Infrastructure and Energy Alternatives, Inc v. Axim Fringe Solutions Group, LLC et al

8:24-cv-01268Mdd18 de dez. de 2025

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENERGY
ALTERNATIVES, INC. on its own 	:
behalf and as Plan Administrator
and Fiduciary of Infrastructure :
and Energy Alternatives, Inc.
Employee Benefit Plan 	:
v. 	: 	Civil Action No. DKC 24-1268
:
AXIM FRINGE SOLUTIONS GROUP,
LLC, et al. 	:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently 	pending 	and 	ready 	for 	resolution 	in 	this 	Employee
Retirement 	Income 	Security 	Act 	(“ERISA”) 	case 	is 	the 	motion 	for
default judgment filed by Infrastructure and Energy Alternatives,
Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “IEA”). 	(ECF No. 23). 	The issues have been
briefed, 	and 	the 	court 	now 	rules, 	no 	hearing 	being 	deemed
necessary. 	Local 	Rule 	105.6. 	For 	the 	following 	reasons, 	the
motion 	for 	default 	judgment 	will 	be 	denied 	and 	Plaintiff 	will 	be
directed 	to 	show 	cause 	why 	the 	complaint 	should 	not 	be 	dismissed
as to all defendants for failure to state a claim.
I. 	Background
A. 	Factual Background
IEA is a corporation that “is the sponsor, Plan Administrator,
and fiduciary of the Infrastructure and Energy Alternatives, Inc.
Employee 	Benefit 	Plan 	(‘Plan’).” 	(ECF 	No. 	1 	¶¶ 	1–2). 	“The 	Plan
provides health benefits to participants and beneficiaries of the
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Plan” and is governed by ERISA. 	(Id. ¶ 2). 	Axim Fringe Solutions
Group 	(“Axim”) 	is 	a 	limited 	liability 	company 	that 	provides
fiduciary and administrative services to ERISA plans. 	(Id. ¶¶ 3–
4). 	Axim’s 	Chief 	Executive 	Officer 	is 	James 	Campbell, 	who 	owns
98% of Axim, and its Director of Compliance Accounting is Melissa
McManes. 	(Id. ¶¶ 5–6).
On 	January 	1, 	2021, 	IEA 	entered 	into 	a 	Provider/Client
Agreement 	with 	Axim 	in 	which 	Axim 	agreed 	to 	“provide[] 	fiduciary
and administrative services to IEA and the Plan.” 	(Id. ¶¶ 4, 10).
As 	part 	of 	its 	services, 	“Axim 	created 	and 	controlled 	trust
accounts 	to 	which 	IEA 	forwarded 	contributions 	that 	were 	intended
for 	the 	purpose 	of 	paying 	benefits 	and 	necessary 	expenses 	of 	the
Plan.” 	(Id. 	¶ 	4). 	Mr. 	Campbell, 	as 	CEO 	of 	Axim, 	“was 	the 	named
Trustee to the IEA Employee Welfare Benefit Plans Trust Agreement
(‘Trust 	Agreement’), 	the 	Axim 	Fringe 	Solutions 	Master 	Trust
Agreement 	(‘Axim 	Master 	Trust 	Agreement’), 	and 	the 	sub-trust
accounts 	that 	held 	the 	Plan 	assets.” 	(Id. 	¶ 	5). 	Among 	Axim’s
other services, it administered benefits from the trust accounts,
received 	and 	paid 	monthly 	insurance 	premium 	invoices, 	provided
accounting and recordkeeping services, and assumed “responsibility
for protecting the Plan assets in the Trust.” 	(Id. ¶ 16).
IEA alleges that it “properly and timely funded the Trust” at
all times “so that proper claims and expenses of the Plan could be
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timely 	paid 	from 	Plan 	assets.” 	(Id. 	¶ 	18). 	Sometime 	later, 	IEA
alleges, 	it 	“discovered 	and 	determined 	that 	Axim 	was 	not 	timely
and 	properly 	paying 	claims 	and 	other 	legitimate 	expenses 	of 	the
Plan.” 	(Id. ¶ 19). 	Instead, Axim, Mr. Campbell, and Ms. McManes
(collectively, 	“Defendants”) 	allegedly 	“misappropriated,
improperly 	commingled, 	and/or 	transferred 	assets 	of 	the 	Plan 	to
Defendants, 	other 	companies 	owned 	by 	[Mr.] 	Campbell, 	and/or 	sub-
trusts for employers unrelated to IEA.” 	(Id. ¶ 22). 	In doing so,
they 	allegedly 	“failed 	to 	properly 	apply 	and 	segregate 	[IEA’s]
contributions 	to 	the 	Trust 	and 	sub-trusts 	established 	for 	the
Plan.” 	(Id. 	¶ 	21). 	All 	the 	while, 	IEA 	posits, 	“Defendants
actively concealed and misled IEA about their improper and illegal
actions 	when 	responding 	to 	questions 	from 	IEA 	or 	the 	Plan’s
vendors.” 	(Id. 	¶ 	26). 	Put 	simply, 	Axim, 	Mr. 	Campbell, 	and 	Ms.
McManes “bill[ed] IEA for [their] services” but allegedly “failed
to perform their obligations as Trustee.” (Id. ¶ 20).
