not use or personally possess computer
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manuals, magazines or other publications that pose a threat to the security, good order or discipline
of the facility.” Mich. Dep’t of Corrs. Policy Directive 01.04.105 ¶ CC (effective 10/02/2023). The
policy further provides that such materials mailed to a prisoner must be rejected in accordance
with the “Prisoner Mail” policy, Policy Directive 05.03.118. Id.
The MDOC has a legitimate concern when it comes to prisoner access of computer-related
information, as the MDOC uses computers and network technology throughout its facilities to
support their day-to-day functioning. (ECF No. 42-8 at PageID.290.) Prisoners possessing
extensive knowledge of computer coding could pose a safety and security risk at both the facility
and MDOC-wide levels. The potential for misuse is real because prisoners currently have regulated
access to network-connected technology through devices located in the law library and provided
through educational programs. (Id.) In addition, prisoners may purchase JP6 tablet computers and
other electronic devices. A JP6 tablet allows a prisoner to communicate electronically with
individuals outside of the facility by plugging the tablet into a kiosk within the housing unit to
upload and download messages. Under normal circumstances, JP6 tablets are not connected to
MDOC networks outside of the connections to the kiosks in housing units. However, prisoners
could use extensive knowledge of computer coding to circumvent controlled access while their
tablets are connected to the kiosk. (Id. at PageID.290–91.) Coding knowledge may also enable
prisoner to “jail break” or compromise the tablets to function in non-approved ways. For example,
although in normal use the tablets do not communicate over wireless networks, they contain the
hardware to communicate with Bluetooth signals and Wi-Fi. In fact, prisoners have used coding
knowledge to enable JP6 tablets to plan criminal activity, communicate with suspected gang
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members, and access pornography and other prohibited materials.1 (Id. at PageID.291.) Prisoners
have also used external devices to enable their tablets to connect to the network, which permits
unmonitored communications over wireless networks. (Id.) In addition to the approved tablets,
prisoners 	are 	frequently 	found 	in 	possession 	of 	illicitly-obtained 	cellphones 	and 	other
technological devices. (Id.) With unauthorized connections, prisoners could use programming
language to communicate with each other or individuals outside the MDOC to potentially plan
riots, smuggling operations, other unlawful activities. (Id. at PageID.292.) For these reasons, the
MDOC considers computer coding materials to pose a risk to the safety and security of MDOC
facilities. (Id.)
On April 18, 2024, the LCF mailroom received a package for Heard containing a book
titled “The Complete Middle School Study Guide: Everything You Need to Ace Computer Science
and Coding in One Big Fat Notebook.” (ECF No. 43-2 at PageID.222.) After examining the book,
Stephens believed that it violated policy because it was a computer manual prohibited by Policy
Directive 01.04.104 ¶ CC, which would also be prohibited under the prisoner mail policy, Policy
Directive 05.03.118 ¶ PP, as a threat to the security, good order, or discipline of the facility. (ECF
No. 43-6 at PageID.274–75.) Therefore, Stephens issued a Notice of Package/Mail Rejection to
Heard in accordance with Policy Directive 05.03.118 ¶ ZZ (effective 11/06/2023). (ECF No. 43-
2; ECF No. 43-6 at PageID.275.) The following day, the mailroom received a package for Heard
containing two additional books, “Introduction to Computer Science for Beginners” and “A
Programmer’s Guide to Computer Science.” Stephens also believed that these books violated
MDOC policy and issued Heard a Notice of Package/Mail Rejection on April 19, 2024. (ECF No.
1 See 	https://www.deadlinedetroit.com/articles/33267/detroit_news_michigan_inmates_figured
_out _how_to_use_prison_tablet_computers_for_crimes_and_porn.
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43-3 at PageID.237; ECF No. 43-6 at PageID.276.) While Heard was involved in an MDOC-
authorized business college program at the time, the books his friend ordered for him were not part
of his course curriculum for that program or for any other MDOC-sponsored program in which he
was enrolled. (ECF No. 43-7 at PageID.284–85.)
