Pierson v. BICI Fitness, LLC et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
MATTHEW PIERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
BICI FITNESS, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
No. 25-cv-2332-ABA
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Gran Fondo National Series is a series of cycling races held around the
country. The 2023 championship was held in Maryland. There were “timed” sections,
which riders sought to complete as quickly as possible, and “untimed” sections, which
riders were required to complete but where they were not competing for speed. During
“timed” sections, intersections were blocked and non-race vehicle traffic was excluded
from the course. During “untimed” sections, in contrast, riders were told that
intersections would not be blocked—that they were on their own to avoid vehicle traffic.
But Plaintiff Matthew Pierson contends things were not quite so black-and-white
that day. He was one of the competitors and contends that as riders entered one
“untimed” section, race organizers continued to block intersections—twenty of them in a
row. He contends this led him (and other riders) to believe that other intersections
ahead would also be blocked. But when Mr. Pierson attempted to cross one of the
intersections, where he says a race official on a motorcycle signaled the lead riders not to
stop and instead waved them through the intersection, he was struck by a car and
suffered serious injuries. He has sued BICI Fitness, LLC (d/b/a Gran Fondo National
Series) (“BICI”) and USA Cycling Inc (“USAC”). As discussed below, some of Plaintiff’s
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claims are foreclosed by a waiver-of-liability provision in the contractual documents he
signed as a participant, but his gross negligence claim may proceed to discovery.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Plaintiff’s allegations
Because the pending motions arise at the pleadings stage, the Court accepts as
true the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 5) and any reasonable inferences
from those allegations must be drawn in Mr. Pierson’s favor. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). With that standard of review in mind, the Court recounts Mr.
Pierson’s allegations regarding his participation in the September 2023 Gran Fondo
race.
A resident of Leesburg, Virginia, Mr. Pierson is a cyclist who qualified and
registered for the 2023 Gran Fondo championship. ECF No. 5 ¶¶ 5, 8. The race “was
managed and/or produced by Defendant BICI Fitness, and sanctioned and/or co-
managed by Defendant USAC.” Id. ¶ 8. Mr. Pierson acknowledges that some dangers are
inherent to competitive cycling, but contends that both BICI and USAC had duties to
ensure riders’ safety. USAC had a duty “to ensure that bicycle races would be safe, that
the race rules would be followed, and that cyclists would not be struck by motor
vehicles.” Id. ¶ 12. And BICI “was responsible for managing the race, for ensuring that
the race rules would be followed, for hiring, training, and supervising motorcycle
officials, and for controlling the racecourse so as to be reasonably safe for competing
cyclists.” Id. ¶ 13.
As noted above, the Gran Fondo race featured “timed” and “untimed” sections.
Id. ¶ 10. “In the ‘timed’ sections, riders were instructed that the rules of the road did not
apply to the racers.” Id. “The riders were informed that in ‘untimed’ sections, the rules
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of the road were to be obeyed.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that “it was the duty of Defendant
BICI Fitness to maintain racecourse security, including the placement of course
marshals, flaggers, and/or police at all ‘timed’ intersections through which competing
cyclists would be crossing.” Id. ¶ 14. He further contends that, given the timed/untimed
format, BICI and its agents also had a duty “not to control any intersection in the
‘untimed’ portions of the race” to maintain, among other things, riders’ understanding
“that the rules of the road were in place” during those segments. Id. ¶ 15 (emphasis
added).
The portion of the race route where the crash occurred, outside of Frederick,
Maryland, had been designated in advance as an “untimed” segment. Id. ¶¶ 9, 18. Mr.
Pierson was in “the lead group of riders” as they entered that untimed segment. Id. ¶ 16.
The riders had been led to believe the race organizers would only be blocking traffic or
otherwise providing a protective escort to riders during timed sections. Id. But Mr.
Pierson alleges that as the lead riders departed Frederick and entered that untimed
segment, course marshals went ahead and blocked traffic. Id. He contends that, at
twenty intersections in a row during that supposedly “untimed” segment, course
officials were not only “present” but “controlled motor vehicle traffic and instructed the
riders to pass through traffic signals without stopping.” Id. He describes the marshals as
having “create[ed] a ‘rolling enclosure’ with the lead group of riders.” Id.
