Shepard v. Homesite Group Incorporated

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LISA SHEPARD,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Sally J. Berens
v. 	Case No. 1:24-cv-804
HOMESITE GROUP
INCORPORATED,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
OPINION
Plaintiff Lisa Shepard has sued her former employer, Homesite Group Incorporated,
alleging that it violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.,
and 	its 	Michigan 	counterpart, 	the 	Michigan 	Persons 	with 	Disabilities 	Civil 	Rights 	Act
(PWDCRA), M.C.L.A. § 37.1101 et seq. (Counts I and II), by discriminating against her and
failing to provide a reasonable accommodation. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.6–7.) Shepherd further
alleges that Homesite violated the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.,
by interfering with her exercise of her FMLA rights and by retaliating against her for exercising
those rights (Count III). (Id. at PageID.7–8.)
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Presently before the Court is Homesite’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 52),
which is fully briefed and ready for decision.1 For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT
Homesite’s motion for summary judgment.2
I. 	Background
A. 	Shepard’s Employment with Homesite
Homesite is a property and casualty insurance company that markets policies directly to
individuals. Because internet and phone are Homesite’s predominant form of contact with
consumers, many of its agents and other employees work remotely. (ECF No. 52-5 at PageID.291.)
Shepard began her employment with Homesite in April 2022, when it hired her to work
remotely as a Coaching Supervisor. (ECF No. 52-2 at PageID.209, 224, 226.) In that position,
Shepard supervised a team of 15 to 20 customer service agents who worked remotely taking
inbound calls from policyholders. (Id. at PageID.209.) She was responsible for ensuring that her
team met performance metrics and complied with internal policies and for boosting the team’s
morale and productivity. (Id.; ECF No. 52-7 at PageID.367.) Shepard’s normal activities included
conducting one-on-one coaching sessions with her team members, providing quality feedback and
de-escalation techniques, conducting monthly and bi-annual performance reviews and taking
corrective action as needed, collaborating with human resources or employee relations to address
policy violations, attending weekly and monthly meetings, and handling policyholder calls on
occasion. (Id. at PageID.211, 212–13, 215–16, 220–23; ECF No. 53-1 at PageID.621.)
1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to have the undersigned conduct all
further proceedings, including entry of judgment, in this case. (ECF No. 47.)
2 Although both parties have requested oral argument, the Court finds it unnecessary as their briefs
adequately develop the issues.
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Senior Manager Jessica Sadeghi-Guran supervised Shepard from the time of her hire until
June 2023, when Operations Manager Amanda Meulemans became Shepard’s supervisor. (ECF
No. 52-7 at PageID.368–69; ECF No. 52-8 at PageID.411; ECF No. 53-1 at PageID.625.)
However, Sadeghi-Guran remained Shepard’s assigned supervisor in Homesite’s human resources
information system and provided support to Meulemans during the supervisor transition. (ECF No.
52-7 at PageID.369; 52-8 at PageID.414.)
B. 	Shepard Requests FMLA Leave
Prior to joining Homesite, Shepard was diagnosed with degenerative disc disease.
Although the condition does not produce constant symptoms, when she has a flareup it causes
debilitating muscle spasms that make it difficult for her sit up or move easily. (ECF No. 52-4 at
PageID.280.) In May 2023, Shepard re-injured her lower back and applied for FMLA leave
through Sedgwick, Homesite’s third-party administrator for its FMLA leave program, short- and
long-term 	disability 	benefits, 	and 	disability 	accommodation 	requests. 	(ECF 	No. 	52-3 	at
PageID.161–63; ECF No. 52-5 at PageID.291.) Sedgewick granted Shepard a continuous period
of FMLA leave and short-term disability (STD) from May 17 through June 4, 2023. (ECF No. 52-
3 at PageID.249–50; ECF No. 53-1 at PageID.621–22.) Later that summer, Shepard experienced
another flareup and Sedgewick granted her request for intermittent FMLA leave. (ECF No. 52-3
at PageID.250.)