Relatedly, 	the 	Secretary 	of 	Labor 	filed 	a 	complaint 	against
Axim, 	Mr. 	Campbell, 	and 	Ms. 	McManes 	in 	this 	district 	on 	February
20, 	2024, 	alleging 	in 	much 	greater 	detail 	similar 	misconduct 	by
Defendants involving dozens of ERISA plans. 	Complaint, Su v. Axim
Fringe 	Sols. 	Grp., 	LLC, 	No. 	24-cv-483-LKG 	(D.Md. 	Feb. 	20, 	2024),
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ECF No. 1.1 	IEA states that it learned of the Secretary’s lawsuit
before filing its complaint, (ECF No. 1 ¶ 23), but it is not clear
whether 	IEA 	learned 	of 	Defendants’ 	alleged 	misconduct 	via 	the
Secretary’s lawsuit.
On March 27, 2024, IEA informed Axim that it would terminate
Axim’s 	services 	“based 	on 	Axim’s 	service 	failures, 	gross
negligence, 	and 	fraud.” 	(Id. 	¶ 	27). 	On 	April 	11, 	2024, 	the
termination took effect. 	(Id.). 	IEA asserts that it “need[ed] to
separately 	fund 	payments 	of 	$1,882,178.86 	due 	under 	the 	Plan.”
(Id. ¶ 28). 	IEA instructed Defendants “to transfer the remaining
amounts 	in 	the 	IEA 	Trust 	to 	a 	new 	account 	established 	for 	the
Plan,” but Defendants did not do so. 	(Id.).
B. 	Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed its complaint against Axim, Mr. Campbell, and
Ms. McManes on April 30, 2024. 	(ECF No. 1). 	The complaint contains
four 	counts: 	breach 	of 	contract 	(Count 	I), 	injunctive 	relief 	to
prevent 	further 	dissipation 	of 	Plan 	assets 	(Count 	II), 	breach 	of
fiduciary 	duty 	and 	injunctive 	relief 	under 	ERISA 	§ 	502(a)(2) 	and
§ 	502(a)(3), 	29 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1132(a)(2) 	and 	(a)(3) 	(Count 	III), 	and
fraudulent 	misrepresentation 	(Count 	IV). 	These 	counts 	cover 	a
period of alleged misconduct from January 2021 to April 2024. 	Axim
1 For detailed factual allegations about Defendants’ actions
as ERISA fiduciaries, see the cited complaint.
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and 	Mr. 	Campbell 	were 	served 	on 	May 	20 	and 	May 	21, 	2024,
respectively.2 	(ECF Nos. 9; 11).
On 	May 	23, 	2024, 	another 	judge 	in 	this 	district 	entered 	a
consent judgment in the Secretary of Labor’s separate suit against
Axim, Mr. Campbell, and Ms. McManes covering their ERISA violations
for 	the 	period 	of 	December 	2015 	to 	June 	2022 	(“DOL 	Consent
Judgment”). 	Consent 	Judgment 	and 	Order 	at 	1–2, 	Axim, 	No. 	24-cv-
483-LKG 	(D.Md. 	May 	23, 	2024), 	ECF 	No. 	20. 	The 	court 	ordered 	the
defendants in that case to pay over $4 million into a distribution
account and appointed Receivership Management, Inc. (“RMI”) as an
independent 	fiduciary. 	Id. 	at 	3–4. 	The 	court 	ordered 	RMI 	to
exercise 	“plenary 	authority 	. 	. 	. 	over 	the 	liquidation 	and
distribution 	of 	the 	assets 	of 	the 	Distribution 	Account 	and 	all
master 	trust 	and 	[sub-trust] 	accounts 	maintained 	and 	held 	by
Defendants,” 	id. 	at 	4, 	granting 	RMI 	“exclusive 	control” 	over 	the
sub-trust accounts, id. at 6. 	One such sub-trust account was that
of 	Plaintiff 	IEA. 	Consent 	Judgment 	and 	Order, 	Exhibit 	2 	at 	3,
2 	It 	is 	not 	clear 	whether 	Plaintiff 	complied 	with 	its
obligation under ERISA to serve its complaint on the Secretary of
Labor 	and 	the 	Secretary 	of 	the 	Treasury 	by 	certified 	mail. 	29
U.S.C. 	§ 	1132(h). 	At 	least 	one 	court 	in 	this 	district 	has
concluded 	that 	a 	failure 	to 	comply 	with 	ERISA’s 	service
requirements 	constitutes 	a 	jurisdictional 	defect. 	Arthur 	v.
Trojan 	Horse, 	Ltd., 	No. 	12-cv-3156-WDQ, 	2013 	WL 	4854138, 	at 	*3–4
(D.Md. Sep. 10, 2013) (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss for
lack 	of 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	because 	there 	was 	“no
indication 	that 	the 	[p]laintiffs 	complied 	with 	the 	service
requirement of § 1132(h)”).
