Davis v. Manning et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
HASAAN KALONJI DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
LAWRENCE MANNING, M.D., et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. DKC-24-3606
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending in this civil rights case concerning medical care are a motion to dismiss filed on
behalf of Defendant Dr. Bryan Klepper (ECF No. 30),1 a motion to stay filed on behalf of
Defendants Dr. Lawrence Manning; Dr. Yonas Sisay; Yvette Ledjo, NP; Emmanuel Esianor, PA;
Lum Maximuangu, NP; and Chidi Oriaku, RN (ECF No. 27), and a motion to dismiss, or
alternatively for summary judgment filed on behalf of YesCare Corp. (ECF No. 33). 	Self-
represented Plaintiff Hasaan Kalonji Davis opposes the dispositive motions and requests
appointment of counsel. ECF Nos. 40, 43, 45.2 Defendants Dr. Bryan Klepper and YesCare Corp.
filed replies. (ECF Nos. 41, 44 respectively). No hearing is deemed necessary as the issues have
been fully briefed. 	See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). 	For the reasons set forth below, the
motion to stay is denied, Defendant Dr. Bryan Klepper’s motion to dismiss is granted as herein set
forth, and YesCare Corp.’s motion is denied without prejudice. 	Counsel shall be appointed to
represent Mr. Davis.
1 	Defendant Klepper initially filed a Motion to Dismiss on June 3, 2026 (ECF No. 22) and
later filed a “Line” seeking to withdraw that motion. ECF No. 32. The request to withdraw the
June 3, 2026, Motion is granted.
2 	Mr. Davis’ Motion for Extension of Time (ECF No. 42) is granted nunc pro tunc.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Mr. Davis’ Allegations
Plaintiff Hasaan Kalonji Davis (“Mr. Davis”), formerly a Maryland state inmate, filed a
civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 on December 12, 2024. ECF No. 1.3 Mr. Davis
alleges that he has been denied constitutionally adequate medical care and suffered medical neglect
due to the delay and failure of Defendants to treat his torn pectoralis muscle properly. 	Id. 	He
named as Defendants Dr. Lawrence Manning; Dr. Yonas Sisay; Yvette Ledjo, NP; Emmanuel
Esianor, PA; Lum Maximuangu, NP; Chidi Oriaku, RN; YesCare, Inc.; Corizon Health, Inc.; Dr.
Bryan Klepper; and Ermano Costabile.4 Id. He seeks injunctive relief in the nature of medical
care and compensatory damages. ECF No. 1 at 17, 19.
Mr. Davis explains that in December of 2020, while weightlifting, he dropped weights on
himself, tearing his pectoralis muscle. 	ECF No. 1 at 6, 9. 	He alleges that medical care for his
injury was denied and delayed. Specifically, Mr. Davis asserts that his medical providers refused
to provide sufficient diagnostic testing, specialty consultations, pain management, and physical
therapy until after much delay resulting in permanent damage and disability. ECF No. 1.
Mr. Davis states that PA Esianor misdiagnosed his injury and he was not seen by Dr. Sisay
until February of 2021. Dr. Sisay concluded that Mr. Davis “suffered a likely disruption of the left
pectoralis major muscle” and submitted an orthopedic consultation request but failed to note the
need for surgery to reattach the torn ligaments and tendons and to repair the muscle. Id. at 1, 10.
3 	At the time, Plaintiff was incarcerated. In April 2025, Plaintiff filed a notice of change of
address reflecting that he had been released. (ECF No. 18).
4 	The Clerk shall amend the docket to reflect the full and complete names of Defendants as
Dr. Lawrence Manning; Dr. Yonas Sisay; Yvette Ledjo, NP; Emmanuel Esianor, PA; Lum
Maximuangu, NP; Chidi Oriaku, RN; YesCare, Inc.; Corizon Health, Inc.; Dr. Bryan Klepper; and
Ermano Costabile.
