J.O.P., et al v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
*
J.O.P., 	et al., 	*
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Plaintiffs, 	*
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v. 	* 	Civil No. SAG-19-01944
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 	*
HOMELAND SECURITY, 	et al., 	*
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Defendants. 	*
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* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Currently pending before this Court is Class Counsel’s Motion to Enforce Section III.H
of the Settlement Agreement. ECF 649. Defendants oppose the motion, ECF 659, and Class
Counsel filed a reply, ECF 683. This Court has reviewed the filings and held a motions hearing
on September 23, 2026. ECF 705. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion will be granted
in part and denied in part.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
A. Procedural Background
On November 25, 2024, this Court approved a settlement agreement (“the Settlement
Agreement”) executed by the Parties to resolve long-running litigation related to the rights of
unaccompanied alien children (“UACs”) under certain USCIS policies. ECF 205. In the
Settlement Agreement, the parties agreed, in relevant part, to Section III.H:
With respect to DHS’s treatment of Class Members in removal proceedings,
DHS will refrain from taking the position that USCIS does not have Initial
Jurisdiction over a Class Member’s asylum application. DHS will join or non-
oppose Class Members’ motion(s) for a continuance, administrative closure
unless unavailable under controlling law in a particular jurisdiction, and, where
available, assignment of cases to the EOIR status docket, that have been filed or
1 	For pincites, in all instances where an ECF header is affixed to the top of a page, this Court
uses the ECF page number in that header; where such headers are 	not 	affixed, this Court uses
the page numbers of the underlying document.
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made orally on the record in immigration proceedings in order to await USCIS
exercise of Initial Jurisdiction over their asylum application. Nothing in this
provision prevents DHS from either filing a motion to dismiss or terminate
removal proceedings of a Class Member to await USCIS’s adjudication of the
asylum application or as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, or from joining or
non-opposing a motion to dismiss or terminate proceedings filed or made orally
on the record by a Class Member. DHS will generally join or non-oppose Class
Members’ motion(s) to dismiss or terminate filed or otherwise made in order to
await USCIS exercise of Initial Jurisdiction over their asylum application.
Defendants retain discretion to oppose Class Members’ motion(s) if it deems
such opposition warranted based on the individual facts of the cases, as long as
DHS’s opposition is not based, in whole or in part, on a position that USCIS
does not have Initial Jurisdiction over the Class Member’s asylum application.
Pursuant to this paragraph, Defendants agree that in cases where DHS chooses
not to file any response with EOIR indicating its position on the Class Members’
properly 	served 	motions 	for 	continuance, 	dismissal 	or 	termination,
administrative closure unless unavailable under controlling law in a particular
jurisdiction, adjournments or, where available, assignment of cases to the EOIR
status docket, this provision of the Settlement Agreement serves as evidence of
DHS’s non-opposition.
ECF 199-2 at 9.
Class Counsel seeks enforcement of Section III.H of the Settlement Agreement on an
individual basis with respect to A.C.H., a Class Member whose motions to terminate and
administratively close were opposed by Defendants, and on a class-wide basis “to prevent
further violations of the Settlement Agreement that imperil Class Members’ access to USCIS’s
initial jurisdiction over their asylum applications.” ECF 649 at 2.
B. 	Factual Background
The instant motion concerns Defendants’ alleged violations of Section III.H by (1)
opposing Class Members’ motions for administrative closure, (2) filing motions to recalendar
Class Members’ previously administratively closed cases, and (3) opposing Class Members’
motions for termination with justifications permitted by the Settlement Agreement.
