Jaiyeola v. Rivian Automotive, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
GANIYU AYINLA JAIYEOLA,
Plaintiff,
v.
RIVIAN AUTOMOTIVE, LLC,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
Case No. 1:23-cv-263
Hon. Jane M. Beckering
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court is Defendant Rivian Automotive’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. (ECF No. 125). Plaintiff Ganiyu Ayinla Jaiyeola opposes the motion (ECF
No. 130), and Rivian has replied (ECF No. 138). This case was referred to the
undersigned judicial officer for all pretrial purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A), and for a report and recommendation on all dispositive matters under
§ 636(b)(1)(B). (Order of Reference, ECF No. 5.) For the reasons below, the
undersigned recommends that Rivian’s motion should be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Jaiyeola is Black. (Compl. ¶ 2.) He was born a citizen of Nigeria and is now a
citizen of the United States. (Id.) He has multiple degrees, including a master’s
degree in business and a doctorate in materials science. (Id. ¶ 5.) He used his
education to work for various companies over the course of his decades-long career.
(Id.)
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In April 2020, Jaiyeola applied to work at Rivian in the position of “Materials
Engineer – Corrosion.” (Id. ¶ 6.) In his cover letter, he highlighted his experience
working in corrosion. (Id.) A recruiter from Rivian called to tell him that the hiring
manager, Xiaoling Jin, wanted to speak with him. (Id. 10-11.) After a phone call
with Jin, the recruiter set up a series of virtual interviews with the rest of the hiring
team: Geoffrey London, John Proulx, Shannon Wells, Sravani Pappu, and Kosta
Papanikolaou. (Id. ¶ 14.) The recruiter also scheduled more time for Jin to talk to
Jaiyeola. (Id.)
On June 18, 2020, everyone on Rivian’s hiring team interviewed Jaiyeola. (Id.
¶ 15.) Two interviewers stood out to him: Pappu and Papanikolaou. According to
Jaiyeola, Pappu turned her camera off during the interview, and there was a blinking
red icon on her blank screen. He asked her why her camera was off, and she told him
that “you don’t want to see me.” (Id. ¶ 16.) Jaiyeola was concerned he was being
recorded. (Id. ¶ 17.) All this made him “extremely stressed.” (Id. ¶ 16.)
During his interview with Papanikolaou, Jaiyeola claims that Papanikolaou
told him that “some people felt Corrosion Engineers just like to feel important but
they are not really needed.” (Id. ¶ 19.) This comment again made Jaiyeola “extremely
stressed.” He alleges that this comment “indicated bias against [him].” (Id. ¶ 19.)
The day after Jaiyeola’s interview, the Rivian hiring team interviewed a white
candidate for the same job as Jaiyeola. Four out of five interviewers (everyone but
London) recommended hiring the white candidate. (Jin Aff. ¶ 18, ECF No. 126-5.)
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Only two of the five interviewers (Proulx and London) recommended hiring Jaiyeola.
(Id. ¶ 10.)
At some point, Jin reviewed the hiring team’s feedback for each candidate. She
decided not to hire Jaiyeola because he lacked recent, hands-on lab experience and
because the hiring team did not reach a consensus to hire him. (Id. ¶ 11-15.) She
also decided not to hire the white candidate because the hiring team had not reached
a consensus to hire him either. (Id. ¶ 18.) Sometime after the white candidate’s
interview, Jin decided that corrosion was not a priority, and she requested that the
position be canceled. (Id. ¶ 19-21.)
On June 24, 2020, the recruiter called Jaiyeola to tell him about Rivian’s
decision not to hire him. (Compl. ¶ 20.) The next day, Jaiyeola messaged Rivian’s
CEO on LinkedIn to share his concerns about how his technical knowledge was tested
and how Pappu and Papanikolaou had treated him. (Jaiyeola Dep. Ex. 7 41-43, ECF
No. 126-3.) Two days later, Jaiyeola filed a complaint with Rivian. (Compl. ¶ 22.)
In August 2020, Jaiyeola filed complaints with the Michigan Department of
Civil Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Id. ¶ 23.) After
he received a notice of dismissal from the MDCR and the right to sue from the EEOC,
he filed this lawsuit against Rivian. (Id. ¶ 24-25.) He claims that Rivian’s decision
not to hire him was based on his race, color, and national origin. If he is right, Rivian’s
decision would have violated both Title VII and Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights
Act (ELCRA). (Id. ¶ 32-55.)