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On April 9, 2021, Dr. Manning evaluated Mr. Davis and diagnosed him as suffering from “left
chest contusion r/o tear of pectoralis tendon insertion left chest wall mass r/o hematoma.” Id. at
10. 	Dr. Manning recommended that Mr. Davis receive physical therapy and an ultrasound and
that he return for follow up in 4-5 weeks; however, the follow up did not occur and the order for
physical therapy and ultrasound were not submitted until over four months later on August 19,
2021. Id. at 9, 10. Mr. Davis did not receive the ultrasound until eight months after it was initially
ordered. Id. at 11. Mr. Davis asserts that Dr. Manning “took no measures to address the need for
repair of the torn ligaments, tendons, and muscles.” Id. at 10.
NP Lum Maximuangu examined Mr. Davis on a number of occasions but failed to address
adequately his need for additional medical treatment, including further diagnostic testing to
determine the extent of damage to the muscle and the need for surgery. 	Id. at 11. 	Dr. Sisay,
Emmanuel Esianor P.A., and Yvette Ledjo, each regularly evaluated Mr. Davis after he received
the ultrasound but made no additional recommendations regarding his care. Id. Additionally, Mr.
Davis states that he was not provided adequate pain relief. Id.
Utilization Management (“UM”) repeatedly refused requests for Mr. Davis to be seen by
an orthopedic surgeon in favor of additional physical therapy. Id. In support of this claim, Mr.
Davis specifies that Dr. Bryan Klepper did not provide the results of his diagnostic tests for UM
to review in order to approve his referral to an orthopedic specialist. Id.
Ermano Costabile5 was to provide Mr. Davis physical therapy but when he saw Mr. Davis
on October 6, 2021, he only demonstrated techniques for home exercises. Id.
On January 3, 2022, an MRI was conducted and found “Impression: High Grade to
complete Chronic tear of the distal pectoralis major tendon.” 	ECF No. 1 at 12. 	Mr. Davis
5 	Ermano Costabile has not been served with the complaint.
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submitted sick call slips requesting the results of the MRI but was not seen by Dr. Sisay for over
four months, until May 24, 2022. 	Id. at 12. 	At that time, medical providers inquired as to Mr.
Davis’ ability to execute his activities of daily living; but they did not inquire about his religious
practices, and he states that as a practicing Muslim he must only use his left hand for toilet
activities. Id. In June and September 2022, Mr. Davis filed sick calls slips requesting an evaluation
by an orthopedic specialist. Id. at 12.
On July 1, 2022, YesCare became the medical contractor for the Division of Corrections,
taking over the provision of medical care from Corizon. ECF No. 1 at 12.
In October or November of 2022, a request for an orthopedic consultation was made, but
it “was denied upon the assumption the injury was too old.” Id. at 14. Mr. Davis asserts that the
delay in his treatment resulted in his distal pectoralis major tendon being “chronically medically
retracted by 9 cm.” Id. at 9.
Mr. Davis asserts that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs
when, for years, he was deprived of treatment and denied access to qualified experts who could
determine the nature and extent of his injuries and determine what medical treatment was required.
ECF No. 1 at 15. He claims that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs when they failed to make him available to receive care from experts and overruled decisions
by experts that he required surgery. Id. He asserts that the deliberate indifference was also due to
the “policy of the corporation ‘private utilization’ which denies medical treatment for pecuniary
reasons.” Id. at 17.
In his opposition to the motions to dismiss, Mr. Davis reiterates his claims and further
argues that YesCare exhibited a pattern of neglect in their months of unfulfilled diagnostic orders.
ECF No. 43 at 4. He notes that an issue to be determined is whether the nurse practitioners and
YesCare were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs when they only provided him Robaxin,
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a muscle relaxer, to treat his pain. Id. at 5. He contends that the individually named Defendants
“passed the buck” by referring him to other providers and not following up on filed consultation
and diagnostic test requests. 	Id. 	In Mr. Davis’ view, “[t]he system failed to implement a
comprehensive treatment 	to the known injury.” 	Id. at 6. 	He points to the delays in treatment
leading to his permanent injury. Id. Additionally, Mr. Davis argues that using activities of daily
living as the basis for treatment amounted to a rationing of resources rather than “following
medical necessity.” Id.
B. 	Defendants’ Motions
Defendant Dr. Bryan Klepper moves to dismiss the complaint, asserting that Mr. Davis’
complaint is one of negligence and Mr. Davis failed to comply with state conditions precedent
before bringing a medical malpractice/negligence claim. ECF No. 30. YesCare Corp. moves for
summary judgment or dismissal, arguing that Mr. Davis fails to state a claim against Yescare and
it is otherwise entitled to summary judgment. ECF No. 33.
