Calhoun #379175 v. Washington et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SAMUEL EUGENE CALHOUN,
Case No. 1:23-cv-459
Plaintiff,
Hon. Paul L. Maloney
v.
HEIDI WASHINGTON, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Samuel Eugene Calhoun is a prisoner in the custody of the Michigan
Department of Corrections (“MDOC”). Plaintiff filed this pro se civil rights lawsuit pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1 The alleged incidents occurred at Muskegon Correctional Facility (“MCF”).
See Opinion (ECF No. 20, PageID.27). 2 	The remaining defendants are Mailroom Clerks Gail
Scanlon and Karen Brown. 3 Plaintiff’s complaint contains three sets of First Amendment claims
related to mail sent to him at the prison. First, defendant Brown violated his right to receive two
newspaper articles in the regular mail (Opinion at PageID.27, 29-30, 68). 	Second, defendants
Brown and Scanlon interfered with his right to receive a “DNA report” in the regular mail (Opinion
1 The Court notes that Attorney Paul Matouka entered a “limited attorney appearance” for plaintiff on October 25,
2023. It appears that Matouka withdrew as plaintiff’s attorney on August 23, 2024.
2 The Court notes that the “PageID.” numbers in this case are not sequential. When the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan (E.D. Mich.) transferred the case to this Court, the case included “PageID.”
numbers 1 through 142. See Order (ECF No. 6); E.D. Mich. docket sheet (ECF No. 7, PageID.142). After transfer,
this Court re-started the “PageID.” numbers. See E.D. Mich. docket sheet (ECF No. 7-1, PageID.1). As a result, ECF
Nos. 1 through 7 are identified as PageID.1-142, while ECF Nos. 7-1 through 46 are also identified as PageID.1-142.
3 On initial screening, the Court also allowed claims against defendant Delo. See Opinion at PageID.68. However,
the Court dismissed Delo on May 30, 2025. See Order (ECF No. 37).
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at PageID.30-31, 41, 68). Third, defendants Brown and Scanlon violated his right to be present
when his legal mail was opened for inspection (Opinion at PageID.27, 33-34, 68).
This matter is now before the Court on plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
(ECF No. 57), defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 60), and defendants’ motion
to compel (ECF No. 54).
I. 	Motions for summary judgment
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 further provides that a party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, 	electronically 	stored 	information, 	affidavits 	or 	declarations,
stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
In Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 1995), the court set forth the parties’
burden of proof in a motion for summary judgment:
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party’s case. Once the moving party has met its burden of
production, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but must present
significant probative evidence in support of the complaint to defeat the motion for
summary judgment. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support
plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for the plaintiff.
Copeland, 57 F.3d at 478-79 (citations omitted). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment,
the court views the factual evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
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party.” 	McLean v. 988011 Ontario Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). 	Here, plaintiff
included a “verification” at the end of his complaint (ECF No. 1, PageID.44). 	See Lavado v.
Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 1993) (a plaintiff’s “verified” complaint has the same force
and effect as an affidavit for purposes of responding to a motion for summary judgment).
II. 	First Amendment claims
Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “provides a civil cause of
action for individuals who are deprived of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution or federal laws by those acting under color of state law.” 	Smith v. City of Salem,
Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 576 (6th Cir. 2004). 	To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege two
elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
(2) that the defendant deprived him of this federal right under color of law. Jones v. Duncan, 840
F.2d 359, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court’s screening opinion set out the legal standard applicable to plaintiff’s
First Amendment claims:
“A prisoner’s right to receive mail is protected by the First Amendment.”
Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1012 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). “Mail is one medium of free speech, and the right to send
and receive mail exists under the First Amendment.” Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d
1317, 1333 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,
501 U.S. 410, 427 (1993) (“[T]he use of the mails is as much a part of free speech
as the right to use our tongues.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
But a prisoner retains only those First Amendment freedoms which are “not
inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with legitimate penological objectives
of the corrections system.” Martin v. Kelley, 803 F.2d 236, 240 n.7 (6th Cir. 1986)
(quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 822; see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). It is
well established that “[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal
or 	limitation 	of 	many 	privileges 	and 	rights, 	a 	retraction 	justified 	by 	the
considerations underlying our penal system.” Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285
(1948). The limitations on the exercise of constitutional rights arise both from the
fact of incarceration and from valid penological objectives-including deterrence of
crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security. O’Lone v. Estate of
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Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citing Pell, 417 U.S. at 822-23; Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974)).
Opinion at PageID.38-39.
This lawsuit involves mail sent to the plaintiff prisoner. As this Court explained:
Incoming mail has long been recognized to pose a greater threat to prison
order and security than outgoing mail. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989);
Turner, 482 U.S. at 78. And the possibility that incoming mail might introduce
contraband into the prison is so obvious that courts have routinely upheld the right
of 	prison 	officials 	to 	inspect 	incoming 	mail 	for 	contraband 	despite 	First
Amendment free speech protection. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
574-76 (1974).
Id. at PageID.40 (footnote omitted).
A. 	Regular mail
1. 	Newspaper articles rejected by defendant Brown
Pursuant to MDOC Policy Directive (PD) 05.03.118 ¶ DD (eff. March 1, 2018), all
incoming that does not require “special handling” (referred to in this report as “regular mail”) is
opened by the MDOC and inspected for contraband:
All incoming mail that does not receive special handling pursuant to
Paragraphs EE through HH shall be opened in one location at each facility and
inspected at that location to determine if it contains money, controlled substances,
or other physical contraband. All physical contraband shall be confiscated prior to
delivery of the mail to the prisoner. The mail’s written content also shall be
skimmed, and if it appears from skimming the content that the mail may violate this
policy, the item shall be read to determine if it is allowed.
Compl. (ECF No. 1, PageID.75). Under this policy, the MDOC may reject a portion of a periodical
such as a newspaper:
If 	any 	written 	material, 	picture, 	or 	photograph 	contained 	within 	a
publication is believed to be in violation of this policy, the entire publication shall
be rejected. However, if the written material, picture or photograph is in a section
of a newspaper that is not stapled or otherwise affixed to the rest of the newspaper,
only that section of the newspaper shall be rejected. The rest of the newspaper shall
be delivered to the prisoner.
