Morgan #805616 v. Washington et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MONTRELL DARSHAWN MORGAN
#805616,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Jane M. Beckering
v. 	Case No. 1:24-cv-165
HEIDI WASHINGTON, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at Carson City Correctional Facility, filed a complaint against several MDOC employees
on February 20, 2024, alleging claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on events that occurred
at Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility (LRF) while Plaintiff was housed there in July 2023.
Plaintiff’s remaining claim in this case is his Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against
Corrections Officer (CO) Robert Roundtree. This matter is before me on CO Roundtree’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 26), which is fully briefed and ready for decision.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), I recommend that the Court GRANT the motion and
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.
I. 	Background
On the evening of July 29, 2023, CO Roundtree and other officers in Baldwin Unit of LRF
had their hands full with prisoner fights. Beginning at 10:17 p.m. and continuing until
approximately 10:25 p.m., numerous fights involving 17 prisoners broke out, necessitating a
significant staff response. (ECF No. 27-2.) The first several fights occurred in the Baldwin Unit
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dayroom. The initial fight began when prisoners Moore and McCallum squared off to fight. Moore
struck McCallum twice in his face, knocking McCallum to the ground and rendering him
unconscious. Moore continued to strike McCallum in the face area with closed fists while
McCallum was laying on the ground until another prisoner, Galego, pushed Moore away from
McCallum. (Id. at PageID.125.) Within seconds, prisoner Allen struck prisoner Harrison from
behind, knocking him to the ground. At about the same time, prisoner Lowery struck Plaintiff from
behind with close fists to the head and body area, and they began to fight. Prisoner Holmes then
joined the fight by striking Lowery with closed fists in the head and body area. Plaintiff, Lowery,
and Holmes continued to fight and eventually ended up on the ground.
CO Roundtree and CO Uriah responded to the dayroom immediately after CO Lo called
“fight” in Baldwin Unit over his radio. (Id.) CO Lo deployed his personal chemical agent toward
Plaintiff’s, Lowery’s and Holmes’s face areas while giving loud verbal commands to stop fighting.
CO Roundtree handcuffed Plaintiff while CO Lo attempted to apply handcuffs to Lowery. CO
Roundtree then escorted Plaintiff from the dayroom to the officer’s station located in a lobby-type
area. (Id.)
Video evidence of these events shows that, at the time CO Roundtree took Plaintiff to the
officer’s station, no prisoners were fighting in the area. (ECF No. 27-3.) Immediately prior to that
time, however, CO Victoria Borkowski had entered Baldwin Unit and separated prisoners Cottle
and Taylor, who were actively fighting in the lobby. (ECF No. 27-2 at PageID.126.) Shortly
thereafter, and before CO Roundtree entered the lobby with Plaintiff, CO Maria Perla entered
Baldwin Unit and went to the hallway leading to the back entrance of the unit, where she separated
prisoner Moore to the doors at the back entrance. (Id.) After CO Roundtree entered the lobby and
took Plaintiff to the officer’s station, CO Borkowski went to the back entrance to assist CO Perla
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in restraining prisoner Moore from fighting. Within a few seconds, four or five prisoners entered
the hallway and began fighting in the area between COs Borkowski and Perla and the lobby. At
this point, CO Roundtree saw that COs Borkowski and Perla were surrounded and cornered by
five or six fighting prisoners and left Plaintiff handcuffed at the officer’s station to assist COs
Borkowski and Perla. (ECF No. 27-3 at PageID.163–64.) CO Roundtree was able to separate
Moore and held him against the wall as Moore resisted and verbally encouraged other prisoners to
continue fighting. (Id. at PageID.164.) After about a minute, Moore broke free and ran into the
lobby. Roundtree chased Moore around the lobby and was finally able to secure Moore. Another
officer then escorted Moore out of the unit. (Id. at PageID.164.)
