Hameed v. Maryland State Board of Physicians et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
*
HAROON I. HAMEED,
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Plaintiff,
V.
* 	Civil No. 25-1606-BAH
MARYLAND STATE BOARD OF
PHYSICIANS ET AL.,
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
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Self-represented PlaintiffHaroon I. Hameed ("Plaintiff' or "Hameed") brought suit against·
the Maryland State Board of Physicians (the "Board"), Christine A. Farrelly ("Farrelly"), in her
individual 	and official capacities as 	Executive Director of the Board, Doreen Noppinger
("Noppinger"), in her individual and official capacities as a compliance manager of the Board,
Troy Garland ("Garland"), in his individual and official capacities as a compliance analyst of the
Board, Alexandra Fata ("Fata"), in her individual and official capacities as a compliance analyst
of the Board, and "John and Jane Doe Board Members" in their individual and official capacities, 	'
as members of the Board (collectively "Defendants"). See ECF 1. Hameed brings a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause (Count
One) and "reputational harm and interference with livelihood" (Count Two), and a defamation
claim under Maryland common law (Count Three) against Defendants arising from the Board's
publication of certain information relating to Hameed and his practice of medicine. See id at 3.
Pending before the Court are four motions to dismiss. See ECF 9 (the Board's); ECF 17 (Fata and
Noppinger's); ECF 26 (Farrelly's); and ECF 30 (Garland's). 	Hameed has filed an opposition to
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the motions to dismiss, see ECF 21 (opposing ECFs 9 and 17); ECF 33 (opposing ECFs 26 and
30), and Defendants have filed replies, see ECF 24 (the Board's reply); ECF 25 (Fota and
Noppinger's reply); ECF 34 (Farrelly and Garland's reply). 	Hameed has moved for leave to file
surreplies. 1 See ECF 28 (motion 'to file a surreply to the Board, Fota, and Noppinger's replies);
ECF 35 (motion for leave to file a surreply to Farrelly and Garland's reply). Hameed has also filed
two motions for leave to file supplemental pleadings, ECFs 36 and 37, and for motion for judicial
notice of adjudicative facts and a supplement thereto, ECFs 38 and 39. The Board, Farrelly, Fota,
Garland, and Noppinger oppose Hameed's motion for judicial notice, ECF 40, and Hameed has
filed a reply to their opposition, ECF 41. 2
The Court has rev,iewed all relevant filings and finds that no hearing is necessary. See Loe.
R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). 	Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs motions to
supplement his complaint are GRANTED, Plaintiffs motion for judicial notice is DENIED,
Plaintiffs motions to file surreplies are GRANTED, and Defendants' motions to dismiss are
GRANTED.
1 Though surreplies are generally not permitted under Local Rule 105.2(a), "the Court in its
discretion may allow a party to file a surreply." Boland v. Amazon.com Sales, Inc., 628 F. Supp.
3d 595, 599 (D. Md. 2022) (citation omitted). Although "[t]his discretion is typically used in the
interest of fairness to permit parties to respond to new matters raised for the first time in the
opposing parties' reply briefs, ... courts have also used this discretion to permit pro se parties to
file surreplies even where no [n]ew matters were raised in the reply brief." Id. (first citing Khoury
v. Meserve, 268 F. Supp. 2d 600,605 (D. Md. 2003), ajf'd, 85 F. App'x 960 (4th Cir. 2004); and
then citing Williams v. Bartee, Civ. No. CCB-10-935, 2011 WL 2842367, at *2 (D. Md. July 14,
2011), ajf'd sub nom. Williams v. Merritt, 469 F. App'x 270 (4th Cir. 2012)). "Courts have also
permitted pro se parties to file surreplies where the opposing party has not objected to the filing."
Id (citing Zhang v. Sci. & tech. Corp., 382 F. Supp. 2d 761, 767 (D. Md. 2005), ajf'd, 174 F.
App'x 177 (4th Cir. 2006)). Hameed is pro se and the Defendants have not objected to his motions
for leave to file surreplies. Accordingly, the ·Court will grant Hameed's motions at ECFs 28 and
35.
2 The Court references all filings by their respective ECF numbers and page numbers by the ECF-
generated page numbers at the top of the page.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Statutory Background
This suit arises from a 2021 final order issued by the Board sanctioning Ham.eed for
unprofessional conduct. 	By way of background, "Title 14 of the Maryland Code, Health
Occupations Article establishes the State Board of Physicians as a state agency with the authority
to license, investigate, and discipline physicians and other health care providers." 	Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Cohen, 785 F.3d 886, 892 (4th Cir. 2015). 	The Board can
comprise two kinds of disciplinary panels. See Md. Code Ann., Health 0cc. ("HO")§ 14-40l(a) ..
The first disciplinary panel conducts the investigation of a complaint lodged against a physician
and decides whether to issue charges. 	Id. §14-401.1. 	The grounds for charges for which a
physician can be sanctioned are set forth in§ 14-404(a) of the Health Occupations Article. See id.
§ 14-404(a)(l)--{47). If charges are issued, the matter is referred to an administrative prosecutor,
see COMAR 10.32.02.03.E(5)--{6), and the physician is served with notice of the charges, see Md.
Code Ann., State Oov't ("SO")§ 10-207(a); COMAR 10.32.02.03.E(?). The physician then may
engage in a voluntary informal settlement process. See COMAR 10.32.02.03.E(9).
If the case does not settle, it is sent to the other disciplinary panel, which forwards the case
to the independent Office of Administrative Hearings ("OAH") for an evidentiary hearing before
an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). 	See SO§ 10-205(a)(l); COMAR 10.32.02.04.B; see also
HO§ 14-405. The physician may be represented by counsel at the hearing. See HO §14-405(c).
After the evidentiary hearing, the ALJ issues a proposed decision. 	SO §10-220(a); COMAR
10.32.02.04.B(l); see also HO §14-405(b). The parties may file written exceptions to the ALJ's
proposed decision and if either party does so, an exceptions hearing is held before the disciplinary
panel that did not vote to issue the charges. See SO§ 10-216(a)(2); COMAR 10.32.02.05.B(l)-
(2). If the administrative agency overrules the recommendation of an ALI, the agency's decision
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must be based on "substantial evidence." Gabaldoni v. Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance, 785
A.2d 771, 772 (Md. App. 2001) (quoting Dep 't of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Shrieves, 641 A.2d
899, 908-09 (Md. App. 1994)). 	However, the agency must give "substantial deference" to an
ALJ's findings based on the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses. Id.
