Lewis v. Didlake, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
KHIREY LEWIS
:
v. 	: 	Civil Action No. DKC 25-1015
:
DIDLAKE, INC.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently 	pending 	and 	ready 	for 	resolution 	in 	this 	case
brought pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) is
the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Didlake, Inc. (“Didlake”).
(ECF 	No. 	8). 	The 	issues 	have 	been 	briefed, 	and 	the 	court 	now
rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. 	Local Rule 105.6. 	For
the following reasons, the motion to dismiss will be granted.
I. 	Background
Pro 	se 	Plaintiff 	Khirey 	Lewis 	(“Mr. 	Lewis”) 	has 	an
intellectual 	disability, 	(ECF 	No. 	3-1, 	at 	19), 	and 	“was 	employed
at Didlake Inc. for six years, receiving job coaching through the
DORS Program, The Arc Program, and The Resource Connection.”1 	(Id.
1 	These 	three 	programs 	are 	not 	further 	defined 	in 	the
complaint. 	Defendant 	explained, 	in 	its 	motion, 	that 	“Didlake 	is
a 	non-profit 	corporation 	with 	a 	mission 	to 	create 	and 	promote
opportunities 	that 	enrich 	the 	lives 	of 	people 	with 	disabilities.
To fulfill its mission, Didlake provides employment opportunities
to 	individuals 	with 	disabilities 	through 	programs 	including 	the
Maryland State Department of Education Division of Rehabilitation
Services (DORS), The Arc, and the Resource Connection.” 	(ECF No.
8-1, at 2) (footnotes omitted).
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at 	3). 	During 	his 	employment, 	he 	alleges 	“continuous 	harassment
from 	coworkers, 	which 	was 	repeatedly 	reported 	to 	HR 	without
resolution.” 	(Id.). 	According to a letter from Didlake attached
to 	Mr. 	Lewis’ 	complaint, 	a 	November 	2023 	meeting 	with 	Mr. 	Lewis,
Human 	Resources 	(“HR”), 	and 	Mr. 	Lewis’ 	“job 	coach” 	was 	meant 	to
“provide 	support 	on 	ways 	to 	manage 	[Mr. 	Lewis’] 	anger 	after
allegations 	of 	threatening 	behavior 	towards 	[his] 	supervisor.”
(Id. 	at 	5). 	In 	February 	2024, 	Mr. 	Lewis 	was 	terminated 	after
“responding 	to 	workplace 	bullying,” 	(Id. 	at 	3); 	when 	two 	fellow
employees 	called 	him 	“weird” 	and 	“mock[ed] 	his 	disability,” 	Mr.
Lewis 	“told 	them 	to 	leave 	him 	alone 	or 	he 	would 	defend 	himself.”
(Id.). 	The termination letter attached to his complaint provides
additional 	detail. 	(Id. 	at 	5-6). 	The 	letter 	alleges 	that 	when
the 	two 	employees 	boarded 	the 	elevator 	Mr. 	Lewis 	was 	on, 	“one 	of
them 	rolled 	their 	eyes 	and 	the 	other 	breathed 	heavily.” 	(Id. 	at
5). 	Mr. Lewis responded by saying “Leave me alone before I swing.”
(Id.). 	The other employees reported his response, “leading to his
termination.” 	(Id. 	at 	3). 	Mr. 	Lewis 	was 	terminated 	effective
March 	1, 	2024, 	because 	he 	had 	“failed 	to 	meet 	the 	expectations
established in Policy 1020–Standards of Conduct for Employees and
Policy 1025–Workplace Violence.” 	(Id. at 5).
Mr. 	Lewis 	alleges 	emotional 	distress, 	depression, 	and
financial trouble following his termination. 	(Id. at 3). 	He also
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alleges 	that 	support 	services 	failed 	to 	“guide[] 	him 	on 	how 	to
file 	for 	unemployment 	or 	appeal 	his 	termination.” 	(Id.).
