USA v. Goldstein

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
THOMAS C. GOLDSTEIN,
Defendant.
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Criminal Action No. 25-cr-00006-LKG
Dated: November 18, 2025
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court are the following pre-trial motions: (1) the Defendant’s motion
to invalidate certain orders suspending the statute of limitations (ECF No. 116); (2) the
Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failing to allege affirmative acts (ECF No. 120); (3) the
Defendant’s motion to dismiss allegations concerning employees (ECF No. 122); (4) the
Defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars (ECF No. 125); (5) the Defendant’s motion to dismiss
Counts 15 through 19 of the Superseding Indictment (ECF No. 126); (6) the Defendant’s motion
to compel disclosure of Brady and Grand Jury material (ECF No. 127); and (7) the Defendant’s
motion to permit him to sell the Hawthorne Property to fund his defense (ECF No. 166). These
motions are fully briefed. ECF Nos. 116, 120, 122, 125, 126, 127, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136,
149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 166, 175 and 179. The Court held a hearing on the motions on
November 6, 2025. ECF No. 214. For the reasons that follow, and those stated during the
November 6, 2025, hearing, the Court: (1) DENIES the Defendant’s motion to invalidate certain
orders suspending the statute of limitations (ECF No. 116); (2) DENIES the Defendant’s motion
to dismiss allegations for failure to allege affirmative acts (ECF No. 120); (3) HOLDS-in-
ABEYANCE the Defendant’s motion to dismiss allegations concerning employees (ECF No.
122); (4) DENIES the Defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars (ECF No. 125); (5) DENIES
the Defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts 15 through 19 of the Superseding Indictment (ECF
No. 126); (6) DENIES the Defendant’s motion to compel disclosure of Brady and Grand Jury
material (ECF No. 127) WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and (7) DENIES the Defendant’s motion to
permit him to sell the Hawthorne Property to fund his defense (ECF No. 166).
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II. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 16, 2025, a federal grand jury returned a 22-Count Indictment against the
Defendant, Thomas C. Goldstein, for violations of federal tax laws and for making false
statements on mortgage loan applications. ECF No. 1. On January 27, 2025, the Defendant
made his initial appearance and pled not guilty to all charges. ECF No. 4. On August 7, 2025,
the Grand Jury returned a Superseding Indictment. ECF No. 159. On October 7, 2025, the
Defendant pled not guilty to the charges in the Superseding Indictment. ECF No. 185.
The Superseding Indictment
The Superseding Indictment alleges that, between 2016 and 2022, the Defendant
committed various tax crimes, including evading assessment of his income taxes, aiding and
assisting in the preparation of false Forms 1040 for himself and false Forms 1120S for his law
firm, Goldstein & Russell, P.C. (“G&R”), and willfully failing to pay his income taxes. See
generally ECF No. 159. Specifically, the Superseding Indictment alleges, among other things,
that:
Between 2016 and 2022, [the Defendant] engaged in a scheme to
evade the assessment of taxes, file false tax returns, and fail to pay
his tax obligations when they were due. In furtherance of that
scheme:
[The Defendant] used over $1.1 million of G&R funds to pay
personal debts in 2016, including gambling debts owed to poker
players and payments due on Note-1, causing the filing of false
Forms 1120S and 1040 and the evasion of a substantial amount of
his 2016 income tax;
[The Defendant] falsely understated his gambling winnings by more
than $3.9 million on his 2016 Form 1040, causing the filing of a
false Form 1040 and the evasion of a substantial amount of his 2016
income tax;
In March 2018, [the Defendant] falsely told an IRS Revenue Officer
seeking to collect his unpaid taxes for 2016 that his unpaid tax
liability for that year was attributable to a legal case resulting in a
large payment to [the Defendant] whereas, in truth, his liability was
attributable principally to gambling income;
[The Defendant] diverted $250,000 in legal fees due and owing to
G&R from Law Firm-1 to his Gambling Account, causing the false
understatement of G&R’s corporate receipts and the evasion of a
substantial amount of his 2017 income tax;
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[The Defendant] used $175,000 of G&R funds in 2017 to pay a
personal gambling-related debt that he owed to Law Firm-2, causing
the filing of false Forms 1120S and 1040 and the evasion of a
substantial amount of his 2017 income tax;
[The Defendant] falsely omitted $200,000 in gambling winnings
from his 2017 Form 1040 by directing a Nevada-based professional
poker player (“Professional Gambler-1”) to send winnings that he
owed to [the Defendant] to Law Firm-2 in order to satisfy part of a
personal gambling-related debt that [the Defendant] owed to Law
Firm-2;
[The Defendant] falsely stated in an October 11, 2018, email to the
Accounting Firm that he had “[n]o gambling winnings” in 2017,
causing the preparation and filing of a 2017 Form l040 that falsely
omitted over $3.4 million in gambling winnings;
[The Defendant] falsely omitted from his 2017 Form l040 over
$210,000 in income from a 401K distribution;
[The Defendant] used G&R assets in 2018, in the form of a $125,000
legal fee due to G&R from Law Firm-2, to satisfy a $125,000
gambling-related debt owed personally by [the Defendant] to Law
Firm-2, causing the filing of false Forms 1040 and 1120S and the
evasion of a substantial amount of his 2018 income tax;
[The Defendant] used tens of thousands of dollars of G&R funds in
2018 to pay health insurance premiums and full salaries to women,
despite the fact that the women were not entitled to insurance
coverage and performed little or no work for G&R and the payments
were actually personal in nature;
[The 	Defendant] 	falsely 	understated 	substantial 	amounts 	of
gambling and other income on his 2018 Form 1040, resulting in the
evasion of a substantial amount of his 2018 income tax;
[The Defendant] used $170,000 of G&R funds to pay a personal
gambling debt in 2019, causing the filing of false Forms 1120S and
1040 and the evasion of a substantial amount of his 2019 income
tax;
[The Defendant] falsely omitted from his Forms 1040 for the 2016,
2017, and 2018 tax years certain interest income received through
the Gambling Account, the records for which [the Defendant] failed
to provide to the Accounting Firm;
[The Defendant] falsely stated on his 2020 and 2021 Forms 1040
that he had not received, sold, sent, exchanged, or otherwise
acquired or disposed of any financial interest 	in any virtual
currency—despite the fact that he had engaged in dozens of
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cryptocurrency transactions totaling over $10 million over those two
tax years;
[The Defendant] falsely omitted $500,000 in legal fee income from
the 2021 G&R Form 1120S, resulting in the filing of a false Form
1040 and the evasion of a substantial amount of his 2021 income
tax;
[The Defendant] willfully failed to pay his 2016, 2017, 2019, 2020,
and 2021 taxes when due, despite spending millions of dollars on
personal expenses, including luxury purchases and payments to and
on behalf of women;
[The Defendant], throughout the relevant period, systematically and
repeatedly failed to provide to the Accounting Firm, or to G&R’s
firm managers, records of his gambling wins and losses, despite the
fact that [the Defendant] at times kept records of his gambling
activity, and throughout the relevant period had access to such
information, including Forms 1099 and bank records;
[The Defendant] made false and misleading statements to IRS
representatives during an interview on October 14, 2020;
[The Defendant] repeatedly offered things of value, including
cryptocurrency and a $10,000 bonus, to a G&R firm manager in late
2020 through early 2021, at least in part to dissuade her from
cooperating with the IRS’s ongoing criminal investigation; and
[The Defendant] transferred at least $960,000 in personal funds into
G&R’s Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Account (“IOLTA”) in March
2021 so that he could prevent the IRS from levying the funds before
using them to purchase a new home.
Id. at ¶ 24.
The Alleged Affirmative Acts
The Superseding Indictment also describes two categories of “affirmative acts” by the
Defendant that the Government alleges constitute tax evasion: (1) the Defendant
mischaracterized transactions and (2) the Defendant redirected certain payments owed to G&R.
