Hernandez-Lugo v. Bondi et al

1:25-cv-03434Mdd25 de nov. de 2025

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
WINSTONS HERNANDEZ-LUGO,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA BONDI, et al.,
Respondents.
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Civil Action No. GLR-25-3434
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner Winstons Hernandez-
Hernandez-Lugo 	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) and
Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, Todd M. Lyons, and Nikita Scott
2). The Motion is fully
briefed, and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2025). For the reasons
outlined below, the Court will grant the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in part and
deny it in par 	.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background
Petitioner Winstons Hernandez-Lugo is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Pet. Writ
¶ 1, ECF No. 1).1 	Immigration officers paroled him into the United
States in July 2022. (Id. ¶ 2). He is married to a U.S. citizen, and his spouse is a U.S. Army
1 	Unless otherwise noted, citations to the page numbers refer to the pagination
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Veteran. (Id. ¶ 21 	). In
the two years since he was permitted to enter the United States, he has complied with the
conditions of his parole. (Pet. ¶ 22). He has multiple affirmative applications pending with
and an application for adjustment of status based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. (Id.
¶¶ 20 	21). 	Respondents 	do 	not 	allege 	that 	Petitioner 	has 	any 	criminal 	history 	or
convictions.
On October 15, 2025, 	ICE 	officials
detained Hernandez-Lugo when he reported to ICE for a check-in. (Id. ¶ 23). ICE officials
then took him into custody at the Baltimore ICE Holding Cells and served him with a Form
I- 	Form I-862 Notice to Appear ( 	NTA 	)
in the Hyattsville Immigration Court. (Id. ¶¶ 23 	24; Warrant at 4, ECF No. 1-2; NTA at
15 	17, ECF No. 1-2). The NTA states that Hernandez-
United States who has not been admitted or paroled 	Immigration
212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for not
being in possession of valid entry or travel documents. (NTA at 15, 17). The next day, on
October 16, 2025, Respondents transferred Hernandez-Lugo to an ICE facility in California
City, California. ( 	5, ECF
No. 12-1).
B. 	Procedural History
On October 17, 2025, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this Court. (ECF No. 1). On November 4, 2025, Petitioner had a bond
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hearing in the Adelanto, California Immigration Court, where the 	IJ
denied him bond because the Immigration Court 	does not have jurisdiction to set bond
-1). 	On 	November 	5, 	2025, 	Respondents 	submitted 	a
consolidated Answer to the Petition and Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 12). On November
13, 2025, Petitioner submitted his Opposition. (ECF No. 13).
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Standard of Review
A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if a petitioner is in federal custody
in violation of the United States Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). If a
district court entertains a habeas petition, then it must either award the writ or order the
respondent to show cause as to why the writ should not be granted, unless it is apparent
from the application that the petitioner is not entitled to the requested relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2243; see also Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-CV-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *2
(E.D.Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (explaining relevant standard of review in habeas cases).
B. 	Analysis
1. 	Jurisdiction
The Court will first address jurisdiction. Respondents argue that this Court does not
have 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	over 	these 	claims. 	(Answer 	at 	5 	7). 	Contrary 	to
Petitioner is not simply bringing an Administrative
Procedure Act claim. (Id. at 7). Petitioner, instead, is challenging his ongoing detention
under an authority that he alleges to be unlawful, (see Pet. ¶¶ 26 	34), which this Court has
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the authority to review, see Maldonado de Leon v. Baker, No. TDC-25-3084, 2025 WL
2968042, at *4 (D.Md. Oct. 21, 2025) (finding Court has jurisdiction to review habeas
petition challenging detention during pendency of immigration proceedings).
The Government further argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) bars judicial review.