In a declaration accompanying the motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, filed by
YesCare Corp., Dr. Sisay explains that he was employed formerly by Corizon Health and YesCare
Corp. at Maryland Correctional Institution-Jessup. ECF No. 33-2, ¶ 2 (Sisay Decl.). On August
1, 2024, Centurion became the contracted health care provider for DPSCS and Dr. Sisay is
currently employed by Centurion. Id.
Dr. Sisay explains that insurance companies and prison health contractors have a
Utilization Management (“UM”) process to ensure appropriate use of resources. ECF No. 33-2, ¶
5. 	YesCare’s UM department 	reviews consultation requests for certain diagnostic testing,
specialist visits, and surgery. Id. 	After an onsite provider submits a consultation request, a UM
Medical Doctor (“UMMD”) reviews the request, along with any medical records submitted by the
provider, to determine whether medical necessity has been demonstrated for the requested
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procedure or visit. 	Id. The UMMD can approve the request, ask for additional information, or
return an Alternative Treatment Plan (“ATP”) suggesting a different treatment. Id. The decision
of the UMMD is returned to the site where the requesting provider can either accept or appeal it.
Id. He avers that YesCare does not have a policy of denying medical care to insure cost saving.
Id.
Dr. Sisay further explains that Mr. Davis suffered a pectoralis major tendon tear in
December 2020. ECF No. 33-2, ¶ 6. The standard of care for such an injury can be surgical or
non-surgical based on whether the tear is partial or full and management depends on circumstances
including, among other things, the severity of the tear and patient’s activity level. Id. Non-surgical
treatment includes rest, ice and physical therapy and is often suitable for a partial tear and
individuals who are elderly or less active. 	Id. 	Surgical repair is typically recommended for
complete or high-grade tears particularly in younger or active patients such as Mr. Davis. 	Id.
Surgery is ideally performed within six weeks of the injury with delay of surgery making future
surgery more challenging due to the shortening of tendons and scar tissue having developed. Id.
Dr. Sisay explains that Mr. Davis’s initial care was impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic
and that he did not see Mr. Davis until over seven weeks after the injury and generated an
orthopedic consultation request at that time. ECF No. 33- 2, ¶ 7. Mr. Davis was quarantined for
three weeks after that visit due to an exposure to COVID and when he was seen by Dr. Manning
on April 9, 2021, it was over 16 weeks after his injury, and he then had a chronic tendon injury.
Id.
Dr. Sisay states that he did not ignore Mr. Davis’ needs, the initial phase of his treatment
was affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, and there was no suspicion after his injury that he had
a high-grade tear until that was demonstrated on an MRI. 	ECF No. 33-2, ¶ 41. 	In Dr. Sisay’s
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view, Mr. Davis saw all necessary specialists, had all necessary investigations of his injury, and
his care was repeatedly discussed for continuing care. Id.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), the factual allegations of a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations
omitted). “To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff need not ‘forecast’ evidence sufficient to prove the
elements of the claim. 	However, the complaint must allege sufficient facts to establish those
elements.” Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
When the moving party styles its motion as a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative,
motion for summary judgment, as Defendant YesCare has done, and attaches additional materials
to the motion, the nonmoving party is, of course, aware that materials outside the pleadings are
before the court, and the court can treat the motion as one for summary judgment. See Laughlin
v. Metro. Washington Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260–61 (4th Cir. 1998).
Rule 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (emphases added). “A dispute is genuine if ‘a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Judd, 718
F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330
(4th Cir. 2012)). “A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Accordingly, “the
mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment[.]” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in
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original). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656-57 (2014) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted), and
draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)
(citations omitted); see also Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 568–69 (4th Cir.
2015). At the same time, the court must “prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from
proceeding to trial.” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir.