In August 2023, Shepard experienced more back pain and applied for another period of
FMLA leave and STD. Sedgewick granted this request for a period beginning on August 18, 2023,
with an expected return to work (RTW) date of September 18, 2023. (Id. at PageID.121, 164; ECF
No. 52-10 at PageID.451; ECF No. 53-1 at PageID.622.) On September 22, 2023, Shepard
requested an extension of her medical leave, which Sedgwick granted with a revised RTW date of
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October 17, 2023. (ECF No. 52-10 at PageID.455, 457; ECF No. 53-1 at PageID.622.) During
Shepard’s leave, Sedgewick sent updates about Shepard’s status to Sadeghi-Guran, who forwarded
them to Meulemans or to the internal employee relations department as necessary. (ECF No. 52-7
at PageID.373–74; ECF No. 52-8 at PageID.413–14.) In other words, Sadeghi-Guran and
Meulemans relied solely on information that Sedgewick provided and had no direct contact with
Shepard. (ECF No. 52-7 at PageID.368–69; ECF No. 53-1 at PageID.624.)
Shepard exhausted her FMLA leave on October 24, 2023. (ECF No. 52-3 at PageID.254;
ECF No. 53-1 at PageID.623.) At that time, Shepard was medically unable to return to her work
at Homesite, and her doctor was unable to provide a RTW date. (ECF No. 52-1 at PageID.254;
ECF No. 53-1 at PageID.623.) However, Sedgewick granted Shepard’s request to extend her STD
benefits through December 13, 2023, the date of her next neurology appointment. (ECF No. 52-3
at PageID.254.)
In Shepard’s absence, three individuals had been assigned to perform her duties. Matt
Broscha, a senior member of Shepard’s team, provided interim coaching support to the team while
also performing his regular duties, and two other coaching supervisors were assigned Shepard’s
managerial tasks while continuing to manage their own teams. (EF No. 52-7 at PageID.376–77;
ECF 	No. 	52-8 	at 	PageID.432–33.) 	Given 	Shepard’s 	extended 	leave, 	Sadeghi-Guran 	and
Meulemans began to explore options for providing Shepard’s team support and leadership
depending upon her ability to return to work. (ECF No. 52-7 at PageID.398–401.) If Shepard
exhausted her FMLA leave but remained on STD without an ADA accommodation, replacing her
position would have been an option to meet business needs. (Id. at 399–400; ECF No. 52-11.)
Homesite may utilize “[p]osition replacement” when an employee is on leave by filling the
position with a new individual, but it does not entail terminating the replaced employee or
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eliminating the position. (ECF No. 52-6 at PageID.338.) The replaced employee continues on leave
with access to employee benefits and, when able to return to work, may return to their original
position, if available, or to other open positions. (Id. at PageID.343; 52-8 at PageID.427–29.) The
employee is terminated only if no positions are available when the employee is able to return to
work. (ECF No. 52-6 at PageID.343.)
C. 	Homesite Terminates Shepard’s Employment
When a Homesite employee exhausts his or her FMLA leave, Sedgwick informs the
employee of the next steps, including requesting an ADA accommodation. (Id. at PageID.340–
41.) Although Shepard claims that she submitted an accommodation request to Sedgewick around
the time she exhausted her FMLA leave, it is undisputed that Homesite did not receive an
accommodation request through Sedgewick until December 8, 2023. 3 (ECF No. 52-3 at
PageID.252; ECF No. 52-5; ECF No. 52-6 at PageID.329–30, 340, 353–54; ECF No. 53-1 at
PageID.624.)
On October 26, 2023, Sadeghi-Guran and Meulemans met with Employee Relations
Specialist Clark Carter to discuss the next steps regarding Shepard’s situation and whether
Homesite could accommodate an indefinite leave. (ECF No. 52-5 at PageID.306; ECF No. 52-6 at
PageID.325–28; ECF No. 52-8 at PageID.426.) During the meeting, Carter explained that, even if
Shepard requested an accommodation, Homesite may be able to replace the position if the request
was unreasonable, and its business needs warranted replacement. (ECF No. 52-6 at PageID.331–
333.) They concluded that they had no clear alternatives at that time because they would need to
3 Whether Shepard submitted a timely accommodation request to Homesite is immaterial to the
Court’s analysis of the ADA claims.
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determine whether Shepard had a RTW date and whether she would request an accommodation.
(Id. at PageID.328, 331.)
By mid-November 2023, Homesite learned that Shepard’s healthcare provider had
indicated that there was no end date for Shepard’s incapacity. (ECF No. 52-3 at PageID.241–42.)
On November 22, 2023, Sadeghi-Guran, Meulemans, and Carter met to discuss replacing
Shepard’s position due to the length of her absence and the impact it was having on her team. (ECF
No. 52-6 at PageID.334–37; ECF No. 52-7 at PageID.405; ECF No. 52-8 at PageID.419–22.)