After consideration of the proposed decision, the record in the case, the written exceptions,
and a hearing, a final written decision is issued by the second disciplinary panel. 	See SG § 10-
221; COMAR 10.32.02.05.C(l). The final decision must include findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the order itself, in addition to a written statement of appeal rights. See SG § 10-22l(b).
Subject to an.order concluding that a physician violated§ 14-404 of the Health Occupations Article,
the disciplinary panel may issue a sanction, including "plac[ing] any licensee on probation, or
suspend[ing] or revok[ing] a license." 	HO§ 14-404(a). 	If the disciplinary panel concludes that
the physician is in violation of one or more grounds in § 14-404(a), the physician is entitled to
judicial review of the Board's final order in the "circuit court for the county where any party resides
or has a principal place of business." SG § 10-222(a)(l), (c); HO§ 14-408(a). The circuit court
may "reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of the petitioner may have been
prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision" is, among other things "unconstitutional,"
"results from an unlawful procedure," "is affected by any other error of law," or is "arbitrary or •
capricious." SG § 10-222(h)(3). "Except for its possibly peripheral influences on the final agency
decision, the hearing before the ALJ does not concern" the reviewing court. Md. Bd. ofPhysicians
v. Elliott, 907 A.2d 321, 340 (Md. App. 2006). If the physician receives an unfavorable decision
from the circuit court, the physician may then appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland. See SG
§ 10-223 (b)..
II
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By statute, "any orders and findings that result from formal disciplinary actions" of
licensees are public records, in addition to other information related to licensees. Md: Code Ann.,
Gen. Prov. ("GP") § 4-333(b)(7). • Maryland law also requires that "[e]ach health occupations
board shall post on the board's Web site each final, public order for a disciplinary sanction issued
to a licensee or certificate holder." 	HO § 1-607. 	Likewise, the Health Occupations Article
explicitly mandates that the "Board shall create and maintain a public individual.profile on each
licensee that includes ... [a] summary of charges filed against the licensee" and "[a] description
of any disciplinary action taken by the Board or a disciplinary panel against the licensee within the
most recent 10-year period that includes a copy of the public order," in addition to other
information. HO§ 14-411.l(b)(l)-(2).
B. 	Factual Background
The Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in Hameed's complaint and draws all
reasonable factual inferences in his favor. 	See Vito!, S.A. v. Primerose Shipping Co., 708 F.3d
527, 539 (4th Cir. 2013). Hameed "was charged in 2020 by the [] Board with, among other things,
addiction to 	or 	habitual 	abuse 	of narcotics 	(opioid 	addiction), 	habitual 	intoxication, 	and
professional incompetence." ECF 1, at 5 ,r 18. During the proceeding that followed, two experts
testified that Hameed "neither suffered from addiction or habitual intoxication, and was not
professionally incompetent." 	Id. ,i 19. 	The ALJ recommended that the charges of professional
incompetence and habitual intoxication be dismissed, although the ALJ did conclude that Hameed
was "guilty of unprofessional conduct in the practice of medicine, that [Hameed] habitually abused
CDS, and that [Hameed] provided professional services while using a narcotic in •excess of
therapeutic amounts and without valid medical indication." Id. at 5 ,r 20; ECF 1-4, at 23. 3
3 "In reviewing a motion to dismiss, courts may consider documents referenced or relied upon in
the complaint." Medispec, Ltd. v. Chouinard, 133 F. Supp. 3d 771, 772 n.1 (D. Md. 2015) (citing
5
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Despite the ALJ's negative conclusions as to the charges of habitual intoxication and
physical incompetence, Hameed alleges that the Board "re-imposed the charge of habitual
intoxication in the Board's final order," or the "2021 Final Order.". Id. 122. The Board "suspended
Plaintiffs license" to practice medicine "and later placed him on probation after reinstatement in
2021." Id. at 6124. Hameed's probation formally ended in 2025. Id. 	"Throughout the period of
probation and beyond," the Defendants "continued to publicly display the dismissed charges of
opioid addiction and habitual intoxication on" the Board's "physician verification portal and other
public records." Id. 125.
Hameed "acknowledges that he did not seek judicial review of the 2021 Final Order" issued
by the Board, and he specifies that this litigation "does not seek to overturn or modify that order."
Id. at 5. 	"Instead, 'Plaintiff brings this Complaint to address the Board's continued and public
dissemination of specific stigmatizing charges that were rejected by the ALJ, discredited by expert
witnesses, and for'which the last 5 years of supervision by direct or indirect Board-related and
reporting providers and entities failed to show any proof of." Id. at 5-6. Hameed asserts that the
Defendants "knew or should have known that these statements were false" in light of expert reports
from their own consultants, the ALJ's findings rejecting the charges, and "five years of monitoring
and 	clinical 	assessments 	by . Board-affiliated 	providers, 	none 	of which 	corroborated 	the
allegations." Id. at 7128.
Abelman v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA., 976 F. Supp. 2d 660, 662 n.l (D. Md. 2013)). 	Because the
ALJ' s decision is referenced in Hameed' s complaint (and attached to it), and Defendants do not
dispute its authenticity, the Court considers it. See, e.g., ECF 1, at 5 1120, 22; ECF 1-4; ECF 9-
1, at 7. Generally, however, "extrinsic evidence should not be considered at the 12(b)(6) stage."
Am. Chiropractic Ass'n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212,234 (4th Cir. 2004). The Court
thus declines to consider the other exhibits attached to Hameed's complaint in ruling on the
pending motions.