After the lead riders, including Mr. Pierson, passed the twentieth intersection
while traveling on Stottlemeyer Road, they approached the intersection of Maryland
Route 77. Id. ¶ 18. As they approached that intersection, one “motorcycle official pulled
ahead of the riders.” Id. In what Mr. Pierson describes as the culmination of a series of
grossly negligent decisions by race officials, that motorcycle official then “signal[ed] that
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the intersection was cleared.” Id. Mr. Pierson alleges that, “[b]ased on the officials’
actions at the prior 20 intersections, this movement created a clear signal to Mr. Pierson
and the other lead rider that the intersection of Maryland Route 77 and Stottlemeyer
Road had been cleared for them to ride through without obeying the stop sign.” Id. In
other words, although the racers had been told that “untimed” sections would be open to
other traffic, and that riders had to obey traffic laws during those sections, he contends
that the race officials had implemented, and conveyed to riders, a “new standard”—at
least for that portion of that untimed section, and at least for the lead riders. Id. ¶ 19.
But “the course was not closed,” and no one was actually blocking cars on
Maryland Route 77 from crossing Stottlemeyer Road. Id. ¶¶ 16, 20. And although the
motorcycle official “signal[ed] that the intersection was cleared,” id. ¶ 18, it was not. A
driver traveling along Maryland Route 77 at approximately 50 miles per hour crashed
into Mr. Pierson and another cyclist. Id. ¶ 21. “As a direct and proximate result of the
crash, Mr. Pierson suffered catastrophic injuries.” Id. ¶ 22.
Based on those injuries, Mr. Pierson has sued BICI and USAC for negligence
(specifically, negligent hiring, training and supervision of race officials) and gross
negligence. Mr. Pierson originally filed his case in the Circuit Court for Frederick
County, Maryland; the operative complaint remains the one he filed in that court. ECF
No. 5. Defendants removed the case to this Court based on diversity of citizenship; Mr.
Pierson is a citizen of Virginia, BICI is a citizen of Pennsylvania, and USAC is a citizen of
Colorado. ECF No. 5 ¶¶ 5–7.
B. 	The exculpatory provisions
Mr. Pierson did not just show up and join the race. As one would expect, in
addition to qualifying for the championship race, he filled out paperwork before the race
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began. As discussed below, the parties agree that although they have not yet begun
discovery, the Court may also consider the contracts Mr. Pierson signed for the race, for
purposes of assessing the scope and enforceability of those contracts’ exculpatory
provisions. See n. 5, infra.
Most of the provisions in the contracts he signed are not presently relevant. One
potentially relevant portion is a choice-of-law provision in one of Mr. Pierson’s contracts
with USAC: “This agreement shall be governed by and construed under the laws of
Colorado, without regard to its choice of law rules” (ECF No. 10-3 at 4).1 That will be
discussed below. Of greater relevance for current purposes are several exculpatory
provisions, often referred to as liability waivers or releases.
The BICI Waiver applied to “any and all liabilities, claims, actions, causes of
action, demands, lawsuits, and injuries of every kind and nature whatsoever” (other
than “gross negligence or willful misconduct”) “arising out of or relating to the presence
or participation of [Pierson] at the event . . . whether arising from negligence of [BICI]
or otherwise.” ECF No. 10-2 at 3.2 USAC required that riders complete two waivers. The
first, titled “USAC Online Waiver,” released USAC from “any claims that may arise
out of or are related to my participation in an Event, including claims arising from the
ordinary negligence of [USAC].” ECF No. 10-3 at 3. The “USAC License Waiver”
1 References to page numbers in the parties’ filings are to the page numbers in the
CM/ECF headers, which do not necessarily align with the parties’ original numbering.
2 As discussed below, the carve-out for gross negligence and willful misconduct was not,
strictly speaking, necessary; under both Maryland and Colorado law, a person may not
lawfully exculpate another person for gross negligence or willful misconduct.