Opposing Class Members’ Motions for Administrative Closure
Class Counsel identifies three instances of Defendants opposing Class Members’
motions for administrative closure in contravention of Section III.H of the Settlement
Agreement. First, on April 22, 2026, DHS filed a written opposition to A.C.H.’s motion to
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terminate and, in the alternative, to administratively close his removal proceedings based on
his pending asylum application and Class Members status. 	Id. 	at 11; ECF 649-3 ¶ 12. DHS’s
opposition asserted that “[t]he Department has requested that USCIS expedite the adjudication
of Form I-589, but that does not mean that the court lacks jurisdiction [sic] adjudicate relief
applications in removal proceedings,” and argued that A.C.H. had not established that he was
“prima facie eligible” for asylum or provided “an anticipated duration for the closure.” ECF
649-3 ¶ 12. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) subsequently denied A.C.H.’s motion to terminate
and administratively close. 	Id. 	¶ 13. Class Counsel raised this issue with Defendants on April
28, 2026, and Defendants cited to authority in Section III.H which they purported gives DHS
discretion to oppose administrative closure. ECF 649-2 	; ECF 650-1. Defendants also
identified that DHS’s opposition was permissibly based on their claim that A.C.H. “has not
shown prima facie eligibility for relief.” ECF 649-2 	.
Second, DHS opposed renewed administrative closure for Class Member N.N.D. on
July 9, 2026, which resulted in N.N.D.’s renewed motion for administrative closure being
denied by an IJ. 	Id. 	at 12; ECF 650-7.
Third, DHS filed written opposition to administrative closure for Class Members
T.M.T. and F.M.T. in April, 2026, arguing that there was no “clear apparent time frame” for
USCIS’s adjudication. ECF 649-2 at 13; ECF 650-8. An IJ denied T.M.T. and F.M.T.’s
motions for administrative closure based on DHS’s rationale. ECF 649-2 at 13.
Motions to Recalendar Administratively Closed Removal Proceedings
In addition to outright opposition of administrative closure, Defendants have filed
motions to recalendar administratively closed removal proceedings of Class Members. Class
Counsel identifies two instances of this practice. In 2016, an IJ administratively closed the
removal proceedings of J.M.L. and B.M.L, two Class Members, based on their asylum
applications pending with USCIS. 	Id. 	at 15; ECF 650-2; ECF 650-4. In July, 2025, DHS filed
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motions to recalendar the removal proceedings of J.M.L. and B.M.L. while their asylum
applications remained pending with USCIS. ECF 650-2 at 2; ECF 650-4 at 14. DHS’s motions
stated that “DHS seeks to recalendar this matter in order to resolve the respondent’s case on
the merits,” which in effect asked the IJ to preempt USCIS’s initial jurisdiction over the asylum
claims by proceeding to the merits of their removal proceedings without awaiting USCIS’s
adjudication of the asylum claim. 	ECF 650-2 at 2; ECF 650-4 at 14. 	Class Counsel raised this
violation of Section III.H with Defendants on September 15, 2025, and Defendants provided a
written response on November 19, 2025, which argued that motions to recalendar were
permissible because the Settlement Agreement did not expressly prohibit them. ECF 650-2 at
2; ECF 650-4 at 10 	11, 13 	14.
On July 24, 2026, Class Counsel again raised the recalendaring issue with regard to
Class Member N.A.R., who filed an asylum application with USCIS in 2018 and whose
removal proceedings had been administratively closed since 2023. ECF 650-5. DHS filed a
motion to recalendar N.A.R.’s removal proceedings on July 9, 2025, stating that N.A.R. had
not been accorded “new, lawful permanent status” since the 2023 administrative closure grant
and that “DHS seeks to recalendar this matter in order to resolve the respondent’s case on the
merits.” 	Id. 	The immigration court scheduled a hearing in the matter for July 22, 2026, at which
DHS opposed administrative closure. 	Id.
Opposing Class Members’ Motions for Termination Without Proper Justification
Class Counsel identifies two instances of Defendants opposing Class Members’
motions for termination in violation of Section III.H. First, DHS opposed Class Members
M.R.M’s motion to terminate his removal proceedings in December, 2025 based on his pending
asylum application with USCIS. ECF 649-2 at 13; ECF 650-6 at 6 	7. DHS’s opposition argued
that 	the 	USCIS’s 	No Asylum 	Adjudications 	Policy supported 	termination, and the 	IJ
subsequently denied M.R.M’s motion and ordered removal. ECF 650-6 at 6 	7. Class Counsel
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notified Defendants that DHS’s opposition relied on a basis forbidden by the Settlement
Agreement, that the immigration court and not USCIS had the ability to adjudicate M.R.M.’s
asylum application. ECF 649-2 at 14; ECF 650-6 at 6 	7. Defendants responded by arguing that
DHS had permissibly opposed termination because M.R.M. had not provided sufficient
evidence of his Class membership. ECF 649-2 at 14; ECF 650-6 at 4.
