Goss v. Goode Companies, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
LEOPOLD S. GOSS
:
v. 	: 	Civil Action No. DKC 23-2257
:
GOODE COMPANIES, INC.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this employment
law case is the motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
filed 	by 	Goode 	Companies, 	Inc. 	(“GCI” 	or 	“Defendant”). 	(ECF 	No.
42). 	The 	issues 	have 	been 	briefed, 	and 	the 	court 	now 	rules, 	no
hearing 	being 	deemed 	necessary. 	Local 	Rule 	105.6. 	For 	the
following 	reasons, 	the 	motion 	will 	be 	granted. 	The 	court 	also
construes 	the 	opposition 	to 	the 	motion, 	(ECF 	No. 	51), 	filed 	by
Leopold S. Goss (“Plaintiff”) as including a motion to amend, which
the court grants in part and denies in part.
I. 	Background1
Mr. 	Goss 	was 	a 	commercial-vehicle 	driver 	employed 	by 	GCI.
(ECF No. 37, at 6, 7). 	He repeatedly complained to GCI about his
trucks’ 	mechanical 	problems. 	(Id. 	at 	6). 	GCI 	subsequently 	cut
Mr. Goss’s pay and was allegedly “hostile” toward him. 	(Id.). 	At
1 The facts herein are set forth in the amended complaint and
construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
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some point, Mr. Goss was “forced [to] work without [a] full day[’s]
salary” and “receive[d] less than half of [his] pay.” 	(Id.). 	Mr.
Goss 	notified 	GCI’s 	Human 	Resources 	(“HR”) 	Department 	of 	GCI’s
alleged 	discrimination 	against 	him, 	but 	HR 	allegedly 	“failed 	to
fully 	rectify 	the 	issues, 	leaving 	[him] 	without 	representation,
while [he was] being forced to work under harassing circumstances.”
(Id.).
Sometime before December 10, 2021, he was injured in a truck
fire 	and 	received 	medical 	attention 	from 	a 	doctor.2 	(Id. 	at 	6,
7). 	Following the incident, GCI did not “complete a safety report
under 	Worker’s 	Compensation 	on 	[Mr. 	Goss’s] 	behalf,” 	which 	Mr.
Goss alleges denied him the “ability to attend medical appointments
and 	treatment.” 	(Id. 	at 	6). 	After 	the 	accident, 	Mr. 	Goss
experienced some unspecified psychological difficulties. 	(Id. at
7). 	He 	alleges, 	however, 	that 	he 	“was 	denied 	reasonable
accommodations, 	supported 	by 	medical 	assessment 	and 	physician
instructions[,] . . . that are common practice of [GCI] with it[s]
employees,” 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	Americans 	with 	Disabilities 	Act
(“ADA”). 	(Id. 	at 	6). 	Mr. 	Goss 	does 	not 	elaborate 	on 	the 	nature
of the reasonable accommodations he requested. 	He was also denied
2 	In 	his 	original 	complaint, 	Mr. 	Goss 	stated 	that 	the 	truck
fire occurred on November 26, 2021. 	(ECF No. 1, at 6).
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leave, 	to 	which 	he 	alleges 	he 	was 	entitled 	under 	the 	Family 	and
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). 	(Id.).
On 	December 	9, 	2021, 	GCI 	terminated 	Mr. 	Goss’s 	employment.
(See id. at 6, 7 (claiming lost wages due to termination beginning
on 	December 	10, 	2021)). 	Mr. 	Goss 	received 	a 	termination 	letter
from GCI that did not identify a cause for his termination. 	(Id.
at 	6). 	Mr. 	Goss 	alleges 	that 	“[t]here 	was 	no 	policy 	violation,
progressive disciplinary documented issues, no conduct violations,
nor 	. 	. 	. 	any 	communications 	with 	[him] 	regarding 	ongoing 	issues
or complaints.” 	(Id.). 	After Mr. Goss evidently filed a complaint
with 	the 	Equal 	Employment 	Opportunity 	Commission 	(“EEOC”), 	GCI
explained 	to 	the 	EEOC 	that 	the 	termination 	was 	due 	to 	Mr. 	Goss’s
“no 	call, 	no 	show.” 	(Id.). 	Mr. 	Goss 	alleges 	that 	this 	was 	a
“false 	statement,” 	because 	he 	was 	in 	fact 	“at 	work, 	communicated
with 	the 	active 	supervisor 	and 	[HR], 	supported 	by 	emails, 	text,
and 	phone 	logs,” 	though 	he 	does 	not 	attach 	that 	support 	to 	his
complaint. 	(Id.). 	Mr. 	Goss 	does 	not 	provide 	the 	outcome 	of 	his
EEOC 	complaint. 	GCI 	suspended 	Mr. 	Goss’s 	medical 	benefits
immediately following termination, which “imped[ed] [his] ability
to seek immediate and sustained medical treatment.” 	(Id.).
On 	May 	15, 	2025, 	Mr. 	Goss 	filed 	the 	operative 	amended
complaint. 	(ECF 	No. 	37). 	In 	the 	amended 	complaint, 	Mr. 	Goss
asserts 	claims 	of 	“disability 	discrimination,” 	“wrongful
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termination,” 	and 	“discrimination.” 	(Id. 	at 	6). 	These 	three
claims in fact represent at least six different claims, which the
court will refer to as follows: ADA failure to accommodate (Count
I); 	FMLA 	interference 	(Count 	II); 	Maryland 	Workers’ 	Compensation
Act 	(“WCA”) 	violation 	(Count 	III); 	wrongful 	termination 	(Count
IV); Title VII violations (Count V);3 and Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”) 	violation 	(Count 	VI).4 	He 	seeks 	$280,000 	in 	lost 	wages
since 	December 	10, 	2021, 	along 	with 	$800,000 	for 	pain 	and
suffering. 	(Id. at 7). 	GCI filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Goss’s
amended 	complaint 	for 	failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	on 	June 	25, 	2025.
(ECF No. 42). 	After receiving an extension of time, Mr. Goss filed
his 	response 	in 	opposition, 	to 	which 	he 	attached 	twenty-one
exhibits, 	on 	August 	22. 	(ECF 	No. 	51). 	GCI 	replied 	on 	September
2. 	(ECF No. 55).
3 	Plaintiff 	invokes 	Title 	IX, 	rather 	than 	Title 	VII, 	in 	the
jurisdiction 	section 	of 	his 	amended 	complaint. 	(ECF 	No. 	37, 	at
4). 	In the factual allegations of the amended complaint, he does
not 	specify 	which 	federal 	antidiscrimination 	law 	he 	invokes. 	It
is clear, however, that Title IX does not apply to GCI because it
is 	not 	an 	educational 	institution. 	Feminist 	Majority 	Found. 	v.
Hurley, 	911 	F.3d 	674, 	700 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2018) 	(“Title 	IX 	allows 	for
lawsuits 	against 	only 	educational 	institutions 	and 	programs.”).
Mr. 	Goss 	clarifies 	in 	his 	opposition 	that 	he 	intended 	to 	invoke
Title 	VII, 	which 	applies 	to 	employers. 	(ECF 	No. 	51, 	at 	6). 	The
court 	thus 	construes 	his 	amended 	complaint 	as 	asserting 	a 	Title
VII claim.
4 The parties do not agree on the order of the counts or how
many 	counts 	Mr. 	Goss 	asserts. 	The 	court 	lists 	the 	counts 	in 	the
order 	the 	underlying 	claims 	appear 	in 	the 	amended 	complaint 	and
liberally construes the number of counts Mr. Goss asserts.
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II. 	Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendant moves to dismiss all counts of Plaintiff’s amended
complaint. 	As to the factual allegations in the amended complaint,
Defendant 	is 	correct 	that 	Plaintiff 	does 	not 	state 	any 	claim 	for
relief. 	Plaintiff 	supplies 	additional 	factual 	allegations 	and
exhibits 	in 	his 	response 	in 	opposition, 	which 	the 	court 	does 	not
consider 	with 	regard 	to 	Defendant’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	but 	rather
construes as a motion for leave to amend to be addressed later in
the opinion.
A. 	Standard of Review
A 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	under 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	12(b)(6) 	tests 	the
sufficiency of the complaint. 	Presley v. City of Charlottesville,
464 	F.3d 	480, 	483 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2006). 	The 	court 	“must 	accept 	the
complaint’s factual allegations as true and construe the facts in
the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	plaintiff.” 	Barnett 	v. 	Inova
Health 	Care 	Servs., 	125 	F.4th 	465, 	469 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2025) 	(citing
Barbour 	v. 	Garland, 	105 	F.4th 	579, 	589 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2024)). 	A
plaintiff’s 	complaint 	must 	only 	satisfy 	the 	standard 	of 	Rule
8(a)(2), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing 	that 	the 	pleader 	is 	entitled 	to 	relief.” 	“[W]here 	the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere 	possibility 	of 	misconduct, 	the 	complaint 	has 	alleged—but 	it
has 	not 	‘show[n]’—that 	the 	pleader 	is 	entitled 	to 	relief.’”