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PD 05.03.118 ¶ RR (ECF No. 1, PageID.79).
a. 	August 6, 2020 newspaper article
First, Plaintiff alleges that, on August 20, 2020, Defendant Brown rejected four
pages from his Lansing Star Journal because they included an article pertaining to
an MDOC prisoner in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. (Compl., ECF No. 1,
PageID.22-23 ¶ 84.) Plaintiff includes a copy of the Notice of Package/Mail
Rejection form, (Attach., ECF No. 1, PageID.59); nonetheless, he claims he did not
receive notice of the rejection and that he was not afforded an opportunity to be
heard. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.23 ¶ 86.)
Opinion at PageID.19-20. While the Court’s opinion states that a newspaper article was rejected
on August 20, 2020 (ECF No. 20, PageID.29), the complaint and the attached rejection (ECF No.
1, PageID.22, 59) establish that the article was rejected on August 11, 2020. 	Accordingly, the
Court will refer to this rejection as occurring on August 11, 2020.
Defendant Brown explained the rejection of this newspaper article as follows:
On August 11 and August 25, 2020, I issued prisoner Samuel Calhoun #397175
(“Plaintiff”) notices of rejection for newspaper articles. In context, this means
Plaintiff was provided the newspapers at issue, less articles that were withheld
pending resolution of his notice of rejection. The article underlying the August 11
rejection was an article from August 6, 2020, describing an August 3, 2020, escape
attempt by three prisoners at another MDOC prison. The article specifically
identified the three prisoners by first and last name, age, and stated the crime they
were previously convicted of. The article identified the facility they attempted to
escape from, described the manner of how they tried to escape, described how other
prisoners attempted to help them, and described how staff apprehended them.
Brown Decl. (ECF No. 61-3, PageID.335-336).4
Brown stated that she followed and relied on MDOC policy when issuing the
rejection for this article. Id. at PageID.336. Brown further explained the mail rejection procedure:
A “notice of rejection,” . . . is the first step in MDOC’s process for determining
whether a prisoner will be denied incoming mail. Per policy, a prisoner who
disputes the validity of a rejection can request an administrative hearing.
Id.
4 The Court notes that Brown’s declaration is referred to as an “affidavit” and she is referred to as “affiant”.
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MDOC Policy prohibits prisoners from receiving mail such as the rejected article,
which explained how the prisoners attempted to escape from an MDOC correctional facility:
Prisoners are prohibited from receiving mail that may pose a threat to the security,
good order, or discipline of the facility, facilitate or encourage criminal activity, or
interfere with the rehabilitation of the prisoner. The following pose such risks under
all circumstances and therefore shall be rejected: . . . 17. 	Mail depicting,
encouraging, or describing methods of escape from a correctional facility. . .
PD 05.03.118 ¶ NN (ECF No. 1, PageID.76-77) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff did not have a First Amendment right to receive the prohibited newspaper
article. The withholding of a newspaper article that describes an escape attempt at another prison
does not violate the First Amendment because it is “patently reasonable” for MDOC employees to
prevent plaintiff from researching how to escape from prison. See Murphy v. Karber, No. 1:14-
cv-269, 2017 WL 4160949 at *13 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 2017), affirmed No. 17-2271, 2018 WL
5296368 (6th Cir. May 8, 2018) (“It was patently reasonable for MDOC employees at ICF to try
to keep from plaintiff the details of how an Arizona prison break had been accomplished . . . The
same is true for the rejection of the story describing how the Ohio prisoner escaped from his
hospital bed restraints. . .”). 	In summary, defendant Brown did not violate plaintiff’s First
Amendment rights by issuing a Notice of Rejection as to the August 6, 2020 newspaper article.
Accordingly, this claim should be denied.
b. 	August 22, 2020 newspaper article
Next, Plaintiff claims that, on August 25, 2020, Defendant Brown rejected two
pages from another Lansing Star Journal article because it “discuss[ed] the current
global coronavirus and an MDOC prisoner.” (Id., PageID.23 ¶ 85.) Plaintiff claims
that he did not receive notice of the rejection and that he was not afforded an
opportunity to be heard. (Id. ¶ 86.)
Opinion at PageID.30, Brown set forth the basis for rejecting this newspaper article as follows:
The article underlying the August 25 rejection was an article from August 22, 2020,
that contained the names of current MDOC prisoners, along with information that
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a specific MDOC prison, mentioned by first and last name, and age, tested positive
for COVID-19.
Brown Aff. at PageID.336. The Notice of Rejection (Exh. E, ECF No. 61-6) was signed by Brown,
dated August 25, 2020, and identified the rejected mail as follows, “ARTICLE IN 8/22/2020
LANSING JOURNAL DISCUSSES VIRUS AND CURRENT MDOC PRISONER, pages 7A, &
8A, removed.” PageID.356. The listed reason for rejection is PD 05.03.118 ¶ NN. Id.
Defendants’ brief also refers to PD 03.04.100 ¶ J (eff. 04/01/2019), which states,
Prisoners shall not perform direct patient care, except for authorized care performed
by Prisoner Palliative Care Aids and prisoner opticians. Prisoners also shall not
schedule medical appointments, determine access to care, handle critical tools or
medications, operate diagnostic or therapeutic equipment except for authorized use
by prisoner opticians, or have access to information contained in other prisoners’
health records. 	Prisoners may handle their own medications and injections, as
appropriate.
PD 03.04.100 ¶ J (ECF No. 61-5, PageID.343) (emphasis added); Defendants’ Brief (ECF No. 61,
PageID.266).
The Notice of Rejection includes a section “to be completed by the prisoner only”
which allows the prisoner to “[i]ndicate what you want to have done with the item(s) identified by
marking one of the following . . .” Notice (ECF No. 61-6, PageID.356) (emphasis in original).