Under the mail policy, a “prisoner is entitled to a fact-finding hearing conducted pursuant
to Administrative Rule 791.3310” prior to the item being rejected for violation of the policy. Id. ¶
E. Pursuant to this provision, Heard requested a hearing for both rejections, which N. Ader
conducted on May 7, 2024. (ECF No. 43-2 at PageID.223; ECF No. 43-3 at PageID.238.) At the
hearing, Heard was permitted to present his argument that he sought the books for studying and
information purposes, and was subsequently permitted to submit case law in support of his
contention that the books could not be rejected. (ECF No. 43-2 at PageID.223; ECF No. 43-3 at
PageID.238.) Ader found that all three books violated MDOC policy for the following reasons:
PD 01.04.105 CC states In a correctional facility, offenders shall not use or
personally possess computer manuals, magazines or other publications that pose a
threat to the security, good order or discipline of the facility. If received in the mail
for a prisoner such publiscations (sic) shall be rejected in accordance (sic) with PD
05.03.118. After review of this book it is determined that this book includes detailed
information on computer codes and web languages making it a threat to the security
and safety of the facility. Hearing delayed for outside review of contents of book to
make determination on content.
(Id.; see also ECF No. 43-2 at PageID.223.)
The MDOC offers a computer coding course through its Vocational Village program.
Mich. Dep’t of Corrs. Policy Directive 03.02.140 (effective 12/06/2021). The course is offered at
a single MDOC facility, and participants are subjected to various screening requirements. Id. ¶ B,
attach. A. Heard is not currently eligible for this program as he is not within 24 months of his
parole board jurisdiction date. Id. ¶ B.5. Even if an applicant meets the qualifications for the
program, approval is not guaranteed. Id. ¶ C.
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II. 	Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts
are facts that are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return
judgment for the non-moving party. Id.
The court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party but
may grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party.” Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th
Cir. 1992) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
While a moving party without the burden of proof need only show that the opponent cannot
sustain his burden at trial, a moving party with the burden of proof faces a “substantially higher
hurdle.” Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002). Where the moving party has the
burden, “his showing must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could
find other than for the moving party.” Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir.
1986). The Sixth Circuit has emphasized that the party with the burden of proof “must show that
the record contains evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that the evidence is so
powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.” Arnett, 281 F.3d at 561.
Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion “is
inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the trier
of fact.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999).
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III. 	Discussion
Stephens contends that she is entitled to summary judgment on several grounds. First, she
argues that she lacked the necessary personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation
to impose liability against her. Second, she contends that Heard cannot establish that she violated
his First Amendment rights because the computer programming books violated MDOC policy that
furthers a legitimate penological interest. Finally, Stephens contends that she is entitled to qualified
immunity.
Personal Involvement
“Personal involvement is necessary to establish section 1983 liability.” Murphy v. Grenier,
406 F. App’x 972, 974 (6th Cir. 2011). “It is axiomatic that the liability of persons sued in their
individual capacities under section 1983 must be gauged in terms of their own actions.” Rogan v.
Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1999). A defendant cannot be held liable under section 1983
absent a showing that they personally participated in, or otherwise authorized, approved, or
knowingly acquiesced in, the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff,
891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989); Hays v. Jefferson, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982).
Stephens contends that she was not personally involved the alleged constitutional violation
because she merely issued Notices of Mail/Package Rejection to Heard pursuant to Policy
Directive 05.03.118 ¶ ZZ based on her belief that the books violated policy. Stephens notes that a
notice of rejection does not equate to a determination that a book or other material violates policy
and will be rejected because the policy grants a prisoner the right to an administrative hearing at
which the hearing officer makes the final determination. (ECF No. 43 at PageID.202.) Stephens
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points out that she did not conduct, participate in, or attend the hearing and that hearing officer
Ader made the final decision about whether the subject books violated policy.2
Stephens cites Williams v. Warden, Chillicothe Correctional Institution, No. 2:23-cv-1042,
2024 WL 406446, 2024 WL 406446 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 2, 2024), adopted by 2024 WL 1045165
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 11, 2024), for the proposition that her issuance of the notices was only a non-
binding recommendation that cannot support personal involvement for a Section 1983 claim. In
Williams, the court held that the defendant lacked sufficient involvement in the denial of the
plaintiff’s religious meal accommodation request because the defendant’s only involvement was
signing off on a form recommending that the plaintiff’s request be forwarded to the religious
services administrator for a final decision. Id. at *6. In contrast, in Martin v. Hill, No. 2:23-cv-184,
2026 WL 380604 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 11, 2026), the plaintiff sued a mailroom officer alleging
interference with his mail in violation of the First Amendment. The mailroom officer argued that
she lacked personal involvement in the interference because she was only one of several staff
members who reviewed and processed mail and JPay messages during the time at issue, never had
any direct interaction with the plaintiff, and did not interfere with his ability to send or receive
mail. Id. at *3–4. The court found that an issue of fact remained because the defendant’s own
affidavit indicated that she had some level of involvement in “filtering through” the plaintiff’s mail
and JPay messages at the time of the plaintiff’s allegations.