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2)). 	A Rule 8(a)(2) “showing” requires “stat[ing] a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 	U.S. 	544, 	570 	(2007). 	“A 	claim 	has 	facial 	plausibility 	when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the 	reasonable 	inference 	that 	defendant 	is 	liable 	for 	the
misconduct alleged.” 	Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 299–300 (4 th
Cir. 2021) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Plaintiff 	in 	this 	case 	is 	pro 	se. 	Courts 	hold 	pro 	se
pleadings 	to 	“less 	stringent 	standards 	than 	formal 	pleadings
drafted 	by 	lawyers.” 	Erickson 	v. 	Pardus, 	551 	U.S. 	89, 	94 	(2007)
(quoting 	Estelle 	v. 	Gamble, 	429 	U.S. 	97, 	106 	(1976)). 	The 	court
has 	an 	obligation 	to 	construe 	pleadings 	of 	self-represented
litigants 	liberally. 	Id. 	It 	is 	not 	necessary, 	however, 	to
“conjure 	up 	questions 	never 	squarely 	presented,” 	or 	to 	recognize
“obscure or extravagant claims defying the most concerted efforts
to 	unravel 	them.” 	Beaudett 	v. 	City 	of 	Hampton, 	775 	F.2d 	1274,
1277-78 (4th Cir. 1985).
B. 	Exhibits
As 	a 	threshold 	matter, 	the 	court 	must 	determine 	which
extrinsic documents may be considered on a motion to dismiss. 	“As
a general rule, the court does not consider extrinsic evidence at
the 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	stage[.]” 	Faulkenberry 	v. 	U.S. 	Dep’t 	of
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Def., 670 F.Supp.3d 234, 249 (D.Md. 2023) (quoting Reamer v. State
Auto. 	Mut. 	Ins. 	Co., 	556 	F.Supp.3d 	544, 	549 	(D.Md. 	2021), 	aff’d,
No. 21-2432, 2022 WL 17985700 (4 th Cir. Dec. 29, 2022)). 	Relevant
to this case, however, the court may consider exhibits attached to
a response in opposition if they are authentic and integral to the
complaint. 	Robinson 	v. 	Am. 	Honda 	Motor 	Co., 	551 	F.3d 	218, 	222–
23, 	222 	n.2 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2009). 	“[F]or 	an 	extrinsic 	document 	to 	be
integral 	to 	a 	complaint 	the 	document 	must 	either 	give 	rise 	to 	a
claim or be the basis of an element of a claim.” 	Defs. of Wildlife
v. 	Boyles, 	608 	F.Supp.3d 	336, 	345 	(D.S.C. 	2022); 	see 	also 	Goines
v. 	Valley 	Cmty. 	Servs. 	Bd., 	822 	F.3d 	159, 	166 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2016).
Ultimately, 	it 	is 	within 	the 	court’s 	discretion 	whether 	“to
‘exclude’ 	matters 	outside 	the 	pleadings.” 	Henderson 	v. 	Gen.
Revenue Corp., No. 17-cv-292, 2018 WL 4610642, at *2 (W.D.Va. Aug.
7, 2018) (quoting Deegan v. Moore, No. 16-cv-260, 2017 WL 1194718,
at *3 (W.D.Va. Mar. 30, 2017)).
Plaintiff 	attaches 	numerous 	exhibits 	to 	his 	response 	in
opposition, one of which Defendant attaches to its reply. 	Because
neither party has offered an exhibit-by-exhibit analysis regarding
which extrinsic material is permissible to consider on Defendant’s
motion 	to 	dismiss, 	the 	court 	exercises 	its 	discretion 	not 	to
consider any of the exhibits in relation to the motion to dismiss.
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C. 	Count I: ADA Failure to Accommodate
Plaintiff 	first 	alleges 	that 	he 	suffered 	a 	“psychological
disability” 	and 	“was 	denied 	reasonable 	accommodations, 	supported
by medical assessment and physician instructions[,] . . . that are
common 	practice 	of 	[GCI] 	with 	it[s] 	employees,” 	in 	violation 	of
the 	ADA. 	(ECF 	No. 	37, 	at 	6–7). 	By 	invoking 	reasonable
accommodations, 	Plaintiff 	clearly 	seeks 	to 	assert 	a 	failure-to-
accommodate claim under the ADA. 	For the reasons below, Plaintiff
does not state a failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA.
For a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case under the ADA
for 	failure 	to 	accommodate, 	he 	must 	show 	“(1) 	that 	he 	was 	an
individual who had a disability within the meaning of the statute;
(2) 	that 	the 	[employer] 	had 	notice 	of 	the 	disability; 	(3) 	that
with 	reasonable 	accommodation 	he 	could 	perform 	the 	essential
functions 	of 	the 	position 	. 	. 	.; 	and 	(4) 	that 	the 	[employer]
refused to make such accommodations.” 	Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp.,
717 F.3d 337, 345 (4 th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) (quoting
Rhoads v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 257 F.3d 373, 387 n.11 (4 th Cir.
2001)). 	“Even 	though 	a 	plaintiff 	need 	not 	plead 	a 	prima 	facie
case to survive a motion to dismiss, Swierkiewicz [v. Sorema N.A.,
534 U.S. 506 (2002)] ‘left untouched the burden of a plaintiff to
allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his] claim.’”
Manning v. N.C. State Univ., 724 F.Supp.3d 438, 454 (E.D.N.C. Mar.
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19, 	2024) 	(second 	alteration 	in 	original) 	(footnote 	omitted)
(quoting 	Jordan 	v. 	Alt. 	Res. 	Corp., 	458 	F.3d 	332, 	346 	(4 th 	Cir.
2006), 	overruled 	on 	other 	grounds 	by, 	Boyer-Liberto 	v.
Fontainebleau 	Corp., 	786 	F.3d 	264 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2015) 	(en 	banc))
(citing, inter alia, Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510–15).
Defendant 	first 	argues 	that 	Plaintiff 	fails 	to 	provide 	any
details 	in 	his 	amended 	complaint 	regarding 	the 	nature 	of 	his
disability. 	(ECF 	No. 	42-1, 	at 	11–12). 	The 	ADA 	defines
“disability” 	to 	encompass 	“(A) 	a 	physical 	or 	mental 	impairment
that 	substantially 	limits 	one 	or 	more 	major 	life 	activities 	of
such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regarded 	as 	having 	such 	an 	impairment.” 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	12102(1).
Although 	Defendant’s 	characterization 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	amended
complaint is not quite accurate—Plaintiff does state in the relief
section of his amended complaint that he suffered a “psychological
disability,” (ECF No. 37, at 7)—Defendant is correct that Plaintiff
does not get past first base. 	Whether Plaintiff was disabled for
purposes of the ADA is a legal question on which the court cannot
simply credit Plaintiff’s bare conclusion. 	EEOC v. Mfrs. & Traders
Tr. 	Co., 	429 	F.Supp.3d 	89, 	104 	(D.Md. 	2019) 	(“The 	question 	of
whether a plaintiff is disabled or has a record of disability under
the ADA is a question of law for the court.” (citation modified)).
Plaintiff 	does 	not 	elaborate 	on 	what 	his 	psychological 	condition
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was 	at 	the 	time 	he 	was 	denied 	accommodations. 	Without 	further
details 	in 	the 	amended 	complaint, 	Plaintiff 	has 	not 	adequately
alleged 	that 	he 	was 	disabled 	under 	the 	ADA. 	See 	Jackson 	v. 	S.
Glazers 	of 	MD 	LLC, 	No. 	24-cv-1393-GLR, 	2024 	WL 	4335684, 	at 	*3
(D.Md. 	Sep. 	26, 	2024) 	(dismissing 	ADA 	claim 	because 	pro 	se
plaintiff 	did 	not 	allege 	any 	facts, 	beyond 	bare 	allegations 	of
disability, from which to infer a disability).
Defendant 	next 	argues 	that 	Plaintiff 	likewise 	has 	not
plausibly pleaded that he could perform the essential functions of
his job with reasonable accommodation. 	(ECF No. 42-1, at 12–14).
Defendant 	is 	correct 	because 	Plaintiff 	does 	not 	articulate 	any
particular accommodation he requested or was offered. 	Instead, he
states 	only 	that 	he 	“was 	denied 	reasonable 	accommodations 	. 	. 	.
that 	are 	common 	practice 	of 	[GCI] 	with 	it[s] 	employees.”5 	(ECF
No. 	37, 	at 	6). 	Absent 	facts 	regarding 	the 	accommodations 	he 	was
denied and whether he could still perform the essential functions
of his job, Plaintiff cannot nudge this element into the realm of
plausibility. 	See 	Robertson 	v. 	Amazon 	CEO, 	No. 	21-cv-1832-LKG,
2022 WL 2971953, at *4 (D.Md. July 27, 2022).
5 	Defendant 	“surmises 	that 	Plaintiff 	is 	referring 	to 	a
potential ‘light duty’ assignment” as an accommodation. 	(ECF No.