Second, on June 17, 2026, DHS filed an opposition to Class Member J.G.H.’s motion
to terminate his removal proceedings based on his pending asylum application with USCIS.
DHS’s opposition argued that “the statute does not prevent the Immigration Judge from
determining whether initial jurisdiction over an application filed by an alien who has turned 18
lies with the Immigration Judge or the USCIS” and that J.G.H. “no longer qualified as a UAC”
because he was over 18 years old when he filed his asylum application. ECF 649-2 at 14; ECF
650-3 at 6. The IJ denied J.G.H.’s motion to terminate. ECF 649-2 at 14; ECF 650-3 at 6.
II. 	ANALYSIS
Class Counsel identifies three groups of actions by Defendants which they allege
violate Section III.H of the Settlement Agreement: (1) opposing administrative closure; (2)
filing 	motions 	to 	recalendar 	for 	Class 	Members 	whose 	proceedings 	were 	previously
administratively closed; and (3) opposing motions to terminate for reasons not permitted under
the Settlement Agreement. 	Id. 	Class Counsel seeks enforcement of Section III.H to
remedy these violations. 	Id. 	a
As an initial matter, this Court has authority to order enforcement of the Settlement
Agreement on both an individual and class-wide basis pursuant to Sections V.A and V.D of
the Settlement Agreement. ECF 199- 	(providing that “[i]n the event of an alleged
noncompliance with th[e] Settlement Agreement” that cannot be resolved after a meet and
confer to resolve the dispute informally, then “the complaining Class Member(s) may move to
enforce the Agreement on an individual basis before the Court and Class Counsel may elect to
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move to enforce the Agreement on an individual or class-wide basis before the Court.”).
Pursuant to the procedure in the Settlement Agreement, prior to Class Counsel filing this
motion, the parties conferred multiple times in an effort to informally resolve multiple disputes
under Section III.H, but were unable to resolve the disputes. 	See 	ECF 649- 	16; ECF 659
at 9.
Defendants argue that Class Counsel “have failed to present a single Class Member
case ripe for judicial intervention” because (1) the “Class Members identified by Class Counsel
in their motion have either had the allegations mooted” by the “unlawfulness of administrative
closure” or (2) the Class Members’ claims are not ripe because “they have not yet completed
the section V.D process.” ECF 659 at 	11. The Court disagrees. First, as discussed below, the
Court finds that administrative closure remains available under controlling law, and therefore
the claims of Class Members challenging Defendants’ opposition to their motions for
administrative closure and recalendaring are not mooted. Second, the instant motion is ripe. In
their opposition, Defendants agree that Class Counsel’s motion is not premature with respect
to A.C.H., 	id. 	at 10, which would allow the Court to order class-wide relief based on the
violations against one Class Member, even if other Class Members’ violations are not ripe.
ECF No. 199-2 at 14.
Accordingly, because this motion is not premature or moot, this Court will address each
of the alleged violations in turn.
a. 	Opposition to Administrative Closure Violates the Settlement Agreement
Class Counsel first argues that DHS opposition to administrative closure motions
violates Section III.H of the Settlement Agreement, which provides that DHS “will join or non-
oppose Class Members’ motion(s) for a continuance, administrative closure.” ECF 199-2 at 9.
They contend that the “use of the word ‘will’ leaves no discretion to Defendants in deciding
whether to join or non-oppose.” ECF 649- 	Therefore, Class Counsel argues, the
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fifth sentence of 	“Defendants retain discretion to oppose Class Members’
motion(s) if it deems such opposition warranted based on the individual facts of the cases, as
long as DHS’s opposition is not based, in whole or in part, on a position that USCIS does not
have Initial Jurisdiction over the Class Member’s asylum application,” ECF 199-2 at 	“only
applies to motions to dismiss or terminate” because it immediately follows a sentence stating
that ‘DHS 	will generally 	join or non-oppose Class Members’ 	motion(s) to dismiss or terminate
filed....’” ECF 649-2 a 	19 (emphasis in original) (quoting ECF 199-2 at 9). Defendants
also argue that they have not violated the Settlement Agreement by opposing administrative
closure because Class Counsel’s “arguments regarding administrative closure are moot, as
administrative closure is not available in any jurisdiction,” ECF 659 at 13, and Section III.H
affords them discretion to oppose a Class Member’s administrative closure motion.