During the meeting, Meulemans expressed concerns that Shepard’s team had been struggling in
her absence and needed consistent leadership. Meulemans also had concerns about attrition and
the team’s lack of engagement due to the absence of consistent management. (Id. at PageID.422–
23.) In addition, Sadeghi-Guran was concerned that Broscha and the two coaching supervisors
were under added pressure as they assumed additional responsibilities filling in for Shepard. (ECF
No. 52-7 at PageID.376–77.) Ultimately, Meulemans decided to replace Shepard. (ECF No. 52-8
at PageID.418–19.)
On November 29, 2023, Sadeghi-Guran and Carter called Shepard to let her know that her
position was bring replaced due to business needs. (ECF No. 52-3 at PageID.256–57.) They
conducted the call according to standard talking points that Homesite uses to ensure consistency
in communication. (ECF No. 52-6 at PageID.341–43, 345–46.) During the call, Shepard became
emotional and told Sadeghi-Guran and Carter to “go fuck [them]selves,” and continued to use the
same language, even though Carter “ask[ed] her not to use that language.” (Id. at PageID.350–51.)
Sadeghi-Guran also recalls Shepard telling her that she was “a fucking bitch,” that she was “a
horrible supervisor,” and that she did not “deserve to be a mother.” (ECF No. 52-7 at PageID.389–
90; ECF 52-13.) While Shepard denies using most of this language, she admits using the “f-word”
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and being emotional during the conversation.4 (ECF No. 52-3 at PageID.257–59; ECF No. 52-
15.) In fact, Shepard “recall[s] uttering at least one strong curse word out of frustration.” (ECF
NO. 53-1 at PageID.629.)
Following the conversation with Shepard, Carter reached out to Sadeghi-Guran to discuss
the tone of Shepard’s comments and her use of inappropriate language. Sadeghi-Guran told Carter
that she was concerned about Shepard’s poor professional behavior and verbal attacks given her
leadership and customer-facing roles. (ECF No. 52-6 at PageID.360–61; ECF No. 52-7 at
PageID.371.) Sadeghi-Guran recommended termination of Shepard’s employment for violating
Homesite’s standards of conduct during the November 29, 2023 conversation. (Id.) After
consulting with their supervisors and Homesite’s legal department, Carter and Sadeghi finalized
the decision to terminate Shepard’s employment. (ECF No. 52-6 at PageID.358–59; ECF NO. 52-
7 at PageID.394–95.) On December 13, 2023, Sadeghi-Guran and Carter called Shepard to inform
her that her employment would be terminated effective December 14, 2023, based on her use of
profanity and violation of Homesite’s standards of conduct during the November 29 phone call.
(ECF No. 52-3 at PageID.262; ECF No. 52-17.)
II. 	Motion Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts
are facts that are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty
4 During the conversation, Carter mistakenly told Shepard that her health insurance would
terminate effective December 1, 2023. Following the call, Carter looked into the issue and
determined that her insurance would continue through any approved period of STD benefits. Carter
conveyed this information to Shepard the next day. (ECF No. 52–3 at PageID.253; ECF No. 52-6
at PageID357; ECF No. 52-14.)
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Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return
judgment for the non-moving party. Id.
The court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party but
may grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party.” Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th
Cir. 1992) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
III. 	Discussion
A. 	Shepard’s Declaration
In support of her response to Homesite’s motion, Shepard has submitted a 19-page
declaration that, in many ways, reads like a brief. A declaration should not contain argument, see
Gonzalez v. Parker Hannifin Corp., No. 2:18-CV-212, 2020 WL 13698922, at *4 (E.D. Tenn.
Nov. 16, 2020) (“Legal argument is not personal knowledge.”), but Shepard’s does. Homesite
contends that the declaration is improper because much of it is based on hearsay, speculation, and
improper legal argument, and it asks the Court to strike or disregard the offending portions.
Having fully reviewed the declaration, the Court finds Homesite’s objections well taken.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4), affidavits and declarations “must be made
on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant
or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” “[S]peculation, legal conclusions, and
inadmissible hearsay . . . [are] insufficient to create a question of fact upon which summary
judgment may be denied.” Jamison v. Angelo, No. 4:10CV2843, 2012 WL 4434152, at *9 (N.D.