42-1, 	at 	14 	n.3). 	Defendant’s 	interpretation 	of 	Plaintiff’s
amended 	complaint, 	however, 	is 	not 	discernible 	from 	the 	facts 	of
the 	amended 	complaint. 	It 	is 	Plaintiff’s 	role 	to 	fill 	in 	those
vital gaps.
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D. 	Count II: FMLA Interference
Next, Plaintiff alleges that after his “workplace injury” in
the truck fire and subsequent “psychological disability,” he “was
denied 	medically 	protected 	leave 	under 	[the] 	FMLA, 	while 	under 	a
doctor’s care.” 	(ECF No. 37, at 6–7). 	Denial of protected medical
leave 	constitutes 	an 	FMLA 	interference 	claim. 	As 	with 	his 	ADA
claim, however, Plaintiff does not marshal enough factual support
in 	his 	amended 	complaint 	to 	give 	rise 	to 	a 	plausible 	FMLA
interference claim.
Under 	the 	FMLA, 	an 	“eligible 	employee” 	is 	entitled 	to 	take
leave 	for 	up 	to 	twelve 	workweeks 	during 	any 	twelve-month 	period
“[b]ecause 	of 	a 	serious 	health 	condition 	that 	makes 	the 	employee
unable 	to 	perform 	the 	functions 	of 	[his] 	position.” 	29 	U.S.C. 	§
2612(a)(1)(D). 	It is “unlawful for any employer to interfere with,
restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise” this
entitlement to leave. 	Id. § 2615(a)(1). 	Accordingly, to state an
FMLA 	interference 	claim, 	an 	employee 	must 	plausibly 	plead 	that
“(1) she was an eligible employee; (2) her employer was covered by
the statute; (3) she was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) she
gave her employer adequate notice of her intention to take leave;
and 	(5) 	the 	employer 	denied 	her 	FMLA 	benefits 	to 	which 	she 	was
entitled.” 	See Rodriguez v. Smithfield Packing Co., 545 F.Supp.2d
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508, 516 (D.Md. 2008) (citing Edgar v. JAC Prods., Inc., 443 F.3d
501, 507 (6 th Cir. 2006); 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not allege any facts to
support 	the 	first 	and 	third 	elements. 	(ECF 	No. 	42-1, 	at 	14–16).
First, 	to 	be 	an 	eligible 	employee, 	the 	employee 	must 	have 	been
employed “(i) for at least 12 months by the employer with respect
to 	whom 	leave 	is 	requested 	under 	section 	2612 	of 	this 	title; 	and
(ii) for at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer during
the 	previous 	12-month 	period.” 	29 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2611(2)(A). 	Failure
to allege eligibility results in dismissal of the claim. 	Anusie-
Howard v. Bd. of Educ., No. 12-cv-199-WDQ, 2012 WL 1964097, at *3
(D.Md. 	May 	30, 	2012). 	Nowhere 	in 	Plaintiff’s 	amended 	complaint
does he attempt to plead either of the requirements of eligibility.
Therefore, he fails to state an FMLA interference claim.
As 	to 	the 	third 	element, 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	allege 	a 	“serious
health 	condition” 	that 	entitles 	him 	to 	FMLA 	leave, 	and 	“serious
health 	condition” 	covers 	“an 	illness, 	injury, 	impairment, 	or
physical 	or 	mental 	condition 	that 	involves 	. 	. 	. 	continuing
treatment 	by 	a 	health 	care 	provider.” 	29 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2611(11)(B).
Plaintiff 	does 	allege 	that 	his 	“workplace 	injury” 	required
“sustained 	medical 	treatment,” 	(ECF 	No. 	37, 	at 	6), 	but 	without
more facts, this allegation reflects nothing more than “a formulaic
recitation 	of 	[an] 	element[] 	of 	a 	cause 	of 	action,” 	Twombly, 	550
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U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
For this reason, too, Plaintiff fails to state an FMLA interference
claim.
E. 	Count III: WCA
Plaintiff 	next 	appears 	to 	raise 	a 	claim 	under 	the 	Maryland
WCA because he suffered a “workplace injury,” after which Defendant
“failed 	to 	offer 	or 	complete 	a 	safety 	report 	under 	Worker’s
Compensation 	on 	[his] 	behalf.” 	(ECF 	No. 	37, 	at 	6). 	Defendant’s
failure to do so allegedly caused Plaintiff to be unable “to attend
medical 	appointments 	and 	treatment.” 	(Id.). 	Defendant 	did 	not
compensate 	Plaintiff 	for 	lost 	wages 	and 	allegedly 	failed 	to
“execute Worker’s Comp. as indicated in [the] Handbook.” 	(Id.).
Defendant 	correctly 	argues 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	WCA 	claim 	does
not belong in this court.6 	The WCA states that “each employer of
a 	covered 	employee 	shall 	provide 	compensation 	in 	accordance 	with
this 	title 	to 	the 	covered 	employee 	for 	an 	accidental 	personal
injury sustained by the covered employee.” 	Md. Code Ann., Lab. &
6 	At 	least 	two 	consequences 	follow, 	however, 	if 	an 	employer
fails 	to 	file 	a 	report 	with 	the 	Workers’ 	Compensation 	Committee
within 	ten 	days 	after 	an 	employee 	gives 	proper 	notice 	of 	an
accidental 	personal 	injury 	that 	“causes 	disability 	for 	more 	than
3 	days.” 	See 	Md. 	Code 	Ann., 	Lab. 	& 	Empl. 	§§ 	9-704, 	9-707(a).
First, the ordinary claim limitation period of two years is tolled
until 	the 	employer 	files 	the 	report. 	See 	id. 	§§ 	9-708(b), 	9-
709(b)(3). 	Second, 	if 	the 	employer’s 	failure 	to 	file 	within 	ten
days was knowing, the employer is guilty of a misdemeanor. 	Id. §
9-1102.
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Empl. § 9-501(a)(1). 	It establishes a claims procedure channeled
through 	the 	Maryland 	State 	Workers’ 	Compensation 	Commission
(“SWCC”), 	id. 	§§ 	9-709, 	9-714, 	which 	functions 	as 	the 	exclusive
remedial 	forum 	(apart 	from 	several 	inapplicable 	exceptions) 	for
covered employees’ accidental personal injuries on the job, id. §
9-509; 	McCullough 	v. 	Liberty 	Heights 	Health 	& 	Rehab. 	Ctr., 	830
F.Supp.2d 	94, 	99 	(D.Md. 	2011). 	As 	the 	United 	States 	Court 	of
Appeals 	for 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit 	recently 	explained, 	when 	a 	state
“vests 	exclusive 	jurisdiction 	in 	the 	Workers’ 	Compensation
Commission” 	and 	thereby 	“prohibits 	plaintiffs 	from 	suing 	to
enforce 	a 	state-law 	right 	in 	any 	state 	court,” 	a 	federal 	court
presented with an assertion of that state right must “dismiss the
[count] 	for 	failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim.” 	Wideman 	v. 	Innovative
Fibers 	LLC, 	100 	F.4th 	490, 	496–97 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2024).7 	Because
Plaintiff’s 	WCA 	claim 	is 	authorized 	to 	proceed 	only 	before 	the
SWCC, the court dismisses it for failure to state a claim.
Defendant 	further 	requests 	dismissal 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	entire
amended 	complaint 	with 	prejudice 	“[t]o 	the 	extent 	Plaintiff 	is
attempting 	to 	circumvent 	the 	exclusivity 	provision 	contained 	in
7 In Wideman, the suit was premised on diversity jurisdiction,
whereas 	this 	court 	hears 	Plaintiff’s 	WCA 	claim 	based 	on
supplemental jurisdiction. 	This jurisdictional distinction makes
no 	difference; 	it 	does 	not 	change 	the 	fact 	that 	Maryland 	law 	has
created the claim Plaintiff asserts only if it is asserted before
the SWCC.
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the 	WCA.” 	(ECF 	No. 	42-1, 	at 	20). 	But 	the 	exclusivity 	provision
of 	the 	WCA 	applies 	only 	to 	an 	employer’s 	liability 	for 	an
employee’s accidental personal injury. 	Defendant does not explain
how Plaintiff’s only other state law claim in Count IV for wrongful
termination 	constitutes 	an 	effort 	to 	circumvent 	the 	exclusivity
provision of the WCA. 	The tort at which the exclusivity provision
is 	directed 	is 	that 	of 	negligence. 	See 	Flood 	v. 	Merchants 	Mut.
Ins. 	Co., 	230 	Md. 	373, 	377 	(1963) 	(“[T]he 	Workmen’s 	Compensation
Act 	is 	a 	substitute 	for 	the 	employer’s 	common 	law 	liability 	for
negligence[.]”). 	In fact, Plaintiff makes no mention of his injury
in 	the 	section 	of 	his 	complaint 	regarding 	wrongful 	termination.