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Hameed claims these actions have caused him "reputational and economic harm well
beyond the conclusion of formal disciplinary proceedings." Id. at 6. Specifically, he asserts that
he "has been unable to renew his DEA license, which prevented him from practicing medicine and
engaging in lucrative opportunities, including surgery center ownership and other medical
practice-related business ventures." Id. ~ 26. Hameed further alleges he has been "unable to secure
users for a proprietary artificial intelligence-based medical charting application he developed"
previously "valued at over $25 million," because decisionmakers will not engage with Hameed
due to the Board's allegations, "[d]espite stroq.g performance metrics, internal testing, and
endorsements from industry leaders." Id. at 6-7 ~ 27. "In multiple instances, parties conducting
due diligence" regarding Hameed's venture "explicitly cited the Board's postings as the reason for
disengagement." 	Id. 	Additionally, Hameed asserts that colleagues have withdrawn from the
project due to concerns about reputational risk. Id.
C. 	Procedural History
On May 19, 2025, Hameed filed his complaint pro se. See ECF I. He brings three counts
ag,ainst Defendants. See id. at 7...:.9_ 	In Count One, Hameed alleges that Defendants violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and brings an action under§ 1983,for money
damages. 	See id. at 7-8. 	Hameed asserts that "Defendants, acting under color of state Jaw,
published stigmatizing and false charges . . . on public platforms" which were "central to the
deprivation of Plaintiffs liberty interest in practicing medicine and harmed his reputation and
business" and caused him to suffer "economic loss and reputational damage." Id. at 7 ~~ 30-31,
at 8 ~ 33. 	Hameed contends that "Defendants failed to provide procedural safeguards before or
after publishing these stigmatizing charges." Id. at~ 32.
In Count Two, Hameed attempts to assert another claim under § 1983 for "reputational
harm and interference with livelihood," although he does not specify under which federal law or
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constitutional provision his second § 1983 claim arises. 	See id at 8. 	Hameed contends that
"Defendants' continued publication of defamatory content after internal and judicial review found
it unproven constitutes a willful violation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights" and that Defendants
"acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs rights." Id. at 1134, 36. 	.
Finally, in Count Three, Hameed asserts a claim for defamation pursuant to Maryland
common law. See id.-at 8. He alleges that "Defendants published false statements regarding opioid
'addiction and habitual intoxication" and "did so knowing" the ALJ and expert witnesses found
those charges unsupported. 	Id 1137-38. 	Hameed contends that "Defendants' statements were
made with actual malice or reckless disregard for the truth" and that the "continued publication"
of such statements "after reinstatement and probation ending in 2025 constitutes a new defamatory
act within the statute oflimitations." Id. 1139, 40. For this claim, Hameed ~sserts that he "suffered
damages of over $30 million, including ... [!Jost incom~ of$5 million," "[!Joss enterprise value
of at least $25 million" related to his artificial intelligence medical charting company, and
"additional reputational, economic, and emotional harm." Id. at 8-9111-3.,
In addition to compensatory damages, Hameed asks the Court for punitive damages,
declaratory relief, to "[oJrder Defendants to remove or correct public records that continue to state
false charges," and an award of costs and attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, along with "any
other relief' the Court deems just and proper. 	Id. at 9. 	Hameed attaches six exhibits to his •
complaint, including his own curriculum vitae (Exhibit A), expert testimony (Exhibit B), joint
stipulations of fact (Exhibit C), and the decision and recommended order (Exhibit D) from the
administrative proceedings related to the •Board's charges, a "Public_ Display of_ Disproven
Addiction Charge" (Exhibit E), 	and pending "Maryland Physician Rehabilitation Program
Records" (Exhibit F). Id. at 10.
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The Defendants' motions to dismiss Hameed's complaint, ECFs 9, 17, 26, and 30, along
with Hameed's variety of motions, including those to supplement his. complaint and for judicial
notice, are now ripe for the Court's resolution.
II. 	LEGALSTANDARD
A. 	Rule 12(b)(1)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to move to dismiss a complaint for
a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 	Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the
plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that this Court has the authority to hear the case. Home
Buyers Warranty Corp. v. Hanna, 750 F.3d 427,432 (4th Cir. 2014). "Motions to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction are properly granted where a claim fails to allege facts upon which
the court may base jurisdiction." 	Davis v. Thompson, 367 F. Supp. 2d 792, 799 (D. Md. 2005)
(citing Crosten v. Kamauf, 932 F.Supp. 676, 679 (D. Md. 1996)). "[Q]uestions of subject-matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any point during the proceedings and may (or, more precisely, must)
be raised sua sponte by the court." Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. Datanet Engineering, Inc., 369
F.3d 385,390 (4th Cir. 2004).
In deciding whether a complaint alleges facts 	sufficient to 	support subject matter
jurisdiction, the Court assumes the truthfulness of the facts alleged. 	Kerns v. United States, 585
F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 2009). 	And the Court liberally construes pleadings by prose plaintiffs.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). That said, "a pro se plaintiff must still prove that
subject-matter jurisdiction exists." Adams v. Royal Park Nursing & Rehab., No. 20-cv-634, 2021
WL 4462914, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 2021).
B. 	Rule 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs dismissals for failure to "state a claim
upon which relief can be granted." In considering a motion under this rule, courts discount legal 	,
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conclusions stated in the complaint and "accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in
the complaint." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). 	A court then draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff and
considers whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief on its face. 	Nemet Chevrolet,
Ltd. v. Consumerajfairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009). 	"A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
"The complaint must offer 'more than labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation ·of
the elements ofa cause of action[.]"' Swaso v. Onslow Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 698 F. App'x 745, 747
(4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). At the same time,
a "complaint will not be dismissed as long as [it] provides sufficient detail about [the plaintiff's]
claim to show that [the plaintiff] has a more-than-conceivable chance of success on the merits."
Owens v. Balt. City State's Att'ys Off, 767 F.3d 379,396 (4th Cir. 2014).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Motions for Leave to File Supplemental Pleadings
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) provides that "[o]n motion and reasonable notice,
the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any
transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). "The court may permit supplementation even though the original pleading
'
is defective in stating a claim or defense." 	Id. 	As the Fourth Circuit has explained, "[a]
supplemental pleading differs from an amended pleading because it relates to matters occurring
subsequent to the filing of the initial complaint." Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 198 n.15 (4th Cir.