(Answer at 10 	11). Section 1252(b)(9), however, bars judicial review of
removal proceedings and orders rather than custody determinations. See Leal-
Hernandez v. Noem, No. JRR-25-02428, 2025 WL 2430025, at *6 (D.Md. Aug. 24, 2025).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has rejected an overinclusive interpretation of § 1252(b)(9)
that encompasses custody determinations. Maldonado de Leon, 2025 WL 2968042, at *3
(citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 293 	95 (2018)). Because this case concerns
a 	custody 	determination, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	it 	has 	jurisdiction 	to 	review
Hernandez-Lugo 	and agrees with other district courts that have reached the same
conclusion. See, e.g., Leal-Hernandez, 2025 WL 2430025, at *5
argument that § 1252(b)(9) functions as judicial bar and noting that 	[n]one of the cases on
which the Government relies bears remote relevant relation to this habeas action 	not the
Accordingly, for all these
reasons, the Court finds it has jurisdiction to review this Petition.
2. 	Administrative Exhaustion
The Court next turns to administrative exhaustion. No applicable statute or rule
mandates administrative exhaustion in these circumstances; therefore,
Miranda v. Garland, 34 F.4th 338, 351 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting
McCarthy v. Madigan, 503. U.S. 140, 144 (1992)).
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balance the interest of the individual in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum
Maldonado de Leon,
2025 WL 2968042, at *4 (quoting McCarthy 	[I]nstances in which an
easonable or
Id. at *4 (quoting McCarthy, 503 U.S. at
146 	48).
Here, 	there 	is 	no 	reason 	to 	require 	prudential 	exhaustion 	or 	exhaustion 	of
As both parties have recognized, the
decision, Matter
of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), that divests IJs of jurisdiction to hold
bond hearings for noncitizens who were not lawfully admitted because the BIA determined
that all such noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
Id. at 228. Hernandez-Lugo already requested and was granted a bond hearing in front of
an IJ, and the IJ denied
This request was exactly what this Court recently recognized 	would be an exercise in
futility, 	as 	the 	result 	of 	such 	administrative 	proceedings 	[had] 	already 	been
predetermined. 	See Pineda Velasquez v. Noem, GLR-25-3215, 2025 WL 3003684, at
*2 (quoting McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 148).
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Furthermore, a 	where administrative processes may
result in undue delay, a court may properly consider that as a factor militating against
requiring exhaustion. 	Leal-Hernandez, 2025 WL 2430025, at *12 (citing McCarthy, 503
U.S. at 146 	47). This Court could require Hernandez-Lugo to exhaust administrative
remedies, including BIA review, until further judicial review by a U.S. Court of Appeals;
because with the passage of time, the allegedly improper detention would continue to occur
Maldonado de Leon, 2025 WL 2968042, at *4
(quoting McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 147).
§ 1225(b)(2) will result in him being detained until the end of his removal proceedings or
an appeal to a court of appeals, a process that could take months or even years and would
result in a miscarriage of justice if the proper detention authority were § 1226(a).
If Hernandez-Lugo is correct that he should be detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),
then he is entitled to a meaningful bond hearing and may be released from custody. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a)(2)(a). This issue, therefore, is ultimately a matter of statutory interpretation: to
decide whether he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) or
discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Answer at 7). Matters of statutory
interpretation are within the sound province of the judiciary. Loper Bright Enters. v.
Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 385 (2024) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
This Court thus finds waiver of the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies
appropriate. This Court will not compel Hernandez-Lugo to pursue further administrative
remedies before seeking habeas relief and now turns to the merits of his claims.
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3. 	Applicability of Section 1226(a)
The Government cites a variety of provisions to support Hernandez-
detention and rejects that § 1226(a) is the lawful authority, without specifying which
provision it contends is the controlling authority. (See Answer at 12 	14) (referencing 8
U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1) 	(2) and 1231(a)). The Court will therefore review the relevant
provisions to determine which statute is the lawful authority here.
a. 	Inapplicability of § 1225(b)(1)
For the reasons set forth below, the Court first finds that § 1225(b)(1) does not
Under § 1225(b)(1), two groups of people are subject to
mandatory detention and expedited removal:
If an immigration officer determines that an alien . . . who is
arriving in the United States or is described in clause (iii) is
inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7) of this
title, the officer shall order the alien removed from the United
States without further hearing or review unless the alien
indicates either an intention to apply for asylum under section
1158 of this title or a fear of persecution.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). An individual described in clause (iii) and
subject to this provision is:
[a]n alien . . . who has not been admitted or paroled into the
United States, and who has not affirmatively shown, to the
satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien has been
physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-
year period immediately prior to the date of the determination
of inadmissibility under this subparagraph.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). All individuals subject to this provision who do not
manifest a fear of persecution or intention to apply for asylum are summarily removed via
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii). The
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shall be detained pending
a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear,
until removed. 	U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).