Additionally, 	an 	individual 	“hired 	through 	the 	DORS 	program[]
refused 	to 	continue 	services 	unless 	[he] 	reapplied, 	further
complicating 	the 	situation.” 	(Id.). 	Following 	his 	termination,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) investigated
his claims and provided Mr. Lewis with a right to sue letter. 	(Id.
at 3, 9).
Mr. Lewis filed a complaint in the District Court of Maryland
for 	Prince 	George’s 	County 	on 	February 	19, 	2025. 	(Id. 	at 	2).
Didlake removed the case to this court on March 27, 2025, asserting
that this court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1331 because Plaintiff asserts a claim which arises under federal
law, specifically the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (ECF No. 1, at
1-2). 	Didlake 	filed 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	for 	failure 	to 	state 	a
claim on April 3, 2025. 	(ECF No. 8). 	Mr. Lewis filed two responses
to 	the 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	on 	May 	22, 	2025. 	(ECF 	Nos. 	29, 	30).
Didlake 	filed 	a 	reply 	on 	June 	17, 	2025. 	(ECF 	No. 	31). 	On 	June
27, 2025, Mr. Lewis filed a “Motion for Extension of Time, Notice
of Filing Issues, and Request for Accommodation due to Disability
and Hardship.” 	(ECF No. 32). 	On July 15, 2025, the court granted
the 	motion 	for 	extension 	of 	time, 	ordering 	that 	Mr. 	Lewis 	would
have 	until 	August 	12, 	2025, 	to 	supplement 	his 	response 	to 	the
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motion 	to 	dismiss. 	(ECF 	No. 	35, 	at 	3). 	On 	August 	12, 	2025, 	Mr.
Lewis filed a document which the court construed as an additional
motion 	for 	extension 	of 	time. 	(ECF 	No. 	36). 	Didlake 	filed 	a
response 	in 	opposition 	to 	the 	motion 	for 	extension 	of 	time 	on
August 21, 2025. 	(ECF No. 37). 	The court granted a “final twenty-
eight (28) day extension to supplement any response to the pending
motion to dismiss.” 	(ECF No. 38, at 1). 	Mr. Lewis filed a final
supplemental 	response 	to 	the 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	on 	September 	17,
2025, 	(ECF 	No. 	39), 	which 	contains 	a 	request 	that 	the 	court, 	in
the 	alternative, 	allow 	him 	to 	amend 	his 	complaint, 	(Id. 	at 	4).
Didlake 	filed 	a 	final 	reply 	to 	the 	response 	on 	October 	1, 	2025,
(ECF No. 40).
II. 	Standard of Review
A 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	under 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	12(b)(6) 	tests 	the
sufficiency of the complaint. 	Presley v. City of Charlottesville,
464 	F.3d 	480, 	483 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2006). 	The 	court 	“must 	accept 	the
complaint's factual allegations as true and construe the facts in
the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	plaintiff.” 	Barnett 	v. 	Inova
Health 	Care 	Servs., 	125 	F.4th 	465, 	469 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2025) 	(citing
Barbour 	v. 	Garland, 	105 	F.4th 	579, 	589 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2024)). 	A
plaintiff’s 	complaint 	must 	only 	satisfy 	the 	standard 	of
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), which requires a “short and plain statement
of 	the 	claim 	showing 	that 	the 	pleader 	is 	entitled 	to 	relief.”
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“[W]here 	the 	well-pleaded 	facts 	do 	not 	permit 	the 	court 	to 	infer
more 	than 	the 	mere 	possibility 	of 	misconduct, 	the 	complaint 	has
alleged—but 	it 	has 	not 	‘show[n]’—that 	the 	pleader 	is 	entitled 	to
relief.’” 	Ashcroft 	v. 	Iqbal, 	556 	U.S. 	662, 	679 	(2009) 	(quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P. 	8(a)(2)). 	A 	Rule 	8(a)(2) 	“showing” 	requires
“stat[ing] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell
Atl. 	Corp. 	v. 	Twombly, 	550 	U.S. 	544, 	570 	(2007). 	“A 	claim 	has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows 	the 	court 	to 	draw 	the 	reasonable 	inference 	that 	defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d
295, 	299–300 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2021) 	(quoting 	Iqbal, 	556 	U.S. 	at 	678).