Ohio Sept. 24, 2012). Statements qualified with “I later learned through this lawsuit,” “I also find
it significant,” “In fact, I learned,” “I genuinely believe,” or asserting, “I strongly disagree” (ECF
No. 53-1 at PageID.625, 632, 633, 635), and the like cannot defeat summary judgment and do not
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belong in an affidavit or declaration. While the Court finds it unnecessary to parse Shepard’s
declaration line-by-line to expressly identify each statement that is inadmissible, it will consider
only those statements that comply with Rule 56(c)(4)’s personal knowledge requirement in
deciding whether Shepard has presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material
fact on her claims.
B. 	ADA/PWDCRA Claims
As noted, Shepard brings disability discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims
under both the ADA and the PWDCRA. The Sixth Circuit has observed that the PWDCRA
“substantially mirrors the ADA, and resolution of a plaintiff’s ADA claim will generally, though
not always, resolve the plaintiff’s PWDCRA claim.” Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 764 (6th
Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Because both parties address Shepard’s disability claims in a single
analysis, the Court will do the same. See Fraker v. City of Grand Rapids, No. 1:18-cv-1444, 2020
WL 5642254, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 4, 2020); Notarnicola v. Johnson Controls Inc., No. 12-
11331, 2014 WL 1304591, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2014).
1. 	Disability Discrimination
The ADA prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the
basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). An employer cannot take an adverse employment action
against a qualified employee “because of” the employee’s disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1). The
ADA’s “because of” language creates a “but for” causation standard. Lewis v. Humboldt
Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 318 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78 (2009)).
A plaintiff may establish a discrimination claim through direct or circumstantial evidence.
Brown v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 814 F. App’x 72, 79 (6th Cir. 2020). Shepard does not present direct
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evidence of discrimination to support her claim, so she must proceed under the familiar McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework. Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, 847 F.3d 384, 395
(6th Cir. 2017). To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) she has a disability,
(2) she is ‘otherwise qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation,’ (3)
she ‘suffered an adverse employment decision,’ (4) her employer “knew or had reason to know”
of her disability, and (5) she was replaced or her position remained open.” Id. (citing Whitfield v.
Tennessee, 639 F.3d 253, 259 (6th Cir. 2011)). A plaintiff may also satisfy the fifth element “by
showing that similarly situated non-protected employees were treated more favorably.” Jones v.
Potter, 488 F.3d 397, 404 (6th Cir. 2007).
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disability discrimination, then the burden
of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse action against the plaintiff. Morrissey v. Laurel Health Care Co., 946 F.3d 292, 298 (6th
Cir. 2019). If the defendant does so, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to show
that proffered reason was, in fact, a pretext for unlawful disability discrimination. Id. A plaintiff
can prove pretext by showing “that the employer’s stated reason for the adverse employment action
either (1) has no basis in fact, (2) was not the actual reason, or (3) is insufficient to explain the
employer’s action.” Risch v. Royal Oak Police Dep’t, 581 F.3d 383, 391 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must show that
“there is sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute at each stage of the McDonnell Douglas
inquiry.” Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc., 663 F.3d 806, 812 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
Prima Facie Case
Shepard’s claim fails at the initial stage because Homesite has demonstrated that she cannot
present evidence to establish three elements of her prima facie case, specifically, that: (1) she was
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“otherwise qualified” for her position; (2) Sadeghi-Guran or Meulemans knew or had reason to
know that Shepard had a qualifying disability; and (3) Homesite treated any similarly situated non-
disabled individual differently than Shepard for the same or similar conduct.5 (ECF No. 52 at
PageID.190–95.)
a. 	Otherwise Qualified
Homesite has shown that Shepard was not “otherwise qualified” because she was unable
to perform the essential functions of her position “with or without reasonable accommodation.”
Contrary to Shepard’s argument, Homesite does not rely on a “bare assertion . . . that [Shepard]
was unable to work.” (ECF No. 53 at PageID.611.) It cites her deposition testimony that in mid-
November and December 2023 she was unable to return to work because she could not sit or stand
for more than a few minutes at a time, care for her pets, shower without assistance, engage in
physical activity, or work. (ECF No. 52-3 at PageID.242–45.) She had no RTW date at that time.
(Id. at PageID.241.) Shepard also admitted she was not physically able to return to work until
February 2024—a fact neither she nor her doctor could have known in November or December
2023. (Id. at PageID.245.)