The Notice reflects that plaintiff chose the option “Destroy (mail & property only)” and signed the
Notice on September 21, 2020. Id. As Brown explained:
4. The document [“Notice of Package / Mail Rejection], included as Exhibit E [ECF
No. 61-6, PageID.356], memorializes that Plaintiff consented to destroy the article
underlying the August 25 rejection notice. Once a prisoner consents to destroy an
article in lieu of seeking an administrative hearing, the article is discarded.
5. I have been informed Plaintiff is claiming some unknown staff member
improperly notated the disposition section of the rejection form to convey that
Plaintiff consented to destroy article underlying the August 25 rejection notice.
Even if that were true, I would not have known about that, as I was not personally
involved in procuring Plaintiffs signature on the form or notating Plaintiffs
preferred disposition.
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Brown Aff. at PageID.336-337.
Even if there was an error in the Notice of Rejection, plaintiff’s claim fails. 	PD
05.03.118 ¶ NN applies to the rejection because the MDOC has an interest in prohibiting prisoners
“from receiving mail that may pose a threat to the security, good order, or discipline of the facility,
facilitate or encourage criminal activity, or interfere with the rehabilitation of the prisoner.”
PageID.76. See Murphy v. Karber, No. 17-2271, 2018 WL 5296368, at *6 (Order) (6th Cir. May
8, 2018) (observing that “prisons have an interest in preventing personal information to be
disseminated within a prison because it may facilitate criminal acts against individuals”) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In this regard, a prisoner has a significant interest in his or her medical
diagnoses. 	See, e.g., Moore v. Prevo, 379 Fed. Appx. 425, 427-28 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that
“[i]t is beyond question that information about one’s HIV-positive status is information of the most
personal kind and that an individual has an interest in protecting against the dissemination of such
information”, that “a prisoner’s right to privacy in this medical information is not fundamentally
inconsistent with incarceration”, and that “we join the Second Circuit in recognizing that the
constitutional right to privacy in one’s medical information exists in prison.”) (quoting Doe v.
Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 317 (3d Cir. 2001)) (internal citations omitted). 	Accordingly, defendant
Brown did not violate plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by issuing a Notice of Rejection as to the
August 6, 2020 newspaper article.
2. 	The DNA Report
a. 	Plaintiff’s claim
Plaintiff contends that on December 29, 2021, defendants Brown and Scanlon:
censored mail to Plaintiff from Intelligent Solutions Advisory “by removing several
pages of a forensic DNA report that was created by the advisory group at Plaintiff’s
request . . . .” (Id., PageID.25 ¶ 91.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Brown and
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Scanlon again failed to provide the requisite notice so that Plaintiff was never
afforded a hearing regarding the censorship. Plaintiff reordered the report. Plaintiff
contends that Brown and Scanlon entirely failed to provide the second report
without providing notice or an opportunity to be heard. (Id. PageID.28 ¶ 99.)
Opinion at PageID.30.
Plaintiff alleged that the censored mail was from “Intelligent Solutions Advisory
(ISA), located at 4-831 Kuhio Hwy. Suite 438-333, Kapaa, HI 96746”, that defendants “remov[ed]
several pages of a forensic DNA report that was created by the advisory group at Plaintiff’s behest
and mailed to him”, and that “[t]his forensic DNA analysis were [sic] to be presented as newly
discovered exculpatory evidence to the court in Plaintiff’s post-conviction appeal with respect to
his criminal conviction.” 	Compl. at ¶ 91, PageID.25. 	Exhibit F appears to be a label from the
USPS dated December 17, 2021, from ISA to plaintiff. 	See Label (ECF No. 1, PageID.61).
Plaintiff further alleged that in early January 2022,
Plaintiff took this matter to the Unit’s Prisoner Counsel [sic] (PC) Jones and showed
him the forensic DNA report that he had received from ISA and how there were
sections missing from its chronological order, which sections were entitled as
exhibits 	1 	through 	8, 	with 	each 	exhibits’ 	page 	number 	listed 	in 	its 	own
chronological order by page of which some pages were missing. Plaintiff asked PC
Jones to contact mail room clerks Brown and Scanlon and inquire about the missing
pages since he did not received a mail rejection notice of their rejection. Plaintiff
was informed by PC Jones that he had spoken with Scanlon, who told him that
Plaintiff “received what was sent to him.”
Compl. at ¶ 93, PageID.25-26.
Plaintiff alleged that he obtained a second copy of the DNA Report “via [a] third
party” who “requested for ISA to send him another copy of the forensic DNA report immediately
in order for him to file it in the court along with his motion for relief from judgment on post-
conviction appeal, who mailed the second report out to him in mid-January 2022.” 	Id. at ¶ 96,
PageID.27. Plaintiff continued,
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97. As to the issue above regarding the second DNA report mailed to Plaintiff in
paragraph 96, after more than a month of checking in with ISA, who was tracking
the package’s delivery via USPS Tracking System. [sic] Plaintiff was informed that
his mail had arrived at MCF and was signed for by prison officials on February 9,
2022. See Photocopy of the Envelope In Which Plaintiff’s First Forensic DNA
Report Arrived from ISA and MDOX DOM 2202-23 Regarding Prisoners’
Incoming Mail, (attached as Exhibit F, to this Complaint).
98. As to the issue above regarding the arrival of the second DNA report mailed to
Plaintiff in paragraph 97, it now being February 28th, and Plaintiff at this juncture:
had neither received a rejection notice with regard to his mail from ISA nor had he
received the mail itself that was sent to him and signed for by prison officials.
Id. at ¶¶ 97-98, PageID.27.
At his deposition, plaintiff testified that he knew that ISA sent the second package
because “the copy of the envelope that they sent it” was “attached to the verified complaint.” See
Calhoun Dep. (ECF No. 61-2, PageID.299). However, defense counsel had to correct plaintiff by
pointing out that the “envelope” (Exhibit F) was for the first package. Id. Plaintiff then testified
that his daughter contacted Hawaii and they “confirmed to her that the package did arrive here.”