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Axim, 	No. 	24-cv-483-LKG, 	ECF 	No. 	20-2. 	The 	court 	instructed 	RMI
to establish a “notice and claims submission procedure” for Axim’s
clients, 	including 	Plaintiff, 	such 	that 	RMI 	could 	“[f]acilitate
the transfer of the custody of any assets of the sub-trust accounts
. . . to the respective [clients].” 	Consent Judgment and Order at
5, Axim, No. 24-cv-483-LKG, ECF No. 20.3
Returning 	to 	this 	case, 	both 	Axim 	and 	Mr. 	Campbell 	executed
waivers of service on June 7, 2024, meaning their answers were due
on August 6, 2024. 	(ECF Nos. 12; 13). 	After Axim and Mr. Campbell
failed to file their answers with the court by August 6, Plaintiff
3 	The 	existence 	of 	the 	consent 	judgment 	does 	not 	preclude
litigation of the portion of this suit that overlaps with the time
period covered under the consent judgment, namely January 2021 to
June 2022. 	Under the doctrine of res judicata, “[t]here must be:
(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit; (2) an identity
of the cause of action in both the earlier and the later suit; and
(3) 	an 	identity 	of 	parties 	or 	their 	privies 	in 	the 	two 	suits.”
SAS 	Inst., 	Inc. v. 	World 	Programming 	Ltd., 	874 	F.3d 	370, 	378 	(4 th
Cir. 2017) (quoting Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 354–
55 	(4th 	Cir. 	2004)). 	IEA’s 	suit 	is 	not 	precluded 	in 	part 	by 	the
consent 	judgment 	in 	the 	Secretary’s 	suit 	because 	IEA 	is 	not 	in
privity 	with 	the 	Secretary. 	Picardi 	v. 	Chi. 	Truck 	Drivers, 	581
F.Supp. 	794, 	797 	(N.D.Ill. 	1983) 	(holding 	that 	the 	Secretary 	of
Labor’s prior ERISA suit did not preclude the private plaintiff’s
subsequent 	ERISA 	suit; 	the 	parties 	lacked 	privity 	because 	the
Secretary 	represented 	the 	public 	interest, 	distinct 	from 	the
private litigant’s private interest); cf. Wilmington Shipping Co.
v. 	New 	England 	Life 	Ins. 	Co., 	496 	F.3d 	326, 	340 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2007)
(holding the converse due to lack of privity). 	Even so, were this
court 	to 	reach 	the 	remedy 	stage, 	it 	would 	be 	obligated 	to 	tailor
the equitable relief it provides to ensure no windfall accrues to
Plaintiff. 	See 	Trump 	v. 	CASA, 	Inc., 	606 	U.S. 	831, 	861 	(2025)
(holding 	that 	equitable 	relief 	can 	be 	no 	“broader 	than 	necessary
to provide complete relief to each plaintiff”).
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filed 	a 	status 	report 	on 	September 	13, 	2024, 	explaining 	that 	Mr.
Campbell 	had 	sent 	an 	answer, 	purportedly 	on 	behalf 	of 	Axim,4 	to
Plaintiff 	directly 	on 	August 	6. 	(ECF 	No. 	17, 	at 	1). 	Plaintiff
attached 	the 	answer 	to 	its 	status 	report. 	(ECF 	No. 	17-1). 	On
November 	1, 	2024, 	Plaintiff 	moved 	for 	clerk’s 	entry 	of 	default
against 	Axim 	and 	Mr. 	Campbell, 	(ECF 	No. 	18), 	which 	the 	clerk
granted 	as 	to 	both 	Axim 	and 	Mr. 	Campbell 	on 	February 	26, 	2025,
(ECF No. 19).
On July 23, 2025, Plaintiff moved for default judgment against
Axim 	and 	Mr. 	Campbell.5 	(ECF 	No. 	23). 	The 	following 	day, 	the
court 	directed 	Plaintiff 	to 	brief 	how 	this 	case 	relates 	to 	Su 	v.
4 	While 	not 	on 	the 	docket, 	the 	clerk 	received 	an 	email
purportedly 	from 	Mr. 	Campbell 	through 	the 	court’s 	EDSS 	system 	on
August 6, 2024. 	The document was not accepted for filing because
the 	attachment 	lacked 	an 	original, 	ink 	signature. 	Even 	if 	Mr.
Campbell had provided a signed document, it still would have been
improper on behalf of Axim. 	As an entity, Axim must be represented
by 	counsel 	to 	file 	documents 	in 	this 	case. 	Local 	Rule 	101.1.a.
Mr. Campbell is not an attorney. 	(See ECF No. 23-2, at 3 (affidavit
by 	Plaintiff’s 	counsel 	declaring 	that 	“[Mr.] 	Campbell 	is 	not 	an
attorney”); id. at 6 (email from Mr. Campbell stating “I am not an
attorney”)). 	Therefore, he cannot file documents on Axim’s behalf.
The 	“answer” 	sent 	to 	plaintiff’s 	counsel 	also 	is 	not 	signed 	and,
in any event, does not constitute filing with the court. 	See Bauer
Compressors, Inc. v. Three Rivers Crane, Inc., No. 18-cv-282, 2018
WL 4655731, at *3 (E.D.Va. Sep. 27, 2018); Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(d)(1).
5 	Ms. 	McManes 	filed 	an 	answer 	in 	this 	case. 	(ECF 	No. 	15).
No 	scheduling 	order 	has 	yet 	been 	entered, 	and 	no 	further
proceedings have taken place. 	In light of the resolution of this
motion, however, Plaintiff will be directed to show cause why the
complaint 	should 	not 	be 	dismissed 	in 	its 	entirety 	for 	failure 	to
state a claim.