2002). 	But "[t]hi"s distinction is of little practical significance, however, because the standards
used by a district court in ruling on a motion to amend or on a motion to supplement are nearly
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identical." 	Id 	"In either situation, leave should be freely granted, and should be denied only
where 'good reason exists ... , such as prejudice to the defendants."' Id. (quoting Walker v. United
Parcel Serv., 240 F.3d 1268, 1278 (10th Cir. 2001)). The decision to grant leave is committed to
this Court's discretion. See id
On September 24, 2025, Hameed filed his first motion for leave to file a supplemental
pleading. 	See ECF 36. 	In his first motion, Hameed notes that "[o]n September 10, 2025, the
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration ('DEA') issued a Decision and Order
revoking Plaintiffs DEA Certificate of Registration No. FH8064204 and denying pending and
future applications." Id. at 4 1 1. 	The proposed supplemental pleading also notes that "DEA's
Office of the Administrator transmitted the Decision and Order to Plaintiff' on September 16,
2025. 	Id. 1 2. 	Hameed moves to supplement his complaint with this subsequent occurrence
becaus_e the DEA's decision "supplements the allegations of ongoing harm in this case, including
reputational and economic damages, by showing that Defendants' continued pu~lication of
stigmatizing 	and 	disproven 	allegations 	directly 	contributed 	to 	the 	DEA's 	action, 	thereby
compounding Plaintiffs injuries." Id at 1. Hameed attached the DEA's decision and order as an
exhibit to the motion. See id at 7-32. On November 16, 2025, Hameed filed a second motion for
leave to file supplemental pleading. See ECF 37. Hameed seeks to add to his complaint that on
"November 5, 2025, (the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, or] CMS ... notified Plaintiff
that his Medicare enrollment ... had been removed from active status." Id. at 4 1 1. 	"PECOS
system now shows that Plaintiffs Maryland enrollment has been revoked," which Hameed
contends was done "solely because of the DEA's revocation of Plaintiffs registration." Id 112,
3.
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"A supplemental pleading under Rule 15(d) presents more recent events. Rule 15(d) thus
promotes a complete adjudication of the dispute between the parties." 	Wood v. Yancey, No.
l:23CV462 (RDA/JFA), 2025 WL 2493327, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 27, 2025) (emphasis omitted).
"Motions to amend or supplement 'should generally be denied in instances of futility, undue delay,
bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, or undue prejudice to the non-moving party.'" Wood, 2025 WL 2493327, at *2 (quoting
Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 551 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2008)). 	Defendants have not
objected to Hameed's proposed supplements, and the Court agrees that they are proper since they
pertain to events that occurred subsequent to the filing of his complaint. 	See ECF I (original
complaint filed on May 19, 2025); ECF 36 (attempting to add the DEA's decision transmitted td
Hameed on September 16, 2025); ECF 37 (attempting to add CMS's notification to Hameed from
November 5, 2025). 	Accordingly, the Court ·will grant Hameed's motions for leave to file
supplemental pleadings.
B. 	Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts
On January 11, 2026, Hameed filed a motion for judicial notice of adjudicative facts. See
ECF 38. 	Hameed attaches to his motion approximately 300 pages of "statutes, regulations,
publicly available government records, official agency publications, court and administrative
dockets, and objectively verifiable numerical data." 	Id at I. 	Hameed asks the Court to take
judicial notice "pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201" of "institutional, structural, and
historical facts that provide necessary context for the Court's resolution of the pending Rule 12
motions and that courts in this Circuit routinely consider at the pleading stage." Id at 1-2. 	On
January 12, 2026, Hameed filed a supplement to his motion, striking and replacing two paragraphs
of his motion for judicial notice. 	See ECF 39. 	Defendants oppose Hameed's motion on the
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grounds that he "requests judicial notice of non-facts, facts that are disputed, and facts that are
irrelevant to the case at hand and beyond the scope of the complaint." ECF 40-1, at I.
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 governs the circumstances under which the Court may take
judicial notice of an adjudicative fact, which "are simply the facts of the particular case." See Fed.
R. Evid. 201(a) advisory committee note. At any stage of the litigation, a court may take judicial
notice on its own and must take judicial notice "if a party requests it and the. court is supplied with
the necessary in(orrnation." Fed. R. Evid. 20.l(c)-(d). "The court may judicially notice a fact that
is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court's
territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). "The party requesting judicial
notice of the fact bears the burden of proving that Rule 201's standard is satisfied." 	Barnett v.
United States, 650 F. Supp. 3d 412,440 (D.S.C. 2023), ajf'd, 132 F.4th 299 (4th Cir. 2025).
"The consequences of a court taking judicial notice are ·significant. Where ·the trial court
has taken judicial notice of a fact in a civil matter, the judge must instruct the jury to accept that
fact as conclusive." 	Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201(g)). 	"A court taking judicial notice may also
preclude the introduction of evidence to disprove the noticed fact." Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201 (g)
advisory committee note). 	"[A] 	'tradition of circumspection' 	surrounds judicial notice of
adjudicative facts, and courts should exercise caution in taking judicial notice, doing so only when
the matter is beyond reasonable controversy." 	Id. (first citing Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) advisory
committee note; and then citing In re Harmony Holdings, LLC, 393 B:R. 409, 412-13 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 2008)).
Here, Hameed "has failed to explain the ·particular facts of the exhibits [he] .wishes the
court to notice-instead the] asks the court to take judicial notice" of approximately 300 pages of
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exhibits, or nine categories of facts listed by way of26 paragraphs, see ECF 38, "in their entirety
as opposed to noticing specific statements contained therein," see Barnett, 650 F. Supp. 3d at 440.
"[A]sking the court to notice those documents in their entirety [is] disfavored because it could
yield unforeseen repercussions later in the litigation or appeals." Id. (citing Loftus v. F.D.L C., 989
F. Supp. 2d 483, 490 (D.S.C. 2013)). 	Moreover, as Defendants' opposition points out, some of
the information Hameed seeks judicial notice of are not matters beyond reasonable controversy.
