John C. Grimber Co., Inc. v. Nudura Corporation et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
JOHN C. GRIMBERG CO., INC.
:
v. 	: 	Civil Action No. DKC 22-2586
:
NUDURA CORPORATION, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently 	pending 	and 	ready 	for 	resolution 	in 	this
construction law case is the motion of John C. Grimberg, Co., Inc.
(“Grimberg”) 	for 	entry 	of 	final 	judgment 	as 	to 	Defendants 	Nudura
Corporation, 	Nudura 	Systems, 	Inc., 	and 	Tremco 	Construction
Products Group, Inc. (collectively “Nudura”). 	(ECF No. 141). 	The
issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being
deemed 	necessary. 	Local 	Rule 	105.6. 	For 	the 	following 	reasons,
the motion will be granted.
I. 	Background
The relevant factual background in this case is set out in a
prior 	opinion. 	(ECF 	No. 	116, 	at 	2-7). 	On 	March 	20, 	2025, 	this
court issued an order entering summary judgment in favor of Nudura
on 	Counts 	I, 	II, 	III, 	IV, 	V, 	VI, 	VII, 	and 	XI 	of 	the 	amended
complaint. 	(ECF 	No. 	117). 	This 	court 	denied 	reconsideration 	of
the order on October 9, 2025. 	(ECF No. 137).
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Grimberg 	filed 	a 	motion 	for 	entry 	of 	final 	judgment 	as 	to
Nudura 	on 	November 	14, 	2025. 	(ECF 	No. 	141). 	Nudura 	filed 	a
response on December 1, 2025, (ECF No. 142), and Grimberg filed a
reply on December 15, 2025, (ECF No. 143).
II. 	Standard of Review
Grimberg’s 	motion 	is 	governed 	by 	Fed.R.Civ.P 	54(b), 	which
allows 	for 	judgment 	on 	multiple 	claims 	or 	involving 	multiple
parties. 	In relevant part,
When 	an 	action 	presents 	more 	than 	one 	claim
for relief — whether as a claim, counterclaim,
crossclaim, 	or 	third-party 	claim 	— 	or 	when
multiple 	parties 	are 	involved, 	the 	court 	may
direct entry of a final judgment as to one or
more, 	but 	fewer 	than 	all, 	claims 	or 	parties
only 	if 	the 	court 	expressly 	determines 	that
there is no just reason for delay.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). 	As contemplated in the language of the Rule,
there are two prerequisites: there must be a “final judgment,” and
the court must determine that there is “no just reason for delay.”
Curtiss-Wright 	Corp. 	v. 	Gen. 	Elec. 	Co., 	446 	U.S. 	1, 	7-8 	(1980).
In determining if there is a final judgment, the Supreme Court of
the 	United 	States 	counsels 	that 	it 	“must 	be 	a 	‘judgment’ 	in 	the
sense 	that 	it 	is 	a 	decision 	upon 	a 	cognizable 	claim 	for 	relief,
and 	it 	must 	be 	‘final’ 	in 	the 	sense 	that 	it 	is 	‘an 	ultimate
disposition 	of 	an 	individual 	claim 	entered 	in 	the 	course 	of 	a
multiple claims action.’” 	Id. at 7 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 (1956)).
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After 	determining 	that 	there 	is 	a 	final 	judgment, 	the 	court
must 	consider 	if 	there 	is 	“no 	just 	reason 	for 	delay.” 	“[I]n
deciding whether there are no just reasons to delay the appeal of
individual final judgments in [a] setting such as this, a district
court must take into account judicial administrative interests as
well as the equities involved.” 	Id. at 8. 	In the years since the
Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Curtiss-Wright, the United States
Court 	of 	Appeals 	for 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit 	has 	enumerated 	multiple
factors for consideration in the analysis:
(1) 	the 	relationship 	between 	the 	adjudicated
and unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility
that the need for review might or might not be
mooted by future developments in the district
court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing
court 	might 	be 	obliged 	to 	consider 	the 	same
issue 	a 	second 	time; 	(4) 	the 	presence 	or
absence of a claim or counterclaim which could
result 	in 	a 	set-off 	against 	the 	judgment
sought 	to 	be 	made 	final; 	(5) 	miscellaneous
factors 	such 	as 	delay, 	economic 	and 	solvency
considerations, shortening the time of trial,
frivolity 	of 	competing 	claims, 	expense, 	and
the like.
Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1335-36
(4th Cir. 1993).
Rule 	54(b) 	certification 	should 	not 	be 	“granted 	routinely,”
nor 	“as 	an 	accommodation 	to 	counsel.” 	Id. 	at 	1335. 	The 	court
must take care to prevent piecemeal appeals, while considering the
risk 	of 	undue 	hardship 	to 	litigants. 	Id. 	District 	courts 	must
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include 	their 	findings 	justifying 	a 	Rule 	54(b) 	decision 	on 	the
record or in the order. 	Id. at 1336.
III. Analysis
Grimberg 	asks 	the 	court 	to 	direct 	entry 	of 	a 	final 	judgment
as to Nudura following entry of summary judgment in Nudura’s favor.
(ECF No. 141-1, at 1). 	Grimberg also asks the court to “stay the
remainder 	of 	the 	underlying 	action 	that 	is 	currently 	pending
against 	defaulted 	Defendant 	Progressive 	Construction 	Solutions
Group, 	LLC 	d/b/a 	The 	PCS 	Group 	and 	The 	PCS 	Group, 	LLC 	(‘PCS’)
pending Grimberg’s intended appeal” to the Fourth Circuit. 	(Id.).
Nudura did not oppose either request. 	(ECF No. 142, at 1).
A. 	Rule 54(b)
Considering 	the 	relevant 	factors, 	the 	court 	finds 	it
appropriate 	to 	certify 	the 	summary 	judgment 	decision 	under 	Rule
54(b). 	The decision resolved all claims against Nudura, such that
it constitutes a final judgment, and the court finds no just reason
for delay.
1. 	Final Judgment
There has been a final judgment with respect to Nudura.
“[A] 	‘final 	decision’ 	generally 	is 	one 	which
ends 	the 	litigation 	on 	the 	merits 	and 	leaves
nothing 	for 	the 	court 	to 	do 	but 	execute 	the
judgment.” 	[Kinsale 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	JDBC
Holdings, 	Inc., 	31 	F.4th 	870, 	873 	(4 th 	Cir.
2022)] 	(quoting 	Catlin 	v. 	United 	States, 	324
U.S. 	229, 	233 	(1945)). 	A 	judgment 	is 	final
where there is “an ultimate disposition of an
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individual 	claim 	entered 	in 	the 	court 	of 	a
multiple 	claims 	action.” 	Id. 	(quoting 	MCI
Constructors, 	LLC 	v. 	City 	of 	Greensboro, 	610
F.3d 849, 855 (4 th Cir. 2010)).
Nationwide 	Prop. 	& 	Cas. 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Fireline 	Corp., 	No. 	20-cv-
00684-JRR, 2024 WL 1096181, at *8 (D.Md. Mar. 13, 2024).
The 	court 	previously 	granted 	summary 	judgment 	to 	Nudura 	on
Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, and XI, and ordered that judgment
was 	entered 	in 	favor 	of 	Nudura 	on 	those 	same 	counts. 	(ECF 	No.
117, at 1-2). 	While the “label that a district court attaches to
an order it issues does not control,” Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co., 2024 WL 1096181, at *8 (quoting Kinsale Ins. Co., 31 F.4th at
873-74), the summary judgment order adjudicated all claims against
Nudura 	on 	the 	merits. 	The 	only 	remaining 	counts 	in 	the 	case 	are
the 	counts 	against 	PCS, 	which 	has 	had 	a 	default 	entered 	against
it. 	(ECF No. 24). 	Because there is nothing more for either Nudura
or Grimberg to do to determine Nudura’s status in this litigation,
this constitutes a final judgment for purposes of Rule 54(b).
2. 	No Just Reason for Delay
The 	court 	considers 	the 	five 	factors 	outlined 	in 	Braswell
Shipyards to determine if there is “no just reason for delay.” 	2
F.3d at 1335-36.