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Axim 	Fringe 	Sols. 	Grp., 	LLC, 	No. 	24-cv-483-LKG, 	and 	whether 	this
case should be handled by the presiding judge in that case. 	(ECF
No. 	24). 	Plaintiff 	filed 	a 	response 	to 	that 	order 	on 	August 	6,
2025. 	(ECF No. 25). 	Neither Mr. Campbell nor Axim has responded
to Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment.
II. 	Standard of Review
Default 	judgment 	is 	“appropriate 	when 	the 	adversary 	process
has 	been 	halted 	because 	of 	an 	essentially 	unresponsive 	party.”
S.E.C. 	v. 	Lawbaugh, 	359 	F.Supp.2d 	418, 	421 	(D.Md. 	2005) 	(citing
Jackson 	v. 	Beech, 	636 	F.2d 	831, 	836 	(D.C. 	Cir. 	1980)).
Fed.R.Civ.P. 	55(a), 	which 	governs 	default 	judgments, 	states
“[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is
sought 	has 	failed 	to 	plead 	or 	otherwise 	defend, 	and 	that 	failure
is 	shown 	by 	affidavit 	or 	otherwise, 	the 	clerk 	must 	enter 	the
party’s 	default.” 	If 	a 	party 	fails 	to 	plead 	or 	defend, 	then 	the
clerk may enter a default judgment, provided that “the plaintiff’s
claim 	is 	for 	a 	sum 	certain 	or 	a 	sum 	that 	can 	be 	made 	certain 	by
computation.” 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	55(b)(1). 	In 	all 	other 	cases, 	the
party must apply to the court for a default judgment. 	Fed.R.Civ.P.
55(b)(2). 	Plaintiff seeks a default judgment for a specific amount
of 	fund 	payments 	that 	Defendants 	failed 	to 	pay, 	but 	whether 	to
enter 	judgment 	in 	Plaintiff’s 	favor 	is 	within 	the 	court’s
discretion. 	Hanover Ins. Co. v. Persaud Cos., No. 13-cv-1472-GJH,
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2015 WL 4496448, at *2 (D.Md. July 22, 2015) (citing Lawbaugh, 359
F.Supp.2d at 421). 	Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief.
On 	a 	motion 	for 	default 	judgment, 	“the 	well-[pleaded]
allegations 	in 	a 	complaint 	as 	to 	liability 	are 	taken 	as 	true,
although 	the 	allegations 	as 	to 	damages 	are 	not.” 	Lawbaugh, 	359
F.Supp.2d 	at 	422 	(citing 	Dundee 	Cement 	Co. 	v. 	Howard 	Pipe 	&
Concrete 	Prods., 	Inc., 	722 	F.2d 	1319, 	1323 	(7 th 	Cir. 	1983)); 	see
also 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	8(b)(6). 	By 	his 	default, 	a 	defendant 	“admits
the 	plaintiff’s 	well-pleaded 	allegations 	of 	fact.” 	Ryan 	v.
Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 780 (4 th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hou. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5 th
Cir. 1975)). 	Even so, a default does not constitute “an absolute
confession by the defendant of his liability and of the plaintiff’s
right 	to 	recover.” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Nishimatsu, 	515 	F.2d 	at 	1206).
Instead, 	the 	court 	must 	“determine[] 	whether 	the 	unchallenged
factual 	allegations 	constitute 	a 	legitimate 	cause 	of 	action” 	by
“apply[ing] 	the 	Iqbal/Twombly 	pleading 	standard.” 	United 	States
v. Kachikwu, No. 21-cv-1546-GJH, 2023 WL 155248, at *2 (D.Md. Jan.
11, 	2023) 	(citing 	Agora 	Fin., 	LLC 	v. 	Samler, 	725 	F.Supp.2d 	491,
494 (D.Md. 2010); Balt. Line Handling Co. v. Brophy, 771 F.Supp.2d
531, 	544 	(D.Md. 	2011)). 	“Under 	that 	standard, 	a 	complaint 	fails
to state a claim entitling the pleader to relief if the complaint
offers 	only 	‘labels 	and 	conclusions’ 	or 	‘naked 	assertions 	devoid
Case 8:24-cv-01268-DKC Document 26 Filed 12/18/25 Page 9 of 21
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of further factual enhancement.’” 	Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff 	pursues 	claims 	for 	breach 	of 	contract 	(Count 	I),
injunctive relief (Count II), breach of ERISA fiduciary duty (Count
III), 	and 	fraudulent 	misrepresentation 	(Count 	IV). 	Conclusory
allegations doom Plaintiff’s claims in Counts I, III, and IV, and
Plaintiff’s 	request 	for 	injunctive 	relief 	in 	Count 	II 	is 	moot
because 	Axim 	and 	Mr. 	Campbell 	no 	longer 	control 	the 	relevant
accounts. 	The court will deny the motion for default judgment on
all counts.
A. 	Counts I & IV: Breach of Contract and Fraudulent
Misrepresentation
Plaintiff 	pursues 	claims 	for 	breach 	of 	contract 	and
fraudulent misrepresentation in Counts I and IV, respectively. 	As
to 	its 	breach 	of 	contract 	claim, 	Plaintiff 	entered 	three
agreements—the Provider/Client Agreement, Trust Agreement, and the
Axim Master Trust Agreement—with Axim and Mr. Campbell. 	(ECF No.