Id. at PageID.300. 	Plaintiff speculated that his daughter might have the receipt for the second
package. 	Id. at PageID.301. 	Finally, plaintiff had no evidence that either defendant Brown or
Scanlon handled the second package. Rather, plaintiff stated,
I just know what's been conveyed to me, that when she [his daughter] talked to
Solutions, they said that they had received the receipt back, that it was signed for
at the facility, so that it had arrived here.
Id. at PageID.302.
b. 	Plaintiff’s deposition testimony regarding the two copies of the DNA
Report and defendants’ motion to compel production of the first copy of the
DNA Report (ECF No. 54)
To evaluate the parties’ motions for summary judgment related to the two copies
of the DNA Report, the Court needs to address plaintiff’s deposition testimony regarding the DNA
Report and defendants’ motion to compel production of the first copy of the DNA Report received
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on December 29, 2021. 	By way of background, the mailing label (Exhibit F) is the only
documentary evidence to support plaintiff’s claims regarding the existence of the first copy of the
DNA Report. 	Plaintiff has presented no other documentary evidence to support his claims
regarding either the first or second copy of the DNA Report.
As discussed, plaintiff alleged that the DNA Report was “a forensic DNA report
that was created by the advisory group at Plaintiff’s behest and mailed to him” and that the
“forensic DNA analysis” was to be presented as newly discovered exculpatory evidence to the
court in his post-conviction appeal of a criminal conviction. Compl. at ¶ 91, PageID.25. 5 	In its
screening opinion, the Court noted that plaintiff did not allege that the ISA was a laboratory which
prepared a DNA report for him, stating “it does not appear that Intelligent Solutions Advisory is a
laboratory; 	rather, 	it 	is 	— 	or 	perhaps 	was 	— 	a 	book 	vendor 	through 	the 	website
www.toolsforfreedomstore.com. ” PageID.30, fn. 2. 6
5 The Court notes that plaintiff filed this lawsuit more than 20 years after his conviction. A jury found plaintiff guilty
of first-degree criminal sexual conduct on July 27, 2001, and sentenced him to life imprisonment on September 17,
2001. See Calhoun v. Prelesnik, No. 1:09-cv-468, 2014 WL 4983500 at *11 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 25, 2014). Defendants
explained the relevant DNA evidence as follows:
Plaintiff was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct for impregnating his
fourteen-year-old stepdaughter. At trial, Plaintiff was identified as the perpetrator through: (1) the
victim’s testimony that Plaintiff had, to varying degree, molested her since she was in second grade;
and (b) a paternity test which, by way of DNA testing and analysis, confirmed Plaintiff to be the
father of the victim’s infant by a statistical certainty of more than 3 trillion to 1. People v. Calhoun,
No. 237287, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 2646, at *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2003).
Defendants’ Motion to Compel (ECF No. 54, PageID.180, fn. 1).
6 Decisions from other courts indicate that ISA provides “reports” and DVDs. See generally, Caetano v. Board of
State & Community Corrections., No. 122CV00687SKOPC, 2023 WL 3201072 at *5 (May 2, 2023), R&R adopted
2023 WL 3727308 (E.D. Cal. May 30, 2023) (in alleging fraud pursuant to California Penal Code section “1473(b)(2)
‘false physical evidence’ ”, plaintiff claims fraud “based upon a CIA front company out of Hawai‘i named ISA-
Intelligent Solutions Advisory-47 page report 9409 on the inadmissibility of PCR DNA evidence because it is
‘synthetic remanufactured’ evidence clearly § 1473(b)(2) ‘false physical evidence.’ ”); Nicholson v. Boakye, No.
7:17CV00273, 2017 WL 3331775 at *1 (W.D. Va. Aug. 4, 2017) (in dismissing pro se inmate Nicholson’s complaint,
the Court noted that “Nicholson submits a photocopy of a DVD he obtained from Intelligent Solutions Advisory titled
‘RFID Revealed: The Secret Microchip Plan to Tag Everyone.’”).
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Defendants’ counsel deposed plaintiff on August 28, 2025, about one month before
discovery closed (September 30, 2025). 	See Calhoun Dep. (ECF No. 61-2); Case Management
Order (CMO) (ECF No. 38, PageID.118). 	During the deposition, defendants’ counsel asked
plaintiff about the alleged “forensic DNA analysis” contained in the “DNA Report”. 	When
counsel pointed out that ISA does not perform DNA analysis (i.e., the company’s business
description stated that it “primarily operates in the educational aids and electronic training
materials businesses and industry within the miscellaneous retail sector”), plaintiff responded “I
fail to see the relevance to this issue.” Calhoun Dep. at PageID.305. When counsel attempted to
ascertain the nature of the DNA Report, plaintiff gave a rambling answer:
Q And does that involve them running a new test on you, or simply commenting
on the statistic involved with your conviction?
A Neither. It’s the method -- the methodology that was used to conjure the test --
the test that --the test that the Michigan State Police lab took, that I’m -- that I have
in my possession, that was never entered into evidence during trial.
Id. at PageID.295. When counsel pointed out that plaintiff’s grievance claimed that the MDOC
removed sections of the DNA report contained in the package, plaintiff testified that his statement
“was in the context of there being censorship of incoming mail.” Id. at PageID.306.
Based on this record, plaintiff did not establish the nature of the alleged forensic
DNA analysis from ISA. 	However, the issue before the Court is not whether ISA prepared a
forensic DNA analysis. Rather, the remaining claims in this lawsuit involves plaintiff’s allegation
that defendants interfered with his First Amendment right to receive mail from ISA, whether that
mail was an envelope containing a “forensic DNA analysis” or an envelope containing a “DNA
Report”.
That being said, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that defendants censored his
mail from ISA by removing parts of a “DNA Report”. 	Plaintiff could not identify the specific
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portions of the DNA Report which he claims defendants removed. When defense counsel asked
“how do you know the first envelope was incomplete”, plaintiff testified that,
Because the papers was in a series. They were -- it was in a series of exhibits, 1 to
8, and there was a section missing. It was all in chronological order, and there was
a section missing.