When 	ruling 	on 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	“courts 	may 	consider 	the
complaint itself and any documents that are attached to it.” 	CACI
Int’l, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 566 F.3d 150, 154
(4th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff 	in 	this 	case 	is 	pro 	se.2 	Courts 	hold 	pro 	se
pleadings 	to 	“less 	stringent 	standards 	than 	formal 	pleadings
2 	Mr. 	Lewis 	is 	listed 	as 	a 	pro 	se 	plaintiff 	on 	the 	docket.
The complaint, initially filed in state court on a preprinted form,
is 	not 	entirely 	legible 	but 	appears 	to 	contain 	his 	signature.
Later 	filed 	documents 	also 	contain 	somewhat 	illegible 	signatures
although some appear to have been signed by two different people,
both 	Plaintiff 	and 	his 	mother. 	(ECF 	Nos. 	3-1, 	at 	16; 	39 	at 	5).
The complaint states, however, that his mother prepared it on his
behalf. 	(ECF No. 3-1, at 3 (“I, Alicia Nathan[], POA and advocate
for 	my 	son, 	[Khirey 	Lewis], 	am 	filing 	this 	complaint 	against
Didlake 	Inc. 	for 	wrongful 	termination, 	discrimination 	based 	on
disability, 	and 	failure 	to 	accommodate 	under 	the 	Americans 	with
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drafted 	by 	lawyers.” 	Erickson 	v. 	Pardus, 	551 	U.S. 	89, 	94 	(2007)
(quoting 	Estelle 	v. 	Gamble, 	429 	U.S. 	97, 	106 	(1976)). 	The 	court
has 	an 	obligation 	to 	construe 	pleadings 	of 	self-represented
litigants 	liberally. 	Id. 	It 	is 	not 	necessary, 	however, 	to
“conjure 	up 	questions 	never 	squarely 	presented,” 	or 	to 	recognize
“obscure or extravagant claims defying the most concerted efforts
to 	unravel 	them.” 	Beaudett 	v. 	City 	of 	Hampton, 	775 	F.2d 	1274,
1277-78 (4th Cir. 1985).
Fed.R.Civ.P. 	15 	governs 	motions 	for 	leave 	to 	amend 	a
complaint. 	After 	the 	time 	has 	elapsed 	for 	a 	party 	to 	amend 	as 	a
matter of right, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1), parties may only amend
their complaint with the written consent of the opposing party or
the 	court’s 	leave. 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	15(a)(2) 	provides 	that 	courts
“should 	freely 	give 	leave 	when 	justice 	so 	requires.” 	“Denial 	of
leave 	to 	amend 	should 	occur 	‘only 	when 	the 	amendment 	would 	be
prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the
Disabilities 	Act 	(ADA).”). 	While 	non-attorneys 	may 	represent
themselves 	pro 	se 	in 	federal 	court, 	“a 	person 	ordinarily 	may 	not
appear 	pro 	se 	in 	the 	cause 	of 	another 	person.” 	Witherspoon 	v.
Jeffords 	Agency, 	Inc., 	88 	F.App’x 	659, 	2004 	WL 	370230, 	at 	*1 	(4th
Cir. 2004) (quoting Pridgen v. Andresen, 113 F.3d 391, 393 (2 d Cir.
1997)). 	See 	also 	Wojcicki 	v. 	SCANA/SCE&G, 	947 	F.3d 	240, 	244 	(4 th
Cir. 2020). 	A notarized power of attorney document is attached to
the complaint, (ECF No. 3-1, at 16), but “[a] non-attorney may not
appear as counsel in this Court even if granted power-of-attorney
authority 	by 	an 	unrepresented 	party.” 	Miller 	v. 	Butler, 	No. 	18-
cv-3102-GJH, 	2019 	WL 	2410937, 	at 	*1 	n.1 	(D.Md. 	June 	7, 	2019)
(citing Local Rule 101.1.a).
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part 	of 	the 	moving 	party, 	or 	the 	amendment 	would 	be 	futile.’”
