Ross et al v. Erie Insurance Exchange et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
ZERITA L. ROSS, et al., *
Plaintiffs, *
v. * Civil Action No. RDB-24-2414
ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, et al., *
Defendants. *
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This federal civil rights action arises from a business relationship between Plaintiffs
Zerita L. Ross (“Individual Plaintiff” or “Ms. Ross”), her company, Ross Insurance Agency,
Inc. (“Corporate Plaintiff” or “Ross Insurance”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) and the companies
for which they sold insurance. (ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 3–12.) Ms. Ross is an African American
woman who serves as principal of Ross Insurance and has sold insurance in Maryland since
1998. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 13.) Plaintiffs allege that between September 1, 1998, and August 21, 2020,
they experienced racial discrimination while selling insurance for various Erie insurance
companies. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 16.) On August 20, 2024, Plaintiffs initiated the instant action by filing
a three-count Complaint in this Court against Defendants Erie Insurance Exchange; Erie
Insurance Company; Erie Insurance Property & Casualty Company; Erie Family Life
Insurance Company (collectively, “Original Entity Defendants”), and Kristopher C. Marrion
(“Individual Defendant” or “Mr. Marrion”) (collectively, “Original Defendants”).1 (ECF No.
1 Plaintiffs’ Complaint also contained substantive allegations against Flagship City Insurance Company
(“Flagship”), but Plaintiffs did not name Flagship as a defendant in the caption and did not attempt to serve
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1.) Plaintiffs alleged against all Original Defendants race discrimination in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (Count I); intentional interference with economic relations (Count II); and
respondeat superior (Count III). (Id.)
By Memorandum Opinion and Order dated March 31, 2025, this Court granted
Original Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) but allowed Plaintiffs leave to amend
their § 1981 claim in Count I.2 On April 14, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the operative, two-Count
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 27) against Original Entity Defendants, Flagship City
Insurance Company (“Flagship”),3 (collectively with Flagship and Original Entity Defendants,
“Erie Defendants”), Erie Insurance Company of New York (“Erie Insurance New York”),4
and Mr. Marrion (collectively, “Defendants”). Specifically, they allege (1) violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981 against Erie Defendants (Count I); and (2) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against
Mr. Marrion (Count II). See generally (ECF No. 27 at 12–14.) Presently pending before this
Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 34)
(“Defendants’ Motion”). Plaintiffs have responded in Opposition (ECF No. 36), and
summons or process upon Flagship. Even so, Flagship was on notice of this action and joined in Defendants’
filings, but expressly reserved defenses related to improper service. See, e.g., (ECF No. 14-1 at 1 n.2).
2 As explained in this Court’s Memorandum Opinion (ECF No. 25) dated March 31, 2025, the Maryland
Insurance Administration (“MIA”) has primary jurisdiction over the state tort claims alleged in Counts II and
III of Plaintiffs’ original Complaint. Where a state agency has primary jurisdiction, a Court may either stay a
case or dismiss the case without prejudice, but it cannot hear those claims until the agency proceedings have
concluded. Smith v. Clark/Smoot/Russell, 796 F.3d 424, 431 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S.
258, 268–69 (1993)).
3 Flagship is the subsidiary of ERIE Insurance Exchange, which owns one hundred percent of the stock of
Flagship. (ECF No. 35 at 1.) Flagship is affiliated with ERIE Insurance Company; ERIE Insurance Property
& Casualty Company; and ERIE Family Life Insurance Company, each of which is one hundred percent owned
by ERIE Insurance Exchange. (Id.)
4 As explained further below, Erie Insurance New York was not a party to the original Complaint, see (ECF
No. 1), and is not included in Plaintiffs’ definition of “Erie Entity Defendants” in the Amended Complaint,
(ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 5–11).
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Defendants have replied (ECF No. 37). The parties’ submissions have been reviewed, and no
hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025).
As explained below, Plaintiffs’ claims against Erie Defendants, Mr. Marrion, and newly
named defendant Erie Insurance New York are untimely under the four-year statute of
limitations applicable to claims of post-contract racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981. First, as to Erie Defendants and Mr. Marrion, Plaintiffs received notice of the
termination of their agency agreements—Defendants’ latest alleged discriminatory act—on
May 14, 2020. Thus, under the applicable four-year statute of limitations, Plaintiffs were
required to file their § 1981 claims no later than May 14, 2024. Nevertheless, they waited until
August 20, 2024, to file the instant action, thereby rendering their claims untimely. Second,
Plaintiffs did not name Erie Insurance New York as defendant until they filed their Amended
Complaint on April 14, 2025. Accordingly, any claims against Erie Insurance New York are
time-barred under the four-year limitations period that terminated on May 14, 2024.