See id. at ¶ 105. Specifically, the Superseding Indictment alleges that the Defendant
mischaracterized the following transactions:
When 	causing 	those 	four 	gambling 	debt 	payments 	and 	two
promissory note payments totaling $1,171,600 to be sent from the
G&R bank account, [the Defendant] failed to inform the G&R firm
manager that the transfers were to satisfy his personal debts rather
than those of G&R, resulting in those transfers being falsely
classified as “Legal Fee[]” expenses of G&R. Moreover, despite
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having been provided by the firm manager in late December 2016
with a written, year-end summary spreadsheet of transfers from the
G&R bank account that classified the six payments as “Legal Fees”
paid by G&R, [the Defendant] did not inform the firm manager or
the Accounting Firm that those six payments were to satisfy [the
Defendant’s] personal debts. Consequently, [the Defendant] caused
the $1,171,600 in payments to be falsely classified and deducted, for
tax reporting purposes, as G&R expenses. . . .
To partially satisfy his $500,000 personal debt to Law Firm-2, [the
Defendant] caused the G&R firm manager to send, via wire transfer
from a G&R business bank account, $175,000 of G&R’s funds to
Law Firm-2 on or about November 7, 2017. When directing that the
$175,000 wire be sent, [the Defendant] did not disclose to the G&R
firm manager that this transfer-which was between two law firms-
was to satisfy [the Defendant’s] personal gambling-related debt and
not a legal fee or other G&R business expense. To further satisfy
part of his debt, on or about November 14, 2017, [the Defendant]
caused Professional Gambler-1 to send to Law Firm-2 $200,000 that
he owed to [the Defendant] personally as a result of a poker match
that [the Defendant] had won. By the end of 2017, [the Defendant]
still owed $125,000 to Law Firm-2 in connection with the gambling
“investment.” . . .
During 2019, [the Defendant] was involved in a poker match
involving a California Movie Producer (“the Producer”). In that
match, [the Defendant] lost $170,000 to the Producer. To satisfy that
poker debt, [the Defendant] caused a $170,000 wire transfer to be
sent from the G&R bank account to the Producer.
Id. at ¶¶ 32, 47 and 63. The Superseding Indictment also alleges that the Defendant “divert[ed]
G&R fees” either “to his personal bank account,” or “to a third party to pay personal gambling
debts,” in the following manner:
[The Defendant] used G&R assets in 2018, in the form of a $125,000
legal fee due to G&R from Law Firm-2, to satisfy a $ 125,000
gambling-related debt owed personally by [the Defendant] to Law
Firm-2, causing the filing of false Forms 1040 and 1120S and the
evasion of a substantial amount of his 2018 income tax . . .
In early February 2017, [the Defendant] engaged in a scheme to
divert to his Gambling Account a $250,000 legal fee owed by Law
Firm-1 to G&R in connection with G&R’s Supreme Court briefing
in a securities class-action case. . . .
Pursuant to his agreement with [the Defendant], the Actor owed a
fee of $500,000 to [the Defendant] and G&R. But rather than
directing the Actor to transfer this fee income to the G&R bank
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account or otherwise to him, [the Defendant] directed the Actor to
transfer the fee to California Businessman-3 to pay down part of the
multi-million poker debt still owed to him by [the Defendant], as
memorialized in Note-2.
Id. at ¶¶ 24, 42 and 81.
In addition, the Superseding Indictment alleges that the Defendant “received taxable
income . . . on which taxable income there was owing to the United States of America an income
tax . . . which required [the Defendant] to pay, on or before the payment due dates set forth
below, that income tax to the Internal Revenue Service.” Id. at ¶ 115. The Superseding
Indictment also alleges that “[w]ell-knowing the foregoing, on or about the tax payment due
dates set forth below,” the Defendant “did willfully fail to pay the income tax due,” as follows:
COUNT 	TAX YEAR 	TAXABLE INCOME
(Reported on Tax Return)
APPROXIMATE
TAX DUE
PAYMENT
DUE DATE
15 	2016 	$4,350,019 	$1,690,527 	04/18/2017
16 	2017 	$2,707,866 	$1,037,595 	04/17/2018
17 	2019 	$2,004,734 	$512,522 	07/15/2020
18 	2020 	$2,941,485 	$947,137 	05/17/2021
19 	2021 	$3,675,863 	$1,139,488 	04/18/2022
Id.
The Tolling Orders And Agreement
During the investigation of this matter, the Government made the following official
requests for evidence to Montenegro, China and Hong Kong:
• 	On September 25, 2023, the Government transmitted an Official Request
for evidence to Montenegro (“First Official Request”) seeking records
related to Defendant’s foreign bank accounts at Universal Capital Bank
(“UCB”), located in Montenegro.
• 	On April 5, 2024, the Government transmitted a supplemental Official
Request for evidence to Montenegro (“Second Official Request”), seeking
documents related to UCB accounts owned by the person identified in the
Indictment as Foreign Gambler 3 (herein, “Gambler 3”). On July 19, 2024,
after Montenegro produced some but not all records responsive to this
Second Official Request, the Government sent a follow-up letter seeking
the documents that had initially been requested on April 5 but were still
missing.
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• 	On May 21, 2024, the Government transmitted Official Requests to China
and Hong Kong seeking records of Defendant’s travel and transportation of
fiat currency.
ECF No. 136 at 4. The Government also submitted the following four ex parte applications to
the Court to toll the statutes of limitations under Section 3292 related to these official requests:
• 	On October 27, 2023, the Government applied for tolling based on the First
Official Request to Montenegro (the “First Tolling Application”). Id. at 4-5; ECF
No. 136-1 (First Tolling Application). On December 28, 2023, Montenegro took
final action on the First Official Request. ECF No. 136 at 5.
• 	On May 6, 2024, the Government applied for tolling based on the Second Official
Request to Montenegro (the “Second Tolling Application”). Id.; ECF No. 136-4
(Second Tolling Application).
• 	On July 22, 2024, the Government applied for tolling based on the Second
Official Request to Montenegro and its July 19, 2024, follow-up letter to
Montenegro seeking documents missing from that country’s initial response to the
Second Official Request (the “Third Tolling Application”). ECF No. 136 at 5;
ECF No. 136-7 (Third Tolling Application). To date, Montenegro has not taken
final action on this Second Official Request. ECF No. 136 at 5.
• 	On July 31, 2024, the Government applied for tolling based on the Official
Requests to Hong Kong and China (the “Fourth Tolling Application”). Id. at 5.
China and Hong Kong took final action on these requests on September 23, 2024,
and January 21, 2025, respectively. Id.
To support its Tolling Applications, the Government also submitted the following
Declarations from Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation Special Agent Andrew
Accardi:
• 	On October 27, 2023, Special Agent Accardi submitted a Declaration in support
of the United States’ ex parte application for suspension of the running of the
statute of limitations (the “First Accardi Declaration”). ECF No. 136-2 (First
Accardi Declaration).
• 	On May 6, 2024, Special Agent Accardi submitted a Declaration in support of the
United States’ ex parte application for suspension of the running of the statute of
limitations (the “Second Accardi Declaration”). ECF No. 136-5 (Second Accardi
Declaration).
• 	On July 22, 2024, Special Agent Accardi submitted a Declaration in support of the
United States’ ex parte application for suspension of the running of the statute of
limitations (the “Third Accardi Declaration”). ECF No. 136-8 (Third Accardi
Declaration).
Based upon this information, the Court issued the following four Tolling Orders:
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• 	On October 31, 2023, the Court ordered the limitations periods tolled starting on
the date of the First Official Request (the “First Tolling Order”). ECF No. 136-3
(First Tolling Order).
• 	On May 7, 2024, the Court ordered the limitations periods tolled starting on the
date of the Second Official Request—April 5, 2024 (the “Second Tolling Order”).
ECF No. 136-6 (Second Tolling Order).