2 Stephens also contends that she lacks the requisite personal involvement to the extent Heard’s
First Amendment claim is predicated on the validity of Policy Directive 01.04.105 itself because
she is not involved in crafting or adopting any MDOC policy directive, has no authority to change
policy, and is not even involved in the promulgation of operating procedures at the facility. (ECF
No. 43 at PageID.203; ECF No. 43-6 at PageID.276.) Because Heard claims that he is asserting an
as applied challenge to the policy and, therefore, does not challenge the policy itself, I find no need
to address this particular argument.
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Although the defendant in Hill did not raise the non-binding recommendation argument
that Stephens raises here, the situation here is still closer to Hill than Williams. Stephens did more
than just sign a form. Rather, she reviewed the books at issue and determined that they violated
policy, even though her determination was subject to additional review. Moreover, had Heard
waived his right to a hearing and agreed to an appropriate disposition of the books, Stephens’s
decision would have been final. Mich. Dep’t of Corrs. Policy Directive 05.03.118 ¶ AAA. In other
words, her actions triggered the alleged violation. Finally, Stephens fails to cite any case finding
that a mailroom employee who issued a rejection notice under the MDOC’s mail policy lacked
personal involvement for a Section 1983 claim. See Spencer v. Simpson, No. 1:18-cv-643, 2020
WL 6597285, at *8 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 17, 2020), adopted by 2020 WL 5757382 (Sept. 28, 2020)
(“Defendants cite no authority to suggest that a prison official who initiates an allegedly
unconstitutional action may not be held liable, even if the official is not the final decisionmaker.”
(citing Murphy v. Karber, No. 1:14-cv-269, 2017 WL 4160949, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 2017)
(addressing merits of First Amendment claim against mailroom clerks for issuance of rejection
notices))). Accordingly, I conclude that Stephens was sufficiently connected to the alleged
violation to satisfy the personal involvement requirement.
First Amendment Claim
It is well established that a prisoner does not forfeit all of his constitutional rights. Cruz v.
Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972). “The First Amendment protects ‘the right to receive
information and ideas,’ which, as applicable in the prison context, extends to the right to receive
mail and to access reading material.” Bethel v. Jenkins, 988 F.3d 931, 938 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)) But it is also well established that incarceration
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legitimately requires restrictions on many rights and privileges that prisoners retain. O’Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).
[S]uch a standard is necessary “if prison administrators . . . , and not the courts,
[are] to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.” Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners’ Union, 433 U.S. [119,] 128, 97 S. Ct. [2532, 2539
(1977)]. Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible
strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security
problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison
administration. The rule would also distort the decisionmaking process, for every
administrative judgment would be subject to the possibility that some court
somewhere would conclude that it had a less restrictive way of solving the problem
at hand. Courts inevitably would become the primary arbiters of what constitutes
the 	best 	solution 	to 	every 	administrative 	problem, 	thereby 	“unnecessarily
perpetuat[ing] 	the 	involvement 	of 	the 	federal 	courts 	in 	affairs 	of 	prison
administration.” Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. [396], 407, 94 S. Ct. [1800, 1808
(1974)].
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). In other words, “simply because prison inmates retain
certain constitutional rights does not mean that these rights are not subject to restrictions and
limitations,” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979), as operating a prison is a difficult task
requiring “expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within
the province of the legislative and executive branches of government.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 85.
In Turner, the Supreme Court articulated four factors to assess the reasonableness of a
prison regulation: (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation
and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether there are alternative
means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates; (3) what impact accommodation
of the asserted constitutional right will have on prison staff and inmates; and (4) whether there are
other readily available alternatives at a de minimis cost to valid penological interests. Id. at 89–91.
This standard is not a “least restrictive alternative” test requiring prison officials “to set up and
then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s
constitutional complaint.” Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 484 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting
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Turner). Instead, the issue is simply whether the policy at issue is reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest. Id. “The burden . . . is not on the State to prove the validity of prison
regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it.” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003).