Jarallah v. Thompson, 123 F.Supp.3d 719, 728 (D.Md. 2015) (quoting
Johnson 	v. 	Oroweat 	Foods 	Co., 	785 	F.2d 	503, 	509 (4 th 	Cir. 	1986)).
An amendment is futile if it is clearly insufficient or frivolous
on its face and would not survive a motion to dismiss. 	See Tawwaab
v. Va. Linen Serv., Inc., 729 F.Supp.2d 757, 769 (D.Md. 2010).
III. Analysis
Under 	the 	heading 	“Legal 	Claims,” 	the 	complaint 	lists 	five
asserted 	causes 	of 	action: 	“Violation 	of 	the 	Americans 	with
Disabilities 	Act 	(ADA),” 	“Workplace 	Discrimination,” 	“Wrongful
Termination,” “Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodations,” and
“Emotional Distress.” 	(ECF No. 3-1, at 3-4). 	Reading the pro se
complaint’s claims liberally, Plaintiff appears to be making three
claims 	under 	the 	ADA: 	discrimination 	based 	on 	a 	failure 	to
accommodate, 	hostile 	work 	environment, 	and 	wrongful 	termination.
It is unclear if “Emotional Distress” is meant to indicate a state
law 	claim 	for 	intentional 	infliction 	of 	emotional 	distress 	or 	if
it 	is 	solely 	meant 	as 	a 	possible 	measure 	of 	damages. 	The 	court
will 	consider 	it 	as 	a 	tort 	claim. 	Finally, 	Plaintiff’s
supplementary 	response 	to 	the 	Defendant’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss
requests leave to amend the complaint in the alternative.
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A. 	ADA Claims
Plaintiff 	brings 	three 	claims 	under 	the 	ADA: 	failure 	to
accommodate his disability, hostile work environment, and wrongful
termination. 	Even 	with 	the 	leeway 	provided 	to 	pro 	se 	pleadings,
Plaintiff 	has 	not 	stated 	“a 	claim 	to 	relief 	that 	is 	plausible 	on
its face.” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
1. 	Failure to Accommodate
A court in this district previously outlined the analysis for
an ADA claim based on a failure to accommodate:
[T]o 	establish 	a 	prima 	facie 	case 	of
discrimination 	based 	on 	a 	failure 	to
accommodate 	under 	the 	ADA 	. 	. 	. 	a 	plaintiff
must 	demonstrate 	that: 	(1) 	the 	plaintiff 	was
an individual who had a disability within the
meaning 	of 	the 	statute; 	(2) 	the 	employer 	had
notice 	of 	the 	disability; 	(3) 	with 	a
reasonable 	accommodation 	the 	plaintiff 	could
perform 	the 	essential 	functions 	of 	the
position sought; and (4) the employer refused
to make such an accommodation.
Gagnon v. Bd. of Educ., 760 F.Supp.3d 359, 371 (D.Md. 2024) (citing
Wilson v. Dollar General Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 345 (4 th Cir. 2013).
Didlake does not dispute that Mr. Lewis has a disability, and that
it was aware of his disability. 	Didlake argues, however, that Mr.
Lewis 	has 	not 	pleaded 	facts 	sufficient 	to 	support 	the 	final 	two
prongs: 	that 	the 	employee 	could 	perform 	“the 	essential 	functions
of the position sought” with a reasonable accommodation, and that
the employer refused to provide a reasonable accommodation.
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Plaintiff 	has 	failed 	to 	allege 	any 	facts 	that 	could 	support
a claim on this ground. 	Reviewing Plaintiff’s complaint, the only
possible 	allegation 	that 	Didlake 	failed 	to 	accommodate 	Plaintiff
is that “no one properly guided him on how to file for unemployment
or appeal his termination,” (ECF No. 3-1, at 3), and an individual
“hired 	through 	the 	DORS 	program, 	refused 	to 	continue 	services
unless 	[he] 	reapplied,” 	(Id.). 	“Under 	the 	ADA, 	‘[r]easonable
accommodations’ 	are 	‘modifications 	or 	adjustments 	to 	the 	work
environment, 	or 	to 	the 	manner 	or 	circumstances 	under 	which 	the
position held is desired or customarily performed, that enable an
individual 	with 	a 	disability 	who 	is 	qualified 	to 	perform 	the
essential functions of that position.’” 	Gagnon, 760 F.Supp.3d at
371 	(quoting 	29 	C.F.R. 	§ 	1630.2(o)(ii)). 	Plaintiff’s 	requested
“accommodations” are all from after he was terminated; he makes no
allegation 	that 	Didlake 	failed 	to 	make 	changes 	to 	his 	work
environment or position to make it possible for him to do his job.