(See ECF No. 37, at 6). 	As to the federal claims Plaintiff raises
in Counts I, II, V, and VI, Defendant does not explain how a state
exclusivity 	provision 	could 	bar 	federal 	claims 	in 	federal 	court
without 	running 	headlong 	into 	the 	Supremacy 	Clause. 	See 	U.S.
Const. 	art. 	VI. 	The 	court 	declines 	to 	dismiss 	any 	other 	claim
based on the WCA’s exclusivity provision.
F. 	Count IV: Wrongful Termination
Plaintiff 	also 	asserts 	a 	claim 	for 	wrongful 	termination,
alleging that he “was terminated without just cause following the
truck fire” and that Defendant misrepresented to the EEOC that the
reason for Plaintiff’s termination was that he was a “no call, no
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show.”8 	(ECF 	No. 	37, 	at 	6). 	He 	later 	alleges 	that 	he 	was
“terminated 	. 	. 	. 	as 	a 	form 	of 	retaliation 	due 	to 	[his] 	ongoing
documented complaints about [his] trucks[’] mechanical problems.”
(Id.).
Wrongful termination is a narrow exception to the rule of at-
will employment; an employee must show: “(1) that the employee was
discharged; (2) that the basis of the discharge violated some clear
mandate 	of 	public 	policy; 	and 	(3) 	that 	there 	is 	a 	nexus 	between
the 	employee’s 	conduct 	and 	the 	employer’s 	decision 	to 	fire 	the
employee.” 	Symeonidis 	v. 	Paxton 	Cap. 	Grp., 	Inc., 	220 	F.Supp.2d
478, 	483 	(D.Md. 	2002) 	(citing 	Shapiro 	v. 	Massengill, 	105 	Md.App.
743, 764 (1995)). 	A clear mandate of public policy exists only if
there 	is 	“a 	preexisting, 	unambiguous, 	and 	particularized
pronouncement, 	by 	constitution, 	enactment, 	or 	prior 	judicial
decision, 	directing, 	prohibiting, 	or 	protecting 	the 	conduct 	in
question.” 	Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 142 Md.App. 134, 140
(2002) 	(citing 	Sears, 	Roebuck 	& 	Co. 	v. 	Wholey, 	139 	Md.App. 	642,
661 	(2001)). 	Maryland 	courts 	have 	identified 	two 	situations 	in
8 Defendant’s alleged misrepresentation to the EEOC regarding
the reason for Plaintiff’s termination cannot form the basis of a
wrongful 	termination 	claim 	because 	it 	occurred 	after 	the
termination in question. 	Other litigants have asserted claims of
defamation against their employers for allegedly false statements
to 	the 	EEOC, 	but 	courts 	have 	dismissed 	such 	claims 	because 	the
employers’ statements to the EEOC are absolutely privileged. 	See,
e.g., 	Smith 	v. 	Dupont 	Specialty 	Prods. 	USA, 	LLC, 	No. 	23-cv-292,
2023 WL 7703470, at *4 (E.D.Va. Nov. 15, 2023).
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which termination violates a clear mandate of public policy: “(1)
where an employee was fired for refusing to violate the law or the
legal 	rights 	of 	a 	third 	party 	and 	(2) 	where 	an 	employee 	has 	been
terminated for exercising a specific legal right or duty.” 	Elliott
v. Md. Corr. Training Ctr., No. 20-cv-2963-CCB, 2022 WL 814294, at
*4 (D.Md. Mar. 17, 2022) (citing King v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 160
Md.App. 	689, 	700–01 	(2005)). 	An 	employee 	who 	asserts 	a 	claim 	of
wrongful termination must “specifically identify the clear mandate
of 	Maryland 	public 	policy 	that 	was 	violated 	by 	his 	termination”
and 	“plead 	with 	particularity 	the 	source 	of 	the 	public 	policy.”
Terry v. Legato Sys., Inc., 241 F.Supp.2d 566, 569–70 (D.Md. 2003)
(quoting 	Szaller 	v. 	Am. 	Nat’l 	Red 	Cross, 	293 	F.3d 	148, 	151 	(4 th
Cir. 2002); Porterfield, 142 Md.App. at 140).
Defendant convincingly moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s wrongful
termination 	claim 	because 	Plaintiff 	has 	not 	pleaded 	any 	clear
mandate of public policy that his termination violated. 	(ECF No.
42-1, 	at 	17–19). 	Plaintiff 	first 	implies 	that 	he 	could 	only 	be
terminated 	for 	cause, 	but 	that 	contravenes 	the 	principle 	of 	at-
will employment in Maryland. 	Of the two violations that can give
rise to a wrongful termination claim in Maryland, Plaintiff’s next
allegation that he was terminated “due to [his] ongoing documented
complaints 	about 	[his] 	truck’s 	mechanical 	problems” 	could 	only
theoretically arise under the second, termination for the exercise
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of 	a 	specific 	legal 	right 	or 	duty. 	But 	he 	does 	not 	identify 	how
those 	complaints 	constitute 	the 	exercise 	of 	either 	a 	legal 	right
or duty. 	Even liberally construing Plaintiff’s amended complaint,
his allegations fall well short of the pleading requirements of a
wrongful termination claim.
G. 	Count V: Title VII
Plaintiff 	raises 	claims 	for 	discrimination, 	hostile 	work
environment, 	retaliation, 	and 	harassment 	presumably 	under 	Title
VII, although he mistakenly raises them under Title IX. 	(ECF No.
37, 	at 	4, 	6). 	Defendant 	moves 	to 	dismiss 	these 	claims 	on 	the
grounds 	that 	Title 	IX 	applies 	only 	to 	educational 	institutions,
which Defendant is not, and that even construing Plaintiff’s claims
as 	arising 	under 	Title 	VII, 	he 	does 	not 	identify 	any 	protected
characteristic. 	(ECF 	No. 	42-1, 	at 	8 	n.1, 	16–17). 	Plaintiff
plainly intended to invoke Title VII rather than Title IX and does
not explicitly rely on either statute in his factual allegations.
Thus, 	the 	court 	will 	liberally 	construe 	his 	amended 	complaint 	to
raise 	these 	claims 	under 	Title 	VII 	and 	reject 	Defendant’s 	first
argument.
Defendant’s 	second 	argument, 	however, 	carries 	the 	day.
Whichever 	Title 	VII 	claim 	a 	plaintiff 	raises, 	he 	must 	plead 	that
the adverse action he suffered was “because of [his] race, color,
religion, 	sex, 	or 	national 	origin.” 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2000e-2(a)(1).
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Defendant 	includes 	no 	allegations 	in 	the 	amended 	complaint
regarding 	any 	of 	these 	protected 	characteristics. 	Rather, 	he
alleges discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, and
harassment 	on 	the 	basis 	of 	his 	complaints 	to 	Defendant 	regarding
his 	truck’s 	mechanical 	issues. 	(ECF 	No. 	37, 	at 	6). 	Without
alleging 	a 	protected 	characteristic, 	Plaintiff 	falters 	at 	Title
VII’s first hurdle.
H. 	Count VI: FLSA
Finally, 	Plaintiff 	briefly 	attempts 	to 	allege 	an 	FLSA
violation because he was “forced to work without [a] full day[’s]
salary” and “to receive less than half of [his] pay.” 	(Id. at 6).
FLSA provides a private right of action to employees who were not
paid 	minimum 	wage, 	not 	paid 	overtime 	wages 	due, 	or 	who 	were
discharged 	or 	discriminated 	against 	for 	filing 	a 	complaint 	under
FLSA. 	See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (providing a private right of action
for violations of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 and 215(a)(3)). 	The FLSA
statute 	of 	limitations 	is 	“two 	years 	after 	the 	cause 	of 	action
accrues,” or three years for willful violations. 	Id. § 255(a).
Defendant 	argues 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	FLSA 	claim 	in 	his 	amended
complaint 	is 	time-barred 	because 	Plaintiff 	failed 	to 	assert 	the
claim 	within 	FLSA’s 	outermost 	statute 	of 	limitations 	of 	three
years, and it does not relate back to his original complaint, which
did 	not 	include 	the 	FLSA 	claim. 	(ECF 	No. 	42-1, 	at 	21–23).
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Plaintiff responds that his FLSA claim was delayed because it “was
initially filed with [the] EEOC,” there were “unprecedented delays
with 	[the] 	EEOC,” 	and 	thus 	he 	is 	entitled 	to 	equitable 	tolling.
(ECF 	No. 	51, 	at 	9–10). 	He 	does 	not 	meaningfully 	contest
Defendant’s relation-back argument.