Shepard also fails to present evidence that she could have worked had she been granted a
reasonable accommodation. The only accommodation Shepard requested was indefinite leave
(ECF No. 52-3 at PageID.265 (“I needed additional time off.”)), but the Sixth Circuit has held that
“[a]n employer is not required to keep an employee’s job open indefinitely.”6 Williams, 847 F.3d
5 For purposes of its summary judgment motion, Homesite does not dispute that Shepard had a
qualifying disability or that she was subjected to an adverse employment action.
6 In her response, Shepard argues that Homesite should have considered telework (ECF No. 53 at
PageID.611), but this assertion ignores that she was already fully remote.
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at 394. As the Williams court explained, “additional leave is an objectively unreasonable
accommodation where an employee has already received significant amounts of leave and has
demonstrated ‘no clear prospects for recovery.’” Id. (quoting Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201
F.3d 718, 717 (6th Cir. 2000)); see also Cleveland v. Federal Express Corp., 83 F. App’x 74, 78
(6th Cir. 2003) (“Where an employee is incapacitated from work by a condition whose end cannot
be determined with any certainty, the ADA does not always require that the employer allow
indefinite leave.” (citing Boykin v. ATC/VanCom of Colo., L.P., 247 F.3d 1061, 1064 (10th Cir.
2001))); Claspell v. Denso Mgf. Mich., Inc., No. 5:97-CV-69, 1998 WL 480875, at *7 (W.D. Mich.
June 26, 1998) (“‘Reasonable accommodation does not require the employer to wait indefinitely
for an employee’s medical condition to be corrected.’” (quoting Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods
Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1047 (6th Cir. 1998))). When an employee requests additional medical leave
following a lengthy initial period, the key to reasonableness is whether “its duration is definite.”
Maat v. County of Ottawa, 657 F. App’x 404, 412 (6th Cir. 2016).7 Here, it is undisputed that by
early December 2023, Shepard had already taken approximately sixteen weeks of continuous
medical leave, and there was no “‘certain or credibly proven end’ to the leave.” Id. at 413 (quoting
Aston v. Tapco Int’l Corp., 631 F. App’x 292, 298 (6th Cir. 2015)). Shepard’s doctor could not
provide a RTW date and Shepard could not say when she could return. Shepard’s hindsight-based
statement in her declaration that “she likely would have been able to return to work in early 2024”
if Homesite had allowed her more time (ECF No. 53-1 at PageID.637), is insufficient to defeat
summary judgment.
7 Michigan courts addressing the PWDCRA have held that “[a]n employer’s duty to make
‘reasonable accommodation’ . . . does not extend to granting the plaintiff a medical leave until
such time as he would be able to perform the requirements of his job.” Kerns v. Dura Mech.
Components, Inc., 242 Mich. App. 1, 16 (2000).
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b. 	Knowledge of Disability
It is well established that an employer “cannot discriminate ‘because of’ a disability if it
has no knowledge of the disability.” Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgm’t, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 884 (6th Cir.
1996). “An employer has notice of the employee’s disability when the employee tells the employer
that [s]he is disabled.” Brown v. BKW Drywall Supply, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 814, 828–29 (S.D.
Ohio 2004) (citing Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 449–50 (6th Cir. 1999)). A
supervisor’s mere knowledge that an employee took leave is insufficient to establish this element.
Tennial v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 840 F.3d 292, 306 (6th Cir. 2016). Thus, “[a] prima facie case
is not made out if the decisionmaker is unaware of the specifics of an employee’s disabilities or
restrictions, even if the decisionmaker has a general knowledge that a disability exists.” Id.
Shepard fails to show that any of the relevant decisionmakers—Sadeghi-Guran and
Meulmansr—knew or should have known of her disability. Sadeghi-Guran testified that, while she
was aware that Shepard had taken FMLA leave and was on approved STD, she knew none of the
details pertaining to Shepard’s health issue. (ECF No. 52-7 at PageID.368, 401.) Meulemans said
she knew “[a]t a high level” that Shepard “had issues with her back” but was not aware of the
medical details of her leave. (ECF No. 52 at PageID.412.) There is also no evidence that Carter—
a non-decisionmaker—was aware of Shepard’s disability. Shepard presents no evidence showing
that Sadeghi-Guran or Meulemans were aware of her disability. While Shepard asserts in her
declaration that she informed her supervisors about her “back issues” in 2022 and 2023, and she
argues that Meulemans knew she was taking FMLA leave (ECF No. 53-1 at PageID.636), these
vague assertions and inadmissible argument fail to show that any decisionmaker was aware of her
disabilities or restrictions.