Regarding the first Turner factor, Heard concedes that the MDOC has a legitimate interest
in protecting its computer networks. (ECF No. 33 at PageID.132.) In fact, the MDOC has an
interest not simply in protecting its computer networks, but in ensuring the safety and security of
its facilities, including prisoners and staff, that might be compromised due to prisoners’ illicit use
of computer devices, whether or not connected to its network. The regulation itself, which
precludes prisoners from possessing computer manuals and materials, is rationally related to the
MDOC’s legitimate interest in guarding against computer misuse by prisoners. Moreover,
Stephens provides support for this interest and the MDOC’s response to these concerns through
the Ohrman Declaration. (ECF No. 48-8.) As Ohrman explains, prisoners do have limited access
to network-connected technology and have already modified tablets to skirt MDOC controls.
Given these circumstances, a ban on prisoner possession of computer coding information is
rationally related to furthering the foregoing interests. (Id. at PageID.291–92.)
Heard argues that because he raises an as-applied challenge, the Court must examine the
material that Stephens found objectionable to determine whether the rejection was an exaggerated
response to the concern. (ECF No. 56 at PageID.352–53.) Stephens responds that this argument
lacks merit because requiring the Court to review the books in question is contrary to the discretion
courts must afford prison officials. (ECF No. 58 at PageID.379.) It is debatable whether Heard
raised an as-applied challenge in his complaint, as he alleged that the MDOC’s “blanket ban on
him receiving computer books[] violates the constitution.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID.4.) Regardless,
assuming that Heard asserts an as-applied challenge, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that “under
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Turner, plaintiffs may pursue as-applied challenges to facially valid prison regulations.” Flagner,
241 F.3d at 483 n.5; see also Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 419 (1989) (“remand[ing] for
an examination of the validity of the regulations as applied to any of the 46 publications introduced
at trial”).
Having reviewed the books Heard sought to possess (which Stephens has submitted),
including but not limited to the portions Stephens cited in her interrogatory responses, I find that
the books contain the type of information the regulation seeks to prevent prisoners from accessing
and that Stephens’s rejections were reasonable applications of the policy. The issue, as noted in
Thompson v. Campbell, 81 F. App’x 563, 567 (6th Cir. 2003), “is not whether the prohibited
materials have in fact caused problems or are even ‘likely’ to cause problems, but whether a
reasonable official might think that the policy advances these interests.” Id. at 567 (quoting Turner,
482 	U.S. 	at 	89–90). 	Here, 	Stephens 	could 	have 	reasonably 	believed 	that 	the 	computer
programming material in the books Heard sought to possess could pose the type of problems the
policy aims to prevent.
Heard contends that Stephens’s rejections were irrational for two reasons. First, citing King
v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2005), in which the Seventh Circuit reversed
the district court’s dismissal on initial screening of a prisoner’s First Amendment claim arising out
of the prison’s refusal to allow him to obtain a book on computer programming, Heard contends
that he has no access to the MDOC’s networks. (ECF No. 43 at PageID.208.) In King, the court
found the prison’s concern that the plaintiff might write a program that contained a virus and use
it to infect the prison’s network “far-fetched” because the computers that prisoner were allowed to
use were not connected to the prison network, or any other network. Id. at 638–39. But King fails
to support Heard’s claim for two reasons. First, King was decided at the motion to dismiss stage,
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so it is inapplicable here. Second, in contrast to King, Stephens has presented evidence showing
that prisoners in MDOC facilities have access to computers that are connected to the MDOC
network and that prisoners possess JP6 tablets that prisoners can enable to connect to MDOC
networks for improper purposes. In fact, as mentioned above, this has already occurred within the
MDOC. Moreover, Heard fails to present any evidence, including an affidavit or declaration,
supporting his claim that he has no access to internet connected devices or a JP6 tablet.
Heard also argues that Stephens’s rejection was irrational because the MDOC offers a
computer coding program that “teach[es] the exact same material to hundreds of other prisoners
that have access to the same security networks Heard has[.]” (ECF No. 56 at PageID.356 n.3.)