First, 	considering 	the 	relationship 	between 	the 	adjudicated
and 	unadjudicated 	claims, 	there 	is 	one 	count 	in 	the 	amended
complaint 	that 	is 	brought 	against 	both 	PCS 	and 	Nudura. 	Count 	XI
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is 	a 	negligence 	claim 	brought 	against 	PCS 	and 	Nudura 	“as 	joint
tortfeasors,” 	(ECF 	No. 	38, 	at 	60), 	which 	alleges 	that 	the 	two
Defendants 	“owed 	Plaintiff 	a 	duty 	to 	ensure 	that 	the 	ICF 	wall
system at the Project was installed in an appropriate manner,” and
that they “negligently breached their duties of care by improperly
designing 	and 	installing 	the 	ICF 	walls.” 	(Id. 	at 	61). 	As
evidenced 	by 	the 	court’s 	ability 	to 	grant 	summary 	judgment 	to
Nudura on all the relevant claims, however, Nudura’s liability is
not 	inherently 	linked 	to 	PCS’ 	liability. 	It 	is 	possible 	for 	one
party 	to 	breach 	its 	duty 	of 	care 	independent 	of 	the 	other 	party.
Grimberg had relationships with both PCS and Nudura, even bringing
breach of contract claims separately against both parties, and ten
of the eleven counts in the amended complaint are brought against
one or the other. 	(Id. at 44-60). 	This factor weighs in favor of
certification, 	as 	appealing 	the 	decision 	with 	respect 	to 	Nudura
will provide greater clarity for the relevant counts.
Additionally, 	Grimberg’s 	point 	is 	well 	taken 	that 	their
requested 	relief 	avoids 	a 	possible 	Frow 	doctrine 	problem.
Generally, under the Frow doctrine, “when one of several defendants
who is alleged to be jointly liable defaults, judgment should not
be 	entered 	against 	that 	defendant 	until 	the 	matter 	has 	been
adjudicated with regard to all defendants, or all defendants have
defaulted.” 	10A Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure §
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2690 (4th ed. 2025) (citing Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552 (1872)).
Grimberg asserts that it cannot currently bring a motion for entry
of default judgment against PCS because of the Frow doctrine. 	(ECF
No. 141-1, at 8); see, e.g., J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Glanville,
Inc., 	No. 	18-cv-568-ELH, 	2019 	WL 	285954, 	at 	*3-4 	(D.Md. 	Jan. 	18,
2019) 	(declining 	to 	enter 	a 	default 	judgment 	when 	a 	second
defendant 	alleged 	to 	be 	jointly 	and 	severally 	liable 	had 	not 	had
a 	chance 	to 	participate 	in 	the 	case). 	Nudura 	counters 	that 	the
questions pertaining to each party are sufficiently separate, and
“[w]here 	each 	defendant 	is 	potentially 	liable 	to 	the 	plaintiff
based 	upon 	his 	own 	actions 	only, 	there 	is 	no 	possibility 	for
inconsistent 	results.” 	(ECF 	No. 	142, 	at 	3) 	(citing 	Diggs 	v.
Balogun, 	No. 	15-cv-0535-TDC, 	2017 	WL 	4921690, 	at 	*6 	(D.Md. 	Oct.
31, 	2017)). 	Because 	there 	is 	no 	pending 	motion 	for 	a 	default
judgment, 	there 	is 	no 	need 	for 	the 	court 	to 	determine 	the 	Frow
doctrine’s impact on this specific scenario. 	Grimberg is correct,
however, that granting the Rule 54(b) motion now allows the court
to 	avoid 	“the 	procedural 	quandary 	surrounding 	Frow.” 	(ECF 	No.
143, 	at 	2). 	See 	Jefferson 	v. 	Briner, 	461 	F.Supp.2d 	430, 	434
(E.D.Va. 	2006) 	(“logically 	inconsistent 	judgments 	resulting 	from
an 	answering 	defendant’s 	success 	on 	the 	merits 	and 	another
defendant’s 	suffering 	of 	a 	default 	judgment 	are 	to 	be
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avoided.”). 	Accordingly, this further weighs in favor of finding
“no just reason for delay.”
Second, the court considers the possibility that the need for
review may be mooted by further development in the district court.
The court granted summary judgment to Nudura and PCS has defaulted,
so 	the 	only 	remaining 	action 	expected 	is 	for 	Grimberg 	to 	seek 	a
default 	judgment 	against 	PCS. 	Litigation 	in 	the 	district 	court
has ended for Nudura, so the parties can litigate on appeal without
concern 	that 	additional 	proceedings 	in 	district 	court 	could
address 	the 	same 	matter. 	This 	factor 	weighs 	in 	favor 	of 	finding
no just reason for delay.
