Mason v. Kijakazi

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF 	U.S. COURTHOUSE
AJMEL A. QUERESHI 	6500 CHERRYWOOD LANE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 	GREENBELT, MARYLAND 20770
(301) 344-0393
February 3, 2026
LETTER TO COUNSEL
Re: 	Tiffany M. v. Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner, Social Security
Administration, 	Civil No. AAQ-21-2284
Dear Counsel:
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Equal Access to Justice Act Fees, which
has now been fully briefed. ECF Nos. 20, 22, and 23. Defendant, the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration, concedes that Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to an award of fees.
Additionally, Defendant does not challenge Plaintiff’s counsel’s requested rate. Defendant’s sole
basis for challenging Plaintiff’s counsel’s request is whether the number of hours he has requested
are reasonable. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s Motion is granted, in part, and denied,
in part.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed her claim for financial assistance on July 13, 2018, alleging a disability onset
date of January 3, 2017. 	ECF No. 9-3, at 13. 	Plaintiff was issued an initial denial of disability
insurance 	financial 	assistance 	on 	December 	19, 	2018, 	and 	her 	subsequent 	Request 	for
Reconsideration was 	likewise 	denied. 	Id. 	Plaintiff 	then requested 	a 	hearing 	before 	an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) which took place telephonically on March 3, 2021. 	Id.
Following that hearing, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not have a disability within the meaning
of the Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. 	Id.
On September 3, 2021, Tiffany M. (“Plaintiff”) petitioned this Court to review the Social
Security Administration’s (“SSA’s”) final decision to deny her claim for disability insurance
financial assistance under Title II of the Social Security Act. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff raised several
arguments on appeal; however, all of them stem from the ALJ’s failure to conclude that Plaintiff
suffered from a severe impairment of complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS).1 	ECF No. 15-1,
at 22. 	The Commissioner provided no substantive response defending the merits of the ALJ’s
CRPS determination, but instead argued that any error was harmless. ECF No. 16-1, at 5–7. On
September 12, 2022, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order agreeing that the effect
of the ALJ’s error was not limited to Step 2 of the relevant analysis. 	ECF No. 18, at 4–7.
1 	CRPS is also referred to as “severe Asthma and Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy” (RSD). 	Houston
v. Kirkland, No. GJH-15-2507, 2016 WL 7176580, at *6 (D. Md. Dec. 7, 2016). I will refer to the
condition as CRPS, understanding that the names may be used interchangeably.
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Tiffany M. v. Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. AAQ-21-2284
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Accordingly, the Court vacated the ALJ’s opinion and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with the Opinion and Order. ECF No. 19.
After this Court’s decision remanding the case, Plaintiff moved for an award of attorney’s
fees. ECF No. 20. Attached to her Motion, Plaintiff included a listing of time entries for which
Plaintiff’s counsel seeks compensation. ECF No. 20-3. These included: 1) 18.75 hours for drafting
the Statement of Facts associated with Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment; 2) 10.75 for
drafting the remaining portions of the brief and revising the brief, as a whole; 3) 7.75 hours for
drafting and revising the Reply in Support of Summary Judgment; 4) 1.0 hour for drafting the Fee
Petition; and 5) 3.62 hours for various miscellaneous tasks. 	Id. 	at 1–3; ECF No. 23, at 3.
Altogether, according to his time entries, Plaintiff’s counsel devoted 41.87 hours to the case. 	Id.
Plaintiff’s counsel, on his own accord, sought payment for only 40 hours. 	ECF No. 23, at 3.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s counsel decided not to seek compensation for the 5.7 hours his paralegal
worked. 	Id.
Defendant filed a timely Opposition, challenging whether Plaintiff’s counsel was entitled
to recoup fees for all of the hours requested. 	See 	ECF No. 22, at 1 (“[T]he Commissioner
respectfully requests a reduction in fees to exclude those hours that were not reasonably expended
and are not properly billable.”). 	Defendant specifically raised concern regarding the number of
hours Plaintiff’s counsel devoted towards drafting the statement of facts in the opening Motion
and the Petition for Fees. 	Id. 	at 5–7. 	Defendant also highlighted that this Court has previously
critiqued Plaintiff’s counsel’s fee petitions, particularly when he has submitted petitions using
block billing or records that were not contemporaneously entered. 	Id. 	at 6.