1 	¶ 	31). 	Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	it 	states 	a 	claim 	for 	breach 	of
contract 	because 	it 	alleges 	that 	Axim 	and 	Mr. 	Campbell 	“(1) 	did
not 	timely 	and 	properly 	pay 	claims 	and 	other 	legitimate 	expenses
of 	the 	Plan, 	(2) 	billed 	IEA 	for 	services 	which 	they 	did 	not
properly 	perform, 	(3) 	failed 	to 	properly 	apply 	and 	segregate 	the
contributions to the Trust and sub-trusts established for the Plan,
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and (4) misappropriated, improperly commingled, and/or transferred
assets 	of 	the 	Plan 	to 	[themselves], 	other 	companies 	owned 	by
Campbell, and/or sub-trusts for employers unrelated to IEA.” 	(ECF
No. 23-1, at 4 (citing ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 19–22)). 	As a result of Axim
and Mr. Campbell’s alleged breaches, Plaintiff had to fund payments
of $1,882,178.86 “due under the Plan.” 	(Id. (citing ECF No. 1 ¶¶
28, 	33)). 	Plaintiff 	did 	not 	attach 	copies 	of 	the 	agreements 	in
question to its complaint nor to its motion for default judgment.
Relatedly, Plaintiff’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim rests on
the 	assertion 	that 	Axim 	and 	Mr. 	Campbell 	“made 	repeated 	false
statements and intentionally misrepresented material facts to IEA
and 	IEA’s 	vendors 	about 	performance 	of 	Defendants[’] 	duties 	and
payment of the Plan’s obligations,” which they allegedly knew were
false and on which Plaintiff’s reliance was allegedly reasonable.
(ECF 	No. 	1 	¶¶ 	49–50, 	52; 	see 	also 	ECF 	No. 	23-1, 	at 	6). 	Before
reaching 	the 	plausibility 	of 	the 	breach 	of 	contract 	and 	fraud
claims, it is necessary to assess whether ERISA completely preempts
them.
1. 	ERISA Preemption
“The 	purpose 	of 	ERISA 	is 	to 	provide 	a 	uniform 	regulatory
regime over employee benefit plans.” 	Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,
542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004). 	There are two forms of preemption under
ERISA, 	complete 	and 	conflict, 	captured 	respectively 	in 	ERISA 	§
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502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132, and ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144.6 	Complete
preemption 	occurs 	when 	Congress 	“so 	completely 	[preempts] 	a
particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group
of 	claims 	is 	necessarily 	federal 	in 	character.” 	Darcangelo 	v.
Verizon Comm’cns, Inc., 292 F.3d 181, 187 (4 th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Metro. 	Life 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Taylor, 	481 	U.S. 	58, 	63–64 	(1987)). 	In
other 	words, 	the 	doctrine 	of 	complete 	preemption 	automatically
converts state claims into federal claims. 	Id. 	“The Supreme Court
[of 	the 	United 	States] 	has 	determined 	that 	ERISA’s 	civil
enforcement provision, § 502(a) (29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)), completely
preempts state law claims that come within its scope and converts
these state claims into federal claims under § 502.” 	Id. (citing
Taylor, 481 U.S. at 65–66). 	State claims that do not fall within
the 	scope 	of 	§ 	502, 	however, 	may 	still 	be 	subject 	to 	conflict
preemption. 	Under conflict preemption, “state laws that conflict
with federal laws are preempted, and preemption is asserted as ‘a
federal defense to the plaintiff’s suit.’” 	Id. at 186–87 (quoting
Taylor, 481 U.S. at 63). 	Conflict preemption in the ERISA context
stems 	from 	ERISA 	§ 	514, 	which 	mandates 	that 	“state 	laws 	are
superseded insofar as they ‘relate to’ an ERISA plan.” 	Id. at 187
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)). 	Accordingly, ERISA § 514 operates
6 	“For 	ERISA 	preemption 	purposes, 	‘State 	law’ 	includes 	both
statutory and common law.” 	Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1166
(4th Cir. 1996) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1)).
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as 	an 	affirmative 	defense 	to 	state 	claims 	relating 	to 	an 	ERISA
plan that are not within the scope of § 502. 	See Pinney v. Nokia,
Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 449 (4 th Cir. 2005); Marks v. Watters, 322 F.3d
316, 	323 	(4th 	Cir. 	2003). 	In 	short, 	ERISA 	§ 	502 	automatically
preempts all state claims within its scope and converts them into
federal 	§ 	502 	claims, 	whereas 	ERISA 	§ 	514 	provides 	a 	conflict
preemption defense to all other claims related to ERISA plans not
within the scope of § 502. 	Of course, Axim and Mr. Campbell have
not raised a conflict preemption defense in this case. 	Only § 502
complete preemption is at issue.
The Fourth Circuit follows a three-prong test to determine if
a 	particular 	state 	law 	claim 	is 	completely 	preempted 	by 	ERISA 	§
502:
(1) 	the 	plaintiff 	must 	have 	standing 	under 	§
502(a) to pursue its claim; (2) its claim must
“fall[] within the scope of an ERISA provision
that 	[it] 	can 	enforce 	via 	§ 	502(a)”; 	and 	(3)
the 	claim 	must 	not 	be 	capable 	of 	resolution
“without 	an 	interpretation 	of 	the 	contract
governed 	by 	federal 	law,” 	i.e., 	an 	ERISA-
governed employee benefit plan.