Third, the court considers the possibility that the appellate
court 	may 	have 	to 	review 	the 	same 	issue 	a 	second 	time. 	Grimberg
seeks 	to 	appeal 	a 	decision 	granting 	summary 	judgment 	to 	Nudura,
where 	this 	court 	found 	that 	there 	was 	“no 	genuine 	dispute 	as 	to
any material fact and [Nudura was] entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” 	(See ECF No. 116, at 9 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a))). 	If
the 	case 	were 	to 	proceed 	to 	a 	jury 	trial 	and 	be 	appealed 	again,
the Fourth Circuit would not be asked to re-consider if there was
“a genuine dispute as to a material fact.” 	This factor weighs in
favor 	of 	certification. 	See 	Fox 	v. 	Baltimore 	City 	Police 	Dep't,
201 F.3d 526, 531 (4 th Cir. 2000) (finding Rule 54(b) certification
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appropriate 	where 	“[t]he 	central 	question 	raised 	on 	appeal 	. 	. 	.
is a pure question of law”).
The fourth factor is the presence of a claim or counterclaim
that 	could 	result 	in 	a 	set-off 	against 	the 	judgment 	that 	the
parties are seeking to make final. 	There are no counterclaims in
this 	case, 	so 	this 	factor 	weighs 	in 	favor 	of 	certification. 	See
Bobb v. FinePoints Priv. Duty Healthcare, LLC, 794 F.Supp.3d 343,
363-364 (“There are no counterclaims which would result in a set-
off against the judgment, so that, too, weighs in favor of a Rule
54(b) certification.”).
Fifth, 	“miscellaneous 	factors 	such 	as 	delay, 	economic 	and
solvency 	considerations, 	shortening 	the 	time 	of 	trial, 	frivolity
of competing claims, expense, and the like.” 	Braswell Shipyards,
Inc., 	2 	F.3d 	at 	1335-36. 	Neither 	party 	argues 	that 	any 	of 	the
enumerated concerns are present here. 	Rather, Grimberg argues it
would 	be 	harmed 	by 	having 	to 	seek 	a 	default 	judgment 	before
appealing 	the 	decision 	in 	Nudura’s 	favor. 	In 	support 	of 	its
motion, 	Grimberg 	asserts 	that 	there 	are 	factual 	questions 	common
to both Nudura and PCS, such that it would be harmed by having to
seek a default judgment against PCS before taking an appeal of the
order granting summary judgment to Nudura. 	(ECF No. 141-1, at 8-
9). 	Specifically, 	Grimberg 	cites 	concerns 	about 	any 	default
judgment’s impact on a future jury trial. 	(ECF No. 141-1, at 9).
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While 	the 	court 	makes 	no 	finding 	that 	Grimberg 	would 	actually 	be
harmed 	by 	theoretical 	evidentiary 	rulings 	in 	a 	possible 	trial,1
Nudura makes no argument that they would be harmed by an immediate
appeal. 	(ECF No. 142, at 1). 	It is unlikely that PCS would suffer
any hardship, as it has not entered an appearance or participated
in this litigation at all. 	(ECF No. 24). 	Because the parties are
requesting 	certification 	of 	a 	judgment 	adjudicating 	all 	claims
against 	the 	only 	defendant 	participating 	in 	this 	case,
certification is appropriate and will be granted.
B. 	Staying the Case Against PCS
The 	court 	must 	next 	consider 	Grimberg’s 	request 	to 	stay 	the
case against PCS while Grimberg takes its appeal. 	“[T]he power to
stay 	proceedings 	is 	incidental 	to 	the 	power 	in 	every 	court 	to
control 	the 	disposition 	of 	the 	causes 	on 	its 	docket 	with 	economy
of 	time 	and 	effort 	for 	itself, 	for 	counsel, 	and 	for 	litigants.”
Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 323 F.Supp.3d 726, 730
(D.Md. 	2018) 	(quoting 	Landis 	v. 	N. 	Am. 	Co., 	299 	U.S. 	248, 	254
(1936)). 	In considering a motion to stay, the court must “balance
the various factors relevant to the expeditious and comprehensive
disposition of the causes of action on the court’s docket.” 	United
States 	v. 	Georgia 	Pac. 	Corp., 	562 	F.2d 	294, 	296 	(4 th 	Cir. 	1977).