Inspection of aliens arriving in the United States
As stated, for mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(1) to apply, a noncitizen must either ( 	arriving in the
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), or (2) have not been admitted or paroled into the U.S.
and not have sufficiently shown at least two years of continuous presence in the United
States, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II).
Here, the NTA issued to Hernandez-
15), so the Court does not find that Hernandez-Lugo is subject to
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). He similarly does not fall under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) because the
Court finds that the parole documentation that he submitted sufficiently demonstrates that
he 	on July 29, 2022 and therefore has been physically
present in the United States for at least three years. (See Parole Auth., ECF No. 13-2) The
Court has no reason to doubt the authenticity of this document. As a result, because
Hernandez-Lugo is not arriving in the United States, was paroled into the U.S., and has
been physically present for over two years, the Court finds that he cannot be subject to
expedited removal or mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).
b. 	8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)
Although the Government does not explicitly state that it relies on § 1231(a) in
justifying Hernandez- 	, it cites almost exclusively to cases that
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involve § 1231(a) detention. (Answer at 12 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001);
Rodriguez-Guardado v. Smith, 271 F.Supp.3d 331 (D.Mass. 2017); Julce v. Smith, No 18-
10163-FDS, 2018 WL 1083734 (D.Mass. Feb. 27, 2018); 	, 12
F.4th 1312 (11th Cir. 2021))). For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that § 1231(a)
applies to noncitizens that have final orders of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B).
Zadvydas, a case upon which the Government relies (Answer at 12), stands for the
proposition that an individual with a final order of removal cannot be indefinitely detained.
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. For the six-month presumption of reasonable detention under
Zadvydas to apply, an individual must have been through removal proceedings, an IJ must
See 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). Without these conditions being fulfilled, however, there is no
presumptively reasonable period of detention, as detention under an unlawful authority is
inherently unreasonable.
Here, 	because 	Hernandez-Lugo 	has 	not 	been 	ordered 	removed, 	there 	is 	no
presumptively reasonable period of detention barring habeas review, and he cannot be
detained under the authority of § 1231. See Maldonado, 2025 WL 2968042, at *10 	Where
[Petitioner] is not subject to a removal order, and his detention is not governed by § 1231,
the 	presumptively 	reasonable 	six-month 	period 	of 	Zadvydas 	is 	inapplicable 	to
Petition. For all of these reasons, the Court will grant the Petition.
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c. 	8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a) and 1225(b)(2)
The Court next considers whether a review of the relevant statutes supports
detention under § 1226(a) or § 1225(b)(2). If Hernandez-Lugo is detained under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), his detention is mandatory. If he is not, his detention falls under the
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) detention framework, and he is entitled to a bond hearing before an IJ.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that a plain reading of the statute makes
clear that Hernandez-Lugo 	1225(b)(2)(A) and
instead falls under the discretionary detention category under § 1226(a) as a noncitizen
proceedings under § 1229a. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
The Government argues that Hernandez-Lugo is subject to mandatory detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (Answer at 8 	9). In relevant part, that provision provides that
in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration
officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled
to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this
title. 	U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Section 1225
officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing, 	and
contains subsections related to stowaways, crewmen, and noncitizens arriving from
contiguous territories. 8 U.S.C. § 1225. It also contains provisions authorizing officers to
, aircraft, railway car, or other conveyance in which they
at airports of arrival. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(d).
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Hernandez-Lugo argues instead that his detention is subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. (Pet.