Prince 	v. 	Sears Holdings 	Corp., 848 	F.3d 	173, 	177 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2017)
(alterations in original) (quoting Sonoco Prods. Co. v. Physicians
Health Plan, Inc., 338 F.3d 366, 	372 (4 th Cir. 2003)). 	Given the
factually 	thin 	complaint 	and 	the 	fact 	that 	the 	agreements
themselves 	are 	not 	before 	the 	court, 	there 	are 	substantial
questions about all three prongs that the court cannot resolve on
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the current record. 	Ultimately, however, the claims fail in both
their state and federal forms. 	Accordingly, resolving whether the
state claims are completely preempted is unnecessary to dispose of
the present motion.
2. 	Breach of Contract
If the breach of contract claim is not completely preempted,
then 	“[t]o 	state 	a 	claim 	for 	breach 	of 	contract 	under 	Maryland
law, 	the 	plaintiff 	must 	establish 	that 	‘the 	defendant 	owed 	the
plaintiff a contractual obligation and that the defendant breached
that obligation.’” 	Timilon Corp. v. Empowerment Just. Ctr. Corp.,
738 F.Supp.3d 669, 684 (D.Md. 2024) (quoting Reamer v. State Auto.
Mut. Ins. Co., 556 F.Supp.3d 544, 550 (D.Md. 2021), aff’d, No. 21-
2432, 	2022 	WL 	17985700 	(4 th 	Cir. 	Dec. 	29, 	2022)). 	To 	meet 	the
first 	element, 	the 	plaintiff 	must 	plead 	sufficient 	facts 	related
to 	“offer, 	acceptance, 	and 	consideration” 	to 	support 	the 	legal
conclusion that a valid and enforceable contract existed. 	See B-
Line 	Med., 	LLC 	v. 	Interactive 	Digit. 	Sols., 	209 	Md.App. 	22, 	46
(2012) (citing Peer v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 273 Md. 610,
614 (1975)). 	The complaint supplies sufficient facts to conclude
that 	the 	Provider/Client 	Agreement 	constituted 	an 	enforceable
contract because it alleges that IEA agreed to pay Axim in exchange
for 	Axim’s 	provision 	of 	at 	least 	ten 	services 	related 	to 	plan
administration. 	(ECF 	No. 	1 	¶¶ 	11, 	16, 	20). 	As 	to 	the 	Trust
Case 8:24-cv-01268-DKC Document 26 Filed 12/18/25 Page 14 of 21
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Agreement 	and 	the 	Axim 	Master 	Trust 	Agreement, 	however, 	the
complaint 	offers 	no 	facts 	supporting 	the 	legal 	conclusion 	that
they 	“are 	valid 	and 	enforceable 	contracts 	and 	agreements.” 	(Id.
¶ 	31). 	The 	court 	does 	not 	consider 	such 	legal 	conclusions, 	and
the 	breach 	of 	contract 	claim 	regarding 	the 	Trust 	Agreement 	and
Axim 	Master 	Trust 	Agreement 	is 	insufficient 	to 	warrant 	default
judgment. 	To 	meet 	the 	second 	element, 	the 	complaint 	must 	allege
sufficient facts to support the legal conclusion that Axim and Mr.
Campbell materially breached the three agreements. 	On this front,
the complaint offers no more than bare legal conclusions as to the
Provider/Client Agreement, Trust Agreement, and Axim Master Trust
Agreement. 	(See 	id. 	¶¶ 	19–22, 	32). 	Consequently, 	Plaintiff’s
failure 	to 	allege 	breach 	adequately 	bars 	default 	judgment 	on 	its
breach of contract claim regarding the Provider/Client Agreement,
and 	additionally 	bars 	default 	judgment 	on 	its 	breach 	of 	contract
claim 	regarding 	the 	Trust 	Agreement 	and 	Axim 	Master 	Trust
Agreement.
If 	Plaintiff’s 	breach 	of 	contract 	claim 	is 	completely
preempted 	by 	ERISA, 	the 	claim 	is 	recast 	as 	an 	ERISA 	§ 	502 	claim.
There 	are 	two 	relevant 	claims 	an 	ERISA 	fiduciary 	can 	bring 	under
§ 502: breach of fiduciary duty under § 502(a)(2), and injunctive
relief 	against 	“any 	act 	or 	practice 	which 	violates 	any 	provision
of 	[ERISA] 	or 	the 	terms 	of 	the 	plan, 	or. 	. 	. 	[to] 	redress 	such
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violations” 	under 	§ 	502(a)(3). 	Whether 	the 	allegation 	is 	that
Axim 	and 	Mr. 	Campbell 	breached 	a 	fiduciary 	duty, 	a 	provision 	of
ERISA, 	or 	the 	terms 	of 	the 	plan, 	the 	conclusory 	nature 	of
Plaintiff’s allegations renders the claim deficient.