1 Questions regarding the admissibility of a judgment are best
dealt with via a motion in limine before trial.
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Courts have developed a three-part test to assist in the weighing
of those factors.
When 	considering 	a 	discretionary 	motion 	to
stay, courts typically examine three factors:
(1) 	the 	impact 	on 	the 	orderly 	course 	of
justice, 	sometimes 	referred 	to 	as 	judicial
economy, measured in terms of the simplifying
or 	complicating 	of 	issues, 	proof, 	and
questions of law which could be expected from
a 	stay; 	(2) 	the 	hardship 	to 	the 	moving 	party
if 	the 	case 	is 	not 	stayed; 	and 	(3) 	the
potential 	damage 	or 	prejudice 	to 	the 	non-
moving party if a stay is granted.
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 323 F.Supp.3d at 731.
Weighing 	the 	three 	factors 	outlined 	above, 	a 	stay 	is
appropriate 	in 	this 	case. 	First, 	in 	terms 	of 	judicial 	economy,
this 	case 	is 	very 	nearly 	at 	its 	end. 	One 	defendant 	has 	been
granted 	summary 	judgment 	on 	all 	the 	counts 	against 	it, 	and 	the
other is in default. 	Grimberg has the option to move for a default
judgment against PCS, but Nudura would remain in the same position
regardless. 	It will not complicate any issues to stay the case in
its current posture.
Second, 	Grimberg 	argues 	that 	it 	will 	suffer 	hardship 	if 	the
case 	is 	not 	stayed, 	largely 	for 	the 	same 	reasons 	it 	argues 	the
judgment 	should 	be 	certified. 	If 	the 	decision 	“were 	to 	be
overturned 	on 	appeal 	— 	and 	Grimberg 	had 	proved 	up 	a 	default
judgment 	against 	PCS 	in 	the 	meantime 	— 	there 	would 	be 	no
opportunity 	for 	any 	party 	to 	present 	a 	jury 	with 	the 	intertwined
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issues 	of 	fault 	as 	between 	Nudura 	and 	PCS.” 	(ECF 	No. 	141-1, 	at
9). 	As mentioned above, the default judgment’s role in the trial
could be discussed in future pre-trial briefing if necessary, but
it is not immediately clear that this fear is warranted. 	Grimberg
could 	seek 	to 	exclude 	the 	fact 	of 	the 	default 	judgment 	from 	the
trial, 	while 	still 	discussing 	PCS’ 	role 	in 	the 	construction.
Grimberg 	also 	argues 	that 	it 	would 	be 	unfairly 	limited 	to 	the
damages 	it 	was 	able 	to 	plead 	when 	moving 	for 	default 	judgment.
(Id.) 	Grimberg 	does 	not 	clarify 	how 	it 	would 	avoid 	that 	clear
rule 	following 	a 	trial, 	assuming 	PCS 	would 	still 	be 	in 	default.
See 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	54(c) 	(“A 	default 	judgment 	must 	not 	differ 	in
kind 	from, 	or 	exceed 	in 	amount, 	what 	is 	demanded 	in 	the
pleadings.”). 	These 	arguments 	of 	hardship 	are 	tenuous 	but
ultimately weigh toward a stay in this case.
Finally, 	there 	is 	no 	potential 	damage 	or 	prejudice 	to 	the
non-moving parties. 	The non-moving parties in this case are Nudura
and PCS. 	Nudura has consented to the motion, (ECF No. 142, at 1),
and any stay is a period that PCS will not have a default judgment
against 	it. 	The 	only 	party 	that 	a 	stay 	could 	theoretically 	harm
is 	Grimberg, 	as 	it 	will 	not 	be 	able 	to 	execute 	on 	any 	judgment
against PCS until it has the default judgment. 	Given that Grimberg
is the moving party, this factor weighs in favor of a stay.
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The 	court 	will 	stay 	the 	case 	against 	PCS 	while 	Grimberg
appeals the earlier summary judgment motion.
IV. 	Conclusion
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	Grimberg’s 	motion 	for 	entry 	of
final judgment as to Nudura will be granted, and this case will be
stayed. 	A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
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