Plaintiff’s counsel filed a timely Reply, emphasizing the complicated and extensive nature
of the medical records in the case, as well as the fact that the total number of hours for which he
seeks payment are reasonable. ECF No. 23, at 3-6. In addition to the hours previously requested,
Plaintiff’s counsel requested compensation for an additional 4.75 hours he spent drafting the
Reply. 	Id. 	at 13.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), a prevailing party in a civil action
against the United States is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and expenses, unless the
government’s position was substantially justified or special circumstances make an award
unjust. 	28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); 	Crawford v. Sullivan, 935 F.2d 655, 656 (4th Cir. 1991).
However, to receive attorney’s fees, the prevailing party must submit a fee application and an
itemized statement of fees for approval. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
Once a plaintiff has met the threshold conditions for an award of fees and costs, the court
must “determin[e] what fee is reasonable.” 	Hyatt v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 239, 253 (4th Cir. 2002)
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Tiffany M. v. Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration
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(quoting 	INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161 (1990)). In addition to “submit[ting] evidence supporting
the hours worked,” counsel should exercise “billing judgment” when determining how may hours
to seek payment for. 	Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1983). “Hours that are not
properly billed to one’s 	client 	also are not properly billed to one’s 	adversary 	pursuant to statutory
authority.” 	Id. 	at 434 (quoting 	Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
“Once a fee request is submitted, it becomes the responsibility of the party challenging the
request to articulate the areas where an award would be inappropriate.” 	Barnes v. NCC Bus. Servs.,
LLC, No. PJM-18-1473, 2019 WL 4141012, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 30, 2019). “[T]he Court will not
review any challenged entry in the bill unless the challenging party has identified it specifically
and given an adequate explanation for the basis of the challenge.” 	Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of
Hous. & Urban Dev., No. MJG-95-309, 2002 WL 31777631, at *10 (D. Md. Nov. 21, 2002). The
reviewing court has “substantial discretion in fixing the amount of an EAJA award,” with the
ultimate goal of ensuring that the final award is reasonable. 	Hyatt, 315 F.3d at 254 (quoting 	Jean,
496 U.S. at 163).
III. 	ANALYSIS
As discussed, Defendant challenges only the number of hours Plaintiff’s counsel has
worked, not that he is entitled to fees or the hourly rate he has charged. 	Defendant specifically
objects to: 1) the number of hours that Plaintiff’s counsel devoted to drafting the Statement of
Facts in the initial Motion for Summary Judgment; and 2) the one hour Plaintiff’s counsel devoted
to drafting the initial Petition for EAJA fees.2 	ECF No. 22, at 3–5. 	As context, Defendant
highlights that this Court has previously faulted Plaintiff’s counsel for some of his billing practices.
Id. 	at 6.
Given the extensive nature of the medical records in the case, Plaintiff’s counsel reasonably
expended a longer than normal amount of time reviewing the medical records and composing the
Statement of Facts in the opening brief. 	As Defendant concedes, the “large” record in this case
was “greater than average.” ECF No. 22, at 5; 	id. 	at 4. Plaintiff’s recitation of facts served several
purposes, most importantly: 1) it highlighted the impact of the ALJ’s error at step 2 on the
remaining 	portions 	of 	the 	analysis, 	given 	Plaintiff’s 	extensive 	history 	of 	pain 	and 	pain
management; and 2) it assisted the Court in its review of the record. 	See 	ECF No. 18, at 6
(explaining that “[c]ontrary to the ALJ’s assertion that there was ‘no evidence,’ Plaintiff had
presented evidence of chronic pain, instability and limited mobility in one of her lower extremities
– each of which are also symptoms of CRPS”); 	id. 	at 6 (reasoning that “had the ALJ concluded
that the Plaintiff suffered from CRPS, it may have more fully considered whether Plaintiff’s
2 	Defendant, in passing, also notes that Plaintiff’s counsel includes numerous billing entries for
non-compensable time. ECF No. 22, at 4. However, as Plaintiff’s counsel highlights in the Reply,
although he attached the complete billing records to the Petition, he did not seek fees for the non-
compensable time his paralegal worked on the case. ECF No. 23, at 3.