An 	employer 	is 	under 	no 	obligation 	to 	make 	reasonable
accommodations for a former employee. 	A reasonable accommodation
is a modification or adjustment to the “job application process,”
“work 	environment, 	or 	to 	the 	manner 	or 	circumstances 	under 	which
the 	position 	held 	or 	desired 	is 	customarily 	performed,” 	or 	that
enables a disabled employee “to enjoy equal benefits and privileges
of 	employment” 	as 	employees 	who 	are 	not 	disabled. 	29 	C.F.R. 	§
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1630.2(o)(1); 	see 	also 	EEOC 	v. 	Mfrs. 	& 	Traders 	Tr. 	Co., 	429
F.Supp.3d 	89, 	103 	(D.Md. 	2019) 	(describing 	possible 	reasonable
accommodations 	including 	changes 	to 	the 	work 	environment 	or 	paid
or 	unpaid 	leave). 	Mr. 	Lewis 	has 	failed 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	for 	a
lack of reasonable accommodation under the ADA.
2. 	Hostile Work Environment
Mr. Lewis next alleges that he was subject to a hostile work
environment 	due 	to 	“continuous 	harassment 	from 	coworkers, 	which
was repeatedly reported to HR without resolution.” 	(ECF No. 3-1,
at 3). 	The Gagnon court also described the elements of a hostile
work environment claim:
The 	elements 	of 	an 	ADA 	hostile 	work
environment 	claim 	derive 	from 	the 	standards
applicable 	to 	a 	Title 	VII 	hostile 	work
environment 	claim. 	See 	Fox 	v. 	Gen. 	Motors
Corp., 	247 	F.3d 	169, 	177 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2001). 	“A
hostile [work] environment exists ‘[w]hen the
workplace 	is 	permeated 	with 	discriminatory
intimidation, 	ridicule, 	and 	insult 	that 	is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions 	of 	the 	victim’s 	employment 	and
create 	an 	abusive 	working 	environment.’”
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d
264, 	277 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2015) 	(quoting 	Harris 	v.
Forklift 	Sys., 	Inc., 	510 	U.S. 	17, 	21[]
(1993)). 	To 	establish 	a 	claim 	of 	a 	hostile
work 	environment 	based 	on 	disability, 	a
plaintiff 	must 	show 	that: 	(1) 	the 	plaintiff
was a qualified individual with a disability;
(2) 	the 	plaintiff 	was 	subjected 	to 	unwelcome
harassment; 	(3) 	the 	harassment 	was 	based 	on
the 	disability; 	(4) 	the 	harassment 	was
“sufficiently 	severe 	or 	pervasive 	to 	alter 	a
term, condition, or privilege of employment”;
and 	(5) 	there 	was 	a 	factual 	basis 	to 	impute
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liability 	for 	the 	harassment 	to 	the
plaintiff’s employer. 	Fox, 247 F.3d at 177.
Gagnon, 760 F.Supp.3d at 374.
Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that the harassment was
“sufficiently 	severe 	or 	pervasive 	to 	alter 	a 	term, 	condition, 	or
privilege 	of 	employment,” 	or 	that 	there 	was 	any 	basis 	to 	“impute
liability for the harassment” to Didlake. 	Id. 	First, Mr. Lewis’
conclusory allegation of “continuous harassment” is only supported
with 	facts 	about 	a 	single 	instance 	of 	harassment 	from 	coworkers.