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Discovery came and went in this case without an opportunity to evaluate
Jaiyeola’s complaint. Rivian instead waited to move for summary judgment (ECF
No. 125). The parties fully briefed the issues in Rivian’s motion (ECF Nos. 126, 130,
138), and so now the issues are ripe for review.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 56, summary judgment is mandatory where “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact” and the moving party “is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” when it might “affect the
outcome” of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
A dispute over a material fact is “genuine” when the evidence enables a reasonable
jury to find for the non-moving party. Id. To determine whether a dispute is
“genuine,” the court cannot weigh the evidence or determine the truth of any matter
in dispute. Id. at 249. Instead, the court must view the facts and all inferences that
can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court may consider any
affidavits along with pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or
admissions. Pennycuff v. Fentress Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 404 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir.
2005). The moving party meets its burden by demonstrating that there is no genuine
issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving
party can support its assertion that a fact is not in dispute by “citing to particular
parts of materials in the record” or by showing “that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support [a] fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). The court
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must consider the evidence cited, and although it may consider other evidence in the
record, id. 56(c)(3), it does not comb the record for the non-moving party’s sake,
Guarino v. Brookfield Tp. Trs., 980 F.2d 399, 410 (6th Cir. 1992).
In response to a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party may
argue that the moving party failed to meet their burden by “showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence” of “a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1)(B). If the moving party has met their burden, however, the non-moving party
must then present probative evidence to demonstrate the necessity of a trial to resolve
a genuine dispute. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
In assessing the non-moving party’s burden, the court is limited to determining
whether the case contains enough evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find for the
non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. A mere scintilla of evidence is not
enough. Id. at 252. And the non-moving party cannot rely on the allegations in their
complaint either. Nykoriak v. Wileczek, 666 F. App’x 441, 443 (6th Cir. 2016).
Instead, the non-moving party must “designate” facts in the record with at least
“enough specificity that the district court can readily identify [them].” Guarino, 980
F.2d at 405. If the non-moving party fails to designate any evidence, the court has
grounds to grant the motion. Loc. No. 499, Bd. of Trs. of Shopmen’s Pension Plan v.
Art Iron, Inc., 117 F.4th 923, 934 (6th Cir. 2024).
III. DISCUSSION
It is unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire an individual based on
their race, color, or national origin. This language appears in federal law under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and in Michigan law under the
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ELCRA, Mich. Comp. Law § 37.2202(a). Given the same language in each statute,
courts interpret ELCRA claims in the same way as Title VII claims. Sutherland v.
Michigan Dept. of Treas., 344 F.3d 603, 614 n.4 (6th Cir. 2003); Crane v. Mary Free
Bed Rehab. Hosp., 634 F. App’x 518, 524 (6th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases).
For a failure-to-hire claim under Title VII, courts apply a three-part test. Tartt
v. Wilson Cnty., 592 F. App’x 441 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)). The plaintiff must first be able to make a prima
facie case of discrimination. Id. If he is able to do that, the employer must then
respond with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason it did not hire him. Id. The
burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated reason is
merely pretext for discrimination. Id.
A. Prima Facie Case
The elements of a prima facie case depend on the facts that make up the claim.
But the key question is always the same: could the plaintiff present sufficient
evidence that he “suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances which
give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination”? Blair v. Henry Filters, Inc., 505
F.3d 517, 528 (6th Cir. 2007). To answer that question, Jaiyeola must ultimately
show that: (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he applied for and was qualified for
the position; (3) Rivian rejected his application despite his qualifications; and (4) after
he was rejected, Rivian kept the position open and continued to seek applicants with
similar qualifications as Jaiyeola. See Tartt, 592 F. App’x at 445. Jaiyeola’s burden
here is “light,” “easily met” and “not onerous.” Willard v. Huntington Ford, Inc., 952
F.3d 795, 808 (6th Cir. 2020).
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Rivian challenges the second and fourth elements of Jaiyeola’s prima facie
case. A plaintiff ultimately satisfies the second element of the prima facie case “by
presenting credible evidence that his or her qualifications are at least equivalent to
the minimum objective criteria required for employment in the relevant field.” Wexler
v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
“Although the specific qualifications will vary depending on the job in question, the
inquiry should focus on criteria such as the plaintiff’s education, experience in the
relevant industry, and demonstrated possession of the required general skills.” Id.
at 576.
