Hunter Warfield, Inc v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London and Certain Insurance Companies Subscribing to Policy Number B074021F3032 et al

8:25-cv-00455Mdd17 de dez. de 2025

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
HUNTER WARFIELD, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT
LLOYD’S LONDON AND CERTAIN
INSURANCE COMPANIES
SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY NUMBER
B074021F3032, 	et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 25-cv-00455-LKG
Dated: December 17, 2025
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. 	INTRODUCTION
In this declaratory judgment action, the Plaintiff, Hunter Warfield, Inc. (“HWI”), seeks a
declaratory judgment pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202,
regarding the obligations of the Defendants, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London and Certain
Insurance Companies Subscribing to Policy Number B074021F3032 (“Underwriters”), Lloyd’s
Underwriter Syndicate Number 1274 AUL (“Syndicate”), and Volante International Limited
(“Volante”), to insure certain punitive damages awarded against HWI in a state lawsuit under
HWI’s Market Reform Contract insurance policy (the “Policy”). 	See generally 	ECF No. 4. The
Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, to transfer, or, in the alternative, to
stay, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) and (b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1404. ECF No. 16. The
motion is fully briefed. 	See 	ECF Nos. 16, 29 and 22. No hearing is necessary to resolve this
motion. 	See 	L.R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons that follow, the Court: (1) 	GRANTS-in-
PART and DENIES-in-PART 	the Defendant’s motion to dismiss, to transfer, or, in the
alternative, to stay (ECF No. 16) and (2) 	STAYS 	the proceedings in this matter, pending the
resolution of HWI’s Indiana State Court Appeal.
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II. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
A. 	Factual Background
Overview Of The Case
In this declaratory judgment action, the Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment regarding
the obligations of the Defendants to insure certain punitive damages awarded against HWI in a
state lawsuit under its Policy. 	See generally 	ECF No. 4. As relief, the Plaintiff seeks, among
other things:
(1) That this Court determine and adjudicate the rights and liabilities
of the parties with respect to the insurability of punitive damages
and the Policy’s Exclusion A;
(2) That this Court declare that the insurability of the punitive
damages 	award 	against 	HWI 	in 	the 	Lawsuit 	is 	governed 	by
Maryland law;
(3) That this Court declare that the Policy’s Exclusion A does not
exclude coverage for the punitive damages award against HWI in
the Lawsuit;
(4) That this Court find that Underwriters and/or other Defendants
responsible for HWI’s coverage rights under the Policy must pay the
punitive damages award in an amount up to the remaining coverage
limit under the Policy, plus prejudgment and post-judgment interest
at the legal rate of six percent per annum in accordance with Md.
Const. Art. III, § 57.
Id. 	at Prayer for Relief.
The Parties
Plaintiff HWI is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Maryland, with its
principal place of business located in Montgomery County, Maryland. 	Id. 	at ¶ 3.
Defendant Underwriters are unincorporated associations of entities and/or individuals
who transact business in Maryland, including the business of insurance. 	Id. 	at ¶ 4.
Defendant Syndicate is an unincorporated association of one or more entities and
individuals who subscribe to the Policy and transact business in Maryland, including the business
of insurance. 	Id. 	at ¶ 5.
1 	The facts recited in this memorandum opinion are taken from the complaint and the attachments thereto;
the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, to transfer, or, in the alternative, to stay, and the attachments thereto;
and the Plaintiff’s response in opposition to the Defendants’ motion. ECF Nos. 4, 4-1, 16 and 19. Unless
otherwise stated, the facts herein are undisputed.
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Defendant Volante is an entity that subscribes to the Policy and transacts business in
Maryland, including the business of insurance. 	Id. 	at ¶ 6.
The State Court Litigation
As background, in August 2019, the Plaintiff was sued in the Circuit Court for
Tippecanoe County, Indiana (the “Indiana Lawsuit”). 	See Alexandra Hustedt-Mai v. Hunter
Warfield, Inc., 	Case No. 79C01-1908-CT-114; 	see also 	ECF No. 4 at ¶ 10. At some point
thereafter, the Defendants issued the Policy to HWI, with an effective policy period of May 1,
2021, to May 1, 2022. ECF No. 4-1 at 2; ECF No. 16-1 at 2. It is undisputed that the
Defendants have acknowledged coverage under the Policy for the Indiana Lawsuit and provided
for HWI’s defense in that case. ECF No. 4 at ¶ 10; ECF No. 16 at ¶ 2.