This 	sort 	of 	occasion 	does 	not 	rise 	to 	the 	high 	bar 	of 	severe 	or
pervasive 	harassment. 	“[A]lthough 	some 	workplace 	conduct 	may 	be
deeply unpleasant, complaints premised on nothing more than ‘rude
treatment 	by 	coworkers 	. 	. 	. 	callous 	behavior 	by 	one’s 	superiors
. . . or a routine difference of opinion and personality conflict
with 	one's 	supervisor 	. 	. 	. 	are 	not 	actionable.’” 	Anderson 	v.
Sch. Bd., No. 18-cv-745-MHL, 2020 WL 2832475, at *23 (E.D.Va. May
29, 	2020) 	(quoting 	EEOC 	v. 	Sunbelt 	Rentals, 	Inc., 	521 	F.3d 	306,
315-316 (4th Cir. 2008)).
Additionally, 	Mr. 	Lewis 	has 	not 	pleaded 	facts 	showing 	that
the harassment by coworkers could be imputed to Didlake. 	To impute
liability to the employer, a plaintiff must show that the employer
“knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take
effective action to stop it.” 	Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d at
319 (quoting Howard v. Winter, 446 F.3d 559, 565 (4 th Cir. 2006)).
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Within 	his 	complaint, 	Mr. 	Lewis 	says 	that 	his 	termination 	notice
attached 	to 	his 	complaint 	constitutes 	“[d]ocumentation 	of 	prior
complaints to HR.” 	(ECF No. 3-1, at 4). 	The only reference to HR
in the termination letter says “[i]n November 2023, Human Resources
along with your job coach met with you to provide support on ways
to 	manage 	your 	anger 	after 	allegations 	of 	threatening 	behavior
towards your supervisor.” 	(Id. at 5). 	Mr. Lewis has not pleaded
facts 	showing 	that 	Didlake 	was 	aware 	of 	“continuous 	harassment”
directed 	toward 	Mr. 	Lewis; 	rather, 	the 	only 	specific 	HR 	meeting
alleged related to Mr. Lewis’ actions toward other coworkers. 	Mr.
Lewis 	has 	not 	pleaded 	sufficient 	facts 	to 	support 	a 	claim 	of 	a
hostile work environment under the ADA.
3. 	Wrongful Termination
Finally, Mr. Lewis alleges that he was wrongfully terminated
“after 	responding 	to 	workplace 	bullying.” 	(ECF 	No. 	3-1, 	at 	3).
Another 	court 	in 	this 	district 	previously 	described 	the 	test 	for
wrongful termination, or discharge, under the ADA:
The 	elements 	of 	a 	wrongful 	discharge 	claim
under 	the 	ADA 	are 	“(1) 	[the 	plaintiff] 	was 	a
‘qualified individual with a disability’; (2)
she was discharged; (3) she was fulfilling her
employer’s legitimate expectations at the time
of discharge; and (4) the circumstances of her
discharge 	raise 	a 	reasonable 	inference 	of
unlawful 	discrimination.” 	Rohan 	v. 	Networks
Presentations 	LLC, 	375 	F.3d 	266, 	273 	n.9 	(4 th
Cir. 	2004) 	(quoting 	Haulbrook 	v. 	Michelin 	N.
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Am., 	Inc., 	252 	F.3d 	696, 	702 	(4 th 	Cir.
2001))[.]
Wilson 	v. 	Montgomery 	Cnty. 	Bd. 	of 	Trs., 	No. 	17-cv-2784-PWG, 	2018
WL 4300498, at *6 (D.Md. Sep. 10, 2018). 	Didlake does not dispute
that 	the 	first 	two 	factors 	are 	met; 	it 	argues 	that 	Mr. 	Lewis 	has
not 	alleged 	facts 	meeting 	the 	final 	two 	factors. 	This 	court
agrees.