Rivian argues that there is no genuine dispute over Jaiyeola’s lack of
qualifications because he did not have any recent, hands-on experience testing
materials in a lab. (Brief S.J. 17-18.) This is one of the legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons used by Jin to explain why she did not hire Jaiyeola. (Id. at 18.) The Sixth
Circuit prohibits courts from considering an employer’s legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons when evaluating a plaintiff’s prima facie case. Cline v.
Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 660–61 (6th Cir. 2000). To allow otherwise
“would bypass the burden-shifting analysis and deprive the plaintiff of the
opportunity to show that the nondiscriminatory reason was in actuality a pretext
designed to mask discrimination.” Wexler, 317 F.3d at 574. So Jaiyeola’s
qualifications are considered undisputed at this stage for the purposes of the motion.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). Rivian’s argument that Jaiyeola lacked lab experience
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will instead be analyzed as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its failure to
hire him.
With respect to the fourth element, Rivian argues that Jaiyeola cannot meet
his burden because it canceled the position after it rejected him and never hired
anyone to fill the role. But Rivian makes two false assumptions. First, Rivian
assumes that Jaiyeola must show that the role was ultimately filled. While this
showing may be required in some failure-to-promote claims, it is not required for
failure-to-hire claims. Compare Sumner v. Beaumont Health System, No. 20-13163,
2022 WL 1322850, at *7 (E.D. Mich. May 3, 2022) and Carter v. Pena, 14 F. Supp. 2d
1, 5 (D.D.C. 1997) with McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 and Tartt, 592 F. App’x
at 445; see also George v. Youngstown State U., 966 F.3d 446, 470 (6th Cir. 2020).
Second, Rivian assumes that the fact that it canceled the position after it
rejected Jaiyeola means that it could not have at any point kept the position open to
seek applicants similar to him. Rivian cites to Jin’s affidavit where she explains that
she requested the position be canceled sometime after she reviewed the hiring team’s
recommendations for the white candidate, decided not to hire him, and chose to “take
my team in a different direction as corrosion was not a priority.” (Jin Aff. ¶¶ 18-21.)
This timeline does not specify whether the company continued to seek other
applications at any point after Rivian rejected Jaiyeola. Given the undersigned’s
obligation to view evidence in a light most favorable to Jaiyeola, Rivian fails to
establish the absence of a genuine dispute with respect to the fourth element.
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Still, Rivian argues that there is no evidence in the record to support the fact
that it continued to seek applicants after it rejected Jaiyeola. But Jaiyeola does not
argue that Rivian continued to seek applicants for the same position. Instead, he
relies on a theory that Rivian’s cancellation of the position was itself discriminatory
and that Rivian “continued to advertise” for “similar” positions. (Compl. ¶ 21.) A
discriminatory cancellation can be evaluated either as part of a prima facie case or as
part of pretext. Moore v. Abbott Laboratories, 780 F. Supp. 2d 600, 613 (S.D. Ohio
2011). In this case, Rivian’s argument that Jin’s cancellation was discriminatory
depends on an evaluation of Jin’s reasons for cancelling the position and whether the
subsequent “similar” positions undermine her reasoning. So keeping in mind the
Sixth Circuit’s prohibition against evaluating pretext as part of the prima facie case,
the undersigned will review Jaiyeola’s argument alongside pretext.1
B. Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reasons
What matters in assessing an employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons is “not whether the employer’s reasons are right,” but rather “whether the
employer’s description of its reasons is honest.” Young v. Oakland Cnty., 351 F. Supp.
2d 653, 658 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (emphasis added). In other words, the employer must
offer evidence to establish a “reasonable reliance on the particularized facts that were
before it at the time the decision was made.” Id. (citing Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155
1 The Sixth Circuit neither prohibits an analysis of discriminatory cancellation at the
prima facie stage, see Lindsay v. Yates, 578 F.3d 407, 415 (6th Cir. 2009), nor does it
require it, see Charlton-Perkins v. U. of Cincinnati, 35 F.4th 1053, 1061 (6th Cir.
2022) (analyzing discriminatory cancellation as it relates to pretext).
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F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir.1998)). These particularized facts can be proven by, for
example, looking at the hiring team’s notes from the plaintiff’s interview. See
Romano v. Hudson City Sch. Dist., 772 F. App’x 258, 266 (6th Cir. 2019).