See J]arnett, 650 F. Supp. 3d at 440. As the advisory committee notes to Rule 201 explain, "[t]he
usual method of establishing adjudicative facts in through the introduction of evidence, ordinaril):'
consisting of the testimony of witnesses." Fed. R. Evid. 201 advisory committee note. To dispense
with that process through judicial notice, "[a] high degree of indisputability is the essential
prerequisite." 	Id. 	A 	nongovernmental 	private 	database 	website, 	for 	example, 	such 	as
"OpenTheBooks.com,"· does not satisfy this standard, even if it purports to provide data from
"[p]ublicly available Maryland state employee payroll records." ECF 38, at 6111, at257 (Exhibit
D-11). See Gaza v. LTD Fin. Servs., LP., No. 8:14-CV-1012-T-30JSS, 2015 WL 5009741, at *2
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 2015) ("Courts have long recognized that private, non-governmental websites
are 	not 	the 	proper 	subject 	of .judicial 	notice."); 	Daniels 	v. 	Howe 	L. 	Firm, 	P.C., 	No.
115CV00827SCJRGV, 2016 WL 11581822, at *2 (N.D. Ga. May 17, 2016) (collecting cases),
report and recommendation adopted, No. I: 15-CV-0827-SCJ, 2016 WL 11581982 (N.D. Ga. June
15, 2016).
Furthermore, it is not clear that much of the information Hameed requests judicial notice
ofis relevant to the litigation. "Adjudicative facts must, by definition, be relevant." Barnett, 650
F. Supp. 3d at 440 (quoting United States v. LaRouche, 4 F.3d 987 (table) (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1993)
(per curiam)). 	"Further, whether information is the proper subject of judicial notice depends on
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the use to which it is put." Id. (quoting Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 FJd 549, 558
(4th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds, as recognized in Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 FJd 399,
405 (4th Cir. 2015)). Hameed does not specify how the information he includes in his motion is
relevant to his case in chief, other than to note that ".[t]he noticed facts provide essential .context
· for evaluating Defendants' motions to dismiss" and "will assist the Court in understanding the
statutory framework, 	institutional structure, and procedural realities underlying PlaintiffT']s
allegations without resolving disputed issues of fact." ECF 38, at 10. Cf Loftus, 989 F. Supp. 2d
at 490 (D.S.C. 2013) ("The Court finds that the documents submitted by the FDIC are extensive
... [and] Defendant has failed to satisfy its burden of demonstrating that each exhibit is relevant
to the instant Motion .... ").
Accordingly, the Court will deny Hameed's.motion for judicial notice of adjudicative facts
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 20 L The Court reiterates, however, that it takes all well-
pied factual allegations in Hameed's complaint (and supplemental pleadings) and reasonable
inferences flowing therefrom as true for the purposes of deciding the pending motions to dismiss.
See Vito/, S.A., 708 F.3d at 539.
C. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Younger Abstention
Defendants advance several arguments for dismissal in their motions under both Rule
12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6), including that this Court lacks subject .matter jurisdiction or should
otherwise decline to exercise its jurisdiction. See ECF 9-1, at 10; ECF 17-1, at 11, 23-24; ECF.
26-1, at 24-25; ECF 30-1, at 24-25. Although Defendants' arguments vary in some respects, they
share a common theme: "Plaintiff is attempting to relitigate in federal court a case he lost before a
State Board, approximately four ye~s ago, which he did not appeal.'' ECF 9-1, at 9; see also ECF
17-1, at 10; ECF 26-1, at 10; ECF 30-1, at 10.
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The Board first argues that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over
Hameed's lawsuit because "[t]here is no viable federal claim" in Hameed's complaint. ECF 9-1,
at 11. It is true that "[t]he mere assertion of a federal claim is not sufficient to obtain jurisdiction
under" § 1331. 	Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999). 	"Federal jurisdiction
requires that a party assert a substantial federal claim." Id. (emphasis in Lovern) (quoting Davis
v. Pak, 856 F.2d 648, 650 (4th Cir. 1988)). 	"[W]here a claim is obviously without merit," the
Supreme Court has "preclude[d] a federal district court from exercising its jurisdiction," otherwise
known as the "Hagans doctrine." 	Id at 654-55 (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536
(1974)).
Lovern v. Edwards provides a.salient example of the Hagans doctrine in action. In Lovern,
the plaintiff sued the superintendent of a public school system in federal district court, asserting
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). 	Id. at 650. 	The
plainiiffs complaint alleged, under § 1983, that the superintendent violated the plaintiffs
. constitutional rights by prohibiting the plaintiff from entering the property of the public school
system. 	Id. 	The district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims and
dismissed the case without prejudice. Id. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision,
concluding that the plaintiffs "claims fail to pass muster under the substantiality doctrine." Id. at
650; see also id. at 654-55. In so holding, the court emphasized that the plaintiff"had recourse to
appropriate state process to remedy any grievance arising from a school board's action against
him." Id at 655 n.11. "Virginia law provides for state court review of actions ofa school board,
and requires the state court to sustain such actions unless the board exceeded its authority, acted
arbitrarily or capriciously, or abused its discretion." Id (citing Va. Code§ 22.1-87).
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The Fourth Circuit reasoned in Lovern that "[t]he Hagans doctrine of substantiality is
especially important where a wholly frivolous federal claim s_erves as a pretext to allow a ·state-
law issue, the real focus of the claim, to be litigated in the federal system." Id at 655. "[F]ederal
courts must guard against the litigant who frames a pretextual federal issue solely for the purpose
of having a state-law claim adjudicated in the federal system; Article III of the Constitution forbids
this practice." Id. 	Hameed counters that jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343
"because Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1_983 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution." See ECF 21, at 19; ECF 33, at 3 I. 	But, as noted, "[t]he mere assertion of a
federal claim is not sufficient to obtain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3)."
Lovern, 190 F.3d at 654. 	Hameed's complaint must assert a."substantial federal claim," see id,
and the similarities between Hameed' s federal claims and those asserted in Lovern are striking.
