Cassaday v. Trump, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
KEVIN WILLIAM CASSADAY,
Plaintiff, 	Case No. 1:25-cv-13074
v. 	Honorable Thomas L. Ludington
United States District Judge
DONALD J. TRUMP,
Defendant.
__________________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT AND WARNING
OF SANCTIONS
Plaintiff Kevin William Cassaday, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP), filed
this civil rights action on September 26, 2025, against President Donald J. Trump. Plaintiff sues
President Trump in his official capacities under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and seeks $40 trillion in damages, among other relief.
Due to Plaintiff’s IFP status, his pro se Complaint is subject to preliminary screening.
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not survive this screening. Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint will be
dismissed. And because no appeal can be taken in good faith, his ability to proceed IFP on appeal
will be denied.
I.
On September 26, 2025, Plaintiff Kevin William Cassaday filed a pro se civil rights
Complaint. ECF No. 1. He alleges that President Donald Trump has “waged war against the United
States, projecting claims against any of his foes of his choosing” and “[sent] troops onto U.S. soil
to enforce his rule of law outside the bounds of powers prescribed by Congress.” Id. at PageID.4.
He also says that Defendant is “[i]mposing tariffs in violation of the Congressional laws as a back
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door tax on Americans to cover up the ‘Big Beautiful Bill.’” Id. He also alleges that Defendant
incited an “[i]nsurrection against” Congress on January 6, 2021. Id. That Defendant “[violates] the
Constitution on a daily basis…to delude his followers into whitewashed ideology.” Id. That
Defendant “has a mental disease or defect that renders his occupation of the Oval Office a threat
to Democracy…the integrity [and] sanity of America.” Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that President
Trump is currently “staging a coup against the United States, habitually lying about the truth [and]
using Social Media” to “bolster those falsehoods” so “individuals cannot decipher the truth.” Id.
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff sues President Trump, asserting unclear claims against
him under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). 	Id. 	at 	PageID.3. 	As 	relief, 	Plaintiff 	seeks 	(1) 	“emergency 	consideration”, 	(2)
$40,000,000,000,000 	in 	damages, 	(3) 	injunctive 	relief 	against 	President 	Trump’s 	alleged
“continually vile . . . targeting of the Left or [Anti-Fascist] groups” that oppose him,” and (4)
seemingly a declaration that “[t]he tariffs imposed by [Defendant] are in direct violation of the
powers given solely to Congress.” Id. at PageID.5.
The same day he sued Plaintiff Trump, Plaintiff applied to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP).
ECF No. 2. Plaintiff’s IFP Application was granted on October 17, 2025. ECF No. 4.
II.
Because Plaintiff proceeds IFP, Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to preliminary screening.
Courts should dismiss an IFP complaint before service if the complaint is frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks any arguable basis in law or fact. See Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). And a
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complaint fails to state a claim if, even when construed liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520–21 (1972), it does not include “a short and plain statement of the claim” showing entitlement
to relief and “a demand for the relief sought[.]” See FED. R. CIV. P. 8. Bare “labels and conclusions”
or “naked assertions” are insufficient. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57, 679 (2007). Instead, the complaint must include
sufficient factual allegations to push its claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
III.
Plaintiff’s claims must be summarily dismissed. Indeed, this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over his claims because sovereign immunity bars them.
At English common law, the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred lawsuits against the
Crown. Welch v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 108 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir. 1939). This doctrine rested on
the notion that, as the supreme political sovereign, “the King can do no wrong.” Duncan v. Peck,
844 F.2d 1261, 1264 (6th Cir. 1988). That is, as a juridical matter, “it would be a contradiction to
allow him to be sued as of rights in his own courts,” when no political sovereign could enforce a
judgment against the Crown. Id. (citing W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, The Law of Torts, § 131
(5th Ed. 1984)).
Although mechanically different than the English monarchical tradition, the American
Republic assumed the doctrine of sovereign immunity, both for “the States and the Federal
Government.” Ernst v. Rising, 471 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Relevant here, for the
Federal Government, the architecture of the United States Constitution yields this immunity “from
the nature of sovereignty itself.” Id. (citing Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S.
381, 388 (1939)). Indeed, the ultimate political sovereign—the People—created the United States
as the federal sovereign government, delegating it certain authority to govern. See United States v.
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Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205–09 (1882) (explaining federal sovereign immunity’s development while
reiterating “[u]nder our system, the people” are the ultimate political sovereign (emphasis in
original)). In so doing, they necessarily vested the United States with the essential attributes of
government sovereignty, including immunity from unconsented judicial compulsion. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). Still, the People retained control over the
extent to which the United States government may be sued and exercise that control through
Congress, which may waive the United States’s immunity. Id.; see also Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S.
187, 192 (1996).