2003) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. 	Motion to Stay
On June 23, 2025, Defendants Dr. Lawrence Manning; Dr. Yonas Sisay; Yvette Ledjo; NP;
Emmanuel Esianor, PA; Lum Maximuangu, NP; and Chidi Oriaku, RN moved this court to enter
an order staying this action until the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas,
Houston Division issues an order deciding the Omnibus Motion to Enjoin filed by YesCare in In
Re Tehum Care Services, Inc. (f/k/a Corizon Health Inc.), Case No. 23-90086 (CML) (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 2023). ECF No. 27 at 1. The omnibus motion sought an order from the Bankruptcy court
clarifying that “actions brought against the Debtor’s former employees are enjoined consistent
with the administration and intended consummation [with] the now-effective Bankruptcy Plan,
including the existing injunctions and releases therein.” Id. The Debtor referenced is Tehum Care
Services, formerly Corizon Health. 	Id. at 2. The motion states that “Defendants are former
employees of the Debtor” and former employees are included as “Released Parties” under the Plan.
Id. This case was stayed as to Corizon Health after a suggestion of bankruptcy was filed. ECF
No. 24.
Lawrence Manning; Dr. Yonas Sisay; Yvette Ledjo, NP; Emmanuel Esianor, PA; Lum
Maximuangu, NP; and Chidi Oriaku, RN were directed to supplement the record with evidence of
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the nature and type of notice Mr. Davis received regarding the bankruptcy proceedings before the
court would consider the Motion to Stay. 	See Docket entry dated June 23, 2025. 	To date,
Defendants have failed to comply with the court’s order as no response has been received. 	On
August 7, 2025, the Bankruptcy court found that Mr. Davis was not served an Opt-Out Release
Form and he was therefore not bound by the consensual third-party release in the Bankruptcy Plan
regarding Tehum Care Services, Inc. See In re Tehum Care Services, Inc., Case No. 23-900086
(CML) (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2023) Order dated August 7, 2025.
The motion to stay is denied due to Defendants’ failure to respond to the court’s order and
the finding of the Bankruptcy court that Mr. Davis was not served with the Opt-Out Release Form.
B. 	Motion to Appoint Counsel
In his Motion for Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 45) Mr. Davis argues, among other
things, that “[t]his case requires extensive documentary discovery, depositions or access to
witnesses Plaintiff cannot get to.” Id. at 2. 	He argues that the medical issues are complex and
require expert testimony to explain the injury, the permanency of the damages, and other medical
factors. Id. He notes that as a pro se litigant he is unable to address these issues adequately. Id.
A federal district court judge’s power to appoint counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1),6 is
a discretionary one, and may be considered where an indigent claimant presents exceptional
circumstances. See Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1975); see also, Branch v. Cole, 686
F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1982). 	There is no absolute right to appointment of counsel; an indigent
claimant must present “exceptional circumstances.” 	See Miller v. Simmons, 814 F.2d 962, 966
(4th Cir. 1987). Exceptional circumstances exist where a “pro se litigant has a colorable claim but
6 	Under § 1915(e)(1), a court of the United States may request an attorney to represent any
person unable to afford counsel.
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lacks the capacity to present it.” 	See Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984),
abrogated on other grounds by Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989) (holding that
28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not authorize compulsory appointment of counsel); see also Jenkins v.
Woodard, 109 F.4th 242, 247 (4th Cir. 2024) (“…a district court must conduct a fact specific, two-
part inquiry to assess whether a case presents exceptional circumstances before it decides whether
to appoint counsel” including “whether the plaintiff has a colorable claim” and “considering the
claim’s objective complexity and the plaintiff’s subjective abilities, whether the plaintiff lacks the
capacity to present it.” (internal quotations omitted)).
As discussed, the complaint concerns Mr. Davis’ claim that he was denied adequate
medical care over a period of several years by two health care contractors. ECF No. 1. Mr. Davis
presents a colorable claim, and the court must consider whether, given “the claim’s objective
complexity and the plaintiff’s subjective abilities,” he “lacks the capacity to present it.” Jenkins,
109 F.4th at 247. Informing this review, the court is mindful that summary judgment is generally
inappropriate “where the parties have not had an opportunity for reasonable discovery.” E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448–49 (4th Cir. 2011); see Shaw v.
Foreman, 59 F.4th 121, 128 (4th Cir. 2023); Putney v. Likin, 656 F. App'x 632, 638–39 (4th Cir.
