Cromwell v. Bisignano

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Chambers of
Douglas R. Miller
United States Magistrate Judge
101 West Lombard Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
MDD_DRMChambers@mdd.uscourts.gov
(410) 962-7770
February 24, 2026
LETTER TO ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD
Re: Lyaundra C. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner, Social Security Administration1
Civil No. 24-3659-DRM
Dear Counsel:
On December 18, 2024, Plaintiff Lyaundra C. (“Plaintiff”) petitioned this Court to review
the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA’s” or “Commissioner’s” or “Defendant’s”) final
decision to deny Plaintiff’s claim for Social Security benefits. ECF No. 1. This case was then
referred to me with the parties’ consent. See 28 U.S.C. § 636; Loc. R. 301. I have considered the
record in this case and the parties’ briefs. ECF Nos. 8, 11, 13, 14. I find that no hearing is necessary.
See Loc. R. 105.6. The Court must uphold the decision of the SSA if it is supported by substantial
evidence and if the SSA employed proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3);
Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I will REMAND the
Commissioner’s decision. This letter explains why.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a Title II application for Disability Insurance Benefit benefits (“DIB”) and a
Title XVI application for Supplemental Society Income Benefits (“SSI”) on December 5, 2019,
alleging a disability onset of September 6, 2019 in both applications. Tr. 17. Plaintiff’s claims were
denied initially and on reconsideration. Tr. 172-179. On September 21, 2023, an Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing. Tr. 14-37. Following the hearing, on December 14, 2023, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act2
during the relevant time frame. Tr. 14-37. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for
review, Tr. 1-6, so the ALJ’s decision constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the SSA, Sims
v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106–07 (2000); see also 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(a).
1 Plaintiff filed this case against Carolyn Colvin, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on
December 18, 2024. ECF No. 1. Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on
May 7, 2025. Accordingly, Commissioner Bisignano has been substituted as this case’s Defendant
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.
Case 1:24-cv-03659-DRM Document 16 Filed 02/24/26 Page 1 of 6

Lyaundra C. v. Frank Bisignano
Civil No. 24-3659-DRM
February 24, 2026
Page 2
II. THE ALJ’S DECISION
Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). The ALJ is required to evaluate a claimant’s disability determination
using a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. “Under this
process, an ALJ evaluates, in sequence, whether the claimant: ‘(1) worked during the alleged
period of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled the
requirements of a listed impairment; (4) could return to [their] past relevant work; and (5) if not,
could perform any other work in the national economy.’” Kiser v. Saul, 821 F. App’x 211, 212
(4th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted) (quoting Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012)).
Here, at step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had “not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since September 6, 2019, the amended alleged onset date.” Tr. 19. At step two, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of “degenerative disc disease of the
lumbar spine with a lumbar disc herniation at the L5-S1 levels with post-laminectomy syndrome;
seizures; irritable bowel syndrome; migraine headaches; asthma; intermittent explosive disorder;
and major depressive disorder.” Tr. 20. At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “does not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of
one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Tr. 21-24. The ALJ
also determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the
claimant is capable of standing and/or walking no more than four hours in an eight-
hour work day; never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; occasionally climb ramps
or stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl; must avoid concentrated exposure
to extreme cold and extreme heat; and must avoid all exposure to any hazards, such
as dangerous moving machinery and unprotected heights, but is not capable of
commercial driving. The claimant is capable of simple, routine, and repetitive
tasks, in a low-stress job, defined as having only occasional decision making
required, occasional changes in the work setting, and no fast-paced production
requirements, such as fast-paced assembly line work or high-volume piecemeal
quotas. The claimant is capable of no more than occasional interaction with the
general public, co-workers, and supervisors. She must be afforded the opportunity
for brief, five-to-ten-minute changes of positions at intervals not to exceed one hour
without being off task.
Tr. 24-25. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work but
could perform jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy, such as office
helper, retail stock clerk, and mail clerk. Tr. 30-31. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff
was not disabled. Tr. 32.
Case 1:24-cv-03659-DRM Document 16 Filed 02/24/26 Page 2 of 6