On or about June 7, 2024, following a jury trial, the Circuit Court for Tippecanoe County,
Indiana entered a Jury Trial Order and Judgment against HWI, which awarded the plaintiff in the
Indiana Lawsuit $200,000 in actual damages and $1.75 million in punitive damages. ECF No. 4
at ¶ 11; 	see also 	ECF No. 16-2 at 25. On or about October 21, 2024, the Circuit Court for
Tippecanoe County, Indiana entered a Final Judgment (the “Judgment”) against HWI, which
included the award of punitive damages. ECF No. 4 at ¶ 11; ECF No. 16-2 at 19-23.
Following entry of the Judgment, the Defendants denied coverage for the punitive
damages award under the Policy. ECF No. 4 at ¶ 12. The Defendants also reserved the right to
deny coverage for the punitive damages award under the Policy’s Exclusion A, which excludes
coverage for damages based on conduct by the Plaintiff that is criminal, fraudulent, dishonest or
malicious, or committed with the intent to cause damage. 	Id. 	at ¶ 14.
On January 8, 2025, HWI filed a notice of appeal of the Judgment in the Indiana Lawsuit
(the “Indiana State Court Appeal”). ECF No. 16-2 at 13-18. The Indiana State Court Appeal is
currently pending before the Indiana Court of Appeals. 	See 	ECF No. 16-1 at 2; ECF No. 19 at 3;
see also Hunter Warfield Inc. v. Mai, No. 25A-CT-00038 (Ind. Ct. App.).
B. 	Procedural History
The Plaintiff commenced this declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, Maryland, on December 31, 2024. 	See 	ECF No. 4. On February 12, 2025,
the Defendants removed the case to this Court. ECF No. 1.
On April 21, 2025, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, to transfer, or,
in the alternative, to stay, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) and (b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1404,
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and a memorandum in support thereof. ECF Nos. 16 and 16-1. On May 20, 2025, the Plaintiff
filed a response in opposition to the Defendants’ motion. ECF No. 19. On June 3, 2025, the
Defendants filed a reply brief. ECF No. 22.
The Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint, to transfer, or, in the alternative, to
stay having been fully briefed, the Court resolves the pending motion.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must
allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible when
“the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Id. 	(citing 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 	When
evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court accepts
the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. 	Nemet Chevrolet, Inc. v. 	Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir.
2009); 	Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005)
(citations omitted). But, the complaint must contain more than “legal conclusions, elements of a
cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” 	Nemet Chevrolet,
591 F.3d at 255. And so, the Court should grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim if
“it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent
with the allegations.” 	GE Inv. Private Placement Partners II, L.P. v. Parker, 247 F.3d 543, 548
(4th Cir. 2001) (quoting 	H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249-50 (1989)).
In addition, a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) “must be treated as one for
summary judgment” when “matters outside the pleadings are presented” to the Court. 	See 	Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(d). But, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that
documents are not considered to be matters outside of the pleadings if they are “explicitly
incorporated into the complaint by reference,” or are “integral to the complaint and there is no
dispute about the document’s authenticity.” 	Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159,
166 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing 	Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322
(2007)).
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B. The Declaratory Judgment Act And Federal Abstention
Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a district court, in “a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). “This Act gives federal courts discretion to
decide whether to declare the rights of litigants.” 	Trustguard Ins. Co. v. Collins, 942 F.3d 195,
201 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing 	Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995)).
The Fourth Circuit has held that, when an ongoing proceeding in state court overlaps with
the federal case, courts must consider whether “federalism, efficiency, and comity” counsel
against exercising jurisdiction.” 	Penn-Am. Ins. Co. v. Coffey, 368 F.3d 409, 412 (4th Cir. 2004).