Flowing from those doctrinal principles is a clear legal framework. Because of its sovereign
immunity, the United States may not be sued without Congress’s consent. Muniz-Muniz v. United
States Border Patrol, 741 F.3d 668, 671 (6th Cir. 2013). Absent that consent, a court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over claims against the United States. Id. This immunity extends to federal
officials sued in their official capacity, as opposed to their individual capacity, because such suits
are functionally against the United States itself. Poffenbarger v. Kendall, 137 F.4th 563, 567 (6th
Cir. 2025). When Congress waives the United States’s immunity for a particular type of suit or
claim, the waiver “must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text.” Lane, 518 U.S. at 192. And
this framework applies regardless of the type of relief a plaintiff seeks. See United States v. City
of Detroit, 329 F.3d 515, 520–21 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (applying this federal sovereign
immunity and waiver framework to the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702,
general immunity waiver for cases seeking nonmonetary against the United States under a statutory
cause of action); see also Haines v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 814 F.3d 417, 425–26 (6th
Cir. 2016) (discussing the framework for both monetary and nonmonetary remedies).
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Here, federal sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims. To that end, he asserts Bivens
claims against President Trump in his official capacity, thus suing the United States itself.1
Poffenbarger, 137 F.4th at 567. And because Congress has not waived the United States’s
immunity for “a Bivens-type action” like Plaintiff’s, sovereign immunity applies, depriving this
Court of jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.2 Nuclear Transp. & Storage, Inc. v. United States,
890 F.2d 1348, 1352 (6th Cir. 1989). Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, will be dismissed.
IV.
This Court must make one final observation. This is not Plaintiff’s first filing that has been
summarily dismissed. In addition to this case, he has three others pending here: Cassaday v. State
of Michigan, No. 1:25-cv-12576; Cassaday v. United States District Court for the Western District
of 	Michigan, 	No. 	1:25-cv-13076; 	and 	Cassaday 	v. 	Trump, 	et. 	al., 	No. 	1:25-cv-13075.
Contemporaneously with this case, Cassaday v. United States District Court for the Western
District of Michigan, No. 1:25-cv-13076 and Cassaday v. Trump, et. al., No. 1:25-cv-13075, will
be summarily dismissed.
Nor are these isolated incidents. Plaintiff has filed and had dismissed numerous other
actions across this District for frivolousness, failure to state a claim, immunity, or procedural
default. See, e.g., Cassaday v. State of Michigan, No. 1:25-cv-10419; Cassaday v. Federal
Defender’s Office, No. 1:22-cv-10801; Cassaday v. Verizon Media Inc., No. 1:25-cv-10276;
1 Even if Plaintiff sued President Trump in his individual capacity, President Trump is entitled to
absolute presidential immunity from civil liability, further barring Plaintiff’s claims. Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).
2 Not to mention, even if sovereign immunity did not apply, Bivens only supports narrow, implied
causes of action for damages against federal agents in their individual capacities—not implied
causes of action against the United States or its agencies. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484
(1994).
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Cassaday v. Dow Chemical Co., No. 1:22-cv-11555; Cassaday v. FBI, No. 4:22-cv-10909 (E.D.
Mich.). Notably, several of those actions raise similar claims to the ones Plaintiff brought here.
Magistrate Judge Patricia T. Morris has already warned Plaintiff that this conduct cannot
be tolerated; time spent on these cases means that much less time can be spent addressing other
litigants’ cases that seek relief from this Court. Cassaday v. Verizon Media Inc., No. 1:25-CV-
10276, 2025 WL 763571, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 10, 2025), R&R adopted, No. 1:25-CV-10276,
2025 WL 636320 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2025). Judge Morris detailed his extensive history of
vexatious and meritless filings—17 in a single month in the Western District of Michigan—and
his subsequent threats against federal judges after dismissal. Id. (citing See United States v.
Cassaday, No. 1:23-cr-00043 (W.D. Mich.) (threatening to “get [his] guns” and “have a party”
with a judge). And Judge Morris cautioned that further vexatious filings could result in sanctions,
including pre-filing restrictions. Id.
Stemming from Civil Rule 11, district courts possess the authority to sanction bad-faith
conduct and to enjoin vexatious litigants from further abuse. See United States ex rel. Odish, 843
F. App’x 748, 750 (6th Cir. 2021) (per curiam); see also Gray v. United States, No. 23-3723, 2025
WL 40818, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 3, 2025) (“A district court has discretion to impose prefiling
restrictions on a party with a track record of repetitive or vexatious litigation.”); Clemons v.
DeWine, No. 19-3033, 2019 WL 7567197, at *3 (6th Cir. May 1, 2019); Feathers v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 269 (6th Cir. 1998). While no sanction issues today, the record leaves
little doubt that Plaintiff’s filings are vexatious. He is now expressly warned: continued submission
of frivolous or duplicative lawsuits will result in an order barring further filings without prior leave
of court.
V.
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Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED.
Further, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s ability to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is
DENIED.
This is a final order and closes this case.
Dated: October 24, 2025 	s/Thomas L. Ludington
THOMAS L. LUDINGTON
United States District Judge
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