• 	On July 23, 2024, the Court ordered the limitations periods tolled starting April 5,
2024, the day of the Second Official Request (the “Third Tolling Order”). ECF
No. 136-9 (Third Tolling Order).
• 	On August 5, 2024, the Court ordered the limitations periods tolled starting May
21, 2024, the date on which the Official Requests to China and Hong Kong had
been made (the “Fourth Tolling Order”). ECF No. 136 at 5.
Lastly, the Defendant entered into written agreements tolling the limitations period for the
relevant charges for the period September 30, 2024, through January 16, 2025. Id.
III. 	STANDARDS OF DECISION
A. Section 3292
Section 3292(a)(1) tolls, or suspends, the statute of limitations for offenses under Titles
18, 26 and 31 while the Government seeks evidence in a foreign country, if the Court enters an
order suspending the limitations periods. See 18 U.S.C. § 3292(a)(1). Specifically, Section 3292
provides that:
Upon application of the United States, filed before return of an
indictment, indicating that evidence of an offense is in a foreign
country, the district court before which a grand jury is impaneled to
investigate the offense shall suspend the running of the statute of
limitations for the offense if the court finds by a preponderance of
the evidence that an official request has been made for such evidence
and that it reasonably appears, or reasonably appeared at the time
the request was made, that such evidence is, or was, in such foreign
country.
Id. § 3292(a)(1).
Tolling under this provision ends when the foreign country takes “final action” on the
request, but the suspension period may not exceed three years. Id. § 3292(b)-(c). And so, a
district court must suspend the limitations period, if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that: (1) an official request has been made for evidence of an offense in a foreign country and (2)
it reasonably appeared, at the time the request was made, that such evidence was in the foreign
country. See id. § 3292(a)-(b); United States v. Broughton, 689 F.3d 1260, 1273 (11th Cir. 2012)
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(“[A] district court’s decision to suspend the running of a statute of limitations is limited to
[those] two considerations . . . .”); United States v. Ratti, 365 F. Supp. 2d 649, 657 (D. Md. 2005)
(applying same standard). Courts have interpreted Section 3292’s “official request” prong to
further require that the offense be under investigation and the official request be “reasonably
specific in order to elicit evidence of the alleged violations under investigation.” United States v.
Neill, 952 F. Supp. 831, 832-33 (D.D.C. 1996); see also Ratti, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 657; United
States v. Wilson, 249 F.3d 366, 374 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The request for evidence must only be
‘reasonably specific in order to elicit evidence of the alleged violations under investigation by
the grand jury.’” (quoting Neill, 952 F. Supp. at 833)), abrogated on other grounds by Whitfield v.
United States, 543 U.S. 209 (2005).
Tolling orders obtained by the Government pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3292 are subject to
post-indictment review, due to the ex parte nature of the tolling applications under Section 3292.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3292; see also Ratti, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 658 (“[I]n an ex parte proceeding the
Court needs to protect the absent defendant’s rights . . . .”). The tolling orders are valid only if
supported by a “preponderance of the evidence.” See Ratti, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 658; cf. United
States v. Trainor, 376 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (preponderance standard requires that
evidence “must tend to prove or disprove the existence of a material fact”).
In addition, the Court must excise the misrepresentation and assess whether the
remaining information in the tolling application presents sufficient evidence to meet the
requirements of Section 3292. See, e.g., Ratti, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 657, 660-61. If so, the
application and order are valid and no evidentiary hearing is warranted. If not, an evidentiary
hearing is warranted. See Wilson, 249 F.3d at 371-73 (remanding for evidentiary hearing on
factual issue of whether November 1993 official request letter was actually sent to Bahamas,
where “this letter” was the only basis for Section 3292 order). Where the defense substantially
contests the prosecution’s ex parte factual representations, the district court holds an evidentiary
hearing. See, e.g., id. at 372-73 (holding the district court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary
hearing where a defendant “raise[d] a factual issue” relating to the validity of a tolling order
under section 3292 and remanding for purposes of an evidentiary hearing).
B. Section 7201 Tax Evasion
The tax evasion statute, 26 U.S.C. § 7201, provides that “[a]ny person who willfully
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment
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thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony . . . .” 26
U.S.C. § 7201. The elements of the crime of tax evasion are “1) that the defendant acted
willfully; 2) that the defendant committed an affirmative act that constituted an attempted
evasion of tax payments; and 3) that a substantial tax deficiency existed.” United States v.
Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 236 (4th Cir. 1997).
The Supreme Court in Spies v. United States set forth a non-exclusive set of examples
that would satisfy the affirmative act requirement, and specifically noted:
[An affirmative willful attempt] may be inferred from conduct such
as keeping a double set of books, making false entries of alterations,
or false invoices or documents, destruction of books or records,
concealment of assets or covering up sources of income, handling of
one’s affairs to avoid making the records usual in transactions of the
kind, and any conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead
or to conceal.
317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943). The Spies Court emphasized that “[i]f the tax-evasion motive plays
any part in such conduct the offense may be made out even though the conduct may also serve
other purposes such as concealment of other crime.” Id. And so, an “affirmative act” is simply an
act committed with an intent to evade taxes. See id.; Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351
(1965) (describing an affirmative act as an act “constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of
the tax”).
Following Spies, courts have found the “affirmative act” element satisfied even where the
act is an otherwise innocent or legal one—so long as it is done with an intent to mislead or conceal.
See United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1090 (3d Cir. 1996) (affirmative act element satisfied
based on defendant’s entry into confidentiality agreements, refusing to pay cash for jewelry when
it would have caused reporting to the IRS, and use of overseas bank account); United States v.
Jungles, 903 F.2d 468, 474 (7th Cir. 1990) (taxpayer’s entry into an “independent contractor
agreement,” although a legal activity in and of itself, satisfied “affirmative act” element); United
States v. Thompson, 518 F.3d 832, 854 (10th Cir. 2008) (domestic and foreign commission checks
deposited in defendant’s personal savings account); United States v. Conley, 826 F.2d 551, 556-
57 (7th Cir. 1987) (use of nominees and cash with intent to evade payment of taxes). Courts
have also found the affirmative act element satisfied where a defendant’s personal use of
corporate funds or diversion of corporate receipts is accompanied by a failure to alert
bookkeepers or accountants of such acts. See, e.g., United States v. Kaatz, 705 F.2d 1237, 1246
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(10th Cir. 1983) (affirmative act element satisfied where defendants “handled their affairs so as to
avoid making the records usual to the businesses which they operated, and they did not disclose
to their accountant the receipts which they diverted.”). And so, the law is clear that tax evasion
cases “simply require that there be some evidence from which a jury could infer an intent to
mislead or conceal beyond mere failure to pay assessed taxes; ‘it is for the jury to determine, as a
matter of fact, whether the affirmative act was undertaken, in part, to conceal funds from or
mislead the government.’” United States v. Hassebrock, 663 F.3d 906, 918-19 (7th Cir. 2011)
(quoting United States v. King, 126 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir.1997)); Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1090 (same).
C. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
All grand jury materials and testimony are presumptively secret. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
6(e)(2); see also United States v. Silva, 745 F.2d 840, 846 (4th Cir. 1984) (“While the aura
shrouding grand jury proceedings has perhaps become less opaque over the years, it is
indisputable that there is still a substantial interest in maintaining the secrecy of those
proceedings.”). But, Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) contains certain exceptions that allow for the
disclosure of grand jury materials. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3).
Relevant to the Defendant’s motion to compel, “[t]he court may authorize disclosure—at
a time, in a manner, and subject to any other conditions that it directs—of a grand-jury matter: (i)
preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i). The
presumption of secrecy applies equally to legal instructions given to the Grand Jury by the
prosecutor, requiring that those seeking access to such legal instructions demonstrate a
particularized need for those portions of the transcripts. See, e.g., United States v. Mosby, No.