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released USAC “from any and all rights and claims including claims arising from
[USAC’s] own negligence to the maximum extent permitted by law.” ECF No. 10-3 at 5.3
II. 	DISCUSSION
Mr. Pierson’s complaint contains six counts. The first two are titled “agency”
counts; his counsel confirmed at the hearing that those counts do not assert
independent causes of action, but rather make clear that he considers both BICI and
USAC to be liable for the conduct of each other and of all of the people who organized
and managed the race. The substantive causes of action are for “negligent hiring,
training, and supervision” (against BICI and USAC, counts 5 and 6 respectively) and
gross negligence (against BICI and USAC, counts 3 and 4 respectively). Defendants have
filed a motion to dismiss all of Mr. Pierson’s claims. They contend that the negligent
hiring, training, and supervision claims are barred by the exculpatory provisions
described above, and that Mr. Pierson’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim for
gross negligence.
A. 	Negligent hiring, training, and supervision (Counts 5 & 6)
The three exculpatory clauses above, which Mr. Pierson concedes he signs and
are enforceable (at least “as to simple negligence,” ECF No. 11 at 14), all undisputedly
exculpate Defendants for negligence claims. See, e.g., BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. v.
Rosen, 435 Md. 714, 724 (2013) (“In the absence of legislation to the contrary,
3 The USAC Online Waiver also contained a forum selection clause: “Any legal suit,
action, or proceeding arising out of or relating to this agreement shall be instituted in
the federal court located in Denver, Colorado, or state courts located in Colorado
Springs and El Paso County. Each party irrevocably submits to the exclusive jurisdiction
of such courts in any such suit, action or proceeding.” ECF No. 10-3 at 4. Neither party
has sought to enforce that provision; the question of whether they have definitively
waived enforcement of it is not presented by the pending motion to dismiss.
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exculpatory clauses are generally valid, and the public policy of freedom of contract is
best served by enforcing the provisions of the clause”) (quoting Wolf v. Ford, 335 Md.
525, 531 (1994)); Chadwick v. Colt Ross Outfitters, Inc., 100 P.3d 465, 467 (Colo. 2004)
(holding that exculpatory provisions are enforceable so long as they do not waive claims
for “willful and wanton negligence,” are “expressed in clear and unambiguous language”
and “fairly entered into,” and do not violate public policy).4
As to this issue, the parties agree that the Court may and should consider the
contractual documents containing the exculpatory provisions for purposes of
adjudicating whether Plaintiff’s negligent hiring/training/supervision claims may
proceed. ECF No. 12 at 6 n.11 (Defendants: “As the terms of the waivers governed
Plaintiff’s participation in the event at issue in the Complaint, and there is no dispute as
to their authenticity, the waivers could properly be considered as integral to Plaintiff’s
claims and allegations in the Complaint, without converting this Motion to Dismiss into
one for Summary Judgment.”); ECF No. 11 at 4, 14 (Plaintiff not disputing that the Court
may partially convert the motion to dismiss to summary judgment, for purposes of
considering the exculpation provisions at this stage).5
4 Because, as explained herein, the result is the same under Maryland and Colorado law,
the Court need not decide the applicability or effect of the choice-of-law clause in the
USAC Online Waiver on Counts 5 and 6. See Perini/Tompkins Joint Venture v. Ace Am.
Ins. Co., 738 F.3d 95, 101 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Choice of law analysis becomes necessary
only if the relevant laws of the different states lead to different outcomes.”) (cleaned up).
5 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), a motion to dismiss “must be treated as
one for summary judgment under Rule 56” if “matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court.” “All parties must be given a reasonable
opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(d). The waiver agreements were not attached to or referenced in Plaintiff’s complaint.
Counsel for the parties were given an opportunity to address the waivers in their
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Thus, Mr. Pierson acknowledges, as he must given the plain language of the
waivers and Maryland and Colorado law, that the waivers apply and are enforceable to
claims that Defendants were negligent in how they organized and managed the race
itself. ECF No. 11-1 at 14 (“Maryland Courts have upheld exculpatory clauses as
enforceable as to simple negligence.”). Defendants, for their part, acknowledge, as they
must, that the waivers do not bar claims that Defendants acted with gross negligence.
ECF No. 10-1 at 15. But where does that leave Mr. Pierson’s claims that BICI and USAC
were negligent in how they hired, trained and supervised the individuals who were
managing the race?