Calhoun Dep. at PageID.297. 	When defendants’ counsel sought clarification about the missing
section, plaintiff provided a rather garbled explanation,
Q 	And so which section do you believe was missing? You said that was like
a chronological order of documents or exhibits. Could you tell which, specifically,
was supposed to be there but wasn’t?
A 	Well, there’s -- it was eight exhibits, from 1 to 8, and then, the -- there was
page numbers. Each exhibit was in chronological order. One from this page, page
1 of 22, page 2 of 22. That’s how it was done. And there was sections missing. If
-- if that -- if I made myself clear there, you know -- know -- if that’s clear -- being
-- if I’m being clear to you, which is how I knew that the sections were missing.
Id. at PageID.298.
Next, plaintiff has no evidence to support his claim that the mailroom staff censored
the DNA Report. When defendants’ counsel asked, “But how do you know that they were missing
because someone in the mailroom withheld them, in contrast to perhaps the Hawaii company just
sent you what they sent you?”, plaintiff admitted “Well, I didn’t, which is why -- which is why I
went to the counselor with my issue.” Id. (emphasis added).
Finally, defendants’ counsel also asked plaintiff about the location of the DNA
Report. 	At least three times during the deposition, plaintiff stated that he possessed the DNA
Report which ISA sent to him in December 2021.7
7 First, when counsel asked “do you still have the documentation that this Hawaii company sent you?”, plaintiff
responded “Yes.” Calhoun Dep. at PageID.295. Second, when defendants’ counsel asked “And then you mentioned
that you do still have the pages that did arrive with the first package?”, plaintiff answered “That is correct.”
PageID.304. Third, when asked “Where is the DNA report?”, plaintiff responded “I’m in possession of -- of the DNA
report.” Id. at PageID.310.
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The next day, defendants served a discovery request for plaintiff to produce the
documents received from ISA:
Please produce a copy of any/all documents in your possession purporting to be
documents sent to you from Intelligent Solutions Advisory” [sic] in December of
2021.
First Request to Produce (ECF No. 54-3, PageID.201); Certificate of Service (ECF No. 47).
Plaintiff did not produce the DNA Report which he claimed to possess. Rather, he responded with
“objections” dated September 17, 2025:
OBJECTIONS: Plaintiff brought his § 1983 action in early-May, 2023, while at
Duane Waters Hospital in Jackson, MI recovering from shoulder replacement
surgery and either nolonger [sic] possess [sic] or cannot locate the documents
requested due to the searching and removal of his legal materials for having
excessive legal property when his property was packed up and move to and fro [sic]
facilities at both Duane Waters and Muskegon Correctional Facility. Moreover, the
contents of the packet received by Plaintiff from “Intelligent Solutions Advisory”
would be largely irrelevant to the case.
Plaintiff’s Response (ECF No. 53, PageID.174-175).
Plaintiff’s response and objections contradict his deposition testimony that he
possessed the DNA Report. Given this contradiction, defendants filed a combined motion/brief to
compel (ECF No. 54), in which they ask the Court to overrule plaintiff’s objection, order
“disclosure of the documents compelled”, and to “grant their motion to compel.” PageID.183. See
Defendants’ Motion at PageID.181-183.
In his response to the motion to compel, plaintiff appears to state that he mistakenly
testified that he possessed the DNA Report (in his words):
[D]uring his deposition when he was giving his testimony regarding the documents
that he had requested to be produced that, he believed that he was in fact in
possession of them at the time until after a thorough search of his property reviled
otherwise as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B).
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Plaintiff’s Response (ECF No . 59, PageID.240-241). Then, plaintiff appears to state that he never
intended to use the DNA Report at trial (in his words):
Therefore, since Plaintiff cannot located the requested documents and did not
beforehand as it continues to be the case to ever use the documents at a hearing or
at a trial thus, the Court should dismiss Defendant’s Motion to Compel.
Id. at PageID.242.
Based on this record, there is no relief that the Court can provide to defendants.
The Court cannot compel plaintiff to produce the DNA Report which he no longer possesses. In
this regard, plaintiff stated that he did not intend to use the alleged DNA Report at trial. The Court
will hold plaintiff to his statements. Finally, defendants’ motion did not seek sanctions or any other
relief from the Court. Accordingly, plaintiff’s objections should be sustained and defendants’
motion to compel (ECF No. 54) should be denied.
c. 	Discussion
Based on this record, plaintiff’s inconsistent deposition testimony and his failure to
produce the alleged DNA Report undermine his First Amendment claim that defendants censored
this report. The only documentary evidence that plaintiff produced to support his claim is a copy
of an envelope from ISA, addressed to plaintiff and postmarked December 17, 2021. See Copy of
Envelope (ECF No. 1, PageID.61). 	Plaintiff did not provide a coherent description of the
document he received or any specific exhibits which were missing from the document.
Furthermore, plaintiff admitted that he had no evidence that someone in the mailroom removed
the alleged missing exhibits from the DNA Report.
Finally, there is no evidence that anyone at the prison received a second copy of the
DNA Report in 2022 or that either Scanlon or Brown withheld the second copy of the report from
him. According to plaintiff, a third-party (his daughter) ordered it, someone at ISA was tracking
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it, an unidentified person informed plaintiff or his daughter that the second report had arrived at
MCF, and an unidentified prison official signed for it on February 9, 2022. See Compl. at ¶¶ 96,
97 and 98, PageID.27. Plaintiff also speculated that his daughter might have a “receipt” without
explaining the nature or relevance of the “receipt”. 	To the extent that plaintiff has any evidence
that a second DNA Report was received at the prison, it is hearsay evidence from his daughter
which cannot create a genuine issue of material fact to support a summary judgment motion. See
Sperle v. Michigan Department of Corrections, 297 F.3d 483, 495 (6th Cir. 2002) (“A party
opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot use hearsay or other inadmissible evidence to
create a genuine issue of material fact.”). Based on this record, no reasonable juror could find that
Brown or Scanlon removed exhibits from the first copy of the DNA Report or withheld a second
copy of the DNA Report.
3. 	Conclusion
For the reasons discussed, the Court should: deny defendants Brown and Scanlon’s
motion to compel; grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all of the regular mail
claims; and, deny plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the regular mail claims.