22-cr-00007-LKG, 2022 WL 4240835, at *6 (D. Md. Sept. 14, 2022) (denying request for Grand
Jury instructions for failing to meet the “particularized need” standard); United States v. Johnson,
92-CR-39A, 1994 WL 805243, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. May 26, 1995) (“As with a request for a review
of grand jury minutes, the secrecy of the grand jury will not be compromised by an order to
disclose grand jury instructions without a showing of ‘particularized need.’”), aff’d, 108 F.3d
1370 (2d Cir. 1997). Disclosure under Rule 6(e)(3) requires “a strong showing of particularized
need.” United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 443 (1983).
D. Section 7203 Willful Failure To Pay Taxes
Under 26 U.S.C. § 7203, a defendant can be charged with a misdemeanor for willfully
failing to perform a number of specified acts at the time required by law, including the failure to
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file and failure to pay a tax when due. Sansone, 380 U.S. at 351. If a taxpayer willfully fails to
report his income by not filing a return, or fails to timely pay his tax, the violation of Section
7203 is complete, irrespective of whether the taxpayer intends to comply with those duties at a
later date. See id. at 354 (“[T]he intent to report the income and pay the tax sometime in the
future does not vitiate the willfulness required by [26 U.S.C. § 7203].”); see also id. at 351
(stating that Section 7203 requires only “willfulness and the omission of the required act—here
the payment of the tax when due”). And so, the Supreme Court has emphasized that there “are
sanctions to assure punctual as well as faithful performance of these duties,” including criminal
sanctions for the “[w]illful failure to pay the tax when due.” Spies, 317 U.S. at 496-97.
E. Bill Of Particulars
“A defendant is entitled to a bill of particulars when an indictment fails to adequately
inform the defendant of the charges against [him],” or “if certain portions of the indictment are
so general that they do not advise a defendant of the specific acts that []he must defend against.”
United States v. Mosby, 22:cr-00007-LKG, 2022 WL 1120073, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 14, 2022).
“[T]he decision to grant or deny a motion for a bill of particulars is within the sound discretion of
the trial court.” United States v. Cuong Gia Le, 310 F. Supp. 2d 763, 781 (E.D. Va. 2004); see
also United States v. Anderson, 481 F.2d 685, 690 (4th Cir. 1973). “A bill of particulars is not to
be used to provide detailed disclosure of the government’s evidence in advance of trial.” United
States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 405 (4th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).
F. 	Use Of Assets To Pay For Counsel
It is well-established that criminal defendants have no constitutional right to use tainted
property to pay for counsel. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626
(1989); see also United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 802 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Caplin and
stating that “any Sixth Amendment right to obtain counsel of choice does not extend beyond the
individual’s right to spend his own legitimate, nonforfeitable assets”). In this regard, the
Supreme Court has held that “[t]here is a strong governmental interest in obtaining full recovery
of all forfeitable assets, an interest that overrides any Sixth Amendment interest in permitting
criminals to use assets adjudged forfeitable to pay for their defense.” Caplin, 491 U.S. at 630-
31.
To use an asset subject to forfeiture to pay for counsel, a criminal defendant must show
that “a portion of the assets restrained pursuant to criminal forfeiture statutes are untainted and
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that he has no other funds from which to secure the counsel of his choice.” Farmer, 274 F.3d at
803. To do so, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the seized assets are not
subject to forfeiture, which involves presenting evidence that the assets are untainted or
otherwise nonforfeitable, and that the government lacked probable cause to seize them. See
United States v. Byrd, 153 F. Supp. 3d 851, 855-56 (D. Md. 2015); United States v. Cohen, No.
CR. WDQ-14-0310, 2015 WL 2261661, at *31 (D. Md. May 7, 2015), aff’d in part and
dismissed in part, 888 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 2018). To demonstrate that the defendant has no other
funds to hire an attorney of his or her choice, the defendant must provide evidence, such as
affidavits or other admissible proof, showing that they are effectively indigent due to the
government’s seizure of their assets. See Byrd, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 856; Farmer, 274 F.3d at 804.
Both conditions must be met for the Court to grant a Farmer hearing. See Byrd, 153 F. Supp. 3d
at 856.
IV. 	ANALYSIS
Pending before the Court are the following pre-trial motions: (1) the Defendant’s motion
to invalidate certain orders suspending the statute of limitations (ECF No. 116); (2) the
Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failing to allege affirmative acts (ECF No. 120); (3) the
Defendant’s motion to dismiss allegations concerning employees (ECF No. 122); (4) the
Defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars (ECF No. 125); (5) the Defendant’s motion to dismiss
Counts 15 through 19 of the Superseding Indictment (ECF No. 126); (6) the Defendant’s motion
to compel disclosure of Brady and Grand Jury material (ECF No. 127); and (7) the Defendant’s
motion to permit him to sell the Hawthorne Property to fund his defense (ECF No. 166). The
Court addresses and resolves these motions below.
A. The Court Declines To Invalidate The Tolling Orders
As an initial matter, the Defendant has not shown that the Court should invalidate the
First and Second Tolling Orders issued in this case. And so, the Court DENIES the Defendant’s
motion to invalidate certain orders suspending the statute of limitations (ECF No. 116) for the
reasons stated below.
In his motion to invalidate, the Defendant seeks to invalidate the Court’s First Tolling
Order issued on October 31, 2023, which tolled the statute of limitations from October 27, 2023,
to December 28, 2023, and the Court’s Second Tolling Order, which tolled the statute of
limitations from April 5, 2024, to January 16, 2025. ECF No. 136 at 4-5. To support this
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motion, the Defendant argues that the following three statements by the Government in the First
and Second Accardi Declarations contain materially false statements and/or omissions that
warrant invalidating the First and Second Tolling Orders: (1) Agent Accardi falsely stated in his
First Declaration that the Defendant did not report certain money that he received in his
Montenegro bank account, or any income earned on this money, on his federal tax returns made
in 2016; (2) Agent Accardi falsely stated in his First and Second Declarations that the Defendant
failed to file reports of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (“FBAR”) for his four Montenegrin
bank accounts and omitted material and exculpatory information about the FBARs; and (3) that
Agent Accardi falsely represented in his Second Declaration that “the investigation has revealed
that income due and owing to [the Defendant] was sent by certain foreign officials in Malaysia to
[Gambler 3].” ECF No. 116 at 7-10; First Accardi Decl. at ¶¶ 13-15 (ECF No. 136-2); Second
Accardi Decl. at ¶¶ 13-18 and 27 (ECF No. 136-5). For the reasons below, the Court declines to
invalidate the First and Second Tolling Orders based on these claims.
First, a careful reading of the Government’s Tolling Applications and Declarations show
that these filings generally comply with the requirements of Section 3292. It is well-established,
that under 18 U.S.C. § 3292, the Court must suspend the limitations period, at the request of the
Government, if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) an official request has been
made for evidence of an offense in a foreign country and (2) it reasonably appeared, at the time
the request was made, that such evidence was in the foreign country. See 18 U.S.C. §
3292(a)(1); United States v. Broughton, 689 F.3d 1260, 1273 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[A] district
court’s decision to suspend the running of a statute of limitations is limited to [those] two
considerations . . . .”); United States v. Ratti, 365 F. Supp. 2d 649, 657 (D. Md. 2005) (applying
same standard). Tolling under this provision ends when the foreign country takes “final action”
on the request, but the suspension period may not exceed three years. 18 U.S.C. § 3292(b)-(c).
Courts have interpreted Section 3292’s “official request” prong to further require that the offense
be under investigation and the official request be “reasonably specific in order to elicit evidence
of the alleged violations under investigation.” United States v. Neill, 952 F. Supp. 831, 832-33
(D.D.C. 1996); see also Ratti, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 657; United States v. Wilson, 249 F.3d 366, 374
(5th Cir. 2001) (“The request for evidence must only be ‘reasonably specific in order to elicit
evidence of the alleged violations under investigation by the grand jury.’” (quoting Neill, 952 F.
Supp. at 833)), abrogated on other grounds by Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209 (2005).