Lyaundra C. v. Frank Bisignano
Civil No. 24-3659-DRM
February 24, 2026
Page 3
III. LEGAL STANDARD
The scope of the Court’s review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s factual findings and whether the decision was reached through the application
of the correct legal standards. See Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). “The
findings of the [ALJ] . . . as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive .
. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “evidence which a reasoning mind would accept
as sufficient to support a particular conclusion.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir.
1966). It is “more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Id. In
conducting the “substantial evidence” inquiry, my review is limited to whether the ALJ analyzed
the relevant evidence and sufficiently explained their findings and rationale in crediting the
evidence. See, e.g., Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438, 439–40 (4th Cir. 1997);
DeLoatche v. Heckler, 715 F.2d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 1983) (“Judicial review of an administrative
decision is impossible without an adequate explanation of that decision by the [ALJ].”).
IV. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC and step-five findings are unsupported by
substantial evidence because the ALJ posed an inadequate hypothetical to the vocational expert
(“VE”). ECF No. 11 at 8. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ included a limitation to work with “no
fast-paced production requirements” without defining the phrase, which is not addressed in the
regulations or the DOT, and that the ALJ’s brief examples (i.e. “such as fast-paced assembly line
work or high-volume piecemeal quotas”) did not clarify its scope. Id. at 8-14. Plaintiff also asserts
that undefined production-pace restrictions prevent meaningful review and undermine the
reliability of the VE’s testimony. As a result, Plaintiff maintains that the Commissioner failed to
meet the step-five burden, and remand is warranted. Id.
In response, the Commissioner contends that the ALJ’s RFC and step-five findings are
supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ adequately explained the limitation to “no fast-
paced production requirements.” ECF No. 13 at 6. According to the Commissioner, the ALJ
supplied sufficient context by providing examples, i.e. fast-paced assembly-line work and high-
volume piecemeal quotas, and a limitation within broader restrictions to simple, routine tasks,
simple decisions, and few workplace changes. Id. The Commissioner further contends that the
ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s mental-health records, activities, and the persuasive state-agency
opinions demonstrates a reasonable “logical bridge,” and that Plaintiff has not shown she cannot
perform the non-production-oriented work identified at step five. Id. at 14.
The Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence at
step five. Courts look “to an existing administrative record and [ask] whether it contains ‘sufficient
evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations” when reviewing for substantial
evidence. Trena Sue Y. v. Kijakazi, No. DLB-20-1075, 2021 WL 4034264, at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 3,
2021) (citing Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (internal citation omitted)). Agency
conclusions must be stated in terms the Court can understand for the Court to conduct substantial
evidence review.
Case 1:24-cv-03659-DRM Document 16 Filed 02/24/26 Page 3 of 6