In determining whether to proceed with a federal declaratory judgment action when a parallel
state action is pending, the Court considers: (1) the state’s interest in having its own courts
decide the issue; (2) the state courts’ ability to resolve the issues more efficiently than the federal
courts; (3) the potential for unnecessary entanglement between the state and federal courts based
on overlapping issues of fact or law; and (4) whether the federal action is mere forum-shopping.
See id. 	at 412 (citing 	Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Winchester Homes, Inc., 15 F.3d 371, 376 (4th Cir.
1994)). And so, federal courts typically abstain from interfering with ongoing state court
proceedings when there has been no final judgment to “avoid duplicative litigation and
interference with state-court proceedings.” 	Trustguard, 942 F.3d at 202.
C. Stays
Lastly, “[t]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court
to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself,
for counsel, and for litigants.” 	Donnelly v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 971 F. Supp. 2d 495, 501
(D. Md. 2013) (internal citation omitted). And so, this Court considers the following factors
when staying proceedings: (1) “the length of the requested stay”; (2) “the hardship that the
movant would face if the motion were denied”; (3) “the burden a stay would impose on the
nonmovant”; and (4) “whether the stay would promote judicial economy by avoiding duplicative
litigation.” 	Id. 	at 501-02.
IV. 	ANALYSIS
The Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint, to transfer, or, in the alternative, to
stay, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) and (b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1404, upon the following
three grounds: (1) there is no justiciable controversy in this case; (2) venue is not proper in
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Maryland under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, because none of the events giving rise to the issues in this
case involve the State of Maryland and the Policy was issued in Florida; and (3) alternatively,
this matter should be transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). ECF No. 16-1 at 4-14. And so, the Defendants request
that the Court either dismiss this matter, transfer the case to the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida, or stay these proceedings until a final determination is rendered in
the Indiana Lawsuit, including any appeals. 	Id. 	at 14-15.
HWI counters that the Court should not dismiss, or transfer, this matter, because: (1) the
legal issue raised in this case is ripe for resolution and the Declaratory Judgment Act gives this
Court the discretion to resolve this dispute while the Indiana State Court Appeal proceeds; (2)
venue is proper in the District of Maryland under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), because the case was
removed from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland; and (3) the Defendants have
not shown that a transfer of venue is warranted. ECF No. 19 at 6-15. HWI also argues that the
Court should not stay this matter pending the resolution of the Indiana State Court Appeal,
because the Defendants will not suffer any hardship and inequity in the absence of a stay and this
dispute creates an economic harm to HWI. 	Id. 	at 15. 	And so, the Plaintiff requests that the
Court deny the Defendants’ motion. 	Id.
For the reasons that follow, the Court will exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over this
declaratory judgment matter. But, the Court will also exercise its inherent power to stay further
proceedings in this matter, pending the resolution of the Indiana State Court Appeal, because that
litigation could render moot the Plaintiff’s requested relief in this action. And so, the Court: (1)
GRANTS-in-PART and DENIES-in-PART the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, to transfer, or, in
the alternative, to stay (ECF No. 16) and (2) STAYS the proceedings in this matter, pending the
resolution of HWI’s 	Indiana State Court Appeal.
A. The Court Will Exercise Jurisdiction Over This Declaratory Judgment Action
As an initial matter, the Court will exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over this
declaratory judgment action, consistent with the Declaratory Judgment Act. 	See 	28 U.S.C §§
2201-2202. Pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, a district court, in “a case of actual
controversy within its jurisdiction . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). And so, the Fourth Circuit has
held that “[t]his Act gives federal courts discretion to decide whether to declare the rights of
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litigants.” 	Trustguard Ins. Co. v. Collins, 942 F.3d 195, 201 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing 	Wilton v.
Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995)).