First, this Court rejects Defendants’ argument that administrative closure is unlawful.
Defendants cite to 	State of Texas v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 7:26-CV-00070-O, 2026 WL 1803245
(N.D. Tex. June 22, 2026) for their proposition. In that suit, the Northern District of Texas
granted a joint motion for entry of consent judgment filed by the State of Texas and the
Department of Justice which sought vacatur of the Department’s Efficient Case and Docket
Management in Immigration Proceedings regulation, 89 Fed. Reg. 46,742 (May 29, 2024)
(“Administrative Closure Rule”). 	Id. 	The consent judgment was entered the same day the
complaint was filed, and the court has subsequently denied any attempts by other interested
parties to intervene and challenge the collusive nature of the settlement. 	Texas v. U.S. Dep’t of
Just., No. 7:26-CV-00070-O, 2026 WL 2616805 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2026). The case is
currently on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit by proposed intervenors
arguing that the “judgment unlawfully bypassed the APA’s required notice-and-comment
procedures and that the court lacked jurisdiction because there was no ‘controversy’ between
the parties, given the collusive settlement agreement.” ECF 683 at 7 n.2.
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Even if this Court were to find the Administrative Closure Rule was vacated by the
Northern District of Texas settlement, Defendants’ position that administrative closure is
unlawful and “not available in any jurisdiction,” ECF 659 at 15, is still wrong. The practice of
administrative closure pre-dated the 2024 regulations and is lawful, even in the absence of the
Administrative 	Closure 	Rule. 	Romero 	v. 	Barr, 	937 	F.3d 	282, 	296 	(4th 	Cir. 	2019)
(“[A]dministrative closure has been a procedural mechanism employed by IJs and the BIA
since the late 1980s and consistently reaffirmed.”). Precedential decisions issued by the
attorney general and the Board of Immigration Appeals, which existed prior to the 2024
regulations and have not been overturned, support the authority for administrative closures. 	See
Matter of Cruz-Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. 326 (A.G. 2021) (overruling an attorney general opinion
issued three years earlier that had stripped IJs of general administrative closure authority);
Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012) (setting out the standard for administrative
closure); 	Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017) (same). Further, since the 	Texas
decision and the purported vacatur of the 2024 regulations, IJs have continued to issue
administrative closures based on “precedential Board decisions, which remain binding.” ECF
683 at 	Accordingly, this Court rejects Defendants’ argument and finds it lawful to order
relief related to administrative closures in jurisdictions other than the Sixth Circuit, which ruled
in 2020 that the then-existing immigration regulations did not grant authority to immigration
courts to administratively close removal proceedings. 	See Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr, 981
F.3d 459, 466 (6th Cir. 2020).
Second, Defendants argue, contrary to Class Counsel’s reading of Section III.H, the
Settlement Agreement does not impose a requirement to “unconditionally join or non-oppose
all administrative closure motions brought by Class Members.” ECF 659 at 16. Defendants
read the sentence qualifying Defendants’ limitations on opposing termination motions
“Defendants retain discretion to oppose Class Members’ motion(s) if it deems such opposition
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warranted based on the individual facts of the cases, as long as DHS’s opposition is not based,
in whole or in part, on a position that USCIS does not have Initial Jurisdiction over the Class
Member’s asylum application,” ECF 199-2 at 	as also applying to Defendants’ limitations on
opposing administrative closure. ECF 659 at 16 	17.
The Court disagrees with Defendants’ reading. Per the plain reading of Section III.H,
the parties agreed that DHS “will join or non-oppose” a Class Members’ motion for
administrative closure. ECF 199-2 at 9. The use of the word “will” indicates a mandatory
responsibility for Defendants and a lack of discretion. 	See Lovo v. Miller, 107 F.4th 199, 211
(4th Cir. 2024) (holding that use of the word “will” is “unmistakably mandatory” language).