Ordinarily, “a motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of
Procedure 	12(b)(6)[] 	. 	. 	. 	cannot 	reach 	the 	merits 	of 	an
affirmative defense, such as the defense that the plaintiff’s claim
is 	time-barred,” 	unless 	“all 	facts 	necessary 	to 	the 	affirmative
defense ‘clearly appear[] on the face of the complaint.’” 	Goodman
v. 	Praxair, 	Inc., 	494 	F.3d 	458, 	464 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2007) 	(second
alteration 	in 	original) 	(quoting 	Richmond, 	Fredericksburg 	&
Potomac 	R.R. 	v. 	Forst, 	4 	F.3d 	244, 	250 	(4 th 	Cir. 	1993)). 	Here,
Plaintiff’s amended complaint indicates that he was terminated on
December 	9, 	2021, 	which 	is 	the 	final 	day 	that 	an 	FLSA 	cause 	of
action could have accrued. 	See Scott v. Lori, No. 19-cv-2014-ELH,
2020 	WL 	3833129, 	at 	*13 	(D.Md. 	July 	8, 	2020) 	(noting 	that 	“the
last 	possible 	date 	on 	which 	the 	plaintiff’s 	FLSA 	. 	. 	. 	claim[]
could have accrued was the date of his termination”). 	Therefore,
FLSA’s 	outermost 	statute 	of 	limitations 	of 	three 	years 	required
that Plaintiff file his FLSA claim on or before December 9, 2024.
Plaintiff asserted the FLSA claim for the first time in his amended
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complaint 	filed 	on 	May 	15, 	2025, 	(ECF 	No. 	37), 	over 	five 	months
after the statute of limitations expired.
Defendant 	is 	correct 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	FLSA 	claim 	does 	not
relate 	back 	to 	his 	original 	complaint. 	Under 	Rule 	15, 	“[a]n
amendment 	to 	a 	pleading 	relates 	back 	to 	the 	date 	of 	the 	original
pleading when . . . the amendment asserts a claim or defense that
arose 	out 	of 	the 	conduct, 	transaction, 	or 	occurrence 	set 	out—or
attempted 	to 	be 	set 	out—in 	the 	original 	pleading.” 	Fed.R.Civ.P.
15(c)(1)(B). 	In 	other 	words, 	the 	original 	complaint 	must 	have
“‘adequately 	put 	the 	defendant[] 	on 	notice’ 	of 	the 	new 	claims.”
Ahmed 	v. 	United 	States, 	396 	F.Supp.3d 	600, 	605 	(M.D.N.C. 	2019)
(alteration 	in 	original) 	(quoting 	Bilal-Edwards 	v. 	United 	Plan.
Org., 	15 	F.Supp.3d 	1, 	17 	(D.D.C. 	2013)). 	Plaintiff’s 	original
complaint 	was 	filed 	on 	August 	18, 	2023, 	(ECF 	No. 	1), 	well 	within
FLSA’s 	three-year 	statute 	of 	limitations 	for 	willful 	violations
and two-year statute of limitations for non-willful violations, so
if his FLSA claim relates back, Defendant’s statute of limitations
defense 	fails. 	Plaintiff’s 	original 	complaint, 	however, 	alleged
only 	that 	when 	he 	“informed 	[Defendant] 	of 	the 	[truck 	fire] 	and
the 	hazard 	of 	poorly 	and/or 	non-maintenanced 	vehicles, 	[he] 	was
retaliated 	against 	and 	demoted 	. 	. 	. 	and 	ultimately 	fired 	days
later.” 	(ECF 	No. 	1, 	at 	6). 	Nothing 	in 	that 	allegation 	put
Defendant on notice that Plaintiff believed he was not paid minimum
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wage, 	not 	paid 	overtime 	wages 	due, 	or 	was 	discharged 	or
discriminated 	against 	for 	filing 	an 	FLSA 	complaint. 	In 	fact,
Plaintiff 	did 	not 	mention 	his 	wages 	at 	all 	in 	his 	original
complaint, apart from the implication that his wages were reduced
when 	he 	was 	demoted. 	But 	demotion 	cannot 	give 	notice 	of 	an 	FLSA
claim 	because 	an 	FLSA-compliant 	employer 	cannot 	pay 	an 	employee
less 	than 	minimum 	wage, 	so 	the 	position 	to 	which 	he 	was 	demoted
must 	presumably 	still 	have 	met 	minimum 	wage 	requirements.
Therefore, 	Plaintiff’s 	FLSA 	claim 	does 	not 	relate 	back 	to 	his
original complaint and is barred by the statute of limitations.
Equitable tolling is not available to Plaintiff, either. 	“For
equitable tolling to apply, a litigant must establish ‘(1) that he
has 	been 	pursuing 	his 	rights 	diligently, 	and 	(2) 	that 	some
extraordinary 	circumstance 	stood 	in 	his 	way 	and 	prevented 	timely
filing.’” 	Warfaa v. Ali, 1 F.4th 289, 294 (4 th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 255
(2016)). 	The extraordinary circumstance must be “external to the
party’s own conduct.” 	Id. (quoting Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d
325, 	330 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2000)). 	Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	he 	pursued 	his
FLSA claim at the EEOC and the EEOC’s delays prevented his timely
filing. 	The FLSA, however, does not require that an employee file
a 	complaint 	with 	the 	EEOC 	before 	filing 	suit 	in 	court, 	see 	29
U.S.C. 	§ 	216(b); 	in 	fact, 	the 	bulk 	of 	the 	FLSA 	is 	outside 	the
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EEOC’s 	jurisdiction, 	Other 	Employment 	and 	Civil 	Rights 	Laws 	Not
Enforced 	by 	the 	EEOC, 	U.S. 	Equal 	Emp. 	Opportunity 	Comm’n,
https://www.eeoc.gov/other-employment-and-civil-rights-laws-not-
enforced-eeoc 	[https://perma.cc/RK3S-TYYU] 	(noting 	that 	the 	FLSA
is 	outside 	the 	EEOC’s 	jurisdiction 	except 	for 	its 	equal 	pay
provisions). 	Accordingly, any delay by the EEOC processing a claim
outside its jurisdiction is due to Plaintiff’s own erroneous belief
that he needed to complete his EEOC adjudication before filing his
FLSA claim in federal court. 	More importantly, Plaintiff indicated
in his original complaint that he received his right-to-sue letter
from the EEOC on May 24, 2023. 	(ECF No. 1, at 6). 	In other words,
even if the EEOC were relevant to Plaintiff’s FLSA claim, there is
no 	EEOC 	delay 	attributable 	to 	the 	period 	between 	the 	filing 	of
Plaintiff’s original and amended complaints. 	Put simply, there is
no ground on which to grant Plaintiff equitable tolling.
All the facts necessary to Defendant’s statute of limitations
defense appear on the face of Plaintiff’s complaint, so the court
will dismiss Plaintiff’s FLSA claim.9
9 	Even 	considering 	Plaintiff’s 	FLSA 	claim 	on 	its 	merits, 	he
fails 	to 	state 	a 	claim. 	As 	explained, 	FLSA 	provides 	a 	cause 	of
action 	to 	an 	employee 	who 	is 	not 	paid 	minimum 	wage, 	not 	paid
overtime 	wages 	due, 	or 	discharged 	or 	discriminated 	against 	for
filing 	an 	FLSA 	complaint. 	See 	29 	U.S.C. 	§ 	216(b). 	As 	Defendant
argues, Plaintiff’s allegation that he was “forced to work without
[a] 	full 	day[’s] 	salary” 	and 	“to 	receive 	less 	than 	half 	of 	[his]
pay” 	fails 	to 	raise 	the 	plausible 	inference 	that 	he 	was 	not 	paid
minimum 	wage. 	(ECF 	No. 	42-1, 	at 	23–24). 	Without 	any 	facts
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III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend
Plaintiff 	provides 	numerous 	additional 	factual 	allegations,
along 	with 	twenty-one 	exhibits, 	in 	his 	opposition 	to 	Defendant’s
motion 	to 	dismiss. 	In 	its 	reply, 	Defendant 	treats 	these 	new
allegations 	and 	exhibits 	as 	a 	motion 	for 	leave 	to 	amend 	and
conducts 	a 	futility 	analysis. 	As 	one 	court 	recently 	explained,
when a “plaintiff has alleged new factual details in her response
and [the] defendant has addressed those allegations in its reply,
in 	view 	of 	[the] 	plaintiff’s 	pro 	se 	status, 	the 	court 	construes
[the] plaintiff’s response as including a motion for leave to amend
her 	complaint.” 	Harris 	v. 	Variety 	Wholesalers, 	No. 	23-cv-443,
2024 WL 3471202, at *4 (E.D.N.C. July 19, 2024). 	Accordingly, the
court 	construes 	Plaintiff’s 	opposition 	to 	include 	a 	motion 	for
leave 	to 	amend. 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	leave 	to 	amend, 	so
construed, 	provides 	sufficient 	factual 	allegations 	to 	permit
amendment of his ADA failure-to-accommodate and FMLA interference
claims, 	but 	amendment 	of 	the 	remainder 	of 	his 	claims 	would 	be
futile.