Rivian argues that each of the interviewers that recommended against hiring
Jaiyeola had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for doing so. To support its
argument, Rivian cites to the interviewers’ notes.2 According to Jin, Jaiyeola was
“shy of ideal” because he lacked recent, hands-on lab experience. (Brief S.J. 20
(quoting Jin Aff. ¶ 11; Jin Aff. Ex. B).) To Pappu, Jaiyeola “didn’t seem like a person
who would step out into what is unknown and work through the details” based on
“his response to some of the corrosion questions.” (Id. (quoting Jin Aff. Ex. B).) And
to Wells, Jaiyeola gave “canned” answers, had a “disturbing” demeanor, “made
statements that were intended to shut down” her questions, and became “almost
upset” when asked to explain something. (Id. (quoting Jin Aff. Ex. B).)
Given the materials cited, Rivian has met its burden to show that there is no
genuine dispute of material fact with respect to its legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for not hiring Jaiyeola. Jaiyeola does not challenge the honesty of these
reasons in his response; instead, he argues that these reasons were used as a pretext
for actual discrimination.
2 Papanikolaou’s notes were the only ones that were not available. (Papanikolaou Aff.
¶ 5, ECF No. 126-6.)
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C. Pretext for Discrimination
A plaintiff can still establish discrimination despite an employer’s legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons by proving that the employer’s stated reasons for
rejecting him were a pretext for actual discrimination. Seay v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,
339 F.3d 454, 463 (6th Cir. 2003). A plaintiff can prove pretext by showing that the
employer’s reasons (1) have no basis in fact; (2) were not the employer’s actual
motivation; or (3) were insufficient to explain the employer’s action. Id.
Rivian argues that Jaiyeola cannot cite any evidence to show that Jin’s reasons
for not hiring him were insufficient or untrue. It also argues that Jaiyeola’s message
to Rivian’s CEO on LinkedIn demonstrates that Jaiyeola was aware of other non-
discriminatory reasons that his interviewers may not have been satisfied with his
answers. (Jaiyeola Dep. Ex. 7 41-43.)
In response, Jaiyeola argues that Jin was a “cat’s paw” to Papanikolaou, taking
on his “impermissible bias” and letting it influence her decision to not hire him.
(Response 10-11.) The “cat’s paw” theory refers to a situation in which a supervisor
takes some action while motivated by an unlawful bias to cause the formal
decisionmaker to make an adverse employment action. Flowers v. WestRock Services,
Inc., 979 F.3d 1127 (6th Cir. 2020). So to prove that Jin acted as a “cat’s paw,”
Jaiyeola must at least show that Papanikolaou was motivated by an unlawful bias.
Jaiyeola claims that Papanikolaou told him during his interview that “some
people felt that Corrosion Engineers just like to feel important but they are not really
needed.” (Response 10.) He argues that Papanikolaou’s comment is proof of unlawful
bias because, “[o]n information and belief,” Papanikolaou would not have made these
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comments to Jaiyeola if he was white. But Jaiyeola does not cite any evidence to
substantiate this belief. See Ondo v. City of Cleveland, 795 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2015)
(explaining that an affiant’s personal beliefs do not demonstrate personal knowledge
required by Rule 56). And Papanikolaou’s comment itself is not evidence of unlawful
bias either. When deciding whether a comment is evidence of unlawful bias, courts
consider
whether the comments were made by a decision maker or by an agent
within the scope of his employment; whether they were related to the
decision-making process; whether they were more than merely vague,
ambiguous, or isolated remarks; and whether they were proximate in
time to the act of termination.
Cooley v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 25 F.3d 1325, 1330 (6th Cir. 1994). While the last
consideration is not helpful in a failure-to-hire case, the other three are. In this case,
Papanikolaou’s comment is merely vague, ambiguous, and isolated. After all, the
comment itself is open to interpretation.3 See Kim v. Harvey, 463 F. Supp. 2d 716,
730 (E.D. Mich. 2006). Thus, Jaiyeola is not entitled to an inference that
Papanikolaou was motivated by an unlawful bias.
Jaiyeola also argues that Jin’s reason for cancelling the position was a pretext
to avoid hiring him. (Response at 11.) Jin states in her affidavit that she canceled
the position after she decided to “take my team in a different direction as corrosion
was not a priority.” (Jin Aff. ¶¶ 20-21.) Jaiyeola alleges that Rivian “continued to
3 Papanikolaou’s comment referenced a belief held by “some people” without him
adopting it as his own belief. More importantly, Jaiyeola admitted at his deposition
that corrosion engineers come from many walks of life, and so this comment could not
have been directed at people of any single color, race, or national origin. (Brief S.J.