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Tiffany M. v. Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration
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February 3, 2026
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asserted evidence of pain, instability and immobility equaled the relevant listing”); ECF No. 15-1,
at 4–22 (recounting Plaintiff’s extensive history of pain and pain management and the evidence
she presented thereof to the ALJ). This was particularly important given the Commissioner’s
primary response was that any error the ALJ may have made as to analyzing Plaintiff’s CRPS was
not prejudicial because of the ALJ’s extensive review of the medical record. 	See 	ECF No. 16-1,
at 5–6 (arguing that any error was harmless because the “ALJ evaluated three years’ worth of
medical evidence documenting Ms. Mason’s treatment for her medical conditions, including
CRPS/RSD”). Accordingly, rather than being extraneous, Plaintiff’s review of the medical record
was an important part of her argument. 	Several of the cases on which Defendant relies are
distinguishable in that they involved smaller records or a thorough review of the records was not
as important to highlighting the impact of the ALJ’s alleged error. 	See Duane H. v. Comm’r, Soc.
Sec. Admin., No. JMC-20-3673, 2022 WL 2532425, at *2 (D. Md. July 7, 2022) (“The arguments
presented here are those frequently made by appellants in these matters and the size of the appellate
record is small, making it less time consuming to apply the well-known legal standards to the
particular facts of this case.”); 	Larry W. v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. SAG-19-3089, 2021 WL
2685364, at *2 (D. Md. June 30, 2021) (“The arguments presented here are those frequently made
by appellants in these matters and the size of the appellate record is small to moderate, making it
less time consuming to apply the well-known legal standards to the particular facts of this case.”);
Sloan v. Colvin, No. 5:12–CV–388–D, 2013 WL 5674989, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 7, 2013) (“This
case did not involve any novel issues of law or abnormally complex factual circumstances . . .”).
Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s counsel could have worked more efficiently. 	According to
Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing records, he began drafting the Statement of Facts before having
conducted research on CRPS. 	See 	ECF No. 20-3, at 1. Had Plaintiff’s counsel done the necessary
research in advance, he could have streamlined his review of the records and his recitation of the
facts to more tightly accord with the relevant legal question. Likewise, while Social Security cases
are often intensely factual, it is somewhat unusual to devote nearly double the time drafting the
Statement of Facts as compared with the amount of time spent drafting the remaining portions of
the brief and revising the brief as a whole. 	See Ellen C. v. Kijakazi, No. 22-1698-SAG, 2023 WL
4490457, at *2–3 (D. Md. July 12, 2023) (reducing the compensable time for drafting the statement
of facts in plaintiff’s opening motion to 6.75 hours and awarding 6.75 hours for drafting the entirety
of the reply). Accordingly, the Court shall reduce the number of hours devoted to drafting the
statement of facts by one-third to 12.5 hours. 	This more appropriately accords with the 10.75
hours Plaintiff’s counsel spent drafting the remaining portions of the brief, while respecting the
fact-intensive nature of this case. For similar reasons, the Court shall award 0.5 hour, as opposed
to 1 hour, for the preparation of the Fee Petition. The Memorandum in Support is a standard, pro-
forma motion without any discussion of the case in particular. 	See 	ECF No. 20-1.
Including the four additional hours that Plaintiff devoted to drafting the Reply in Support
of the Fee Petition, the Court shall order compensation for a total of 38 hours. This award accords
with the well-accepted range for attorney’s fees in Social Security cases. 	See Coreen I.T. v.
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Tiffany M. v. Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. AAQ-21-2284
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Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. PJM-17-2260, 2019 WL 244586, at *2 (D. Md. Jan. 17, 2019)
(“Courts within this circuit have held, and I agree, that in typical Social Security cases it is
reasonable for an attorney to expend between twenty and forty hours.”); 	Watkins v. Comm’r, Soc.
Sec. Admin., No. SAG-16-602, 2017 WL 1185190, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2017) (same); 	Patton
v. Colvin, No. TMD 14-1369, 2016 WL 7228873, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 14, 2016) (same); 	Roth v.
Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. SAG–14–62, 2015 WL 567168, at *3 (D. Md. Feb. 10, 2015)
(same).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Equal Access to Justice
Act Fees shall be granted, in part, and denied, in part. The Court shall award Plaintiff’s counsel
fees for 38 hours at a rate of $230.60 for a total award of $8,762.80, as well as $402.00 in costs.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it is an Order of the Court and should be treated
accordingly. An implementing order follows.
Sincerely,
/s/
Ajmel A. Quereshi
United States Magistrate Judge
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