Here, Hameed asserts a due process constitutional challenge under § 1983 that he could have
asserted on appeal to the circuit court under Maryland law. See SG § 10-222(a)(l), (c), (h)(3); HO
§ 14-408(a). Indeed, Maryland law provides for thorough review of the actions of the Board and
permits 	the 	Maryland judiciary 	to 	reverse 	or 	remand 	such 	actions 	if the 	Board 	acted
unconstitutionally, among other things. See SG § 10-222(h)(3); cf Lovern, 190 F.3d at 655 n.11.
The Court thus finds this case indistinguishable from Lovern and concludes that Hameed's federal·
claims fail to pass muster under the substantiality doctrine.
Hameed contends that jurisdiction is nevertheless proper "under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because
the parties are diverse: Plaintiff is a resident of the District of Columbia, while all Defendants are
residents of and perform their official duties within Maryland." ECF 33, at 31. And "[t]he amount
in controversy exceeds $30 million," Hameed contends, "far surpassing the $75,000 threshold
required for diversity jurisdiction." Id 	Defendants respond that Hameed's complaint has "failed
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to plead diversity jurisdiction (ECF 1, ,r 9)." ECF 24, at 4 n. l. The Court agrees with Defendants,
and Hameed "cannot supplement allegations found in a complaint by adding allegations through
an opposition brief." J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. King, Civ. No. ELH-14-953, 2014 WL 4269073,
at *6 n.7 (D. Md, Aug. 27, 2014) (citing Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Akzo, NV., 770 F. Supp.
1053, 1068 (D. Md. 1991)). 4
The Fourth Circuit has held that a plaintiff who both "failed to plead diversity jurisdiction"
and "also failed to plead facts from which the existence of such jurisdiction could properly be
inferred" could not proceed in federal court under § 1332. 	See Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll
Carolina Oil Co.; 145 F.3d 660, 663 (4th Cir. 1998). 	"As the Supreme Court has consistently
held, ... state citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction depends not on residence, but on
national citizenship and domicile." Id. (citing Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S.
826, 828 (1989)). "[T]he existence of such citizenship cannot be inferred from allegations of mere
residence, standing alone." Id. (collecting cases). In addition to failing to assert the statutory basis
for diversity jurisdiction, Hameed's complaint does not allege the citizenship, domicile, or
residence of any defendant, and thus does not properly invoke the Court's diversity jurisdiction.
See ECF !, at 1-10. 	That is likely because "the complaint had, in fact, never been intended to
invoke such jurisdiction, but had been drafted instead with deliberate intent to invoke only the
supplemental jurisdiction of the court." See Axel Johnson, Inc., 145 F.3d at 663.
4 But see Ford v. Master,Sec. Co., LLC, Civ. No. PWG-15-2220, 2016 WL 1752897, at *5 (D. Md.
May 3, 2016). Although Hameed is proceeding prose and the Court has an obligation to construe
his findings liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), Hameed has properly filed
motions to supplement his complaint in this litigation, see ECFs 36 and 37. Accordingly, the Court
will not construe his opposition memorandum as a supplement to his complaint, even if his
opposition memorandum did attempt to properly plead the Defendants' national citizenship and
domicile.
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Even assuming Hameed is correct that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this
lawsuit, other doctrines counsel the Court from exercising that jurisdiction here. Moore v. City of
Asheville, and its discussion of Younger abstention, is squarely on point. 	396 F.3d 385 (4th Cir.
2005). There, the plaintiff was cited for violating a city noise ordinance, a decision which could
be appealed to a city ordinance board and then further to the city manager. 	Id. at 388. 	North
Carolina common law permitted "judicial review of the [c]ity [m]anager's decision by a writ of
certiorari issued by a state Superior Court." Id. (citation omitted). The plaintiff in Moore paid the
first citation without challenge. Id. He appealed the second citation to the board but paid it without
further review after the board affirmed the violation. Id. 	"Rather than pursuing further his rights
of state administrative appeal and judicial review, [the plaintiff] apparently let the times for taking
appeal from his citations lapse, and he commenced this action in federal court." Id. at 389. The
plaintiff there sued the city, the city manager, and the police department, and he challenged the
constitutionality of Asheville's noise ordinance as applied to him. Id. The district court dismissed
certain defendants, but stayed the remainder of the case under the principles of Younger abstention
pending the outcome of the state proceedings, even though "it was certain that no state proceedings
.were pending and that the times for appealing the citations had elapsed." Id. at 390.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered whether Younger abstention compelled such a
result. 	"Stated simply, the Younger v. Harris doctrine holds that 'a federal court should abstain
from interfering in a state proceeding . . . if there is (I) an ongoing state judicial proceeding,
instituted prior to any substantial progress in the federal proceeding; that (2) implicates important,
substantial, or vital state interests; and (3) provides an adequate opportunity for the plaintiff to
raise the federal constitutional claim advanced in the federal lawsuit." 	Id. ( quoting Nivens v.
Gilchrist, 319 F.3d 151, 153 (4th Cir. 2003)). The plaintiff in Moore contended "the district court
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erroneously applied the doctrine of Younger v. Harris because that doctrine applies only to protect
ongoing state proceeding~ from federal interference." 	Id. at 391. 	Although the Fourth Circuit
recognized that the case didn't fall squarely within the situation contemplated by Younger, it
observed that the Supreme Court had extended the doctrine in subsequent cases "to bar a federal
action, even when the state court proceedings had ended by the time the federal complaint was
filed, .so long as the federal complaint was designed 'to annul the results of a state trial."' Id. at
394 (quoting Huffman v, Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592,608 (1975)).
The Fourth Circuit extended that rationale to state court administrative proceedings that
had already concluded by emphasizing "Younger's policy of commanding federal restraint when
the federal action is duplicative, casts aspersion on state proceedings, disrupts important state
enforcement efforts, and is designed to annul a state proceeding." Id. at 3 94-95. By initiating the
suit in federal court after the state administrative agency reached its determination, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff's suit would "relitigate a dispute that has already been resolved"
and "interfere[] with the State's interest in enforcing its substantive laws as well as its interest in
enforcing those laws through available administrative procedures and in its own courts." 	Id. at
395. 	Of course, if the plaintiff's complaint in Moore had been wholly prospective, the Fourth
Circuit agreed that Younger abstention principles would have no application. See id. at 396. But
because the plaintiff there brought an as applied constitutional challenge, the court concluded that
the plaintiff was "seek[ing] to annul the effects of the prior state administrative proceedings." Id.