¶¶ 26 	34). This section is 	Apprehension and detention of aliens, 	and contains
subsection § 1226(a), 	,
by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on
whether the alien is to be removed from the United States 	§ 1226(a). The
ICE determines pursuant to § 1226(a) that a noncitizen will
be detained, that individual may seek review of the detention decision by requesting a bond
Maldonado de Leon, 2025 WL 2968042, at *5
(citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d), 1003.19, 1236.1(d)).
When engaging in statutory
of the statute. Hately v. Watts, 917 F.3d 770, 784 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting In re
Total Realty Mgmt., LLC, 706 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 2013)) 	To determine a statute 	s
plain meaning, 	courts 	not only look to the language itself, but also 	the specific context
in which the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. 	Id.
(quoting In re Total Realty Mgmt., LLC, 706 F.3d at 251).
Considering the plain language of §§ 1225(b)(2) and 1226(a), the Court finds that
§ 1226(a) plainly applies to Hernandez-Lugo. He was 	and placed into removal
proceedings 	- 	, 	(Answer at 2 	4),
the framework described in § 1226(a). No such warrant or arrest provisions exist in
§ 1225(b)(2), further bolstering this finding. Further, the I-200 warrant explicitly states that
it 	pursuant to sections 236 [8 U.S.C. § 1226] and 287 [8
U.S.C. § 1357] of the Immigration and Nationality Act 	to 	arrest and take into custody
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(Warrant at 1 (emphasis added)); see also
Maldonado de Leon, 2025 WL 2968042, at *6 (quoting the I-200 warrant); Pineda
Velasquez, 2025 WL 3003684, at *4 (same).
8 U.S.C. § 1226, and that authority is explicitly referenced in [I-
clear that § 1226 is the applicable statute governing such detention. Maldonado de Leon,
2025 WL 2968042, at *6; see also Pineda Velasquez, 2025 WL 3003684, at *10.
In looking at the interplay between the various subsections of § 1225, the Court has
found that § 1225(b)(1) is inapplicable to Hernandez-Lugo, as it solely addresses those
time. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 	An arriving alien who is a stowaway is not eligible
to apply for admission or to be admitted and shall be ordered removed upon inspection by
an immigration officer.
See generally 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225. This focus throughout § 1225 on the actual place and manner of arrival of
noncitizens to the United States similarly bolsters Hernandez-Lugo
§ 1226, and not § 1225, is the correct statutory authority here, where Hernandez-Lugo has
been present in the United States for at least three years, (Parole Authorization at 1).
Additionally, the recent legislative history of the INA further supports that § 1226
applies here. Earlier this year, Congress amended § 1226 via the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L.
No. 119-
§ 1225(b)(2) superfluous. This amendment, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E), mandates
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detention for noncitizens who are inadmissible under certain inadmissibility grounds who
have been charged with or convicted of certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c)(1)(E)(i) 	(ii).
Other district courts have relied on this recent amendment in finding § 1226(a) to be the
proper detention authority for noncitizens in Hernandez- 	position. See, e.g., Pizarro
Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *7 (
redundant if § 1225(b)(2) authorized their detention as well
As has been previously recognized in Maryland, although § 1225(b)(2) 	applies to
an 	applicant for admission, 	that is not the only operative language in [the statute]. Rather,
the statute conditions mandatory detention on a determination by an immigration officer
that 	an alien seeking admission 	is not clearly entitled to be admitted. 	Maldonado de
Leon, 2025 WL 2968042, at *7 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)). 	The requirement that
the alien at issue be 	seeking admission 	necessarily limits the applicability of this
provision to one who, at the time of the detention, was seeking or attempting to gain 	lawful
entry . . . into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration
officer. 	Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A)). As found in Maldonado de Leon, here,
espondents 	citation to cases that discuss 	admission 	or 	seeking admission 	in different
contexts do[es] not alter the Court 	s reading of the plain language of this statutory
provision. 	Id.