This reading is especially clear when viewed against Section III.H’s limitation on Defendants
opposing termination motions, which instead says DHS “will 	generally 	join or non-oppose
Class Members’ motion(s) to dismiss or terminate.” ECF 199-2 at 9 (emphasis added). The
fifth sentence in Section III.H, which Defendants point to as indication of discretion to oppose
administrative closures, instead only modifies the immediately preceding sentence about
motions to dismiss or terminate. As Class Counsel puts it, “[i]n other words, the Settlement
Agreement provides DHS some discretion (‘will generally’) not to join or non-oppose a Class
Member’s motion to dismiss or terminate, but no such discretion is allowed for motions for
administrative closure (‘will join or non-oppose’).”
Therefore, 	by 	opposing 	Class 	Members’ 	motions 	for 	administrative 	closure,
Defendants have violated Section III.H of the Settlement Agreement. Accordingly, this Court
will order the Settlement Agreement to be enforced as written in Section III.H.
b. 	Motions to Recalendar Violate the Settlement Agreement
Class Counsel next argues that Defendants have violated the Settlement Agreement by
filing motions to recalendar Class Members’ removal proceedings that were administratively
closed. ECF 649-2 at 20. Class Counsel characterizes a motion to recalendar, “which seeks to
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resume active litigation of dormant removal proceedings,” as “a reversal of administrative
closure.” 	Id. 	Reversing administrative closure, Class Counsel argues, “is fundamentally at odds
with [Defendants’] obligation to join or non-oppose a motion for administrative closure.” 	Id.
at 21. Defendants’ counterargument is simple and formalistic: the “term ‘recalendar’ does not
appear a single time in the Settlement Agreement,” so recalendaring cannot be a violation of
the Settlement Agreement. ECF 659 at 23.
The Court disagrees with Defendants’ interpretation. Section III.H of the Settlement
Agreement clearly imposes a restriction on Defendants’ ability to oppose recalendaring by
prohibiting Defendants from opposing administrative closure. Implicit in the Agreement is that
once 	Defendants 	have 	joined 	or 	not 	opposed 	Class 	Members’ 	administrative 	closure,
Defendants will not subsequently ask Immigration Judges to put Class Members’ cases back
on the calendar. Without that implicit promise, Class Members would lose the protection from
opposition to administrative closure that they bargained for in the Settlement Agreement and
Defendants would be “relieve[d] ... of their obligation to uphold the promises they made to
Class Members as consideration for the relinquishment of Class Members’ action.” 	See 	ECF
253 at 10 (declining to construe another term in the Settlement Agreement as narrowly as
Defendants wished). Contracting parties need not specify that one party cannot take action to
reverse the acts bargained for in the agreement. Such a promise is impliedly included as part
of the duty of good faith.
Accordingly, this Court finds that Defendants’ recalendaring violated Section III.H of
the Settlement Agreement and will order the relief Class Counsel seeks in regard to
recalendaring: “DHS must not move to recalendar the administratively closed removal
proceedings of any Class Member.” ECF 649-1 at 2.
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c. 	Blanket 	Opposition 	to 	Termination 	Motions 	Violates 	the 	Settlement
Agreement
The third practice that Class Counsel challenges as violating Section III.H of the
Settlement Agreement is “Defendants’ blanket opposition to Class Members’ termination
motions without any permissible basis—as in A.C.H.’s case.” ECF 649-2 at 23. Section III.H
requires that “DHS will generally join or non-oppose Class Members’ motion(s) to dismiss or
terminate filed or otherwise made in order to await USCIS exercise of Initial Jurisdiction over
their asylum application.” ECF 199-2 at 9. It carves out an exception in next sentence:
“Defendants retain discretion to oppose Class Members’ motion(s) if it deems such opposition
warranted based on the individual facts of the cases, as long as DHS’s opposition is not based,
in whole or in part, on a position that USCIS does not have Initial Jurisdiction over the Class
Member’s asylum application.” 	Id. 	Therefore, Class Counsel argues, DHS may only oppose
Class Members’ motions to terminate if they “put forward individualized reasons specific to
the Class Member,” ECF 649-2 at 24, that are not prohibited by the Settlement Agreement
because “[o]therwise, there’s no way to ensure that there has not been a violation.” ECF 723 at
48.