Relevant to the pending motion, when there is an ongoing proceeding in state court that
overlaps with the federal case, as is the case here, the Court considers whether “federalism,
efficiency, and comity” counsel against exercising jurisdiction. 	Penn-Am. Ins. Co. v. Coffey, 368
F.3d 409, 412 (4th Cir. 2004). In determining whether to proceed with a federal declaratory
judgment action when a parallel state action is pending, the Court considers: (1) the state’s
interest in having its own courts decide the issue; (2) the state courts’ ability to resolve the issues
more efficiently than the federal courts; (3) the potential for unnecessary entanglement between
the state and federal courts based on overlapping issues of fact or law; and (4) whether the
federal action is mere forum-shopping. 	See Penn-Am. Ins. Co., 368 F.3d at 412 (citing 	Nautilus
Ins. Co. v. Winchester Homes, Inc., 15 F.3d 371, 376 (4th Cir. 1994)). And so, federal courts
typically abstain from interfering with ongoing state court proceedings when there has been no
final judgment to “avoid duplicative litigation and interference with state-court proceedings.”
Trustguard, 942 F.3d at 202.
In this case, the factors that the Court considers in deciding whether to abstain from
considering this declaratory judgment action support the exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction.
First, the evidence before the Court shows that there is minimal interest in Indiana having its
own courts decide the issue of whether punitive damages are covered under the Policy, because
this legal issue is not before the courts in Indiana. ECF No. 19 at 8 (“The scope of [the
Defendants’] obligation to cover a punitive damages award is not before the Indiana appellate
court.”). For this same reason, the Court is not concerned that the Indiana courts would more
efficiently resolve this legal issue.
Third, the potential for unnecessary entanglement between the state and federal courts
based on overlapping issues of fact or law is not significant in this case, because any decision by
this Court regarding the Defendants’ obligation to cover punitive damages under the Policy
would not impact the Indiana Lawsuit and the pending Indiana State Court Appeal. 	See Penn-
Am. Ins. Co., 368 F.3d at 412. Lastly, there are no facts before the Court to indicate that this
“federal action is mere forum-shopping,” given that the Plaintiff initially filed this case in
Maryland state court and the Defendants chose to remove the action to this Court. 	See 	id.; ECF
No. 1. And so, the aforementioned factors weigh in favor of this Court exercising jurisdiction
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over the Plaintiff’s claims in this declaratory judgment action. 	See Penn-Am. Ins. Co., 368 F.3d
at 412.
B. The Court Stays This Matter
While the Court will exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter, the Defendants
argue with persuasion that a stay of the proceedings in this case is warranted, pending the
resolution of the Indiana State Court Appeal. “The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the
power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy
of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” 	Donnelly v. Branch Banking & Tr.
Co., 971 F. Supp. 2d 495, 501 (D. Md. 2013) (internal citation omitted). And so, this Court
considers the following factors when staying proceedings: (1) “the length of the requested stay”;
(2) “the hardship that the movant would face if the motion were denied”; (3) “the burden a stay
would impose on the nonmovant”; and (4) “whether the stay would promote judicial economy by
avoiding duplicative litigation.” 	Id. 	at 501-02.
Here, a limited stay of these proceedings until the Indiana State Court Appeal is resolved
will conserve judicial resources and avoid burdening the parties with possibly unnecessary
litigation on the issue of whether the Policy requires the Defendants to cover the punitive
damages award assessed against the Plaintiff in the Judgment. 	See 	Donnelly, 971 F. Supp. 2d at
501. 	2 	As the Defendants correctly observe, the outcome of the Indiana State Court Appeal could
render this issue moot if the state appellate court overturns the award of punitive damages in the
Indiana Lawsuit. And so, the Court will STAY the proceedings in this matter, pending the
resolution of HWI’s Indiana State Court Appeal.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court:
(1) 	GRANTS-in-PART and DENIES-in-PART 	the Defendant’s motion to dismiss, to
transfer, or, in the alternative, to stay (ECF No. 16) and
(2) 	STAYS 	the proceedings in this matter, pending the resolution of HWI’s Indiana State
Court Appeal.
2 	For this same reason, the Court will also DENY the Defendants’ motion to transfer, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1404, WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Plaintiff has also shown that venue is proper in this Court,
because this case was removed from the Circuit Court of Montgomery, County, Maryland. 	See 	28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a).
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A separate Order shall issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Lydia Kay Griggsby
LYDIA KAY GRIGGSBY
United States District Judge
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