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In this case, the evidence shows that the First Tolling Application and the First Accardi
Declaration comply with Section 3292, because the First Tolling Application makes clear that the
Government made an official request for evidence to a foreign country. First Appl. at ¶ 10 (ECF
No. 136-1) (stating that “[o]n September 25, 2023, at the prosecutor’s request, the Office of
International Affairs of the United States Department of Justice (‘OIA’) made an official request
to Montenegro for legal assistance in obtaining evidence” and that no final action had been taken
by Montenegro in response to this request). The First Tolling Application also states that “it
reasonably appears that evidence of” the offenses that a grand jury was investigating, “including
bank account and business records, is located in Montenegro.” Id. at ¶ 9.
Agent Accardi also reliably describes the evidence expected to be located in Montenegro,
in his First Declaration:
In 2016, his domestic UCB account received €926,872.70, which
led [the Defendant] to wire $885,000 of those funds to a U.S. bank
account that he controlled. In 2018, after [the Defendant’s] domestic
account at UCB received €862,142.19, he transferred that money to
the G&R domestic UCB account, then to the G&R international
UCB account, and from there wired the money to a U.S. bank
account. . . . [the Defendant] did not report this money, or any
interest earned on this money, as income on his federal tax returns. .
. .
[The 	Defendant] 	also 	failed 	to 	file 	FBARs 	for 	these 	four
Montenegrin bank accounts for the years 2016 through 2020 and
failed to report these bank accounts on the Schedule B to his income
tax returns.
First Accardi Decl. at ¶¶ 13-15 (ECF No. 136-2). And so, the First Tolling Application and First
Accardi Declaration generally satisfy the requirements of Section 3292.
The evidence before the Court similarly shows that the Second Tolling Application and
Second Accardi Declaration comply with Section 3292. The Second Tolling Application states
that “[o]n April 5, 2024, at the prosecutors’ request, the Office of International Affairs of the
United States Department of Justice (‘OIA’) made a supplemental official request to Montenegro
for legal assistance in obtaining evidence” and that no final action has been taken on the April 5,
2024, request. Second Appl. at ¶ 22 (ECF No. 136-4). The Second Tolling Application also
states represents that “it reasonably appears that evidence of” the offenses in the grand jury
investigation, “including bank account and business records, is located in Montenegro.” Id. at ¶
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21. In addition, Agent Accardi describes the evidence expected to be located in Montenegro in
his Declaration as follows:
On or about December 28, 2023, the United States received certain
records from the Montenegro authorities in response to its request.
Examination 	of 	those 	records 	revealed 	that 	[Gambler 	3], 	a
Malaysian national who is also a well-known poker player (and
former client of [the Defendant’s] firm), transferred over $2,000,000
to [the Defendant’s] accounts at UCB between 2016 and 2018.
Those transfers included: (1) a group of transfers from [Gambler 3]
to [the Defendant’s] domestic account at UCB . . . in October 2016
totaling €926,872.70, followed by [the Defendant] wiring $885,000
of those funds to a U.S. bank account that he controlled; and (2) a
transfer of £862,142.19 by [Gambler 3] on September 25, 2018 to
[the Defendant’s] domestic account at UCB . . . , followed by [the
Defendant] engaging in a series of transfers culminating in the
deposit of the funds in a U.S. bank account controlled by [the
Defendant]. The records indicate that the September 25, 2018
transfer by [Gambler 3] was made from [Gambler 3’s] personal
account at UCB. . . .
Second Accardi Decl. at ¶¶ 16-17 (ECF No. 136-5). 	And so, again, the Court is satisfied that the
Second Application and the Second Accardi Declaration generally satisfy the requirements for
tolling pursuant to Section 3292.
The Defendant also argues without persuasion that the Government’s filings contain
material misrepresentations and/or omissions that warrant invalidating the Court’s Tolling
Orders. In this regard, the Defendant first argues that Agent Accardi made a material
misrepresentation to the Court in his First Declaration, by stating that the Defendant did not
report certain money that he received in his Montenegro bank account, or any income earned on
this money, on his federal tax returns for 2016. ECF No. 116 at 7-10. During the evidentiary
hearing on the Defendant’s motion, Agent Accardi acknowledged that his statement that the
Defendant did not report this money, or any income earned on this money, on his federal tax
returns for 2016, is incorrect. Hr’g Tr. (Unofficial) at 117:1-10; see also Third Appl. at 2 n.1
(ECF No. 136-7) (stating that “further investigation has shown that of the approximately
$1,000,000 that [the Defendant] received from the 2016 set of UCB transfers, he reported as
income the $885,000 that he wired to his law firm’s U.S. bank account”). But, Agent Accardi’s
testimony also makes clear that this inaccuracy was not made with an intent to deceive the Court.
Hr’g Tr. (Unofficial) at 113:16-120:12 (testifying that he failed to verify this statement in the
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First Declaration, which he admits was drafted by a member of the Government’s prosecution
team, with the evidence prior to signing the declaration).
The Court also observes that, when this statement is excised from the rest of the First
Accardi Declaration, there is still sufficient information in that declaration to show that it
reasonably appeared to the Government, at the time, that the evidence of the tax crimes cited in
the declaration was located in Montenegro. See Broughton, 689 F.3d at 1273. Notably,
removing this statement does not alter the fact that the Defendant “failed to report as income the
remainder of the 2016 UCB transfers [approximately $115,000] that he kept at UCB and did not
wire to his law firm’s bank account,” as the Government alleges. See Third Appl. at 2 n.1 (ECF
No. 136-7). The First Accardi Declaration also contains other facts regarding the Defendant’s
alleged failure to report the accurate amount of his gambling winnings and diverting G&R funds
to pay for his personal expenses, to support the Government’s Tolling Application. First Accardi
Decl. at ¶¶ 10-11 (ECF No. 136-2). And so, the Defendant has not shown that the Government’s
acknowledged error in the First Accardi Declaration constitutes a material misrepresentation that
warrants invalidating the First Tolling Order.
The second alleged error by the Government also does not warrant invalidating the
Court’s First and Second Tolling Orders. The Defendant argues that Agent Accardi’s statements
in his First and Second Declarations that the Defendant failed to file FBARs for his four
Montenegrin bank accounts are materially false and that the Government also omitted material
information showing that he did not willfully evade paying taxes. See ECF No. 116 at 10-12;
First Accardi Decl. at ¶ 14 (ECF No. 136-2); Second Accardi Decl. at ¶ 14 (ECF No. 136-5).
Specifically, the Defendant argues that these statements are false and misleading, because he had
provided Government investigators with emails showing that he did not willfully fail to report
these bank accounts and Agent Accardi failed to provide this exculpatory information in his
Declaration. See ECF No. 116 at 11-12.
But, the fact that the Defendant may have requested in an email that his accountant be
informed about certain transactions involving his Montenegrin bank accounts does not render the
statement in the Declaration, that the Defendant failed to file FBARs for the Montenegrin bank
accounts, false. In addition, Agent Accardi’s Second Declaration also explicitly acknowledges
that there is evidence indicating that personnel from G&R informed the Defendant’s outside
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accountants about the UCB accounts. Second Accardi Decl. at ¶ 14 n.1 (ECF No. 136-5).
Notably, Agent Accardi states in his Second Declaration that:
Although certain correspondence indicates that personnel from [the
Defendant’s] firm informed his outside accountants of one or more
of the UCB accounts, no FBARs were ever filed for those accounts,
acknowledging [the Defendant’s] ownership and control of the
accounts. Moreover, [the Defendant’s] tax returns for certain years
during which the accounts were open did not even acknowledge [the
Defendant’s] signatory authority over the accounts—which is a
separate reporting requirement contained on Schedule B to IRS
Form 1040.
Id. And so, the Defendant has not shown that the statement about his failure to file FBARs for
the Montenegrin bank accounts was false, let alone materially false, to warrant invalidating the
subject Tolling Order.