At 10:22:40, while CO Roundtree was dealing with prisoner Moore, prisoner Sykes
approached Plaintiff at the officer’s station and either punched or attempted to punch him with a
closed fist. CO Vela, who had entered the unit as Sykes was walking towards Plaintiff, grabbed
Sykes and pulled him away from Plaintiff. (ECF No. 27-2 at PageID.126.) As CO Vela attempted
to subdue Sykes, prisoner Martin began attacking Sykes. During this scuffle, a prisoner hit CO
Vela in the mouth area, causing him to disengage from Sykes. (Id.) CO Vela was eventually able
to detain Sykes by taking him to the ground, and then escorted him from the unit to a segregation
yard module. (Id. at PageID.127.) About 40 seconds after CO Vela removed prisoner Sykes from
the unit, prisoner Porch ran to the officer’s station, grabbed a pool stick, and swung it at prisoner
Martin. Porch missed Martin and the pool stick hit the floor and broke. CO Martinez then entered
the unit and ordered Porch to drop the pool stick. Prisoner Porch complied, and CO Martinez
secured the pool stick and handcuffed Porch. (Id.)
The video evidence shows Morgan at the officer’s station after CO Roundtree left him to
assist COs Borkowski and Perla. At that time, no prisoners were fighting in the lobby. Over the
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next several minutes, a few inmates spoke with Plaintiff and then walked away from him. Around
10:22:40, without warning, prisoner Sykes attacked Plaintiff. After CO Vela intervened, Plaintiff
walked away from the lobby towards the dayroom. Plaintiff was not near the officer’s station when
prisoner Porch grabbed the pool stick and swung it at prisoner Martin.
II. 	Motion Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts
are facts that are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return
judgment for the non-moving party. Id.
The court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party but
may grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party.” Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th
Cir. 1992) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
III. 	Discussion
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Roundtree violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment
by leaving him handcuffed at the officer’s station and at risk of attack when he went to assist COs
Borkowski and Perla. A failure-to-protect claim is governed by essentially the same standards as
a claim for deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. That is, a plaintiff must
establish that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to “a substantial risk” that he might suffer
“serious harm.” Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 294 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994)). The claim has both an objective and a subjective component. To satisfy
the objective component, the plaintiff must show that, absent reasonable precautions, he was
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exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836. To satisfy the subjective
component, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference. That is,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was “subjectively aware of the risk,” but failed
“to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Greene, 361 F.3d at 294 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at
829, 847). More specifically, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant was aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm would exist if
reasonable measures were not taken; (2) the defendant actually drew the inference; and (3) the
defendant disregarded that risk. Id. at 837. To prevail on the specific claim that a defendant failed
to protect him from an assault by another inmate, the plaintiff must establish: (1) the defendant
had reason to believe another inmate would assault plaintiff; and (2) the defendant had both the
opportunity and means to prevent the assault. See, e.g., Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 475 (6th
Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff’s claim fails on both the objective and subjective components. As an initial matter,
Defendant Roundtree supports his motion with video of the events as they unfolded in Baldwin
Unit on July 29, 2023. The video, which could be appropriately titled Chaos in Balwin Unit, shows
Defendant Roundtree and the other officers as they play a real-life game of whack-a-mole trying
to stop one prisoner fight after another.
As for the objective component, Defendant Roundtree presents a sworn declaration stating
that when he noticed COs Borkowski and Perla surrounded by fighting prisoners and in need of
assistance, he saw no prisoners were actively fighting near Plaintiff and had not heard any prisoner
make threats toward Plaintiff. Given those circumstances, including the obvious danger COs
Borkowski and Perla faced, Roundtree decided to leave Plaintiff and assist them. (ECF No. 27-3
at PageID.163–64.) The video evidence confirms CO Roundtree’s version, as it clearly shows that
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no prisoners were fighting in the lobby when he left to assist the other officers. In fact, the video
shows that, between the time Defendant Roundtree left Plaintiff and the time prisoner Sykes
attacked Plaintiff, no other fight occurred in the lobby area.
Plaintiff argues that Roundtree’s declaration creates a genuine issue of material fact
because Roundtree states that he “[s]ens[ed] . . . danger posed to Officers Borkowski and Perla as
well as other inmates in the unit,” and chose to leave Plaintiff unattended. (ECF No. 30 at
PageID.173 (citing ECF No. 27-3 at PageID.164).) This argument lacks merit because it does not
show that the fighting inmates presented a specific risk of harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff presents
nothing more than argument regarding a “general concern,” as opposed to evidence of a “specific,
known risk to his safety.” Gant v, Campbell, 4 F. App’x 254, 256 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer,
511 U.S. at 833). In fact, Defendant Roundtree reasonably responded to the situation at hand by
intervening to help stop the fighting.