So too here. Hameed's demand for monetary damages "are retrospective in that they seek
to compensate [Plaintiff] for injury that has already occurred; they look backward toward a wrong
committed in the past." 	Id. at 397 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974)).
Moreover, Hameed requests injunctive relief that would effectively annul the State administrative
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proceedings insofar as he asks the Court to"[ o]rder Defendants to remove or correct public records
that continue to state false charges." 	See ECF I, at 9. 	The Board, in light of the results of its
statutory disciplinary process, is required by Maryland law to "post on the board's Web site each
final, public order for a disciplinary sanction issued to a licensee or certificate holder." IfO § 1-
607. Similarly, the Board must "create and maintain a public individual profile on each licensee
that includes ... [a] summary of charges filed against the licensee" and "[a] description of any
disciplinary action taken by the Board or a disciplinary panel against the licensee within the mos(
recent I 0-year period that includes a copy of the public order," among other things. 	HO § 14-
411. l (b )(l}-(2). 	The only mechanism by which Hameed could have escaped the force of
Mary land law on this point was by challenging the 2021 Final Order itself through the avenues of
review in state court. 5
Rather than attempt to distinguish _this case from the teachings of Moore, Hameed's
oppositiqn memoranda confirms that Hameed' s lawsuit is really an attempt to "relitigate a dispute
5 The Court in Moore observed that "a defendant to a coercive state administrative proceeding
must exhaust his state administrative and judicial remedies and may not bypass them in favor of a
federal 	court proceeding 	in which he seeks 	effectively 	'to 	annul 	the 	results' 	of a state
administrative body." Moore, 396 F.3d at,388 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The Court is
satisfied that the administrative proceedings to which Hameed was subject, like those in Moore,
were "unquestionably coercive." See id at 395 n.4; see also Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Wilson,
519 F.3d 156, 166 (4th Cir. 2008) ("The administrative hearing procedures are clearly coercive
and 'judicial in nature'-not legislative." (citation omitted)). 	Although "[n]either Moore nor
Laurel Sand lay out a clear method for determining whether a proceeding is remedial or coercive,"
"[c]ourts have found three factors relevant to determining whether administrative proceedings and
subsequent state court review are remedial or coercive." Dukes v. Maryland, Civ. No. CCB-11-
876, 2011 WL 4500885, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2011). 	A coercive proceeding is generally one
that (I) "has been initiated by the state; where the participation of the federal plaintiff in the state
proceeding was 'mandatory,"' (2) "is itself the wrong which the federal plaintiff seeks to correct
via injunctive relief," and (3) concerns "the commission by the federal plaintiff of some alleged
'bad act.'" Id. (citations omitted). The Court concludes that the Board's disc.iplinary proceeding,
as set out by statute, is coercive, as it is state-initiated, effecti:vely mandates the participation of
the physician, is itself the process which Hameed effectively challenges here, and concerned
Hameed's alleged commission of misconduct in violation of the Health Occupations Article.
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that has already been resolved." See Moore, 396 F.3d at 395. For example, Hameed writes in his
opposition that "there· is good cause to believe" that Defendants engaged in "charge-stacking"
throughout the disciplinary process, which is "directly related to the willful concealment and
inaction despite exculpatory evidence" that Hameed alleges existed in his case. 	ECF 21, at 4.
Hameed further asserts that the disciplinary processes for the Board established by the Maryland
Code and implementing regulations "mandate confidentiality, timely notice, and a framework for
exculpatory evidence to be considered." Id. at 5. However, that is-exactly the kind of argument
that Hameed should have litigated in an appeal of the Board's final order, see SG § 10-222(h)(3);
it is not the appropriate subject of an attempted collateral attack on state administrative proceedings
in federal court. 	That Hameed "did_ not avail him_self of state-provided avenues for review can
only cast aspersion on the State's 'capabilities and.good faith,' and deprive the State of'a function
which quite legitimately is left [to the state appellate bodies], that of overseeing [agency]
dispositions 	of constitutional issues which arise in civil 	litigation over which they have
jurisdiction."' Moore, 396 F.3d at 395 (quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 608). Moreover, any relief
issued by this Court could impede the State's substantive interest "in ensuring that physicians, who
violate the laws that the Board enforces, are regulated in order 'to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of the public."' 	ECF 9-1, at 13 (quoting HO § 1-102(a)). 	The relief Haineed seeks in
federal court "would be duplicatiye, would disrupt the State's substantive policies, would offend
the State's appellate processes, and would undo what the State has done by a now-nonappealable
order." Moore, 396 F.3d at 395. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise any subject matter
jurisdiction it may have over Hameed's claims.
D. 	Statutes of Limitations
The Court is also compelled to dismiss Hameed' s complaint because his claims are barred
by the applicable statutes of limitations. 	"The raising of the statute of limitations as a bar to
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plaintiffs' cause of action constitutes an affirmative defense and may be raised by motion pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), if the time bar is apparent on the face of the complaint." 	Dean v.
Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 395 F.3d 471, 474 (4th Cir. 2005) (first citing Bethel v. 	Jendoco
Construction Corp., 570 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1978); and then citing 2A Moore's Federal Practice§
8.28, at 8-270 (2d ed. 1948)). 	"The Court must dismiss any claim filed after the statute of
limitations period has expired." Deramus v. Montgomery Cnty. Domestic Reis. Section, Civ. No.
GJH-18-2337, 2019 WL 2395311, at *2 (D. Md. June 5, 2019) (citing Wenz/ajfv. NationsBank,
940 F. Supp. 889, 890 (D. Md. 1996)).
Hameed brings two kinds of claims-a constitutional claim under § 1983 and a state law
defamation claim. See generally ECF 1. With respect to the former, "[t]he statute of limitations
for§ 1983 claims is borrowed froiii the applicable state's statute of limitations for personal-injury
actions, even when a plaintiff's particular § 1983 claim does not involve personal injury."