3. 	Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Plaintiff’s 	fraudulent 	misrepresentation 	claim 	fares 	no
better. 	If Plaintiff’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim is not
completely 	preempted, 	then 	Plaintiff 	must 	plead 	sufficient 	facts
that 	“(1) 	the 	defendant 	made 	a 	false 	representation 	to 	the
plaintiff, (2) the falsity of the representation was either known
to 	the 	defendant 	or 	the 	representation 	was 	made 	with 	reckless
indifference to its truth, (3) the misrepresentation was made for
the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff relied
on the misrepresentation and had the right to rely on it, and (5)
the 	plaintiff 	suffered 	compensable 	injury 	as 	a 	result 	of 	the
misrepresentation.” 	Exxon 	Mobil 	Corp. 	v. 	Albright, 	433 	Md. 	303,
334 	(2013) 	(quoting 	Hoffman 	v. 	Stamper, 	385 	Md. 	1, 	28 	(2005)).
The 	only 	allegations 	related 	to 	Axim’s 	and 	Mr. 	Campbell’s
representations 	state 	that 	they 	“made 	repeated 	false 	statements
and 	intentionally 	misrepresented 	material 	facts 	to 	IEA 	and 	IEA’s
vendors 	about 	performance 	of 	[their] 	duties 	and 	payment 	of 	the
Plan’s 	obligations.” 	(ECF 	No. 	1 	¶ 	49). 	Falsity, 	intentional
misrepresentation, 	and 	materiality 	constitute 	legal 	conclusions
Case 8:24-cv-01268-DKC Document 26 Filed 12/18/25 Page 16 of 21
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that 	need 	not 	be 	credited. 	Without 	further 	factual 	allegations
regarding the content of these statements, the court cannot begin
to 	assess 	whether 	the 	representations 	were 	false, 	much 	less 	the
remaining elements that flow from there. 	Stripping away the legal
conclusions 	and 	threadbare 	recitals 	of 	the 	elements, 	there 	is 	no
plausible 	claim 	for 	fraudulent 	misrepresentation, 	and 	default
judgment is not warranted.
If 	the 	fraudulent 	misrepresentation 	claim 	is 	completely
preempted, 	recasting 	it 	under 	ERISA 	similarly 	fails. 	Again,
whether 	the 	claim 	becomes 	a 	breach 	of 	fiduciary 	duty 	claim 	under
ERISA 	§ 	502(a)(2) 	or 	a 	claim 	to 	enjoin 	or 	redress 	violations 	of
ERISA 	or 	the 	plan 	under 	ERISA 	§ 	502(a)(3), 	the 	deficiency 	of
Plaintiff’s allegations remains.
In 	short, 	both 	the 	breach 	of 	contract 	and 	fraudulent
misrepresentation 	claims, 	whether 	in 	their 	state 	or 	ERISA 	form,
are 	far 	too 	conclusory 	to 	meet 	Plaintiff’s 	burden 	at 	the 	default
judgment stage of stating a plausible claim for relief.
B. 	Count III: ERISA Claims
Next, 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	Axim 	and 	Mr. 	Campbell 	breached
their 	fiduciary 	duty 	under 	ERISA 	§ 	502(a)(2). 	Plaintiff 	further
contends 	that 	Axim 	and 	Mr. 	Campbell’s 	breach 	of 	fiduciary 	duty
entitles it to relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3) as well because the
breach 	constitutes 	a 	violation 	of 	ERISA 	§ 	404(a), 	codified 	at 	29
Case 8:24-cv-01268-DKC Document 26 Filed 12/18/25 Page 17 of 21
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U.S.C. 	§ 	1104(a), 	and 	§ 	502(a)(3) 	creates 	a 	cause 	of 	action 	for
relief for any violation of an ERISA provision. 	(See ECF No. 1 ¶¶
40, 42). 	The breach of fiduciary duty is the crux of both claims.
“To 	state 	a 	claim 	for 	breach 	of 	fiduciary 	duty 	under 	ERISA,
the plaintiff must allege: (1) that the defendant was a fiduciary,
(2) who was acting within his fiduciary capacity, and (3) breached
his 	duty.” 	Cuthie 	v. 	Fleet 	Rsrv. 	Ass’n, 	743 	F.Supp.2d 	486, 	494
(D.Md. 	2010) 	(citing 	In 	re 	Morgan 	Stanley 	ERISA 	Litig., 	696
F.Supp.2d 345, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)). 	Even assuming the first two
elements 	are 	met, 	however, 	Plaintiff 	has 	not 	furnished 	the
necessary 	factual 	content 	beyond 	conclusory 	allegations 	and
threadbare recitals to discern a plausible breach by Axim and Mr.
Campbell. 	As discussed in the previous subsection, alleging that
Axim and Mr. Campbell “misappropriate[ed] Plan assets, fail[ed] to
hold 	the 	Plan 	assets 	in 	trust, 	and 	fail[ed] 	to 	prudently 	and
loyally 	discharge 	their 	fiduciary 	duties,” 	(ECF 	No. 	1 	¶ 	44), 	is
simply 	not 	enough. 	On 	the 	current 	record, 	Plaintiff 	is 	not
entitled 	to 	default 	judgment 	on 	its 	§ 	502(a)(2) 	and 	§ 	502(a)(3)
claims.
C. 	Count II: Injunctive Relief
Finally, 	Plaintiff 	seeks 	to 	enjoin 	Axim 	and 	Mr. 	Campbell’s
“further 	dissipation 	of 	the 	Plan 	assets.” 	(ECF 	Nos. 	1 	¶ 	37; 	23-
1, at 7). 	As Plaintiff recognizes, injunctive relief is “not . .