The final error alleged by the Defendant, that Agent Accardi represented that “the
investigation has revealed that income due and owing to [the Defendant] was sent by certain
foreign officials in Malaysia to [Gambler 3],” also does not warrant invalidating the Court’s
Second Tolling Order. ECF No. 116 at 9; see Second Accardi Decl. at ¶ 27 (ECF No. 136-5). In
this regard, Agent Accardi states in his Second Declaration that:
[A]s a result of [the Defendant’s] relationship with [Gambler 3], [the
Defendant] has received over $3,000,000 from [Gambler 3] between
2016 and 2018, including through the UCB accounts controlled by
[Gambler 3] and [the Defendant]. Additionally, the investigation has
revealed that income due and owing to [the Defendant] was sent by
certain foreign officials in Malaysia to [Gambler 3]. As a result of
the relationship between [the Defendant] and [Gambler 3], records
from UCB for [Gambler 3’s] accounts will help the U.S. authorities
assess whether [the Defendant] conspired with [Gambler 3] to have
income due and owing to [the Defendant] to be directed or filtered
through [Gambler 3]— using [Gambler 3’s] UCB account(s).
Second Accardi Decl. at ¶ 27 (ECF No. 136-5). The Defendant argues that this statement is
materially false, because Agent Accardi was aware of an email that shows that the Defendant
“was paid directly $500,000 in cash in Malaysia by that country’s government” and that he
“immediately had an intermediary deliver the cash to partially repay a loan [the Defendant] had
received from . . . Gambler 3 in 2018.” ECF No. 116 at 9. But, when excised from the Second
Accardi Declaration, the Government’s submissions still satisfy Section 3292’s tolling
requirements, because there is ample information in the rest of the Second Accardi Declaration to
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show that the Government reasonably believed, at the time, that there was evidence of tax crimes
in Montenegro. See Second Accardi Decl. at ¶¶ 13-14 and 16-19 (ECF No. 136-5).
Notably, the Second Accardi Declaration states that the Government’s investigation
revealed evidence that: (1) the Defendant diverted firm funds for his personal expenses; (2) the
Defendant failed to report the UCB bank accounts on his federal tax returns and failed to file
FBARs regarding these accounts; and (3) records received from Montenegro show that a
Malaysian national transferred more than $2,000,000 into the Defendant’s UCB accounts
between 2016 and 2018. Id. at ¶¶ 10-12, 14-16; see also id. at ¶¶ 20-25 (alleging that the
Defendant transported $950,000.000 in cash into the United States from Hong Kong and told the
customs agent that the cash was poker winnings).1 And so, invalidating the Court’s First and
Second Tolling Orders is not warranted.
For these reasons, the Court DENIES the Defendant’s motion to invalidate certain orders
suspending the statute of limitations (ECF No. 116).
B. The Court Denies The Defendant’s Motion
To Dismiss For Failure To Allege Affirmative Acts
Turning to the Defendant’s motion to dismiss certain allegations in Counts I-IV of the
Superseding Indictment for failure to allege affirmative acts, the Court also DENIES this motion.
In Spies, the Supreme Court set forth a non-exclusive set of examples that would satisfy the
affirmative act requirement for a tax evasion offense, and specifically noted that:
[An affirmative willful attempt] may be inferred from conduct such
as keeping a double set of books, making false entries of alterations,
or false invoices or documents, destruction of books or records,
1 The Defendant also fails to show that the Government’s inaccurate statement in the Second Tolling
Application that the Defendant told criminal law enforcement agents that certain “UCB” transfers to his
Montenegro bank account, totaling over $2,000,000, were loans, warrants invalidating the Second Tolling
Order. See Second Appl. at ¶¶ 12-13 (ECF No. 136-4). In this regard, the Defendant argues that this
statement was a “knowingly false representation,” because this “allegation is not mentioned in Agent
Accardi’s Declaration,” leaving “this allegation without any evidentiary support.” ECF No. 116 at 8.
During the evidentiary hearing, Agent Accardi testified that he could not recall why the subject statement
appears in the Second Tolling Application, but not his Declaration. Hr’g Tr. (Unofficial) at 139:4-19.
Agent Accardi also testified that he recalls the Defendant saying two different things to him about the
UCB transfers to his Montenegro bank account, during an interview: at one point, the Defendant said that
the UCB transfers was legal fees from a foreign gambler and at another point he said all the money in the
accounts were loans. Hr’g Tr. (Unofficial) at 139:20-25. Given this testimony, the Defendant has not
shown that the Government’s error was made knowingly. This error is also not material, because, as
discussed above, the Second Accardi Declaration and the Government’s Second Tolling Application
contain ample other evidence to show that that the Government believed, at the time, that there was
evidence of tax crimes in Montenegro. See ECF Nos. 136-5 at ¶¶ 10-12, 14-16; see also id. at ¶¶ 20-25.
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concealment of assets or covering up sources of income, handling of
one’s affairs to avoid making the records usual in transactions of the
kind, and any conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead
or to conceal.
Spies v. Unites States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943). Given this, “[i]f the tax-evasion motive plays
any part in such conduct the offense may be made out even though the conduct may also serve
other purposes such as concealment of other crime.” Id. And so, an “affirmative act” is simply an
act committed with an intent to evade taxes. See id.; Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351
(1965) (describing an affirmative act as an act “constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of
the tax”).
Following Spies, courts have found the “affirmative act” element satisfied even where the
act is an otherwise innocent or legal one—so long as it is done with an intent to mislead or conceal.
See United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1090 (3d Cir. 1996) (affirmative act element satisfied
based on defendant’s entry into confidentiality agreements, refusing to pay cash for jewelry when
it would have caused reporting to the IRS, and use of overseas bank account); United States v.
Jungles, 903 F.2d 468, 474 (7th Cir. 1990) (taxpayer’s entry into an “independent contractor
agreement,” although a legal activity in and of itself, satisfied “affirmative act” element); United
States v. Thompson, 518 F.3d 832, 854 (10th Cir. 2008) (domestic and foreign commission checks
deposited in defendant’s personal savings account); United States v. Conley, 826 F.2d 551, 556-
57 (7th Cir. 1987) (use of nominees and cash with intent to evade payment of taxes). Courts
have also found the affirmative act element satisfied where a defendant’s personal use of
corporate funds or diversion of corporate receipts is accompanied by a failure to alert
bookkeepers or accountants of such acts. See, e.g., United States v. Kaatz, 705 F.2d 1237, 1246
(10th Cir. 1983) (affirmative act element satisfied where defendants “handled their affairs so as to
avoid making the records usual to the businesses which they operated, and they did not disclose
to their accountant the receipts which they diverted.”). And so, courts have held that tax evasion
cases “simply require that there be some evidence from which a jury could infer an intent to
mislead or conceal beyond mere failure to pay assessed taxes; ‘it is for the jury to determine, as a
matter of fact, whether the affirmative act was undertaken, in part, to conceal funds from or
mislead the government.’” United States v. Hassebrock, 663 F.3d 906, 918-19 (7th Cir. 2011)
(quoting United States v. King, 126 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir.1997)); Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1090 (same).
Here, the Defendant seeks to dismiss certain allegations supporting Counts I-IV of the
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Superseding Indictment upon the grounds that the Superseding Indictment lacks factual
allegations to show an affirmative act. In this regard, the Defendant argues that the
Government’s “mischaracterized transactions” and “redirected income” theories of tax evasion
do not meet Section 7201’s affirmative act requirement. ECF No. 120 at 2-6. But, a careful
reading of the Superseding Indictment shows that the Government alleges several types of
conduct that a jury could reasonably infer constitute an affirmative act to accomplish tax evasion.