Deramus, 2019 WL 2395311, at *2 (Tommy Davis Const., Inc. v. Cape Fear Pub. Util. Auth., 807
F.3d 62, 66-67 (4th Cir. 2015)). "In Maryland, the applicable statute oflimitations is three years
from the date of the occurrence giving rise.to the cause of action." Id. (quoting Md. Code Ann.,
Cts. & Jud. Proc. ("CJP") § 5-101). 	With respect to Hameed's defamation claim, however,
Maryland.law mandates such an action "be filed \\'.ithin one year froni the date it accrues." See
CJP § 5-105. 	Generally, a "statute of limitations begins to run 'when the plaintiff possesses
sufficient facts about the harm done to him that reasonable inquiry will reveal his cause of action.'"
Deramus, 2019 WL 2395311, at *2 (quotingNassim v. Md House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951,955 (4th
Cir. 1995)).
According to Hameed's complaint, the Board's final order was issued in 2021. ECF 1, at
5. Hameed's complaint was filed on May 19, 2025, over three years aft~r the published final order
23
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and thus after both the general three-year· and specific one-year statute of limitations had run. See
id. 	However, perhaps anticipati~g this issue as to his defamation claim, 6 Hameed notes in his
complaint that "Defendants' continued publication after reinstatement and probation ending in
2025 constitutes a new defamatory act within the statute of limitations." Id. at 8141. Defendants
contend that Hameed's approach to the statute of limitations applicable to his defamation claim is
flawed. See ECF 9-1, at 17; ECF 17-J, at 19; ECF 26-1, at 18; ECF 30-1, at 18. Defendants have
the better argument.
As noted, in a defamation action, "the Maryland statute of limitations begins to run when
the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that the defendant committed a wrongful act
which injured or damaged the plaintiff." Hickey v. St. Martin's Press, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 230,235
(D. Md. 1997). 	"Under the 'single publication rule,' only one action fo~ dama~es can be
maintained as to any single publication." 	Id. (citing Morrissey v. William Morrow & Co., 739
F.2d 962, 967 (4th Cir. 1984)); see also Lokhova v. Halper, 995 F.3d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 2021)
("The single publication rule 'permits only one cause of action to be maintained for any single
publication, even if heard or read by two or more third persons."' (citatioi;i omitted)). 	Although
6 Hameed's oppositions mostly fail to address the statute of limitations argument Defendants
advance related to his§ 1983 claims. See ECF 21 (discussing the statute of limitations as to his
defamation claim); ECF 33, at 15-17 (same). 	To the extent Hameed mentions the statute of
limitations applicable to § 1983, he appears to contend that a "continuing violation" approach -is
also applicable to his due process claim. See ECF 33, at 10, 26. However, the process at issue is
necessarily confined to the 2020-2021 time period described in the complaint, and Hameed does
not allege defects in any process that folio.wed that period-primarily because he failed to utilize
that process to appeal the Board's final order. 	See Doe v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ.,
400 F. Supp. 3d 479,493 (W.D. Va. 2019) (agreeing that claims.of due process violations in the
initial decisional process accrue at the time of the initial decision, but observing that accrual might
come later for defects alleged in an appeal process). Moreover, the Court has found no support in
case law for Hameed's novel assertion that "[a]t each point that exculpatory evidence was
transmitted to the Board, and it failed to act or continued disseminating inaccurate information, a
new due process violation accrued," ECF 21, at 13, nor has the Court identified allegations in
Hameed's complaint that would date any alleged failure to act beyond 2021.
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"subsequent 	distribution 	of a 	defamatory 	statement 	may 	continue 	to 	mcrease 	plaintiff's
compensable damages, ... the subsequent distribution does not ... start the statute of limitations
running anew." Lokhova, 995 F.3d at 142 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Under
the 'multiple publication rule,' every saie or delivery of the defamatory article is viewed as a
distinct publication which causes injury to the defamed person and cr_eates a separate basis for a
cause of action." 	Hickey, 978 F. Supp. at 235 (citing Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 512
P.2d 702, 705 (Mont. 1973)). "The great majority of the States n'ow follow the single publication
rule." Morrissey, 739 F.2d at 967 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 777
n.8 (1984)).
In the absence of governing authority, this Court has before predicted that the Maryland
Supreme Court "would adopt the single publication rule." Hickey, 978 F. Supp. at 236. 	Over 25
years later, however, it appears that the Supreme Court of Maryland still has not had reason to
address this question. For the reasons articulated by Judge Harvey in Hickey, the Court likewise
concludes that the Supreme Court of Maryland would adopt the single publication rule if faced
with the.question today. See id. at 235-37. In sum, and "[a]s various courts have recognized, the
multiple publication rule allows a plaintiff to harass a defendant by bringing numerous causes of
action against the same defendant and also renders the statute of limitations in libel actions a
nullity." Id. at 236 (first citing Givens v. Quinn, 877 F. Supp. 485,488 (W.D. Mo. 1994); and then
citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 549 A.2d 1187, 1190 (N.H. 1988)). "[T]he single publication
rule 'is the better rule because it reflects the facts of modern-day mass publishing and duplicating
and gives effect to the policy ofrepose underlying the statute oflimitations. "' Id. (quoting Church
of Scientology v. Minn State Med. Ass'n Found., 264 N.W.2d 152, 155 (Minn, 1978)).
25
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Applying the single publication rule to Hameed's .defamation claim, the Court concludes
that the complaint permits the inference that Defendants published "false statements regarding
opioid addiction and habitual intoxication" in 2021 at the latest. See ECF 1, at 5, 8-9. Hameed's
defamation claim is thus barred by Maryland's one year limitations period. 	And because
Hameed's § 1983 claims are also barred under the applicable three-year statute of limitations, the
Court concludes that all 'claims in Hameed' s complaint are time-barred and thus must be dismissed.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court need not address the numerous other arguments Defendants provide in support
of their motions to dismiss Hameed's complaint. For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff's motions
to supplement his complaint are granted, the Plaintiff's motion for judicial notice is denied, the
Plaintiffs motions to file surreplies are granted, and the Defendants' motions. to dismiss are
granted. The Clerk will be directed to close this case.
A separate implementing order will issue.
Dated: January 30, 2026 	Isl
Brendan A. Hurson
United States District Judge
26.
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