Lyaundra C. v. Frank Bisignano
Civil No. 24-3659-DRM
February 24, 2026
Page 4
In Thomas v. Berryhill, the Fourth Circuit held that the ALJ’s RFC assessment limiting the
plaintiff to work that did not “require[e] a production rate or demand pace” frustrated judicial
review because the ALJ did not provide the Court with “enough information to understand what
those terms mean[t].” 916 F.3d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (Feb. 22, 2019). The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that, with “production rate” and “demand pace” undefined, it was “difficult, if
not impossible, for [the Court] to assess whether their inclusion in Thomas’s RFC [wa]s supported
by substantial evidence.” Id. Without deciding whether the RFC itself was substantively correct,
the court remanded for “a clearer window into” the ALJ’s reasoning. Thomas, 916 F.3d at 312 n.5.
The panel emphasized that, on remand, the ALJ must clarify how long and under what conditions
the claimant could sustain focus and remain on task. Id. And although Thomas identified other
grounds for remand, later Fourth Circuit decisions relied solely on the failure to define ambiguous
RFC terms as sufficient justification for reversal. In Trena Sue, the court likened the use of the
phrase “fast paced produced” to the terms in Thomas, both in “form and defect.” Trena Sue, 2021
WL 4034264 at *4.
Here, like in Trena Sue and Thomas, the ALJ’s use of the terms “fast-paced production
requirements” and “fast-paced assembly line work or high-volume piecemeal quotas” does not
provide sufficient information for the Court to discern the intended meaning of the limitation,
making it effectively impossible for the Court to evaluate whether the decision is supported by
substantial evidence. See Trena Sue, 2021 WL 4034264 at *4; Thomas, 916 F.3d at 311–12.
In Linger v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-2192, 2025 WL 40548, at *5 (4th Cir. Jan. 7,
2025), the Fourth Circuit considered a formulation, “no fast paced production requirements such
as assembly line work or piecemeal quotas,” very similar to the one at issue here. The court found
that while “assembly line work” and “piecemeal quotas” were “some examples” that the ALJ
provided of “fast paced production requirements,” “there remains uncertainty as to the intended
scope of the limitation, and such uncertainty precludes meaningful review as to whether there is a
logical bridge between the evidence in the record and the ALJ’s conclusion.” Id at *5 (citing Perry
v. Berryhill, 765 F. App’x 869, 872 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding the ALJ failed to offer a definition for
his RFC determination of “non-production oriented work setting” and that “[a]s a result, we remain
uncertain as to what the ALJ intended . . . and cannot meaningfully assess whether there is a logical
bridge between the evidence in the record and the ALJ’s conclusion”) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Here, just as in Linger, the ALJ adopted a limitation to “no fast-paced production
requirements such as fast-paced assembly line work or high-volume piecemeal quotas,” but offered
no clarification beyond these examples—which are themselves ambiguous since “fast-paced” and
“high-volume” are purely relative terms. Tr. 24-25. Without such context, the Court cannot discern
the intended scope of the limitation or meaningfully evaluate whether the VE’s testimony reliably
supports the ALJ’s step-five finding, mirroring the deficiencies identified in Thomas and Linger.
The Commissioner argues that other limitations or descriptors in the RFC provide sufficient
context for understanding “no fast-paced production requirements,” correctly noting that in Perry
Case 1:24-cv-03659-DRM Document 16 Filed 02/24/26 Page 4 of 6

Lyaundra C. v. Frank Bisignano
Civil No. 24-3659-DRM
February 24, 2026
Page 5
v. Berryhill, 765 F. App’x 869, 872 (4th Cir. 2019), the Fourth Circuit drew a distinction between
the result in Thomas (remanded) and that in Sizemore v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 72, 80-81 (4th Cir.
2017) (affirmed), pointing to the presence of similar descriptors in the latter case’s RFC. See also
Ricky F. v. O’Malley, No. 1:23CV720, 2024 WL 4333136, *5 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 27, 2024). ECF
No. 13 at 8-9.
However, in the Fourth Circuit’s subsequent decision in Linger, the court found that the ALJ
failed to adequately define the RFC determination of “no fast paced production requirements”
notwithstanding inclusion of the following mental limitations language:
limited to simple, routine and repetitive 1 to 2 step tasks; requiring only simple
decisions; with no fast paced production requirements such as assembly line work or
piecemeal quotas; is capable of adapting to changes in the work environment,
meaning a change in work responsibilities or work place, which are explained to the
claimant ahead of time and implemented gradually over time; and can [have]
occasional contact with coworkers, supervisors, and the general public.
Linger, 2025 WL 40548, at *4. That language is similar in kind to the mental limitations language
in the present case:
The claimant is capable of simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, in a low-stress job,
defined as having only occasional decision making required, occasional changes in
the work setting, and no fast-paced production requirements, such as fast-paced
assembly line work or high-volume piecemeal quotas. The claimant is capable of no
more than occasional interaction with the general public, co-workers, and
supervisors.
Tr. 24-25.
As in Linger, even with this added context, the Court cannot discern the intended scope of
the limitation or meaningfully evaluate whether the VE’s testimony reliably supports the ALJ’s
step-five finding. Remand is therefore appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the SSA’s
judgment is REMANDED.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be docketed as a Memorandum Opinion.
A separate implementing Order follows.
Case 1:24-cv-03659-DRM Document 16 Filed 02/24/26 Page 5 of 6

Lyaundra C. v. Frank Bisignano
Civil No. 24-3659-DRM
February 24, 2026
Page 6
Sincerely,
/s/
Douglas R. Miller
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:24-cv-03659-DRM Document 16 Filed 02/24/26 Page 6 of 6