Mr. Pierson draws a distinction between two types of negligent conduct that falls
short of gross negligence. (His claims for gross negligence are discussed in the next
section.) On one hand, he argues that Defendants were negligent in how they conducted
the race itself. He does not dispute that such a claim would be barred by the plain
language of the exculpatory provisions. On the other hand, he argues that Defendants
were also negligent in how they selected, trained and supervised the personnel who ran
the race. Mr. Pierson argues that the latter claims were outside the scope of the
briefing and at the hearing, and both sides confirmed there is no dispute with their
authenticity or that Mr. Pierson signed them. The parties also agreed that it is
appropriate at this stage for the Court to consider the effect of the exculpatory
provisions. The Court will thus construe the motion to dismiss to be a motion for
summary judgment on only the limited question of whether the exculpatory agreements
that Mr. Pierson undisputedly signed precludes his negligent hiring claims as a matter
of law. See Randolph v. Caruso Homes, Inc., Case No. 13-cv-2069-RWT, 2014 WL
4661985, at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 16, 2014) (converting a motion to dismiss based upon a
liability release into a motion for summary judgment). Summary judgment is
appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)
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exculpatory provisions. Those waivers, Mr. Pierson argues, “do[] not concern
Defendants’ duty to ensure that it would properly hire, train, and supervise its
employees, including those individuals who would be responsible for the safety of
competing cyclists like Mr. Pierson.” ECF No. 11-1 at 16; see also id. at 17 (“[H]e
understood that there was a possibility that he could be injured while competing,
however, Mr. Pierson did not reasonably believe that he would be placed in danger by
Defendants’ failure to properly hire, train, and supervise its employees, including the
course marshals who were responsible for course safety.”). And he contends Defendants
were negligent not only in how they conducted the race itself, but also with regard to
hiring and training, including that Defendants “hired course marshals for this particular
race within one (1) week of the race itself,” “did little to no pre-race training of the
course marshals,” and “had little to no supervision over the course marshals.” Id. at 18.
Thus, he contends, particularly because exculpatory clauses must be construed
narrowly, id. at 19 (citing Adloo v. H.T. Brown Real Estate, 344 Md. 254, 264 (1996)),
there was “no meeting of the minds” regarding exculpation of Defendants for “claims of
negligent hiring, training, and supervision.” Id.
The plain language of the exculpatory provisions here is incompatible with the
distinction Mr. Pierson asks this Court to draw. Plaintiff agreed that he would not hold
Defendants responsible for negligent conduct by Defendants or their agents that fell
short of willful misconduct or gross negligence. Organizing and running a race like the
Gran Fondo championship requires people, either hired staff or volunteers. The
language in the exculpatory clauses is broad, involving release of all claims related to
personal injuries that riders sustained during a race as a result of negligent conduct (as
opposed to grossly negligent conduct) by BICI and USAC. The BICI Waiver expressly
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applies to claims “arising out of or relating to the presence or participation of a releasor
at the event or from a releasor traveling to and from the event.” ECF No. 10-2 at 3. It
further specifies that this release extends to “negligence of the releasees,” and defines
the released parties to include BICI’s “agents.” Id. This broad release clearly includes
ordinary negligence claims against both BICI and the race officials to the extent they
were acting as BICI’s agents. Similarly, the USAC Online Waiver applies to “claims that
may arise out of or are related to . . . participation in an Event” (ECF No. 10-3 at 3) and
the USAC License Waiver applies to claims “arising from [USAC’s] own negligence”
based on riders’ “participation” in the “event” (id. at 5). The USAC waivers also specify
that Mr. Pierson agreed to “release . . . USAC . . . and [its] . . . agents . . . from any claims
that may arise out of or are related to my participation in an Event, including claims
arising from the ordinary negligence of Releasees.” ECF No. 10-3 at 3; see also id. at 5
(nearly identical).