First, Mr. Lewis offers no indication that he was meeting his
employer’s 	legitimate 	expectations 	when 	he 	was 	discharged 	in
February 2024. 	His termination letter, attached to the complaint,
states 	that 	he 	“failed 	to 	meet 	the 	expectations 	established 	in
Policy 	1020-Standards 	of 	Conduct 	for 	Employees 	and 	Policy 	1025-
Workplace 	Violence.” 	(ECF 	No. 	3-1, 	at 	5). 	His 	actions 	in
threatening 	his 	coworkers 	were 	violations 	of 	those 	policies 	and
led 	to 	his 	termination. 	(Id.). 	Given 	his 	failure 	to 	abide 	by
their policies, and no suggestion that these policies were unfair
or unreasonable, Mr. Lewis does not allege that he was meeting his
employer’s legitimate expectations at the time he was discharged.
See Burnett v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, 722 F.Supp.3d 566, 576 (D.Md.
2024).
Second, 	none 	of 	the 	facts 	pleaded 	give 	rise 	to 	a 	reasonable
inference of unlawful discrimination. 	Mr. Lewis worked for Didlake
for 	six 	years 	and 	his 	employer 	was 	aware 	of 	his 	disability 	when
they 	hired 	him. 	(ECF 	No. 	3-1, 	at 	3). 	Plaintiff 	does 	not 	argue,
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at 	any 	point 	in 	his 	complaint, 	that 	Didlake 	fired 	him 	for 	his
disability. 	Rather, 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	he 	was 	“wrongfully
terminated after responding to workplace bullying.” 	(Id.). 	While
Plaintiff alleges that the “workplace bullying” was related to his
disability, he does not allege that his termination was related to
his 	disability; 	Didlake 	fired 	Mr. 	Lewis 	for 	threatening 	his
coworkers 	in 	response, 	which 	was 	in 	violation 	of 	their 	workplace
policies. 	(Id. 	at 	5). 	Mr. 	Lewis 	has 	not 	stated 	a 	claim 	for
wrongful termination under the ADA.3
B. 	Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In 	his 	complaint, 	Plaintiff 	asserts 	a 	legal 	claim 	for
“Emotional Distress,” which the court will construe as a tort claim
for 	intentional 	infliction 	of 	emotional 	distress 	(“IIED”). 	The
complaint 	alleges 	that 	“[s]ince 	his 	termination, 	[Mr. 	Lewis] 	has
suffered 	extreme 	emotional 	distress, 	depression, 	and 	financial
hardship.” 	(ECF No. 3-1, at 3). 	As with his ADA claims, Mr. Lewis
has not pleaded sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss.
To 	bring 	an 	IIED 	claim 	under 	Maryland 	law, 	Plaintiff 	must
prove “(1) intentional or reckless conduct (2) that is extreme or
outrageous 	(3) 	and 	caused 	(4) 	the 	plaintiff’s 	severe 	emotional
3 These facts also demonstrate that Didlake had a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff. See, Curry v.
Sw. 	Airlines 	Co., 	25-cv-01468-SAG, 	2025 	WL 	3062600, 	at 	*5 	(D.Md.
Nov. 3, 2025).
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distress.” 	Nicholson 	v. 	Balt. 	Police 	Dep't, 	No. 	20-cv-3146-DKC,
2023 WL 4549741, at *10 (D.Md. July 14, 2023) (citing Caldor, Inc.
v. 	Bowden, 	330 	Md. 	632, 	641-42 	(1993)). 	There 	is 	a 	high 	bar;
“[l]iability 	accrues 	only 	‘for 	conduct 	exceeding 	all 	bounds
usually 	tolerated 	by 	decent 	society, 	of 	a 	nature 	which 	is
especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of
a 	very 	serious 	kind.’” 	McPherson 	v. 	Balt. 	Police 	Dep’t, 	494
F.Supp.3d 	269, 	286 	(D.Md. 	2020) 	(quoting 	Ky. 	Fried 	Chicken 	Nat'l
Mgmt. Co. v. Weathersby, 326 Md. 663, 670 (1992)).
Even assuming (without deciding) that Plaintiff has suffered
severe emotional distress following his termination, Plaintiff has
not 	alleged 	any 	facts 	supporting 	a 	finding 	of 	“intentional 	or
reckless 	conduct” 	that 	rises 	to 	the 	level 	of 	“extreme 	or
outrageous.” 	Nicholson, 	2023 	WL 	4549741, 	at 	*10. 	Mr. 	Lewis 	was
terminated after he failed to meet several workplace expectations.