Notably, the four tax evasion counts each allege that the Defendant committed multiple
“affirmative acts” to carry out his willful attempt to evade assessment of his income taxes. ECF
No. 159 at ¶ 105. Among the affirmative acts common to the tax evasion counts are that the
Defendant: (1) mischaracterized certain transactions by “using funds and assets of G&R to pay
personal gambling debts” and (2) redirected payments by “diverting G&R fees” either “to his
personal bank account” or “to a third party to pay personal gambling debts.” Id. at ¶¶ 105(a),
107(a)-(b), 109(a)-(c) and 111(a)-(b).
The Superseding Indictment also details how the Defendant’s alleged personal use of
G&R funds “caused” the transfer of those funds to be improperly characterized on the books and
tax returns of G&R, resulting in the Defendant’s alleged evasion of assessment of taxes. See id.
at ¶¶ 24, 32, 42, 47, 63 and 81. While the Defendant argues that this alleged conduct cannot
constitute an affirmative act, because he did not commit these acts with the requisite intent to
evade taxes, that is a question for the jury to decide. Hassebrock, 663 F.3d at 918–19 (holding
that the jury must decide whether an act—even an innocent or innocuous one—was done with
intent to mislead or conceal such that it constitutes an “affirmative act” of evasion under Section
7201). Given this the Defendant has not shown the dismissal of these charges is warranted.
And so, the Court DENIES the Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to allege affirmative
acts (ECF No. 120).
C. The Court Denies The Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss Counts 15 Through 19
The Defendant also fails to show that the Court should dismiss the willful failure to pay
tax charges in this case. Under 26 U.S.C. § 7203, a defendant can be charged with a
misdemeanor for willfully failing to perform a number of specified acts at the time required by
law, including the failure to file and failure to pay a tax when due. Sansone, 380 U.S. at 351. If
a taxpayer willfully fails to report his income by not filing a return or fails timely pay his tax, the
violation of Section 7203 is complete, irrespective of whether the taxpayer intends to comply
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with those duties at a later date. See id., 380 U.S. at 354 (“[T]he intent to report the income and
pay the tax sometime in the future does not vitiate the willfulness required by [26 U.S.C. §
7203].”); see also id. at 351 (stating § 7203 requires only “willfulness and the omission of the
required act—here the payment of the tax when due”).
In his motion to dismiss, the Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss these
charges, because he previously participated in the IRS’s civil enforcement process and he
ultimately paid the tax liability and penalties to resolve the outstanding tax. ECF No. 126 at 4;
see e.g., ECF No. 153 at 4. But, the Defendant acknowledges that he did not pay these taxes by
the payment due dates identified in the Superseding Indictment. ECF No. 153 at 3.
As this Court and other courts have long held, the fact that a taxpayer has made belated
payments to resolve an outstanding civil tax liability, does not preclude the Government from
pursuing a criminal prosecution for willful failure to timely pay that tax. See United States v.
Ross, 135 F. Supp. 842, 847 (D. Md. 1955); Sansone, 380 U.S. at 354; see, e.g., United States v.
Houser, 754 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Ming, 466 F.2d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir.
1972); United States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d 872, 875 (3d Cir. 1958). Given this, the Defendant’s
previous participation in an IRS payment plan to resolve his outstanding tax liability does not
preclude the Government from bringing criminal charges for willful failure to pay tax in this
case. And so, the Court also DENIES the Defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts 15 through 19
of the Superseding Indictment (ECF No. 126).
D. The Defendant Has Not Shown He Is Entitled To A Bill Of Particulars
The Defendant has also not shown that he is entitled to a bill of particulars in this
criminal matter. “A defendant is entitled to a bill of particulars when an indictment fails to
adequately inform the defendant of the charges against [him],” or “if certain portions of the
indictment are so general that they do not advise a defendant of the specific acts that []he must
defend against.” United States v. Mosby, 22:cr-00007-LKG, 2022 WL 1120073, at *3 (D. Md.
Apr. 14, 2022). “[T]he decision to grant or deny a motion for a bill of particulars is within the
sound discretion of the trial court.” United States v. Cuong Gia Le, 310 F. Supp. 2d 763, 781
(E.D. Va. 2004); see also United States v. Anderson, 481 F.2d 685, 690 (4th Cir. 1973). And so,
when evaluating a request for a bill of particulars, courts generally consider whether any
“essential detail[s] . . . may have been omitted from the indictment.” Anderson, 481 F.2d at 690
(4th Cir. 1973) (quotations and citations omitted).
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In his motion for a bill of particulars, the Defendant argues that he is entitled to a bill of
particulars on three topics: (1) the specific amounts of net gambling income (including both wins
and losses) that the Superseding Indictment alleges he underreported for 2016; (2) the specific
amount of the four employees’ salaries and insurance premiums that the government alleges were
improperly deducted as business expenses; and (3) when the Defendant’s tax payments should
have been sent and in what amount. ECF No. 125 at 4-9. But, a careful reading of the Second
Superseding Indictment shows that the Defendant is not entitled to a bill of particulars on the
specific amounts of his net gambling income from 2016, because the Superseding Indictment
provides this information. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1).
Notably, the Superseding Indictment provides extensive, specific allegations concerning
the alleged underreported gambling winnings in the Defendant’s 2016 tax forms. In fact, the
Superseding Indictment alleges, among other things, that the Defendant “falsely understated his
gambling winnings by more than $3.9 million on his 2016 Form 1040.” ECF No. 159 at ¶ 24.
The Superseding Indictment also identifies: (1) specific poker matches; (2) the location; (3) time
frame; (4) the individuals involved in these poker matches; and (5) numerous transactions that
the Government alleges to be poker winnings. See id. at ¶¶ 25-30 and 36. And so, the Court is
satisfied that the Superseding Indictment provides sufficient details as to the Defendant’s net
gambling income from 2016.
The Court is also satisfied that the Superseding Indictment contains sufficient details
regarding the amount of the employee salaries and insurance premiums that the Government
alleges that the Defendant improperly deducted as business expenses. While the Defendant
argues that the Superseding Indictment provides insufficient information for him to “understand
the nature of the charges against him, leaving him to guess about the government’s theory of
improper business deductions,” ECF No. 125 at 7, a careful reading of the Superseding
Indictment makes clear that this document contains, among other things, the specific amount of
the funds used for the subject employees, and alleges that the Defendant “caused over $8,000 in
G&R funds to be used to pay the four women’s health care premiums and over $31,000 in G&R
funds to be paid to them as salaries.” ECF No. 159 at ¶ 56; see also id. at ¶ 57 (alleging “the
false overstatement of G&R’s expenses and deductions by approximately $40,000, as a result of
[the Defendant’s] use of G&R funds to pay for salaries and healthcare premiums for the women
whom he placed on G&R’s payroll, who were not bona fide employees and who did not qualify
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for G&R’s health insurance”). And so, again, the Defendant has not shown that the Superseding
Indictment fails to provide “a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts
constituting the offense charged.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1).
Lastly, the Defendant’s request for additional information about when his tax payments
should have been sent, and in what amount, is also unwarranted. The Superseding Indictment
contains a chart providing this information. See ECF No. 159 at ¶ 115. And so, the Court also
must DENY the Defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars (ECF No. 125).
E. The Court Denies The Defendant’s Motion To Compel
Disclosure Of Brady And Grand Jury Materials Without Prejudice
The Defendant also fails to show a particularized need for any legal instructions that the
Government provided to the Grand Jury. It is well-established that Grand jury materials and
testimony are presumptively secret. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e); see also United States v. Silva,
745 F.2d 840, 846 (4th Cir. 1984). But, “[t]he court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a
manner, and subject to any other conditions that it directs—of a grand-jury matter: (i)
preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i).
Such disclosure under Rule 6(e)(3) requires “a strong showing of particularized need.” United
States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 443 (1983).