Under Maryland law, although exculpatory clauses are construed narrowly, they
“need not contain or use the word ‘negligence’ or any other ‘magic words,” but are
instead “sufficient . . . as long as [their] language clearly and specifically indicates the
intent to release the defendant from liability for personal injury caused by the
defendant’s negligence.” Adloo, 344 Md. at 266 (quotations omitted). Colorado law
contains essentially the same standard. Chadwick, 100 P.3d at 467 (requiring that
exculpatory clauses be “expressed in clear and unambiguous language”). Mr. Pierson’s
claims that Defendants were negligent in how and when they hired staff, and how they
trained and supervised them (or failed to do so) regarding how to manage the untimed
sections of the race, are still claims that Defendants acted negligently, and are claims
that arose from his participation in the Gran Fondo race. Accordingly, Defendants are
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entitled to summary judgment on counts 5 and 6 of Mr. Pierson’s complaint. If
Defendants’ hiring, training and supervision of race personnel was grossly negligent,
the exculpatory clauses undisputedly will not apply, but counts 5 and 6 invoke simple
negligence, not gross negligence, and thus are foreclosed by the liability releases to
which Mr. Pierson agreed before the race.
B. 	Gross negligence (Counts 3 & 4)
Mr. Pierson alleges that Defendants were not only negligent in how they
conducted the race and hired, trained and supervised race personnel. He contends their
conduct was grossly negligent. Defendants agree that Mr. Pierson’s gross negligence
claims are not barred by the exculpatory provisions discussed above. See, e.g., ECF No.
10-1 at 15. But they argue the gross negligence claims should still be dismissed because
they fail to plead the elements for such claims. This argument invokes the Twombly
standard, under which a pleading must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint” and “draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in
favor of the plaintiff.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d
435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted).
Under Maryland law, a gross negligence claim requires a plaintiff to plead and
prove “an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the
consequences as affecting the life or property of another”—in other words, “a
thoughtless disregard of the consequences without the exertion of any effort to avoid
them.” Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 187 (2007) (quoting Liscombe v. Potomac Edison
Co., 303 Md. 619, 635 (1985)). “Gross negligence is not just big negligence,” but instead
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implies “wanton and reckless disregard for . . . life.” Stracke v. Estate of Butler, 465 Md.
407, 426 (2019) (quotations omitted). Colorado courts have adopted a similar standard.
See Hamill v. Cheley Colorado Camps, Inc., 262 P.3d 945, 954 (Colo. App. 2011)
(“Gross negligence is willful and wanton conduct, that is, action committed recklessly,
with conscious disregard for the safety of others”); Stamp v. Vail Corporation, 172 P.3d
437, 449 (Colo. 2007) (“Conduct is willful and wanton if it is ‘a dangerous course of
action’ that is consciously chosen ‘with knowledge of facts, which to a reasonable mind
creates a strong probability that injury to others will result.’”) (quoting Steeves v.
Smiley, 354 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Colo. 1960)).
Thus, the question presented is this: does the complaint state cognizable claims
for gross negligence under Maryland and/or Colorado law? As explained above, the
Court must not only accept all of Mr. Pierson’s factual allegations as true, but must draw
all reasonable inferences from those allegations in his favor. Those allegations and
inferences describe a series of acts, omissions and events that satisfy the standard for
gross negligence under both Maryland and Colorado law (and thus the Court need not
decide, at least at this stage, which state’s law governs Plaintiff’s gross negligence
claims).