(ECF No. 3-1, at 5). 	Firing an employee for cause, without more,
does not rise to the level of “extreme or outrageous.” 	See Preston
v. Good Samaritan Hosp. of Md., Inc., No. 08-cv-2124-WDQ, 2008 WL
11509473, at *3 (D.Md. Sep. 18, 2008) (finding an employee failed
to show extreme and outrageous conduct by her employer, partially
because 	they 	fired 	her 	“for 	reasonable 	cause” 	after 	a 	“violation
of workplace rules”). 	Mr. Lewis has not pleaded sufficient facts
to state a claim for IIED.
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C. 	Motion to Amend the Complaint
At the end of Mr. Lewis’ supplemental response to the motion
to dismiss, he notes “[i]n the alternative, if the Court identifies
any 	deficiencies 	in 	the 	Complaint, 	Plaintiff 	requests 	leave 	to
amend.” 	(ECF 	No. 	39, 	at 	4). 	Plaintiff 	does 	not 	indicate 	what
changes he would like to make to his complaint, nor does he provide
a copy of the proposed amended complaint as required by Local Rule
103.6. 	This is insufficient to constitute a motion to amend.
Simply requesting leave to amend in a response
in opposition to a motion to dismiss does not
constitute a proper motion for leave to amend.
See 	Cozzarelli 	v. 	Inspire 	Pharms. 	Inc., 	549
F.3d 618, 630–31 (4 th Cir. 2008) (finding that
a 	motion 	for 	leave 	to 	amend 	was 	“never
properly made” where the plaintiffs “requested
leave 	to 	amend 	only 	in 	a 	footnote 	of 	their
response 	to 	defendants’ 	motion 	for 	leave 	to
amend, 	and 	again 	in 	the 	final 	sentence 	of
their objections to the recommendation of the
magistrate 	judge” 	and 	did 	not 	provide 	a
proposed 	amended 	complaint 	to 	the 	district
court); 	see 	also 	U.S. 	ex 	rel. 	Williams 	v.
Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1259
(D.C. 	Cir. 	2004) 	(“While 	Federal 	Rule 	15(a)
provides 	that 	leave 	to 	amend 	shall 	be 	freely
given when justice so requires, a bare request
in 	an 	opposition 	to 	dismiss—without 	any
indication of the particular grounds on which
amendment 	is 	sought—does 	not 	constitute 	a
motion 	within 	the 	contemplation 	of 	Rule
15(a).” 	citation omitted)). 	This holds true
even 	under 	the 	relaxed 	pleading 	standards
applied 	to 	pro 	se 	plaintiffs. 	Osei 	v. 	Univ.
of Md. Univ. Coll., [No. 15-cv-2502-DKC], 2018
WL 	2117927, 	at 	*3 	(D.Md. 	May 	8, 	2018)
(“[W]here 	. 	. 	. 	the 	[pro 	se] 	plaintiff 	fails
to formally move to amend and fails to provide
the 	district 	court 	with 	any 	proposed 	amended
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complaint 	or 	other 	indication 	of 	the
amendments 	he 	wishes 	to 	make, 	‘the 	district
court 	[does] 	not 	abuse 	its 	discretion’ 	in
denying 	a 	motion 	to 	amend 	the 	complaint.”
(omission 	in 	original) 	(quoting 	Estrella 	v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 497 F.App’x. 361, 362
(4th Cir. 2012))).
Harris 	v. 	Hogan, 	21-cv-0298-BAH, 	2024 	WL 	1580186, 	at 	*6 	(D.Md.
Apr. 11, 2024). 	Plaintiff has provided no information about what
factual allegations could be added to the complaint to address its
deficiencies. 	Without 	more, 	the 	court 	is 	unable 	to 	assess 	if
amendment 	is 	appropriate 	under 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	15. 	The 	court 	will
deny leave to amend.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss will
be granted. 	A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
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