Ndzie v. Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream

1:25-cv-01384Mdd10 de dez. de 2025

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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ARIELLE MBARGA NDZIE, 	*
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Plaintiff, 	*
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v. 	* 	Civil No. SAG-25-1384
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DREYER’S GRAND ICE CREAM, INC., 	*
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Defendant. 	*
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* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Arielle Mbarga Ndzie, who is self-represented, filed this lawsuit against her
former employer, Defendant Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. (“DGIC”). ECF 1.1 	DGIC has filed
a motion to dismiss the Complaint as untimely. ECF 20. Plaintiff filed an opposition, ECF 22, and
DGIC filed a reply, ECF 23. This Court has reviewed the briefing, and no hearing is necessary.
See 	Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons stated 	herein, DGIC’s motion 	to dismiss will be
GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on February 15, 2024. ECF 20-2,
which alleged the following facts: In April, 2023, one of her supervisors, Gulrez Arshman, asked
1 	Plaintiff thereafter 	filed a “supplement” to 	her Complaint which appears to be an Amended
Complaint referencing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”), 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k). ECF 5. It
is unclear which version (the Complaint or the “Supplement”) was served on DGIC. Regardless,
Plaintiff’s EEOC charge does not mention pregnancy discrimination, only discrimination on the
basis of national origin and sex. ECF 20-2 at 2. Because the PDA is codified as part of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 	et. seq, and because the PDA
specifies that Title VII's prohibition against sex 	discrimination applies to discrimination “because
of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,” this Court need not
separately address the issue of whether Plaintiff’s EEOC charge stated 	a separate pregnancy
discrimination claim.
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her what she was chewing. ECF 20-2 at 3. When she responded that she was not chewing anything,
Arshman forcibly searched her mouth and pants pocket without consent. 	Id. 	In June, 2023,
Arshman told Plaintiff and three other employees whom he suspected were French Cameroonian
that they were marginalizing English-speaking Cameroonians. 	Id. 	He said that the “only
Cameroonian he can stand” is an English-speaking Cameroonian, Patience Ngum. 	Id.
On another occasion in June, 2023, Arshman said 	to Plaintiff, “Cameroonian, I will teach
you the meaning of karma,” but claimed it was a joke. 	Id. 	A few days later, he accused Plaintiff of
not allowing an employee to go on break. 	Id. 	He again said he would teach her about karma and
stated that he was going to get her fired because she was not from the English-speaking part of
Cameroon. 	Id.
In June, 2023, Plaintiff applied for the “lead position.” 	Id. 	Arshman asked her why she was
applying, and she explained that she was very qualified. 	Id. 	Plaintiff did not receive an interview
for the position, and it was awarded to a Ghanaian employee who was “less qualified.” 	Id.
Plaintiff was pregnant during this time and was experiencing a lot of stress. 	Id. 	The day
that Arshman accused Plaintiff of not allowing an employee to go on break, she started bleeding
and experiencing miscarriage symptoms. 	Id. 	She went home and eventually suffered a miscarriage.
Id. 	She took time off from work, during which she received calls from colleagues stating that
Arshman had told them he had Plaintiff fired. 	Id.
When Plaintiff returned to work, Human Resources told her she had not been fired. 	Id. 	Two
weeks later, however, at the end of July, 2023, Arshman told Plaintiff she was fired and that she
should go home. 	Id. 	Nobody explained the basis for the termination to Plaintiff. 	Id.
Plaintiff’s EEOC charge, after summarizing those facts, alleged discrimination based on
national 	origin 	and 	sex. 	ECF 	20-2. 	During 	her 	administrative 	proceedings, 	Plaintiff 	was
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represented by an attorney, Alex Razazi, Esq. 	See 	ECF 20-3. On January 27, 2025, at 11:09 a.m.,
the EEOC emailed a Right-to-Sue notice to both Plaintiff and Mr. Razazi (as well as DGIC). ECF
20-4. Plaintiff specifically conceded, in her Complaint, that she received her notice of right to sue
on January 27, 2025. ECF 1 at 6. The Right-to-Sue Notice advised Plaintiff that any Title VII
lawsuit “must be filed in a federal or state court WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this
notice; 	or your right to sue based on 	this charge will be lost.” ECF 20-4 (emphasis in original).
Ninety days from January 27, 2025 is April 27, 2025.
Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this case several days late, on May 1, 2025. ECF 1.
II. 	ANALYSIS
Title VII discrimination claims must be filed within 90 days of receipt of a right to sue
letter, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1), and that deadline is strictly enforced. 	Baldwin Cty. Welcome Ctr.
v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984) (per curiam); 	see also Moulden v. Tangherlini, No. RDB-14-
3506, 2015 WL 8757609, at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 15, 2015) (“Courts strictly enforce the ninety day
filing requirement, even if the plaintiff is 	pro se.”); 	Harvey v. City of New Bern Police Dep't, 813
F.2d 652, 654 (4th Cir. 1987) (describing that a complaint filed ninety-one days after receipt of
notice was untimely). While equitable tolling can be available, it 	applies “only in ‘those rare
instances where—due to circumstances external to the party’s own conduct—it would be
unconscionable to enforce the limitation period . . . and gross injustice would result.’” 	Kramer v.
Bd. of Educ. of Balt. Cnty., 788 F. Supp. 2d 421, 426 (D. Md. 2011) (quoting 	Rouse v. Lee, 339
F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc)); 	see also Crabill v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
423 F. App'x 314, 321 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that equitable tolling applies in two kinds of
situations: “In the first, the complainant has been 	induced or tricked . . . into allowing the filing
deadline to pass. In the second, ‘extraordinary 	circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control made
it impossible to file the claims on 	time.’” (citations omitted)).
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Plaintiff does not allege any type of inducement or trickery and does not argue for equitable
tolling. Instead, she argues that 	she “actually received 	the Notice on February 	14, 2025 via email.”
ECF 22 at 1. While Plaintiff has established that the Howard County Office of Human Rights and
Equity (“HCOHRE”) forwarded her a copy of the 	Notice attached to its email on February 14,
2025, ECF 22-1, she has not adduced evidence contravening the evidence that she had received
the same Notice when it was emailed to her on January 27, 2025.2 	In fact, in her Complaint, she
admitted that she did receive it on January 27.3
Because the record is clear that Plaintiff received the notice on January 27, 2025, her claims
are barred as untimely. DGIC’s motion will be granted, and Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed
with prejudice. This case will be closed.
Dated: December 10, 2025 	/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States District Judge
2 	In addition to filing the January 27, 2025 email showing that it was sent to both Plaintiff and her
counsel, ECF 20-4, DGIC filed the correspondence HCOHRE sent to the parties on February 14,
2025. ECF 23-1. HCOHRE’s letter stated, “On 	January 27, 2025, the [EEOC] informed the
[HCOHRE] that Complainant, Ms. Arielle Mbarga had requested a Notice of Right to Sue. The
Notice of Right to Sue was issued on January 27 by the EEOC. Enclosed you will find a copy of
the Notice. As a result, this matter was 	closed administratively on February 14, 2025.” 	Id. 	The
purpose of HCOHRE’s correspondence was advise the 	parties that it also had administratively
closed its investigation, not to transmit 	the EEOC’s Notice in the first instance.
3 	“[W]here facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense”—here, timeliness—“are alleged in
the complaint, the defense may be reached by 	a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6).”
Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
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