Likewise, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the video evidence showing prisoner Lowery
attacking Plaintiff in the dayroom does not establish that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of harm
while at the officer’s station in the lobby. After CO Roundtree left the dayroom with Plaintiff, CO
Lo secured prisoner Lowery in handcuffs, and another officer escorted Lowery from the unit to a
yard module at 10:22:33. (ECF No. 27-2 at PageID.127.) Thus, Lowery did not present a risk of
harm to Plaintiff.
The affidavit Plaintiff presents from prisoner Michael Gunnarsson (ECF No. 30-1) also
does not help Plaintiff establish an issue of fact.1 First, the affidavit does not meet the requirements
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4) because it is not based on Gunnarsson’s personal
1 By separate order (ECF No. 36), I have granted Defendant Roundtree’s motion to strike the
affidavit of Roderick Millener that Plaintiff attached to his sur-reply.
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knowledge. Rather, Gunnarsson swears “to the best of my knowledge,” which is not adequate to
defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Ondo v. City of Cleveland, 795 F.3d 597, 604 (6th
Cir. 2015) (“Affidavits defeat summary judgment only if they are ‘made on personal knowledge,
set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is
competent to testify on the matters stated.’”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); Neis v. Fresenius
USA, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 2d 799, 804–05 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (disregarding affidavit made “to the
best 	of” 	the 	affiant’s 	knowledge 	for 	purposes 	of 	summary 	judgment). 	Second, 	even 	if
Gunnarsson’s statements were admissible, they offer no support for Plaintiff’s claim. The facts
Gunnarsson relates are consistent with Defendant Roundtree’s evidence showing that he left
Plaintiff at the officer’s station to assist COs Borkowski and Perla with the prisoners fighting in
the hallway. Nothing in the affidavit suggests that Plaintiff faced an objectively serious risk of
harm at the time. Finally, to the extent Gunnarsson suggests that Plaintiff had to get away from
prisoner Porch when Porch had the pool stick, the video blatantly contradicts such statement, as
Plaintiff is not present in the lobby at all when Porch had the pool stick. See Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that
version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”). In fact, Porch
swung the pool stick at prisoner Martin, not Plaintiff. (ECF No. 27-2 at PageID.127.)
Plaintiff also fails to present any evidence to establish that Defendant Roundtree was
subjectively aware of a substantial threat or risk of injury to Plaintiff and disregarded that risk. As
noted, the video shows that Defendant Roundtree and the other officers responding to Baldwin
Unit on the night in question were confronted with a continuous string of prisoner fights requiring
them to make split-second decisions. Under these circumstances, Defendant Roundtree was not
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aware of, and did not disregard, a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff presents no evidence
that Defendant Roundtree knew that prisoner Sykes, or any other prisoner involved in the fighting
that night, intended to harm Plaintiff. At best, the evidence shows no more than that Sykes’s attack
of Plaintiff was random and unexpected.
Defendant Roundtree also argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. The doctrine of
qualified immunity provides that government officials performing discretionary functions are
generally shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate a clearly
established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th
Cir. 1999). An “objective legal reasonableness” test is used to determine whether the official could
reasonably have believed his conduct was lawful. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639
(1987). The qualified immunity inquiry requires a court to decide whether the facts as alleged or
shown make out a constitutional violation or whether the defendant’s conduct violated a clearly
established right at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232
(2009). If the court can conclude that either no constitutional violation occurred or that the right
was not clearly established, qualified immunity is warranted.
Here, both prongs of the analysis support that Defendant Roundtree is entitled to qualified
immunity. First, as set forth above, Plaintiff fails to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. In
addition, on the second prong, Plaintiff fails to show that Defendant Roundtree’s actions violated
clearly established law. That is, a reasonable officer in Defendant Roundtree’s position would not
have known that his conduct in the circumstances at issue violated Plaintiff’s clearly established
rights.
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IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Court grant Defendant Roundtree’s
motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 26) and dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.
I further recommend that an appeal of this matter would not be taken in good faith. See
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Dated: November 12, 2025 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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