Mr. Pierson alleges that before the race, Defendants and their agents conveyed to
riders that during timed sections they could (and should) disregard traffic laws, and that
they could safely pass directly through intersections, including at high speed, without
stopping or slowing down.6 He says Defendants also conveyed to riders that there would
6 In their motion, Defendants argued that Plaintiff did not adequately plead an agency
relationship between the race officials and Defendants sufficient to establish vicarious
liability. ECF No. 10-1 at 19–21. Defendants frame this argument as a failure to state an
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be a clear delineation between timed and untimed sections, and that during untimed
sections they not only would have to obey traffic laws but would be responsible for their
own safety, especially at intersections. Mr. Pierson does not contend that Defendants
were obligated to block intersections during untimed sections; to the contrary, he
contends that, particularly with this race containing both timed and untimed sections,
Defendants’ should not have blocked intersections during untimed sections. He
contends that by blocking twenty intersections in a row for the lead riders during a
section that had previously been designated “untimed” and thus unprotected, race
officials led those riders (including Mr. Pierson) to believe that race officials had
effectively converted that section to a “timed” section—not in the sense that they were
now competing for speed, but that intersections were being blocked, and that riders did
not need to stop or slow at intersections to check for cross-traffic. This implied
conversion, he contends, signaled to him and the other lead riders to speed along and
assume that upcoming intersections would also be blocked. That series of decisions by
race officials, he alleges, constituted intentional decisions “in reckless disregard of the
consequences” for the riders’ safety, see Barbre, 402 Md. at 187, in “wanton and reckless
disregard for . . . life,” Stracke, 465 Md. at 426, in other words “a dangerous course of
agency claim, targeting Plaintiff’s first two counts. As stated above, Plaintiff clarified
that his “agency” claims are not standalone, substantive claims. To the extent Defendant
meant to challenge the pleading of an agency relationship for purposes of the negligent
hiring or gross negligence claims, the Court rejects that argument because Plaintiff’s
complaint sufficiently alleges an agency relationship. See, e.g., ECF No. 5 ¶ 13
(“Defendant BICI was responsible for . . . hiring, training, and supervising motorcycle
officials”); id. ¶ 39 (“it was the duty of Defendant [USAC] to ensure that Defendant BICI
would hire qualified course marshals” and deploy them to ensure course safety).
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action” that the course marshals “consciously chose[]” despite a “strong probability that
injury to others will result,” Stamp, 172 P.3d at 449.
If those were all the factual allegations, the question of whether the complaint
states a cognizable claim for gross negligence would be a close one. But Mr. Pierson has
another allegation: that the motorcycle official who had raced ahead of the lead riders
after that twentieth blocked intersection, and who arrived at the Route 77 intersection
before the lead riders, stopped at that intersection and not only “signal[ed] that the
intersection was cleared,” ECF No. 5 ¶ 18, but “waved competing cyclists, including Mr.
Pierson, through the intersection.” Id. ¶ 34. Defendants’ alleged conscious decisions to
block the extended series of intersections in the untimed section in contradiction to the
previously announced course rules, and then to wave the competing cyclists through the
Route 77 intersection without actually blocking that intersection, are sufficient at the
pleading stage to state claims for gross negligence that may proceed to discovery, and
thus Defendants’ motion to dismiss counts 3 and 4 will be denied.
C. 	Contributory/comparative negligence, and assumption of risk
Finally, Defendants also argue that even if the complaint affirmatively states one
or more causes of action, Defendants cannot be held liable because (1) Mr. Pierson
assumed the risk of injuries when he participated in the race and (2) he was
contributorily negligent by failing to obey the stop sign at the Route 77 intersection.
The discussion in the preceding sections mostly disposes of the first issue.
Defendants are correct that, under Maryland law, when a person “(1) had knowledge of
the risk of the danger; (2) appreciated that risk; and (3) voluntarily confronted the risk
of danger,” such voluntary action supports “an affirmative defense that completely bars
a plaintiff's recovery.” Warsham v. James Muscatello, Inc., 189 Md. App. 620, 639
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(2009). An assumption-of-risk defense, in the abstract, is conceptually distinct from
enforcement of an exculpatory clause in a contract. But here the issues collapse—at least
as presented by Defendants’ motion to dismiss—because Defendants’ argument for
dismissal on assumption-of-risk grounds is that Mr. Pierson “signed multiple waivers
prior to the event.” ECF No. 10-1 at 27. As discussed above, the exculpatory clauses do
preclude Plaintiff’s negligence claims, and thus the Court need not reach the question of
assumption of risk as to counts 5 and 6. And Maryland law makes clear that exculpatory
clauses cannot be enforced to defeat gross negligence claims, and thus insofar as
Defendants contend that Mr. Pierson assumed the risks associated with the race by
signing the pre-race waivers, any such waiver does not apply to Plaintiff’s gross
negligence claims (counts 3 and 4).
In addition to their contract-based assumption-of-risk defense, Defendants also
contend that Plaintiff’s claims should be barred because participation in “a voluntary
sporting event like that present in this case” bars negligence claims for the “inherent
risks” of such an event. ECF No. 10-1 at 28–29. But such a defense only applies to bar
claims arising from “risks that are the usual and foreseeable consequences of
participation” in the sporting event. Am. Powerlifting Ass’n v. Cotillo, 401 Md. 658, 675
(2007). Construing the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint as true, the accident that
occurred was not a usual and foreseeable occurrence.