A. 	Standard of Review
Fed.R.Civ.P. 	15(a)(2) 	provides 	that 	courts 	“should 	freely
give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” 	Accordingly, the
regarding Plaintiff’s daily wages, the court cannot conclude that
less 	than 	half 	of 	his 	daily 	wages 	amounted 	to 	below–minimum 	wage
payment.
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Fourth 	Circuit 	has 	instructed 	that 	“leave 	to 	amend 	a 	pleading
should 	be 	denied 	only 	when 	the 	amendment 	would 	be 	prejudicial 	to
the 	opposing 	party, 	there 	has 	been 	bad 	faith 	on 	the 	party 	of 	the
moving 	party, 	or 	the 	amendment 	would 	be 	futile.” 	Johnson 	v.
Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4 th Cir. 1986) (citing Foman
v. 	Davis, 	371 	U.S. 	178, 	182 	(1962)). 	Defendant 	does 	not 	raise
prejudice 	or 	bad 	faith 	but 	does 	argue 	that 	amendment 	would 	be
futile. 	The Fourth Circuit “ha[s] made clear that district courts
are 	free 	to 	deny 	leave 	to 	amend 	as 	futile 	if 	the 	complaint 	[as
amended] 	fails 	to 	withstand 	Rule 	12(b)(6) 	scrutiny.” 	In 	re
Triangle Cap. Corp. Secs. Litig., 988 F.3d 743, 750 (4 th Cir. 2021)
(citing 	Katyle 	v. 	Penn 	Nat’l 	Gaming, 	Inc., 	637 	F.3d 	462, 	471 	(4 th
Cir. 2011)).
B. 	Exhibits
Because the court now construes the exhibits attached at ECF
No. 	51 	as 	part 	of 	the 	proposed 	complaint, 	it 	may 	consider 	the
exhibits 	when 	determining 	whether 	the 	proposed 	complaint 	would
withstand Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, provided that they are “written
instruments.” 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	10(c). 	The 	phrase 	“written
instruments” 	includes 	“documentary 	evidence, 	specifically,
contracts, notes, and other writing[s] on which [a party’s] action
or 	defense 	is 	based.” 	In 	re 	NC 	Swine 	Farm 	Nuisance 	Litig., 	No.
15-cv-13, 2015 WL 3948309, at *2 (E.D.N.C. June 29, 2015) (quoting
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Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 339 n.3 (3 d Cir. 1989)). 	It generally
does 	not 	include 	photographs. 	E.E.O.C. 	v. 	Bo-Cherry, 	Inc., 	No.
13-cv-210, 	2013 	WL 	2317724, 	at 	*3 	(W.D.N.C. 	May 	28, 	2013); 	In 	re
NC Swine Farm, 2015 WL 3948309, at *2. 	All of Plaintiff’s exhibits
constitute 	written, 	documentary 	evidence 	except 	for 	the
photographs 	in 	Exhibits 	P 	and 	Q. 	(See 	ECF 	Nos. 	51-16; 	51-17).
Therefore, the court may consider all the exhibits attached at ECF
No. 51 except for Exhibits P and Q.
C. 	Count I: ADA Failure to Accommodate
Plaintiff 	provides 	numerous 	additional 	facts 	for 	his 	ADA
failure-to-accommodate claim which, taken together, do not render
amendment futile. 	First, Plaintiff specifies that his disability
consisted of post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and anxiety.
(ECF No. 51, at 4). 	Plaintiff’s FMLA medical assessment provides
further information: His condition incapacitated him from December
1, 	2021, 	to 	December 	10, 	2021, 	for 	which 	he 	received 	medical
treatment, 	it 	will 	last 	for 	longer 	than 	one 	year, 	and 	it 	is 	a
chronic 	condition 	requiring 	continuing 	care 	in 	the 	form 	of
behavioral health treatment every one to two weeks. 	(ECF No. 51-
1, 	at 	3–4). 	Defendant 	argues 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	allegations 	are
still 	“too 	vague” 	because 	he 	does 	not 	“allege 	the 	precise 	nature
of 	the 	alleged 	disability, 	the 	degree 	to 	which 	the 	disability
limits a major life activity, and for how long.” 	(ECF No. 55, at
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4). 	Defendant 	demands 	too 	much 	at 	this 	juncture. 	Plaintiff
articulates 	the 	nature 	of 	his 	disability 	as 	PTSD 	and 	anxiety.10
The ADA’s implementing regulations provide that “it should easily
be 	concluded 	that 	. 	. 	. 	post-traumatic 	stress 	disorder[] 	. 	. 	.
substantially 	limit[s] 	brain 	function.” 	29 	C.F.R. 	§
1630.2(j)(3)(iii). 	His FMLA paperwork explains that his condition
will 	last 	for 	longer 	than 	one 	year. 	At 	this 	stage, 	and 	in 	light
of 	Plaintiff’s 	pro 	se 	status, 	he 	has 	offered 	enough 	facts 	to
conclude that it is at least plausible he was disabled. 	See, e.g.,
McNeill 	v. 	Fayetteville 	State 	Univ., 	No. 	17-cv-609, 	2018 	WL
4350176, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Sep. 12, 2018) (“[T]his court can draw a
reasonable 	inference 	that 	severe 	anxiety 	and 	PTSD, 	coupled 	with
short-term 	memory 	deficiencies, 	could 	substantially 	limit 	major
life activities.”).
Second, Plaintiff plausibly alleges notice of his disability
to 	Defendant. 	He 	asserts 	that 	he 	communicated 	the 	nature 	of 	his
disability 	to 	Defendant’s 	HR 	Administrator, 	Alvina 	Coleman, 	on
December 2, 2021. 	(ECF No. 51, at 3–4). 	To corroborate that this
communication 	occurred, 	he 	attaches 	a 	log 	of 	his 	communications
10 Defendant takes issue with the fact that Plaintiff does not
provide 	any 	medical 	documentation 	of 	a 	specific 	PTSD 	or 	anxiety
diagnosis. 	(ECF 	No. 	55, 	at 	4 	n.3). 	It 	is 	true 	that 	Plaintiff’s
FMLA 	paperwork 	does 	not 	state 	with 	particularity 	any 	diagnosis.
Taking as true, however, that Plaintiff was involved in two truck
fires within the span of several months, Plaintiff’s allegation of
PTSD and anxiety is certainly plausible.
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with Ms. Coleman. 	(ECF No. 51-10). 	He also attaches an email he
sent 	to 	Ms. 	Coleman 	on 	December 	3, 	2021, 	in 	which 	he 	expressly
states: 	“I 	am 	dealing 	with 	post 	traumatic 	stress 	as 	a 	result 	of
the 	fire 	and 	my 	anxiety 	is 	uncontrollable.” 	(ECF 	No. 	51-12, 	at
5). 	Such communication more than meets the notice requirement.
Defendant 	argues 	that 	Plaintiff 	does 	not 	plausibly 	allege
notice because Plaintiff sent Defendant a doctor’s note on December
2, 2021, explaining that Plaintiff could return to work on December
6. 	(ECF No. 55, at 5-6, 6 n.1). 	Ms. Coleman responded on December
8: 	“According 	to 	your 	doctor’s 	note, 	you 	can 	return 	to 	work
tomorrow, 	December 	9, 	2021. 	. 	. 	. 	If 	you 	do 	not 	report 	to 	work
tomorrow, it will be deemed a resignation.”11 	(ECF No. 51-13). 	To
Defendant, the doctor’s note extinguishes any ADA claim Plaintiff
may have, because it “affirmatively demonstrates that [Defendant]
could 	not 	have 	any 	knowledge 	of 	[Plaintiff’s] 	alleged 	disability
or need for an accommodation before it terminated his employment.”
(ECF No. 55, at 6).
The 	court 	disagrees. 	As 	already 	explained, 	Defendant 	did
have plausible notice of Plaintiff’s disability via his emails to
Ms. 	Coleman 	on 	December 	2 	and 	3. 	A 	doctor’s 	note 	that 	Plaintiff
11 Defendant notes the discrepancy between the December 6 and
9 	dates 	and 	attributes 	it 	to 	a 	“typo.” 	(ECF 	No. 	55, 	at 	3 	n.1).
Because 	Defendant 	treated 	the 	later 	of 	the 	two 	dates 	as 	the 	date
on 	which 	Plaintiff 	could 	return 	to 	work, 	the 	date 	discrepancy 	is
immaterial.
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was “excused . . . from work” until December 6, (ECF No. 55-1, at
5), 	does 	not 	necessarily 	mean 	that 	the 	disability 	Plaintiff
suffered had vanished and his return to work could be unrestricted.
Rather, 	the 	doctor’s 	note 	served 	only 	to 	excuse 	Plaintiff 	from
work 	entirely 	for 	a 	brief 	period. 	Moreover, 	Plaintiff 	alleges
that 	he 	communicated 	to 	Ms. 	Coleman 	in 	his 	December 	2 	email 	that
“his provider requested a job accommodation by way of modified job
duties 	(light 	duty, 	not 	to 	operate 	a 	commercial 	vehicle,
temporarily).” 	(ECF 	No. 	51, 	at 	4). 	The 	December 	2 	email 	is 	not
before the court, but taking the allegation as true, Defendant was
also 	on 	notice 	that 	Plaintiff 	was 	requesting 	a 	light-duty
accommodation related to his disability.