The Defendant has not shown a particularized need for any Grand Jury instructions in this
case. The Defendant seeks the Government’s legal instructions to the Grand Jury related to: (1)
the four women employees; (2) “what the [G]overnment told the [Grand Jury] about willfulness
and 1099 reporting”; and (3) “how the [G]overnment explained the willfulness requirement in
instructing the grand jurors on probable cause.” ECF No. 127 at 12-14. To support this request,
the Defendant alleges, without any support, that “transcripts of the grand jury instructions are
likely to demonstrate that the government misstated the law.” Id. at 14. But, such bald
speculation is insufficient to warrant the disclosure of Grand Jury transcripts. See Sells Eng’g,
Inc., 463 U.S. at 443; see also Loc Tien Nguyen, 314 F. Supp. 2d 612, 616 (E.D. Va. 2004) (Rule
6(e)(3)(E)(ii) is not “an invitation to engage in a fishing expedition to search for grand jury
wrongdoing and abuse when there are no grounds to believe that any wrongdoing or abuse has
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occurred.”). And so, the Court DENIES the Defendant’s motion to compel disclosure of Brady
and Grand Jury Materials (ECF No. 127) WITHOUT PREJUDICE.2
F. 	The Court Declines To Permit The Defendant
To Sell The Hawthorne Property Fund His Defense
As a final matter, the Defendant has renewed his motion to permit him to sell his
residence located at 4323 Hawthorne Street, NW, Washington, DC (the “Hawthorne Property”),
which is subject to an appearance bond and agreement to forfeit the property if he fails to appear
as required for any court proceeding. See ECF No. 166; ECF No. 8-1. The Court also DENIES
this motion for the following two reasons.
First, as the Court previously held, the Defendant is a flight risk and requiring the
Defendant to post the Hawthorne Property as collateral, along with the other conditions imposed
by the Court, are the least restrictive conditions to reasonably assure his appearance in this
criminal matter. ECF No. 76 at 4-7. Notably, there is no dispute that the Defendant has engaged
in extensive foreign travel and that the alleged offenses in this case involve significant
international travel, unreported income and contacts with gamblers and other individuals in other
countries. ECF No. 175 at 15. And so, while the Defendant is presumed innocent of these
charges, the nature and circumstances of the alleged offenses, the weight of the evidence and the
Defendant’s personal history and characteristics weigh in favor of requiring the Defendant to
agree to forfeit the Hawthorne Property if he fails to appear.
Second, the Defendant has not met his burden to show that he has no other assets to pay
his counsel and that the Hawthorne Property is not subject to forfeiture.3 See, e.g., United States
v. Byrd, 153 F. Supp. 3d 851, 856 (D. Md. 2015) (finding that the Defendant had “made a prima
facie showing that the assets at issue are not subject to forfeiture”). It is well-established that
2 During the November 6, 2025, hearing, the Defense stated that the Government produced a large
production of Grand Jury transcripts on Monday, November 3, 2025, and that the Defense was still
reviewing that production. And so, the Court will allow the Defendant to renew his motion to compel, for
good cause shown, should the Defense determine that the Government’s production is not sufficient to
resolve the request for Grand Jury material.
3 The Court must order the forfeiture of any property “constituting, or derived from, proceeds the person
obtained directly or indirectly” as the result of making false statements on a loan application in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1014. 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2); see United States v. Farkas, 474 F. App’x 349, 359 (4th Cir.
2012). “To obtain forfeiture, the Government must establish by a preponderance of the evidence a nexus
between the property for which it seeks forfeiture and the crime.” United States v. Jones, 622 F. App’x
204, 207 (4th Cir. 2015); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A).
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criminal defendants have no constitutional right to use tainted property to pay for counsel.
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989); see also United States
v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 802 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Caplin and stating that “any Sixth
Amendment right to obtain counsel of choice does not extend beyond the individual’s right to
spend his own legitimate, nonforfeitable assets”). Indeed, as the Supreme Court has recognized,
“there is a strong governmental interest in obtaining full recovery of all forfeitable assets, an
interest that overrides any Sixth Amendment interest in permitting criminals to use assets
adjudged forfeitable to pay for their defense.” Caplin, 491 U.S. at 631. And so, the Defendant
must make a prima facie showing that “a portion of the assets restrained pursuant to criminal
forfeiture statutes are untainted and that he has no other funds from which to secure the counsel
of his choice,” to prevail on his motion to sell. Farmer, 274 F.3d at 803; see also Byrd, 153 F.
Supp. 3d at 856; United States v. Cohen, No. CR. WDQ-14-0310, 2015 WL 2261661, at *31 (D.
Md. May 7, 2015), aff’d in part and dismissed in part, 888 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 2018). Both of
these conditions must be satisfied for the Court to allow a Farmer hearing. See Byrd, 153 F.
Supp. 3d at 856.
In this case, the Superseding Indictment supports the Government’s view that the
Hawthorne Property is a tainted asset that is subject to forfeiture. In Count 22 of the Superseding
Indictment, the Government alleges that:
[On or about September 29, 2021, the Defendant] knowingly [made]
false statements and reports for the purpose of influencing . . . the
action of NFM Lending, a mortgage lending business . . . in
connection with a loan application seeking $180,000, [where the
Defendant] (1) represented that the information he provided was
“true, accurate, and complete,” when, in truth and fact, [he] knew
that the application omitted personal liabilities over $14,500,000 and
federal liability owed to the IRS over $945,000 . . .; (2) answered
“No” in response to the question whether [he] was “currently
delinquent or in default on a federal debt,” when, in truth and fact,
[he] knew that he had over $945,000 in tax liabilities for the 2020
tax year; and (3) answered “No” in response to the question whether
[he] was “a co-signer or guarantor on any debt or loan that is not
disclosed in this application,” when, in truth and fact, [he] knew that
he was a guarantor on the two financing agreements between G&R
and the Funder, which were in the amounts of $1,600,000 and
$4,000,000, respectively.
ECF No. 159 at ¶ 121. The Government also alleges that the Defendant’s false statement on the
NFM mortgage loan allowed the Defendant to obtain this loan and to use the loan proceeds to
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repay an individual who provided him with funds to purchase the Hawthorne Property. ECF See
No. 175 at 8. Given this, the Government argues that, but for the Defendant’s false statements
on the NFM loan application, the Defendant would have lost his ownership interest in the
Hawthorne Property. See id. at 7-8. And so, the Government seeks to forfeit the Hawthorne
Property in the event of the Defendant’s conviction of Count 22. ECF No. 159 at ¶ 122.
Given the factual allegations in the Superseding Indictment, the Defendant has not shown
that the Hawthorne Property is not tainted and subject to forfeiture. See United States v.
Chamberlain, 868 F.3d 290, 296-97 (4th Cir. 2017) (“By its terms, Section 853(e) authorizes
restraining orders to preserve the availability of property . . . that would be subject to forfeiture
upon conviction.” (citation and internal quotations omitted)); Luis v. United States, 578 U.S. 5,
10 (2016) (holding that only “the pretrial restraint of legitimate, untainted assets needed to retain
counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amendment”). Given this, the Defendant has no Sixth
Amendment right to sell the Hawthorne Property to fund his defense. See Farmer, 274 F.3d at
803. And so, the Court DENIES the Defendant’s motion to permit him to sell the Hawthorne
Property to fund his defense (ECF No. 166).
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court:
(1) DENIES the Defendant’s motion to invalidate certain orders suspending the statute of
limitations (ECF No. 116);
(2) DENIES the Defendant’s motion to dismiss allegations for failure to allege
affirmative acts (ECF No. 120);
(3) HOLDS-in-ABEYANCE the Defendant’s motion to dismiss allegations concerning
employees (ECF No. 122);
(4) DENIES the Defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars (ECF No. 125);
(5) DENIES the Defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts 15 through 19 of the Superseding
Indictment (ECF No. 126);
(6) DENIES the Defendant’s motion to compel disclosure of Brady and Grand Jury
material (ECF No. 127) WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and
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(7) DENIES the Defendant’s motion to permit him to sell the Hawthorne Property to
fund his defense (ECF No. 166).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Lydia Kay Griggsby
LYDIA KAY GRIGGSBY
United States District Judge
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