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While Shepard has, in the Court’s view, failed to establish this requirement, even if she
had, her claim would fail on the other elements. Moreover, as discussed below, she fails to establish
pretext.
c. 	Comparators
Shepard seeks to establish the fifth element of her prima facie case by providing
comparator evidence. To make this showing, a plaintiff must present evidence that the employee
with whom she seeks to compare herself was outside the protected class and was “similarly situated
in all respects.” Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992) (italics in original).
“[T]o be deemed ‘similarly-situated’, the individuals with whom the plaintiff seeks to compare
his/her treatment must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards
and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances
that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it.” Id.; see also
Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 710 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding a plaintiff need not
demonstrate an exact correlation, but must establish that a comparator is similarly situated to
plaintiff “in all relevant respects”); Clayton v. Meijer, Inc., 281 F.3d 605, 611 (6th Cir. 2002) (to
be similarly situated, a comparator must have engaged in an act of “comparable seriousness”).
As to her termination, Shepard fails to identify any Homesite employee who engaged in
the use of profane language or similar conduct with supervisors but was not terminated. Shepard
cites three employees, Lisa Roberts, Adelle Neal, and Meulemans, as comparators for replacement.
(ECF No. 53 at PageID.612.) Shepard contends that these employees are similarly situated because
they held similar supervisory roles, took FMLA leave, and returned to work without being
replaced. (Id.) Contrary to Shepard’s argument, her comparator evidence is not sufficient to
survive summary judgment. To begin, Shepard provides no evidence showing that Roberts, Neal,
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or Meulemans are outside the protected class, that is, that they are not disabled. In addition,
although Roberts and Neal were also coaching supervisors, they did not report to Meulemans (ECF
No. 52-8 at PageID.438), and Meulemans was Shepard’s supervisor, not a coaching supervisor.
Perhaps most importantly, unlike Shepard, all three proposed comparators returned to work; none
were out indefinitely. (Id. at PageID.397; ECF 52-8 at PageID.437.) Thus, Shepard’s prima facie
case fails on this element as well.
Pretext
Homesite has presented legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the alleged adverse
actions at issue. Its decision to replace Shepard’s position was based on its business-based
assessment that Shepard’s team required consistent management from a dedicated coaching
supervisor, and its decision to terminate Shepard’s employment was based on her unprofessional
conduct during the November 29, 2023 phone call.
Shepard presents no argument or evidence of pretext with regard to the replacement
decision. Regarding the termination, she contends that it was “excessive and plainly pretextual”
because she had no prior discipline or warnings and other similarly situated employees who took
extended leave were not subject to similar consequences. (ECF No. 53 at PageID.612.) As already
noted, Shepard’s comparator evidence cannot establish differential treatment, and her “view” that
Homesite’s 	justification 	for 	the 	termination 	is 	pretextual 	and 	“belie[f]” 	that 	disability
discrimination motivated its decisions to replace her position and terminate her employment (ECF
No. 53-1 at PageID.637) cannot support a finding of pretext. While Shepard clearly disagrees with
Homesite’s decisions, “[m]ere disagreement with the basis for the [replacement or] discharge does
not create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to pretext.” Lim v. Terumo Corp., No. 14-
1513/14-1573, 2015 WL 13928184, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 2015) (citing Braithwaite v. Timken
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Co., 258 F.3d 488, 493–94 (6th Cir. 2001); Irvin v. Airco Carbide, 837 F.2d 724, 726 (6th Cir.
1987)). Moreover, Shepard’s position is contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s honest belief rule, which
provides that, “so long as the employer honestly believed in the proffered reason given for its
employment action, the employee cannot establish pretext even if the employer’s reason is
ultimately found to be mistaken, foolish, trivial, or baseless.” Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d
799, 806 (6th Cir. 1998). Because the issue here is whether Homesite acted with a discriminatory
motive, not whether its decisions were fair, correct, or sound, Shepard fails to present evidence
showing that Homesite’s reasons were pretext.