B. 	Legal mail
Plaintiff also alleged that defendants interfered with his legal mail. 	“The
determination of whether particular kinds of correspondence qualify for the constitutional
protection accorded a prisoner’s ‘legal mail’ is a question of law properly decided by the court,
not one of fact that can be submitted to a jury.” 	Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir.
2003). The Sixth Circuit explained the significance of legal mail as follows:
[W]hen the incoming mail is “legal mail,” we have heightened concern with
allowing prison officials unfettered discretion to open and read an inmate’s mail
because a prison’s security needs do not automatically trump a prisoner’s First
Amendment right to receive mail, especially correspondence that impacts upon or
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has import for the prisoner’s legal rights, the attorney-client privilege, or the right
of access to the courts. See Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 174 (6th Cir. 1996) (“The
right of a prisoner to receive materials of a legal nature, which have impact upon or
import with respect to that prisoner’s legal rights and/or matters, is a basic right
recognized and afforded protection by the courts . . . .”); see also Davis v. Goord,
320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) (“In balancing the competing interests implicated
in restrictions on prison mail, courts have consistently afforded greater protection
to legal mail than to non-legal mail . . . .”).
In an attempt to accommodate both the prison’s needs and the prisoner’s
rights, courts have approved prison policies that allow prison officials to open
“legal mail” and inspect it for contraband in the presence of the prisoner. See, e.g.,
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)
(upholding such a policy against a Sixth Amendment attorney-client privilege claim
and a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim based on access to the courts). In
Knop [v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996 (6th Cir. 1992)], we addressed an opt-in system in
which prison officials could open any mail sent to a prisoner unless the prisoner
affirmatively requested that “privileged mail,” defined by the policy as mail sent
by a court or by counsel, be opened in his presence. 977 F.2d at 1012. We found
that the opt-in system was constitutionally sound as long as prisoners received
written notice of the policy, did not have to renew the request upon transfer to
another facility, and were not required to designate particular attorneys as their
counsel. Id.
Not all mail that a prisoner receives from a legal source will implicate
constitutionally protected legal mail rights. Indeed, even mail from a legal source
may have little or nothing to do with protecting a prisoner’s access to the courts and
other governmental entities to redress grievances or with protecting an inmate’s
relationship with an attorney. When it does, however, we must balance the interest
of prison security against the possibility of tampering that could unjustifiably chill
the prisoner’s right of access to the courts or impair the right to be represented by
counsel. We also note in response to prison officials’ security concerns that even
constitutionally protected mail can be opened (although not read) and inspected for
contraband. 	The only requirement is that such activity must take place in the
presence of the recipient, if such a request has been made by the prisoner.
Sallier, 343 F.3d at 874.
Under MDOC Policy, incoming “legal mail” receives “special handling”:
A prisoner may have his/her incoming legal mail receive special handling
by submitting a completed Mail Requiring Special Handling form (CSJ-246) to the
institution’s mailroom supervisor or designee. Only mail received directly from an
attorney or a law firm, a legitimate legal service organization, the Department of
Attorney General, a prosecuting attorney’s office, a court, a clerk of the court, a
Friend of the Court office, or the Office of the Legislative Corrections Ombudsman
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is considered legal mail, and only if the mail is clearly identified on the face of the
envelope as being from one of the above. It is not sufficient for the envelope to be
simply marked “legal mail.”
PD 05.03.118 ¶ FF (ECF No. 1, PageID.75). Here, plaintiff signed the MDOC’s form for “Special
Handling of Incoming Legal Mail” checking the box which stated, “I want my legal mail opened
in my presence.” Legal Mail Form (ECF No. 1, PageID.47).
The MDOC’s procedure for “Processing Mail Requiring Special Handling” is as
follows:
II. If it appears upon receipt that mail requiring special handling may have been
mailed from someone other than the identified sender, mailroom staff shall confirm
the mailing with the identified sender at a verified telephone number (e.g.,
Michigan Bar Journal). If confirmed, the mail shall then be processed with special
handling. If the identified sender did not send the mail, an e-mail shall be sent to
the identified sender confirming this information. A copy of the e-mail shall be
retained with the log identified in Paragraph KK. In such cases, the mail will be
processed in accordance with this policy but will not receive special handling.
JJ. Incoming mail receiving special handling shall be opened and inspected for
money, controlled substances, and other physical contraband in the prisoner’s
presence. The content of the mail shall not be read or skimmed. All physical
contraband shall be confiscated prior to delivery to the prisoner. Mail opened in the
prisoner’s presence that clearly does not qualify for special handling or contains
contraband shall be returned to the mailroom for processing in accordance with this
policy.
KK. A log shall be maintained to document the delivery of mail receiving special
handling. The log shall include the date the mail was received in the mailroom, the
sender’s name, the prisoner’s name and number, the date the mail was given to the
prisoner, and the prisoner’s signature acknowledging receipt of the mail. If the
prisoner chooses not to sign or accept the mail, that shall be documented and the
mail delivered to the prisoner.
PD 05.03.118 ¶ II, JJ and KK (ECF No. 1, PageID.76).
1. 	Defendant Scanlon
a. 	April 28, 2020 (legal mail allegedly treated as regular mail)
Plaintiff reports that, on April 28, 2020, Defendants Scanlon and Brown
processed an incoming piece of mail that was legal mail as regular mail. (Compl.,
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ECF No. 1, PageID.8 ¶ 25.) Plaintiff received the mail opened, removed from its
original envelope, and placed into a new envelope. Plaintiff reports that the mail
was sent from this Court. Accepting that allegation as true, under the MDOC policy,
it was legal mail. As noted above, mail from a court is considered legal mail.
Opinion at PageID.33.