That leaves Defendants’ contributory negligence defense. That argument for
dismissal is premised on Defendants’ contention that Maryland law applies at least on
that defense. After all, although Maryland and Colorado law are sufficiently congruent
on the issues discussed above to render immaterial the question of which state’s law
applies to those issues (the enforceability and scope of exculpatory contracts, and on
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what constitutes gross negligence), the parties agree that Colorado and Maryland law
diverge on Defendants’ contributory negligence defense. Colorado, like all but a few
other states, has discarded contributory negligence in favor of a comparative negligence
standard. Under Colorado law, a defendant’s liability for personal injury is diminished
by the degree to which the injured person’s own “negligence or fault” contributed to the
injury, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-21-111.5(1), and a plaintiff is barred from recovery only
if his own negligence was at least “as great as the negligence of the person against whom
recovery is sought,” id. § 13-21-111(1). Thus, under Colorado law, even if a plaintiff was
negligent in ways that contributed to an injury, the plaintiff may still recover damages
(albeit not necessarily full damages) as long as a defendant was more negligent than the
plaintiff. In contrast, Maryland continues to cling to a contributory negligence standard
under which “contributory negligence on the part of a plaintiff completely bars recovery
against a negligent defendant.” Wooldridge v. Price, 184 Md. App. 451, 461 (2009).
If Colorado law applies, Defendants do not contend that comparative negligence
would be a basis for dismissal at the pleadings stage (but rather will ultimately preclude
or at least substantially diminish any recovery). But they argue that Maryland law
applies to that issue, because the Colorado choice-of-law clause in the USAC Online
Waiver is limited to contractual interpretation issues, as it states simply, “[t]his
agreement shall be governed by and construed under the laws of Colorado, without
regard to its choice of law rules” (ECF No. 10-3 at 4). And because the parties agree that
Maryland law would apply here in the absence of an applicable choice-of-law clause,
Defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissal at the pleadings stage on
contributory negligence grounds because Mr. Pierson “admits on the face of the
Complaint that he rode through a stop sign, into an intersection, and was struck by a
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vehicle and injured as a result.” ECF No. 10-1 at 30. Mr. Pierson, for his part, argues that
the choice of law clause is broad enough to encompass the question of whether
contributory or comparative negligence applies here, and that either way dismissal at
the pleadings stage would be inappropriate given his allegations as a whole.
The Court need not decide these issues at this stage. Because the Court is
dismissing counts 5 and 6 on exculpatory clause grounds, it need not decide whether
those counts would alternatively be subject to dismissal on other grounds. Moreover,
Defendants have only moved for dismissal on contributory negligence grounds of
Plaintiff’s negligence claims, not his gross negligence claims. ECF No. 10-1 at 30
(“Plaintiff’s Contributory Negligence Bars His Negligence Claims”). And even if
Defendants had argued that the gross negligence claims should be barred under
contributory or comparative negligence, the facts in Plaintiff’s complaint allege that he
was not at all negligent but merely followed the instruction of the race officials to not
stop at the intersection. Thus, the Court need not decide at this stage, for example,
whether Maryland or Colorado law applies to Defendants’ comparative/contributory
negligence defense or whether that defense under either state’s law applies to gross
negligence claims. Depending on how the evidence develops during discovery, the Court
may need to resolve those disputes at the dispositive motions stage. But because
Plaintiff’s gross negligence claims will be proceeding to discovery regardless, the Court
need not resolve those disputes for now.
III. 	CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For these reasons, although Plaintiff’s gross negligence claim may proceed to
discovery, his other claims are subject to dismissal based on the exculpatory provisions
in the applicable contractual documents. Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS that:
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1. Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Or In The Alternative For Summary
Judgment, ECF No. 10, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; and
2. Defendants shall file answers pertinent to Plaintiff’s gross negligence
counts within 14 days of this Order.
Date: January 15, 2026
Adam B. Abelson
United States District Judge
/s/
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