In 	its 	reply, 	Defendant 	does 	not 	challenge 	Plaintiff’s
proposed amendments as futile with regard to the third and fourth
elements 	of 	a 	failure-to-accommodate 	claim, 	namely 	that 	“with
reasonable accommodation he could perform the essential functions
of 	the 	position” 	and 	that 	Defendant 	“refused 	to 	make 	such
accommodations.” 	That said, Defendant did argue in its motion to
dismiss 	Plaintiff’s 	amended 	complaint 	that 	light 	duty 	is 	not 	a
reasonable 	accommodation 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law 	because 	it, 	“by
definition, 	removes 	essential 	functions 	of 	any 	position.” 	(ECF
No. 	42-1, 	at 	14 	n.3 	(citing 	Shoptaw 	v. 	Walmart, 	Inc., 	No. 	21-cv-
2152, 2023 WL 5287066, at *5 (D.S.C. Aug. 17, 2023)). 	Defendant’s
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reliance 	on 	an 	unpublished, 	out-of-district 	opinion 	for 	this
sweeping 	proposition 	is 	unpersuasive. 	The 	ADA 	contemplates 	that
reasonable 	accommodations 	may 	include 	“job 	restructuring” 	and
“part-time or modified work schedules.” 	42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
It 	is 	not 	clear 	that 	intermittent, 	temporary 	“light 	duty
assignments 	and 	ride-along 	accommodations” 	for 	a 	commercial-
vehicle 	driver 	fall 	outside 	these 	statutory 	categories.
Accordingly, the court is unprepared to foreclose Plaintiff’s ADA
claim 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law 	on 	this 	basis. 	Because 	“the
reasonableness of an accommodation is a fact-specific inquiry” to
be 	adjudicated 	at 	a 	later 	stage, 	and 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	he
could perform the essential functions of his job with his requested
accommodations, 	amendment 	would 	not 	be 	futile. 	Gagnon 	v. 	Bd. 	of
Educ., 	760 	F.Supp.3d 	359, 	371-72 	(D.Md. 	2024) 	(citing 	Pandazides
v. Va. Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 823, 833 (4 th Cir. 1994)).
As 	to 	the 	fourth 	element, 	Defendant 	never 	challenges
Plaintiff’s 	allegations 	on 	this 	front. 	Plaintiff 	evidently 	did
not 	receive 	any 	accommodation 	and 	alleges 	that 	Defendant 	failed
“to engage in the interactive process required by the ADA.”12 	(ECF
No. 51, at 3); see also Gagnon, 760 F.Supp.3d at 373 (“[T]he Fourth
12 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	after 	the 	second 	truck 	fire 	in
November 2021, he was suspended, then demoted from front-end driver
to 	rear-end 	driver 	and 	put 	on 	a 	performance 	improvement 	plan,
before ultimately being terminated. 	(ECF No. 51, at 2, 8).
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Circuit 	has 	analyzed 	the 	failure 	to 	engage 	in 	an 	interactive
process 	. 	. 	. 	as 	relevant 	to 	the 	fourth 	element 	of 	a 	prima 	facie
case 	of 	a 	claim 	of 	a 	failure 	to 	provide 	a 	reasonable
accommodation[.]” (citing Wilson, 717 F.3d at 346; Haneke v. Mid-
Atl. 	Cap. 	Mgmt., 	131 	F.App’x 	399, 	400 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2005) 	(per
curiam))). 	Because 	Defendant 	did 	not 	provide 	Plaintiff 	any
accommodation, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged the fourth element.
Given 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	amendments 	give 	rise 	to 	a 	plausible
ADA 	failure-to-accommodate 	claim, 	he 	will 	be 	permitted 	to 	amend
his complaint.13
D. 	Count II: FMLA Interference
Plaintiff 	cures 	the 	deficiencies 	in 	his 	FMLA 	interference
claim 	that 	Defendant 	had 	highlighted 	in 	his 	amended 	complaint.
Specifically, Plaintiff plausibly alleges that he was an eligible
employee under the FMLA because he had been employed by Defendant
for ten years and worked more than 1,250 hours in the twelve-month
period 	preceding 	the 	incident 	entitling 	him 	to 	leave. 	(ECF 	No.
13 	Defendant 	construes 	Plaintiff’s 	response 	in 	opposition 	to
include 	a 	disability 	termination 	claim, 	too. 	(ECF 	No. 	55, 	at 	6-
8). 	Despite Defendant’s generous interpretation, Plaintiff at no
point 	alleges 	that 	he 	was 	terminated 	due 	to 	his 	disability.
Instead, 	he 	consistently 	maintains 	that 	he 	was 	terminated 	due 	to
the 	complaints 	he 	filed. 	(E.g., 	ECF 	No. 	51, 	at 	7 	(alleging 	that
he 	was 	terminated 	“for 	reporting 	workplace 	safety 	violations,
hostile work environment, and unfair pay under [the FLSA]”). 	The
court will not read this theory of disability discrimination into
Plaintiff’s proposed amendments.
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51, at 6). 	Additionally, he alleges enough to support a plausible
inference that he suffered a serious health condition for the same
reason that he plausibly alleges a disability. 	(See id. at 3-4).
Defendant 	argues, 	however, 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	proposed
amendment 	is 	still 	futile 	because 	he 	did 	not 	give 	Defendant
adequate notice of his intent to take leave. 	(ECF No. 55, at 8).
A brief timeline is helpful here. 	Plaintiff says he contacted HR
on 	December 	2, 	2021, 	to 	self-advocate 	for 	FMLA 	and 	ADA
accommodation. 	(ECF No. 51, at 3). 	He says that HR provided him
a medical assessment form and was told that the paperwork was due
by 	December 	16, 	2021. 	(Id. 	at 	3–4). 	Exhibit 	A 	is 	that 	form 	and
provides 	that 	the 	form 	must 	be 	returned 	by 	12/16/2021. 	(ECF 	No.
51-1, 	at 	2). 	Plaintiff 	sent 	a 	doctor’s 	note 	to 	Defendant 	on
December 2 stating that he was excused from work until December 6.
(ECF No. 51-10, at 2). 	On December 8, Defendant notified Plaintiff
that, 	according 	to 	his 	doctor’s 	note, 	he 	could 	return 	to 	work 	on
December 	9, 	so 	he 	was 	to 	“report 	to 	work 	at 	5:30 	a.m.” 	and 	his
manager would be Bruce Underdue. 	(ECF No. 51-13, at 2). 	Defendant
further informed Plaintiff that if he failed to report to work on
December 	9, 	it 	would 	“be 	deemed 	a 	resignation 	of 	employment.”
(Id.). 	There is evidence in the record that Plaintiff did report
to 	work 	on 	December 	9; 	he 	attached 	a 	text 	of 	his 	to 	an 	employee
named 	Richard 	Simms 	on 	December 	9 	at 	5:28 	a.m., 	stating: 	“[T]his
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33
is 	Lee 	im 	here. 	not 	certain 	what 	I’m 	supposed 	to 	be 	doing 	but 	I
can’t be behind the wheels of a commercial vehicle.” 	(ECF No. 51-
11, 	at 	3). 	He 	followed 	up 	at 	5:59 	a.m.: 	“[K]eep 	me 	posted. 	Im
sitting 	in 	car.” 	(Id.). 	Mr. 	Simms 	responded 	“Ok” 	at 	5:59 	a.m.
(Id.). 	Plaintiff texted Mr. Simms again at 9:13 a.m.: “I’m still
here 	waiting 	on 	HR 	to 	respond.” 	(Id. 	at 	2). 	In 	a 	separate 	text
message 	Plaintiff 	attaches, 	Plaintiff 	texted 	Defendant’s 	HR
Administrator 	at 	10:38 	a.m. 	an 	updated 	doctor’s 	note 	excusing
Plaintiff from work until December 10. 	(ECF Nos. 51-11, at 4; 51-
10, at 2). 	Defendant evidently determined that Plaintiff did not
“report 	to 	work” 	on 	December 	9 	and 	mailed 	him 	his 	termination
letter sometime that same day. 	(ECF No. 51-10, at 2). 	On December
16, 2021, Plaintiff sent the completed medical form to HR. 	(Id.).
Defendant 	believes 	that 	it 	could 	not 	have 	had 	any 	knowledge 	of
Plaintiff’s 	intent 	to 	request 	further 	leave 	at 	the 	time 	he 	was
terminated 	on 	December 	9 	because, 	at 	that 	time, 	it 	had 	in 	its
possession 	only 	the 	doctor’s 	note 	clearing 	Plaintiff 	to 	work
beginning December 6.
At 	this 	juncture, 	Defendant’s 	argument 	is 	unpersuasive.