Heard provides no proof for this assertion, but it lacks merit in any event. As explained above, the
MDOC’s computer programming course is offered in a controlled setting at a single facility to
prisoners who have met the security requirements. In other words, computer programming books
and training are not available to the MDOC prison population at large.3
The situation here is analogous to Peters v. Simpson, 1:15-cv-751, 2015 WL 5608237
(W.D. Mich. Sept. 23, 2015), in which prison officials denied the plaintiff access to books on
electrical wiring even though plaintiff had a security classification that allowed him to learn some
aspects of wiring in his prison job. The court found that the prohibition on such books was
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, even though the plaintiff could learn some
of this information through his job. Id. at *11–12. The court observed, “the risk is not limited to
Petitioner’s own exposure to information about electrical wiring, some of which he alleges he
3 For this reason, Heard’s reliance on the Alaska Supreme Court’s statement in Antenor v.
Department of Corrections, 462 P.3d 1, 17 n. 110 (Alaska 2020), that “if DOC does in fact allow
inmates access to similar programming books [in the institution library], this would tend to show
that a policy prohibiting inmates from ordering such books bears no rational relation to any security
interest[,]” is misplaced.
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already learned from his prison job, but also includes the risk of having the book in the general
population, where other prisoners who have not passed security screenings may access the
information.” Id. at *11. As in Peters, the fact that the MDOC allows some prisoners to participate
in a computer programming course in a controlled setting does not undermine its legitimate
penological interest in keeping such information from the larger MDOC prisoner population that
does not participate in the program.
As for the remaining Turner factors, Heard has the right to receive other publications that
are not restricted by the MDOC. Heard provides no evidence that he is unable to receive other
books or materials that are not against policy. Moreover, the existence of an MDOC coding
program is proof that Heard has another avenue to learn computer coding if he is admitted into the
program. In addition, allowing prisoners to possess books and other materials could lead to
prohibited conduct or activity threatening the safety or security of prison facilities. Finally, there
exists no reasonable alternative that could accommodate Heard’s desire to possess the computer
coding books at issue.
Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity provides that government officials performing
discretionary functions are generally shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Dietrich v. Burrows,
167 F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir. 1999). An “objective legal reasonableness” test is used to determine
whether the official could reasonably have believed his conduct was lawful. Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). The qualified immunity inquiry requires a court to decide
whether the facts as alleged or shown make out a constitutional violation and whether the right
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that was allegedly violated was a clearly established right at the time of the alleged misconduct.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). If the court can conclude either that no
constitutional violation occurred or that the right was not clearly established, qualified immunity
is warranted. The court may consider either prong of the inquiry without regard to sequence. Id. at
236.
The second prong of the qualified immunity analysis focuses on the state of the law at the
time the alleged violation occurred. As the Supreme Court has observed, “this Court’s case law
does not require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established, [but] existing
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” White v.
Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (internal quotation marks and original brackets omitted) (quoting
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)). It is not enough to show that the right is established at
“‘a high level of generality.’” Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford Heights, 858 F.3d 988, 992 (6th
Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)). “[A] plaintiff must identify a
case with a similar fact pattern that would have given ‘fair and clear warning to officers’ about
what the law requires.” Id. at 993 (quoting White, 580 U.S. at 79). Stated differently, “[o]n both
the facts and the law, specificity is [a court's] guiding light.” Novak v. City of Parma, 932 F.3d
421, 426 (6th Cir. 2019). “An official's conduct flunks this ‘clearly established’ test only if the
conduct's unconstitutionality was ‘beyond debate’ when the official acted, such that any reasonable
person would have known that it exceeded constitutional bounds.” DeCrane v. Eckart, 12 F.4th
586, 599 (6th Cir. 2021). To determine whether a right is clearly established, a district court within
the Sixth Circuit may consider binding precedent from the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit, the
district court itself, or other circuits that is directly on point. Holzemer v. City of Memphis, 621
F.3d 512, 527 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Risbridger v. Connelly, 275 F.3 565, 569 (6th Cir. 2002)).
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Stephens is entitled to qualified immunity on both prongs of the analysis. For the reasons
set forth above, Heard fails to establish that Stephens violated his First Amendment rights. As to
the second prong, Heard fails to show that he had a clearly established First Amendment right to
computer coding books. Contrary to Heard’s argument, neither Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S.
401 (1989), nor King v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2005), would serve to
place the constitutional issue beyond debate and provide fair notice to Stephens that issuing notices
of rejection to Heard violated his clearly established rights based on the particular facts of this
case. Thornburgh simply provides guidance at a high level of generality for incoming prison mail,
while King was decided at a different stage of litigation and under a different set of facts.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Court grant Stephens’s motion for
summary judgment, deny Heard’s motion for summary judgment, and dismiss this action with
prejudice.
Dated: April 27, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO PARTIES
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Case 1:24-cv-01041-JMB-SJB ECF No. 59, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/27/26 Page
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