Case 8:24-cv-01268-DKC Document 26 Filed 12/18/25 Page 18 of 21
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. 	a 	standalone 	claim,” 	(ECF 	No. 	23-1, 	at 	3 	n.1), 	but 	rather 	a
prayer 	for 	relief 	that 	depends 	on 	an 	underlying 	cause 	of 	action.
Doe 	v. 	Salisbury 	Univ., 	123 	F.Supp.3d 	748, 	770 	(D.Md. 	2015). 	A
request 	for 	injunctive 	relief 	becomes 	moot, 	however, 	when 	“there
is 	no 	effective 	relief 	available 	in 	federal 	court 	that 	[the
plaintiff] has not already received.” 	SAS Inst., 874 F.3d at 389
(alteration in original) (quoting Friedman’s, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290
F.3d 191, 197 (4 th Cir. 2002)).
Here, 	even 	if 	Plaintiff 	stated 	a 	plausible 	underlying 	claim
for 	relief, 	an 	injunction 	to 	prevent 	Axim 	and 	Mr. 	Campbell’s
further 	dissipation 	of 	Plan 	assets 	is 	moot 	because 	Plaintiff 	has
already 	effectively 	received 	such 	relief. 	In 	the 	DOL 	Consent
Judgment, the court ordered that RMI take control and custody over
Axim’s accounts, including the IEA sub-trust account with the IEA
Plan 	assets. 	See 	Consent 	Judgment 	and 	Order 	at 	4, 	6, 	Axim, 	No.
24-cv-483-LKG, 	ECF 	No. 	20; 	Consent 	Judgment 	and 	Order, 	Exhibit 	2
at 3, Axim, No. 24-cv-483-LKG, ECF No. 20-2. 	In its first status
report in that case, RMI informed the court that it had “fulfilled
all 	its 	duties” 	related 	to 	the 	assumption 	of 	control 	over 	Axim’s
accounts. 	See 	Status 	Report 	of 	the 	Court-Appointed 	Independent
Fiduciary 	at 	1–2, 	Axim, 	No. 	24-cv-483-LKG 	(D.Md. 	Sep. 	26, 	2024),
Case 8:24-cv-01268-DKC Document 26 Filed 12/18/25 Page 19 of 21
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ECF No. 21.7 	Furthermore, RMI reported that it had “returned all
of 	the[] 	funds” 	remaining 	in 	the 	seized 	Axim 	accounts 	“to 	the
respective 	employer 	clients.” 	Id. 	at 	3. 	Accordingly, 	it 	is 	not
possible 	for 	Axim 	and 	Mr. 	Campbell 	to 	further 	dissipate 	the 	Plan
assets 	because 	they 	no 	longer 	control 	them. 	Plaintiff’s 	request
for injunctive relief to prevent further dissipation of Plan assets
is thus moot.
* 	* 	*
Although the Secretary of Labor’s complaint alleged detailed,
serious 	misconduct 	by 	Axim 	and 	Mr. 	Campbell 	and 	resulted 	in 	a
consent judgment, that does not excuse Plaintiff’s burden in this
case 	to 	allege 	specific 	facts 	regarding 	Axim 	and 	Mr. 	Campbell’s
misconduct vis-à-vis IEA. 	Plaintiff will be directed to show cause
why 	the 	complaint 	should 	not 	be 	dismissed 	for 	failure 	to 	state 	a
claim 	as 	to 	all 	defendants. 	That 	effort 	may 	take 	the 	form 	of 	a
motion for leave to file an amended complaint.8
7 It is appropriate for the court to “take judicial notice of
its own records in another case if ‘the prior case is brought into
the pleadings in the case on trial or where the two cases represent
related litigation.’” 	Cason v. Holder, 815 F.Supp.2d 918, 922 n.8
(D.Md. 	2011) 	(quoting 	Thurman 	v. 	Robinson, 	51 	F.3d 	268, 	1995 	WL
133350, 	at 	*2 	(4 th 	Cir. 	Mar. 	28, 	1995) 	(unpublished 	table
decision)). 	Plaintiff 	brought 	the 	Department 	of 	Labor’s 	lawsuit
against Axim and Mr. Campbell into the pleadings of the case, (ECF
No. 1 ¶¶ 23–24), and that lawsuit is related to this case because
both hinge on the same misconduct by Axim.
8 When moving for default judgment, “[a] plaintiff’s assertion
of a sum in a complaint does not make the sum ‘certain’ unless the
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IV. 	Conclusion
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	default
judgment will be denied. 	A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
plaintiff claims liquidated damages; otherwise, the complaint must
be supported by affidavit or documentary evidence.” 	United States
v. 	Moschonas, 	No. 	19-cv-332-DKC, 	2020 	WL 	6545884, 	at 	*2 	(D.Md.
Nov. 	6, 	2020) 	(quoting 	United 	States 	v. 	Vardoulakis, 	No. 	07-cv-
3341-WDQ, 	2010 	WL 	5137653, 	at 	*3 	(D.Md. 	Nov. 	9, 	2010)). 	In 	the
current 	record, 	Plaintiff 	provides 	no 	documentary 	evidence 	to
support its damages figure, nor does the affidavit it attaches to
its motion for default judgment discuss the damages figure.
Case 8:24-cv-01268-DKC Document 26 Filed 12/18/25 Page 21 of 21

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