A parcel mailed from a third party, even if it contains correspondence that includes
a court document, is not processed as “legal mail.” See PD 05.03.118, ¶ FF. 	In such a situation,
mailroom staff has no way of knowing that an envelope from a third-party contains court
correspondence until that envelope is opened. In investigating this matter, the respondent to
plaintiff’s related grievance (B. Dixon-Ingalls) stated in relevant part,
I was unable to determine how the amil [sic] entered the facility, but do know the
mail was processed as regular mail. 	Policy and procedures were reviewed and a
new procedure was put in place to copy any envelope that contains legal mail in
which the mail was not sent in from a legal entity identified in the Michigan Bar
Association.
Grievance Response (ECF No. 61-7, PageID.358). The grievance response did not identify either
Scanlon or Brown as the person who opened plaintiff’s “legal mail” as plaintiff claims in his
complaint. Brown Decl. (ECF No. 61-3, PageID.338).
Plaintiff lacks competent evidence that this correspondence was mailed directly
from the federal court, as opposed to a third party who mailed the court document to plaintiff.
Although plaintiff did not see the envelope in which the correspondence arrived, he contends that
that it was “legal mail” processed as “regular mail.” Calhoun Dep. at PageID.315-316. Plaintiff
testified that:
the mail came from the United States District Court and was removed from its
original envelope and put into a stationery, which was then -- which was then --
which then, my name was placed on it name and prison number was placed on it,
and the unit that I lock in. And then it was sent to me, regular mail.
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PageID.314. Plaintiff received the correspondence in an envelope which he attributes to defendant
Scanlon. Calhoun Dep. at PageID.315.
Here, because the envelope contained correspondence from this Court, plaintiff
suspects that the correspondence was sent directly from this Court, opened, and then placed in
another envelope by mailroom staff. 	Plaintiff has no evidence to support this claim. 	Plaintiff
cannot create a genuine issue of material fact based upon conjecture and conclusory accusations.
Walden v. General Electric International, Inc, 119 F.4th 1049, 1056 (6th Cir. 2024). 	See
generally, Feagin v. Mansfield Police Department, 155 F.4th 595, 609 (6th Cir. 2025) (observing
that “the absence of evidence . . . 	cannot create genuine disputes of material fact”) (italics in
original). Accordingly, this claim should be denied.
b. 	May 28, 2020 (United States District Court envelope)
On May 28, 2020, Plaintiff was called to the unit control center to pick up
and sign for another piece of legal mail from this Court. Plaintiff noticed that the
adhesive on the left side flap of the envelope had been “activated and sealed” but
was “at some point . . . torn open and taped close[d].” (Id., PageID.10 ¶ 32.) Based
on that fact, Plaintiff contends that the envelope was opened outside of his presence.
Plaintiff posits that Scanlon or Brown opened Plaintiff’s legal mail outside of his
presence. (Id. ¶ 34.)
Opinion at PageID.34.
Plaintiff did not allege any facts to support a claim against either defendant Scanlon
or defendant Brown. 	Rather, plaintiff alleged that he “filed a grievance against Defendants
Scanlon, Brown and Dixion-Ingalls [sic] for opening his incoming legal mail outside of his
presence that was addressed to him from the United States District Court without justification
contrary to PD 05.03.118, pgh. JJ.” PageID.10-11, ¶ 34.
In her declaration, Scanlon stated,
I processed a May 28, 2020, correspondence from the United States District Court
addressed to Samuel Calhoun #75 (“Plaintiff”). 	I did not open or disturb the
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envelope. It arrived at the facility in the same damaged condition as it was provided
to Plaintiff.
Scanlon Decl. (ECF No. 61-4, PageID.340).8
Defendants admit that “Sixth Circuit precedent dictates this correspondence, sent
by the United States District Court, is legal mail entitled to heightened protection.” Defendants’
Brief (ECF No. 61, PageID.276). While plaintiff alleged that the envelope flap was sealed, torn
open, and taped closed before he received it, plaintiff has no evidence that this envelope was
opened outside of his presence at MCF by either Scanlon or Brown. 	See Calhoun Dep. at
PageID.320-327. 	At most, plaintiff’s suggestion that Scanlon, Brown, or both of them, opened
this envelope and re-taped it is speculative. Plaintiff cannot create a genuine issue of material fact
based upon conjecture and conclusory accusations. See Walden, 119 F.4th at 1056. Accordingly,
this claim should be denied.
c. 	August 12, 2020 (Michigan Court of Appeals envelope)
On August 12, 2020, Plaintiff again received mail from a court—this time
the Michigan Court of Appeals—that had been processed as regular mail. (Id.,
PageID.11-12 ¶¶ 39, 40.) The Michigan Court of Appeals was returning documents
that Plaintiff had submitted for filing. 	Plaintiff attaches the envelope, which
includes a note from the mailroom: “called Court of Appeals[;] Ms. Stockwell in
clerk’s office stated that they did not send any mail to this prisoner – not considered
legal mail.” (Attach., ECF No. 1, PageID.51; Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.12 ¶ 41.)
Plaintiff contends that Defendants Brown and Scanlon again violated Plaintiff’s
rights by opening his legal mail outside of his presence.
Opinion at PageID.34. The following return address was printed on the attached envelope:
State of Michigan
Court of Appeals
925 West Ottawa Street
P.O. Box 30022
Lansing, MI 48909-7522
8 The Court notes that Scanlon’s declaration is referred to as an “affidavit” and she is referred to as the “affiant”.
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(ECF No. 1, PageID.50). On its face, this appears to be legal mail sent from “a court”. See PD
05.03.118 ¶ FF.
In her declaration, defendant Scanlon stated:
I processed an August 12, 2020, correspondence related to the Michigan
Court of Appeals. 	I processed the correspondence as regular mail because, in
advance of opening the envelope, I contacted the Michigan Court of Appeals clerks’
office to determine whether they sent the mail. 	During that phone call, I was
informed by the Clerk’s office that they did not send this mail to Plaintiff.
Contemporaneous with my phone call to the clerk’s office, I noted the envelope to
memorialize the same and that the mail was therefore not considered legal mail.