2016) (per curiam); McCray v. Maryland Dep’t of Transportation, 741 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir.
2015). A party opposing the conversion of a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment
must, ordinarily, submit a Rule 56(d) affidavit setting forth the reasons for opposition. Evans v.
Tech Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th Cir. 1996). 	Even without a Rule 56(d)
affidavit, the court may consider whether the nonmoving party has “adequately informed the []
court that the motion [for summary judgment] is [premature] and more discovery is necessary.”
Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002). 	The Fourth
Circuit has emphasized that discovery is “broadly favored” in advance of reaching summary
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judgment and district courts are to afford pro se plaintiffs leniency in regard to the requirements
of Rule 56(d). 	Farabee v. Gardella, 131 F.4th 185, 193-95 (4th Cir. 2025). 	Nevertheless, a
plaintiff “cannot simply demand discovery for the sake of discovery.” Hamilton v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore, 807 F. Supp. 3d 331, 342 (D. Md. 2011).
While Mr. Davis has not formally requested discovery, in his opposition response and in
his request for appointment of counsel, he argues, among other things, that because he is
proceeding pro se he has not had an opportunity to consult with a medical expert or to evaluate
properly the medical evidence including deposing witnesses. 	ECF No. 45. According to Mr.
Davis, there are genuine disputes of material fact regarding defendants’ deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs.
Defendants each had a role in the diagnosis and treatment of Mr. Davis’ injury as well as
in following up on consultation requests and the ATP approval process. It is not clear what, if any,
additional actions any of the named Defendants should have taken in reviewing Mr. Davis’ medical
records, following up on consultation requests, or in reviewing the multiple requests for specialty
care. Further, while the court has been furnished with some information concerning the process
for approving medical care, it has not been provided specific information concerning Mr. Davis’
care such as how and why the UM did not receive timely information regarding Mr. Davis’ trial
of physical therapy or home exercises. Nor, has the court been provided adequate information
regarding the initial delay in assessing Mr. Davis’ injury. 	It is also not clear what, if any,
responsibility individual Defendants may have had to gather additional information regarding Mr.
Davis’ treatment before determining that a conservative plan of treatment as recommended by the
ATP had not been fully tried. 	While Defendant YesCare contends that Mr. Davis has failed to
provide sufficient information to support a policy or practice claim against them, Mr. Davis is
entitled to an opportunity to explore these topics through discovery and with the assistance of
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counsel. 	Discovery will allow him to develop further his claim that YesCare had a policy and
practice to delay and deny treatment in order to save costs. Mr. Davis’ motion to appoint counsel
is granted and YesCare Corp.’s dispositive motion is denied without prejudice.
C. 	Defendant Dr. Bryan Klepper’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendant Dr. Bryan Klepper argues that Mr. Davis has failed to satisfy the conditions
precedent for filing a state law medical malpractice claim and therefore he is entitled to dismissal
of this claim.7 Medical malpractice claims must first be presented to the Maryland Health Claims
Arbitration Board before a complaint may be filed in court if the plaintiff is seeking more than
$30,000 in damages. See Md. Code Ann., Cts & Jud. Proc. § 3-2A-02 et seq.; Davis v. Frostburg
Facility Operation, LLC, 177 A.3d 709, 715 (Md. 2018). Nothing in the record demonstrates that
Mr. Davis complied with this prerequisite. Accordingly, the state law medical malpractice claim
asserted against Defendant Dr. Bryan Klepper is dismissed without prejudice. 	However,
Defendant Dr. Bryan Klepper fails to address Mr. Davis’ federal constitutional claims (merely
claiming one is not pled) and as such those claims shall proceed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to stay is denied, Defendant Dr. Bryan Klepper’s
motion to dismiss is granted as to the medical malpractice claim asserted against him, and denied
as to Mr. Davis’ constitutional claims, and YesCare Corp.’s dispositive motion is denied without
prejudice. Counsel shall be appointed for Mr. Davis. A separate Order follows.
February 9, 2026 	/s/
Date 	DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
7 	Mr. Davis disclaimed any intention to file such a claim in his opposition. (ECF No. 40).
Dr. Bryan Klepper erroneously asserts that the issue presents a question of subject matter
jurisdiction. Instead, it raises a question of failure to state a claim.
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