In addition to their class-wide challenge, Class Counsel cite to an instance where
Defendants opposed a Class Member’s termination motion for a reason not permitted by the
Settlement Agreement and seek enforcement with respect to that individual. DHS filed a
written opposition to Class Member A.C.H.’s motion to terminate and, in the alternative, to
administratively close his removal proceedings, based on his pending asylum application and
Class Member status. ECF 649-2 at 11. DHS filed a written opposition in April, 2026 on the
grounds that “A.C.H. had not established that he was ‘prima facie eligible’ for asylum or
provided ‘an anticipated duration for the closure,’” 	id. 	at 11 	12, reasons not permitted in
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Section III.H of the Settlement Agreement. A.C.H.’s motions were subsequently denied by an
IJ. 	Id. 	at 11.
Defendants first challenge Class Counsel’s factual allegation that “Defendants are filing
oppositions across the board to Class Member motions to terminate ‘without any case-specific
reasons,’ in violation of section III.H.” ECF 659 at 28 (internal citation omitted). With regard
to A.C.H., Defendants contended at oral argument that opposition to A.C.H.’s motion was
permissible 	because 	A.C.H. 	“was 	being 	expedited 	before 	USCIS.” 	ECF 	723 	at 	62.
Substantively, Defendants also contend that Section III.H “does not obligate Defendants to
provide further explanation of the reasons for their opposition to the immigration court or the
Class Member” so long as “Defendants do not take the position prohibited by the Settlement
Agreement, that USCIS does not have Initial Jurisdiction over the Class Member’s asylum
application.” ECF 659 at 28.
The Court largely agrees with Class Counsel and will order the relief sought, except for
Class Counsel’s request to read in an additional provision to the Settlement Agreement
requiring Defendants to “present[] individual facts of a Class Member’s case that DHS deems
to warrant opposition to the motion” if they wish to oppose a Class Members’ termination
motion. ECF 649-1 at 2. The text of Section III.H sets clear parameters for when Defendants
can oppose Class Members’ termination motions: only if DHS (a) “deems such opposition
warranted based on the individual facts of the cases,” and (b) DHS’s opposition “is not based,
in whole or in part, on a position that USCIS does not have Initial Jurisdiction over the Class
Member’s asylum application.” In A.C.H.’s case, not only did Defendants tell the IJ that it had
jurisdiction before USCIS exercised its initial jurisdiction, ECF 649-2 at 24, but they were
unable to articulate individual facts warranting opposition when asked by this Court. 	See 	ECF
7 	Defendants’ opposition, then, violates the plain text of Section III.H of the
Settlement Agreement, both as to A.C.H.’s motion to terminate and for administrative closure.
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Accordingly, this Court finds that “DHS has violated Section III.H of the Settlement
Agreement by filing oppositions to Class Members’ motions to terminate their immigration
court proceedings that were not based on the individual facts of the case, and/or were based, in
whole or in part, on a position that USCIS does not have Initial Jurisdiction over the Class
Member’s asylum application.” ECF 649-1 at 1.
This Court rejects the request for the additional relief Class Counsel seeks, an order
requiring DHS to join or non-oppose Class Members’ motions to terminate “unless DHS
presents individual facts of a Class Member’s case that DHS deems to warrant opposition to
the motion.” 	Id. 	at 2. Such a request goes beyond the text of Section III.H, which allows
Defendants to oppose Class Members’ termination motions when they “deem[] such opposition
warranted based on the individual facts of the cases.” ECF 199-2 at 9. Expanding this language
to require Defendants to state those reasons during the immigration proceedings would modify
the agreed upon provision and give Class Members more than they bargained for in the
Settlement Agreement. Therefore, the Court denies this request for relief.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Class Counsel’s Motion to Enforce Section III.H of the
Settlement Agreement, ECF 649, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as reflected
in the accompanying order.
Dated: October 8, 2026 	/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States District Judge
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