Plaintiff 	was 	initially 	told 	that 	December 	16, 	2021, 	was 	the
deadline 	for 	submission 	of 	the 	medical 	assessment 	form, 	in 	which
the 	doctor 	was 	to 	specify 	the 	amount 	of 	leave 	needed. 	There 	is
also 	evidence 	that 	Plaintiff 	did 	report 	to 	work 	on 	December 	9 	as
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34
requested by Defendant, and that Plaintiff notified Defendant’s HR
Administrator on the morning of December 9 that he would take leave
until 	December 	10. 	It 	is 	unclear 	when 	on 	December 	9 	Defendant
officially 	terminated 	Plaintiff. 	It 	is 	at 	least 	plausible,
however, 	that 	Plaintiff 	notified 	Defendant 	of 	his 	intent 	to 	take
leave 	before 	he 	was 	terminated. 	Thus, 	amendment 	would 	not 	be
futile.14
E. 	Count III: WCA
Although 	Plaintiff 	provides 	several 	additional 	factual
allegations related to his WCA claim, the deficiency in his amended
complaint was legal, not factual. 	Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
failed 	to 	follow 	its 	internal 	protocol 	for 	workers’ 	compensation
claims, 	which 	required 	the 	employer 	to 	complete 	an 	injury 	report
and 	submit 	it 	to 	Defendant’s 	Safety 	Department, 	and 	the 	Safety
Department to file a claim with Defendant’s workers’ compensation
14 	Again, 	Defendant 	generously 	interprets 	Plaintiff’s 	FMLA
count to include an FMLA retaliation claim in addition to his FMLA
interference 	claim. 	“Plaintiff 	must 	prove 	three 	elements 	to
establish a prima facie case of retaliation: (1) she engaged in a
protected 	activity; 	(2) 	her 	employer 	took 	an 	adverse 	employment
action 	against 	her; 	and 	(3) 	there 	was 	a 	causal 	link 	between 	the
two 	events.” 	Adams 	v. 	Anne 	Arundel 	Cnty. 	Pub. 	Schs., 	789 	F.3d
422, 	429 	(4th 	Cir. 	2015) 	(citation 	modified), 	abrogated 	on 	other
grounds by, Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024). 	At
no 	point, 	however, 	does 	Plaintiff 	allege 	that 	he 	was 	retaliated
against 	for 	engaging 	in 	protected 	activity 	under 	the 	FMLA. 	His
failure to allege a causal connection between his termination and
any 	protected 	activity 	he 	engaged 	in 	is 	fatal 	to 	any 	FMLA
retaliation claim he raises.
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35
insurer. 	(See 	ECF 	Nos. 	51, 	at 	8–9; 	51-18). 	The 	only 	relevant
exception to the exclusivity provision of the WCA is the provision
that 	permits 	a 	covered 	employee 	to 	“bring 	an 	action 	for 	damages”
when “an employer fails to secure compensation in accordance with”
the 	WCA. 	Md. 	Code 	Ann., 	Lab. 	& 	Empl. 	§ 	9-509(c)(1)(ii).
Elsewhere, 	the 	WCA 	defines 	the 	phrase 	“secure 	compensation” 	to
mean, 	among 	other 	things, 	“maintaining 	insurance 	with 	an
authorized insurer.” 	Id. § 9-402(a)(1). 	So, although “failure to
secure 	compensation” 	could 	plausibly 	mean 	failure 	to 	file 	a
workers’ 	compensation 	claim 	with 	the 	insurer 	on 	the 	employee’s
behalf, 	the 	WCA 	narrows 	it 	to 	mean 	failure 	to 	maintain 	insurance
with 	an 	authorized 	insurer. 	By 	Plaintiff’s 	own 	admission,
Defendant 	carried 	workers’ 	compensation 	insurance. 	Therefore,
this 	exception 	to 	the 	exclusivity 	provision 	does 	not 	apply.
Whether 	Defendant 	properly 	followed 	protocol 	is 	a 	matter 	to 	be
litigated 	in 	the 	SWCC, 	not 	this 	court. 	Plaintiff 	will 	not 	be
permitted to amend this count.
F. 	Count IV: Wrongful Termination
Plaintiff 	offers 	no 	new 	facts 	or 	legal 	theories 	to 	support
his wrongful termination claim. 	Instead, his wrongful termination
claim 	is 	simply 	a 	different 	label 	for 	his 	Title 	VII 	and 	FLSA
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claims, which fail on their own merits.15 	Amendment of this count
would be futile.
G. 	Count V: Title VII
Plaintiff 	raises 	the 	same 	four 	theories 	for 	his 	Title 	VII
claims—discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, and
harassment—but 	still 	does 	not 	tie 	any 	of 	those 	theories 	to 	a
protected 	characteristic 	in 	Title 	VII. 	The 	closest 	he 	comes 	to
doing so is circling “race, color” in the excerpt of the Employee
Handbook 	he 	attaches 	that 	discusses 	Defendant’s 	employment 	law
policies. 	(ECF No. 51-20, at 2). 	That is hardly enough to satisfy
the 	requirement 	that 	a 	Title 	VII 	claim 	be 	linked 	to 	a 	protected
characteristic. 	Also, 	Plaintiff 	gives 	no 	indication 	that
Defendant 	exhibited 	racial 	hostility 	at 	any 	point. 	Amendment 	of
Plaintiff’s Title VII claim would be futile.
H. 	Count VI: FLSA
Plaintiff 	again 	asserts 	that 	he 	“was 	forced 	to 	work 	against
his 	will 	and 	was 	paid 	less 	than 	his 	normal 	rate 	of 	pay 	for 	doing
so.” 	(ECF 	No. 	51, 	at 	10). 	His 	new 	allegations 	state 	that 	he
15 	Plaintiff 	invokes 	a 	Maryland 	regulation 	providing 	a 	clear
process for disciplinary action against employees that he alleges
Defendant 	did 	not 	follow. 	(ECF 	No. 	51, 	at 	8 	(citing 	COMAR 	§
17.04.05.04)). 	Unsurprisingly, the regulation he invokes applies
only to certain public employees, not private employees. 	See COMAR
§ 17.04.05.04; Md. Reception, Diagnostic & Classification Ctr. v.
Watson, 	144 	Md.App. 	684, 	691 	(2002) 	(noting 	that 	COMAR 	§
17.04.05.04 	exists 	within 	a 	“statutory 	scheme 	for 	imposing
discipline on State employees”).
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“raised 	concerns 	on 	an 	ongoing 	basis” 	about 	his 	pay, 	Defendant
“acknowledged 	[wrongdoing], 	told 	him 	they 	would 	make 	the 	pay
adjustments 	and 	never 	did.” 	(Id.). 	Then, 	“[s]hortly 	after
Plaintiff’s termination, [Defendant] changed [its] pay practices,
sent out notification of these changes, and paid [its] drivers the
lawful amount of compensation.” 	(Id.). 	Finally, Plaintiff offers
that 	he 	“will 	demonstrate 	the 	correlation 	between 	his 	ongoing
complaints and Defendant’s ultimate act of retaliation that led to
his termination.” 	(Id.).
Amendment 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	FLSA 	claim 	would 	be 	futile. 	He
provides no new allegation to support relation back to his original
complaint 	or 	equitable 	tolling. 	In 	fact, 	his 	exhibits 	clarify
that 	his 	FLSA 	claim 	is 	not 	one 	for 	a 	minimum 	wage 	violation 	but
rather 	an 	overtime 	wage 	violation 	related 	to 	a 	change 	in 	company
policy in 2020 requiring Saturday work. 	(ECF Nos. 51-4, at 2 (“It
is 	my 	understanding 	that 	working 	on 	Saturdays 	is 	no 	longer
optional, but is required . . . [and] we are also working for less
than 	(almost 	half) 	of 	our 	daily 	wage.”); 	51-12, 	at 	4 	(“I 	have
complained 	about 	not 	receiving 	my 	full 	pay 	for 	all 	the 	overtime
work that I was forced to perform at a lower rate that goes against
the 	overtime 	wage 	and 	hour 	laws[.]”)). 	These 	allegations 	relate
to 	a 	company-wide 	policy 	change 	in 	the 	middle 	of 	2020, 	clearly 	a
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different 	transaction 	or 	occurrence 	from 	the 	November 	2021 	truck
fire. 	Thus, the lack of relation back is all the more plain.
Plaintiff also appears to raise an FLSA retaliation claim for
the 	first 	time 	by 	asserting 	a 	“correlation” 	between 	his 	FLSA
complaints and his termination. 	(ECF No. 51, at 10). 	Apart from
the 	same 	relation-back 	issue 	as 	his 	original 	FLSA 	claim,
Plaintiff’s 	FLSA 	retaliation 	claim 	would 	also 	fail 	because 	a
statement that he “will demonstrate the correlation” at some later
point 	is 	insufficient 	to 	support 	a 	plausible 	inference 	of
correlation, much less causation.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss will
be granted and Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend, so construed,
will be granted in part and denied in part. 	A separate order will
follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
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