2. 	Failure to Accommodate
A failure to make a reasonable accommodation constitutes disability discrimination. 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). To establish a prima facie case of failure to accommodate, a plaintiff
must show that: (1) she is disabled under the ADA; (2) she is otherwise qualified for the position,
with or without a reasonable accommodation; (3) her employer knew or had reason to know of her
disability; (4) she requested a reasonable accommodation; and (5) the employer failed to provide
the reasonable accommodation. Aldini v. Kroger Co. of Mich., 628 F. App’x 347, 350 (6th Cir.
2015).
Shepard’s failure-to-accommodate claim is subject to summary judgment because, as
discussed above, the evidence fails to show that she was otherwise qualified or that Homesite knew
or had reason to know of her disability, and her requested accommodation was not reasonable. In
addition, although Shepard claims that she requested an accommodation in October 2023, it is
undisputed that Homesite was not aware of the accommodation request until, at the earliest,
December 8, 2023, after the November 29, 2023 phone call with Carter and Sadeghi-Guran that
provided the basis for her termination.
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C. 	FMLA Claims
1. 	Interference
In order to establish an FMLA interference claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she was
an eligible employee; (2) the defendant is a covered employer; (3) she was entitled to leave under
the FMLA; (4) she gave the defendant notice of her intent to take leave; and (5) the defendant
denied her FMLA benefits or interfered with FMLA rights to which she was entitled. Cavin v.
Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 346 F.3d 713, 719 (6th Cir. 2003). Shepard’s interference claim fails
because the evidence shows that Shepard took all of the leave to which she was entitled without
interference from Homesite. Contrary to Shepard’s assertion, Homesite did not interfere with her
right to reinstatement because she was unable to return to work upon expiration of her leave.
Shepard’s reliance on Arban v. West Publishing Corp., 345 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2003), is misplaced
because the defendant in Arban terminated the plaintiff’s employment during his leave, which did
not occur here.
3. 	Retaliation
A plaintiff may prove an FMLA retaliation claim either through direct or indirect evidence.
Demyanovich v. Cadon Plating & Coatings, LLC, 747 F.3d 419, 432 (6th Cir. 2014). Because
Shepard lacks direct evidence of FMLA retaliation, she must establish her claim under the
circumstantial evidence framework by showing that:
(1) she was engaged in an activity protected by the FMLA; (2) the employer knew
that she was exercising her rights under the FMLA; (3) after learning of the
employee’s exercise of FMLA rights, the employer took an employment action
adverse to her; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected FMLA
activity and the adverse employment action.
Donald, 667 F.3d at 761 (quoting Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 556 (6th Cir.
2006)). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the employer to proffer
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a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for discharging the employee.” Edgar v. JAC Prods.,
Inc., 443 F.3d 501, 508 (6th Cir. 2006).
Homesite contends that Shepard fails to establish a prima facie of case of retaliation
because temporal proximity is her only evidence of a causal connection and the period of time
between when Homesite learned of Shepard’s protected activity in May 2023 and when it took the
first alleged adverse action of replacing her position on November 22, 2023, is too attenuated to
infer a causal connection. (ECF No. 52 at PageID.200–01.) Shepard responds that temporal
proximity is sufficiently close to support a causal connection because Homesite made the decision
to replace her position on October 26, 2023. (ECF No. 53 at PageID.596.) This contention is
meritless because it relies solely on Shepard’s unsupported speculation in her declaration. (ECF
No. 53-1 at PageID.625.) The only admissible evidence in the record, recounted above, shows that
Sadeghi-Guran and Meulemans did not make the decision to replace Shepard’s position until
November 22, 2023.
The Court need not decide the issue of causation because, as set forth above, even if
Shepard could establish a prima facie case, Shepard has failed to show that Homesite’s legitimate,
non-retaliatory reasons for replacing her position and terminating her employment were pretext
for unlawful conduct. 8 Accordingly, Homesite is entitled to summary judgment on Shepard’s
FMLA claims.
8 In any event, Homesite has the better of the argument. Even if August 18, 2023, is considered
the date Homesite learned of Shepard’s protected activity (taking FMLA leave), the three-month
period that elapsed before Homesite decided to replace Shepard’s position is insufficient to support
a causal connection, particularly because Shepard fails to put forth any other evidence on the issue.
See Bush v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 683 F. App’x 440, 451–52 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that two-
and-one-half month period between employer learning of the plaintiff’s leave and its termination
decision was, without other evidence, insufficient to establish causal connection).
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IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Homesite’s motion for summary judgment
and dismiss Shepard’s complaint with prejudice.
A separate order will enter.
Dated: March 31, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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