22.)
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advertise” for “similar” positions after he was rejected. (Compl. ¶ 21.) Rivian argues
that these “similar” positions were actually different from the original position. (Brief
S.J. 18-19.) Jaiyeola does not cite any evidence to challenge Rivian’s characterization
or to show that the position was cancelled to avoid hiring him. His failure to do so is
fatal. Moore, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 613; cf. Charlton-Perkins, 35 F.4th at 1061 (holding
that a plaintiff could satisfy pretext given specific facts to show that a position’s
cancellation was to avoid hiring a member of a disfavored class). And so, his
pretextual cancellation argument fails.4
As a last resort, Jaiyeola argues that other members of the hiring team showed
signs of discrimination. He argues that Pappu’s decision to interview him with her
camera off was a “disturbing procedural irregularity.” (Response 7.) And Wells’s
reasons for recommending against his hire were evidence of “subliminal
discrimination.” (Id. at 8-9.)
A “disturbing procedural irregularity” is one way the Tenth Circuit evaluates
pretext by looking at, for example, whether an employer falsified or manipulated
criteria for a job. Jaramillo v. Colorado Jud. Dept., 427 F.3d 1303, 1308 (10th Cir.
2005). In a similar vein, courts in the Sixth Circuit assess pretext in light of an
“employer’s failure to uniformly apply the policies it cites as the basis for its hiring
4 Although the undersigned declines to evaluate whether the position’s cancellation
was discriminatory as part of the fourth element of Jaiyeola’s prima facie case, the
result would be the same at that step as it is at this one given Jaiyeola’s failure to
designate any evidence in support of his argument. See Lindsay, 578 F.3d at 416-20
(requiring “additional evidence” to infer discrimination from the cancellation of a
purchasing agreement at the prima facie stage).
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and firing decisions.” Kimble v. Wasylyshyn, 439 F. App’x 492, 499 (6th Cir. 2011).
In this case, the reason Pappu did not recommend hiring Jaiyeola was based on his
responses to her answers. The fact that she decided to keep her camera off during
his interview is unrelated to her stated reason and Rivian’s hiring criteria. There is
no evidence in the record to show otherwise.
Finally, Jaiyeola’s argument against Wells’s reasons is also misplaced. In
Yazdian v. ConMed Endoscopic Techs., Inc., 793 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2015), the Sixth
Circuit used the term “subliminal discrimination” to illustrate the subjective nature
of certain labels that a supervisor used to describe his employee’s alleged
insubordination. Id. at 651-52. There, the panel held that there was a difference
“between a refusal to follow an order and an assertion that an employee was ‘rude’ or
‘defiant.’” Id. at 652. The former is insubordination while the latter is too subjective
to infer insubordination outright. In fact, words like “rude” or “defiant” by themselves
are so subjective that they lend themselves to subliminal discrimination, like when a
manager calls “a black man ‘aggressive’ and a white man ‘passionate’ for the same
speech.” Id. When terms like these are this subjective, they must be “examined in
the context and demeanor of the speakers—quintessential jury functions.” Id.
In her interview notes, Wells described Jaiyeola’s answers as “canned,” his
response when asked to elaborate as “disturbing,” his attempts to shut down
questions as “not at all collaborative,” and his attitude when asked to explain
something as “almost upset.” (Jin Aff. Ex. B.) Unlike bald assertions of rudeness or
defiance during alleged insubordination as described om Yazdian, Wells’s description
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of Jaiyeola’s interview are focused on his performance when asked to respond to
questions in a job interview. Her reasons for not hiring him are not so baseless or
subjective that a reasonable juror could infer subliminal discrimination or
unconscious bias. More importantly, Jaiyeola does not cite any evidence to show that
words like “canned” or “not at all collaborative” are unfairly used against people of
the same color, race, or national origin as him. See Clayton v. Greater Knoxville
Chamber of Com., No. 3:20-CV-00099-DCLC, 2022 WL 655710, *10 (E.D. Tenn. Feb.
4, 2022). As a result, Jaiyeola has failed to show pretext with respect to any of Wells’s
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the undersigned recommends that Defendant Rivian
Automotive’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 125) be granted and that this
case be closed.
Objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of
the Court within fourteen days of receipt of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to file timely
objections constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. United States v.
Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Dated: December 17, 2025 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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