Scanlon Decl. at PageID.340. 	Defendant Scanlon’s declaration appears to be an incomplete
discussion of the relevant facts. Specifically, it does not explain why Scanlon decided to call the
Michigan Court of Appeals rather than simply treating this as legal mail. Based on this record,
genuine issues of material fact exist as to why Scanlon contacted the Michigan Court of Appeals
when the envelope appeared to have been sent to plaintiff from that court and appeared to meet
the definition of legal mail under PD 05.03.118 ¶ FF. 	Accordingly, this claim should survive
summary judgment.
2. 	Defendant Brown
a. 	April 28, May 28 and August 12, 2020 legal mail
There is no evidence that defendant Brown was involved in processing plaintiff’s
legal mail from May 28, 2020 or August 12, 2020. As discussed, defendant Scanlon stated that
she processed the legal mail received on May 28th and August 12th. In addition, plaintiff attributed
the April 28, 2020 legal mail to defendant Scanlon because it included Scanlon’s handwriting. See
Calhoun Dep. at PageID.318-319. However, plaintiff also named defendant Brown as responsible
for the April 28, 2020 mail “because there’s only two people there [i.e., in the mail room].” Id. at
PageID.319. Plaintiff has presented no evidence linking Brown to the processing of this legal mail
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which he claims violated the First Amendment. “Personal involvement is necessary to establish
section 1983 liability.” Murphy v. Grenier, 406 Fed. Appx. 972, 974 (6th Cir. 2011). See Rogan
v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1999) (“It is axiomatic that the liability of persons sued in
their individual capacities under section 1983 must be gauged in terms of their own actions.”).
Accordingly, these three claims against defendant Brown should be denied.
b. 	January 29, 2021 legal mail from Jay Trucks & Associates
Finally, the record reflects that defendant Brown did open one piece of legal mail
outside of plaintiff’s presence.
On January 29, 2021, Plaintiff was again called to the unit control center to
pick up and sign for his legal mail. (Id., PageID.15 ¶ 55.) The mail was addressed
to Plaintiff; it was from attorneys Jay Trucks & Associates. (Id.) A note on the
envelope indicated that it had been opened by Defendant Brown; the note stated:
“Opened in error. Contents not searched. K.B. 1/29/21” (Id.)
Opinion at PageID.34. In her declaration, Brown admitted that she opened the envelope:
On January 29, 2021, I opened mail from “Jay Trucks,” not realizing it was
from a law firm as I did so. 	I did not read the correspondence inside. 	To
memorialize that I had opened the envelope by mistake, I contemporaneously
notated the same on the envelope.
Brown Aff. (ECF No. 61-3, PageID.337). 	The envelope includes the following handwritten
statement, “Opened in error. 	Contents not searched. 	KB 1/29/21”. 	Envelope (ECF No. 1,
PageID.57. 	“Numerous courts have recognized that a prison official’s negligent interference with
a prisoner's First Amendment rights does not violate the constitution.” Atkinson v. Kent County
Correctional Facility, No. 1:25-cv-1179, 2026 WL 1145568 at *5 (W.D. Mich. April 28, 2026)
(citing cases including Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 293-94 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that
isolated incidents of negligence by prison officials in implementing kosher food requirements is
not actionable under the First Amendment). Here, there is no evidence to suggest that defendant
Brown intentionally opened the legal mail outside of plaintiff’s presence.
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Furthermore, Brown’s opening of the envelope was an isolated incident which did
not rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation. 	To establish a constitutional violation,
plaintiff must demonstrate that Brown regularly and unjustifiably interfered with the prisoner’s
mail. 	“[A] random and isolated incident [of mail interference] is insufficient to establish a
constitutional violation.” Okoro v. Scibana, 63 Fed. Appx. 182, 184 (6th Cir. 2003). “[T]he inmate
must show that prison officials ‘regularly and unjustifiably interfered with the incoming legal
mail.’ ” Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003). See also, Johnson v. Wilkinson, 229
F.3d 1152, 2000 WL 1175519 at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 11, 2000) (unpublished table decision) (stating
that a prisoner’s allegations about “random and isolated interference with [his] mail” did not rise
the level of a First Amendment violation). 	Here, plaintiff has not demonstrated that defendant
Brown regularly and unjustifiably interfered with his mail. 	Accordingly, this claim should be
denied.
C. 	Qualified Immunity
Defendants contend that plaintiff's claims are barred by qualified immunity. Under
this defense, “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “A clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v.
Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrine of qualified immunity
“gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and
protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” 	Carroll v.
Carman, 574 U.S. 13, 17 (2014).
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The qualified-immunity inquiry involves two questions: whether the defendant
violated a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established. 	See Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). “These questions may be answered in any order; if either one
is answered in the negative, then qualified immunity protects the official from civil damages.”
Brown v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 447, 457 (6th Cir. 2016). “On summary judgment, the court must
analyze these questions after construing the facts in the light most favorable to the party asserting
the injury and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” 	Id. “When, as here, a
defendant raises qualified immunity as a defense, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating
that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.” Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 494 (6th
Cir. 2009).
Here, with the exception of defendant Scanlon’s treatment of the Michigan Court
of Appeals envelope, plaintiff has failed to establish that defendants violated his First Amendment
rights with respect to any of his mail. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity
with respect to these claims.
However, the legal mail claim against defendant Scanlon involves genuine a issue
of material fact. For that reason, this Court cannot grant Scanlon qualified immunity. See Lyttle
v. Riley, 524 Fed. Appx. 226, 228 (6th Cir. 2013) (“We cannot grant qualified immunity to [the
defendant] because disputed issues of material fact preclude a determination of whether a
constitutional violation occurred.”).
III. 	Recommendation
For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully recommend that defendants’ motion
to compel (ECF No. 54) be DENIED.
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I further recommend that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 57)
be DENIED as to all claims, and that defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 60) be
GRANTED as to all claims except for the claim that defendant Scanlon interfered with legal mail
from the Michigan Court of Appeals.
I further recommend that defendant Brown be DISMISSED from this action.
Dated: June 9, 2026 	/s/ Ray Kent
RAY KENT
United States Magistrate Judge
ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be served and filed with the Clerk
of the Court within fourteen (14) days after service of the report. All objections and responses to
objections are governed by W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to serve and file written objections
within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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