Yajure Hurtado is not persuasive nor binding
on this Court. See, e.g., id. at *8; Pineda Velasquez, 2025 WL 3003684, at *6. Under Loper
Bright 	exercise independent judgment in
determining the meaning of statutory provisions 	. . . defer to an
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agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.
413. Further 	where Respondents 	new interpretation of these detention provisions so as
to require mandatory detention of all inadmissible noncitizens runs counter to nearly 30
years of government immigration practice, the BIA 	s recent about-face in Matter of Yajure-
Hurtado carries very little weight. 	Maldonado de Leon, 2025 WL 2968042, at *8.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Hernandez-Lugo 	er the
framework of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
§ 1225(b)(2).
d. 	Prior Practice and Usage of § 1226(a)
This finding that Hernandez-Lugo
therefore subject to discretionary detention and entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a),
is consistent with the decades-long history of the application of § 1226(a).
The Supreme Court has recognized §
who were inadmissible at the time of entry and
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288. Similarly, in Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523 (2021),
the Supreme Court outlined th 	if the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) discovers
that an alien is living in the United States without authorization, it may initiate removal
proceedings 	DHS may arrest and detain the alien 	pending a decision on whether
the alien is to be removed from the United States 	who are
arrested and detained may generally apply for release on bond or conditional parole 	Id.
at 527 	28 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). Under existing Supreme Court precedent, Section
1226 	applies to aliens already present 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303
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(emphasis added). 	Hernandez-Lugo
1225(b)(2), (Answer at 8 	12), is
inconsistent with decades-long precedent on this topic.
Further, 	the 	Government 	reliance 	on 	the 	Jennings 	Court 	statement 	that
§ 	catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not
covered by § 1225(b)(1) 	3 (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287)), is
misplaced. In the first part of the Jennings opinion, the Court broadly described the
differences between individuals subject to § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2) and noted that
the latter, § 1225(b)(2), is 	for noncitizens seeking admission at the
borders and ports of entry, 	while § 	for noncitizens
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 286 	88. The Court recognized that
§ 1226(a) authorizes 	the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country
pending the outcome of removal proceedings 	Id. at 288 	89.
Based on this precedent, the Court here finds that Hernandez-Lugo is subject to the
discretionary detention and bond provisions under § 1226(a) and that detention under
§ 1225 is improper.
4. 	Fifth Amendment Claim
Because the Court finds that Hernandez-Lugo is detained and entitled to a bond
hearing under the statutory authority of § 1226(a), the Court declines to decide the merits
of his Fifth Amendment claim.
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C.
After a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is filed, the proper response by the
Respondent is the filing of an Answer, to be followed by a Reply filed by the Petitioner.
See Rules 2, 5, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts
see also
these rules to a habeas corpus petition not covered by Rule 1(a). 	).
There is no corresponding action or motion to dismiss under the Habeas Rules.
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 	may 	be applied to a habeas petition, see
Habeas Rule 12, the Court ordinarily does not apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12,
which governs the filing of a motion to dismiss, to a habeas petition because such a motion
is effectively duplicative of an Answer to a Petition, in which all relevant arguments that
could be made on such a motion can and should be made.
Here, where the Motion to Dismiss was simultaneously Respondents 	Answer
through a single brief addressing both the Motion and the Answer, (see ECF No. 12), the
Court finds that (1) there was no need for a Motion to Dismiss; and (2) the Court 	s
resolution of the Petition necessarily resolves the Motion to Dismiss. Because the Court
has denied Respondents 	jurisdictional and procedural arguments and granted the Petition,
the 	Motion to Dismiss will be denied. See Maldonado de Leon, 2025 WL
2968042, at *11.
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III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will GRANT Hernandez-Lugo 	(ECF
No. 1) in part and DENY it in part. The Petition will be granted to the extent explained in
this Opinion and accompanying Order and denied as to all other respects. The Court will
DENY 	(ECF No. 12). A separate Order follows.
Entered this 25th day of November, 2025.
/s/
George L. Russell, III
Chief United States District Judge
Case 1:25-cv-03434-GLR Document 14 Filed 11/25/25 Page 17 of 17

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