Alternatively, even if Plaintiffs had timely filed their claims, they have failed to state a claim of
individual liability against Mr. Marrion and likely cannot raise allegations of redlining as the
basis of their § 1981 claim against Erie Defendants. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth
below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 34) is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this Court “accept[s] as true
all well-pleaded facts in a complaint and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing SD3,
LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015)). Except where otherwise
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indicated, the following facts are derived from Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (ECF No. 27)
and accepted as true for the purpose of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 34).
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint contains allegations specific to their relationship with
Defendants and broader allegations involving proceedings before the Maryland Insurance
Administration (“MIA”).
I. Allegations specific to Plaintiffs’ relationship with Defendants
Plaintiff Zerita L. Ross (“Ms. Ross”) alleges that she is an African American woman
who owns and operates Plaintiff Ross Insurance Agency (“Ross Insurance”). (ECF No. 27
¶¶ 3, 4.) Between September 1, 1998, and August 21, 2020, Plaintiffs sold insurance pursuant
to multiple “agency agreements” with Erie Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 18.) Plaintiffs primarily
sold insurance to majority-Black communities in Baltimore City and Prince George’s County,
and, during this period, Ms. Ross developed a book of business worth nearly $4 million based
on services to more than 2,600 insureds. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 15.) Plaintiffs allege that Erie Defendants
racially discriminated against them between 2002 and the termination of the agency
agreements in 2020. See generally (id. ¶¶ 15–20.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that beginning in
April 2002, Erie Defendants “interfered with [Ms. Ross’s] ability to enter contracts with
prospective insureds in the greater Baltimore area” by (1) engaging in discriminatory lead
distribution to reroute to Ms. Ross leads with names that sounded African American or
Hispanic and divert from her leads with names that sounded European or European
American; (2) racially profiling leads by requiring Ms. Ross and similarly situated agents to
review applicants’ criminal histories and deny appropriate coverage to applicants and covered
individuals; (3) arbitrarily reducing Ms. Ross’s commission between 2003 and 2021; and
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(4) requiring Ms. Ross—but not non-African American agents—to impose on her insureds
and applicants additional requirements such as background checks and improper site visits.
(Id. ¶ 16.)
Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Marrion, in his capacity as “Vice President and
Branch Manager of Erie’s Silver Spring Branch” since May 2011, and his predecessor, Ms.
Sandra I. Dorsey (“Ms. Dorsey”),5 discriminated against Ms. Ross and other African American
agencies based on their race. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Marrion and Ms. Dorsey
engaged in discriminatory supervision and discipline that included: (1) Ms. Dorsey’s letter
dated October 29, 2012, which reduced Plaintiffs’ commission;6 (2) Ms. Dorsey’s letter dated
March 4, 2016, which reduced Plaintiffs’ “Private Passenger Auto commissions by 2%;” (3)
Mr. Marrion’s August 2019 warning letter “citing pretextual performance issues;” and (4) Mr.
Marrion’s May 14, 2020 termination letter. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Marrion and Ms.
Dorsey committed these actions at the direction of Erie Defendants. (Id.) Specifically,
Plaintiffs allege that Erie Defendants acted through branch managers such as Mr. Marrion to
discriminate against “minority-serving agents” by implementing or using (1) “‘front line
underwriting’ to discourage writing policies in urban areas;”7 (2) “uniform loss ratio
5 Ms. Dorsey is not a named defendant in this action.
6 Plaintiffs state that Defendants reduced “Ross’s commission,” but they do not clarify whether “Ross” refers
to Ms. Ross, Ross Insurance, or both. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, this Court
generally assumes without deciding that “Ross” refers to both Plaintiffs collectively. Where allegations in the
Amended Complaint refer to Ross using the pronouns “her” or “she,” however, the Court treats “Ross” as
referring to Ms. Ross alone.
7 Although Plaintiffs do not define “front line underwriting,” the MIA Determination Letter attached as
Exhibit B to the Amended Complaint explains that “‘Front Line’ Underwriting” refers to a system of asking
insurance producers to ensure that they develop relationships with clients of an appropriate risk level, thereby
enabling producers to use ill-defined, relationship-based risk metrics that are stricter than documented risk
metrics to deny coverage to covered applicants. (ECF No. 27 Ex. B. at 12.)
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benchmarks that ignored territorial risk differences;”8 and (3) “progressive disciplinary
measures against agents serving minority communities.” (Id. ¶ 24.)
Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that between 2012 and 2020, Erie Defendants
impermissibly reduced commissions for the eight “minority-owned agencies serving majority-
Black ZIP codes.” (Id. ¶ 23(a).) As part of these reductions, Plaintiffs faced commission
reductions of two percent in 2012—despite a 75.58 percent loss ratio—while non-minority
agents in majority-white areas such as Carroll County retained their full commissions. (Id.)
Plaintiffs further allege that all twelve agents that Erie Defendants terminated in Maryland
between 2016 and 2020 served “majority-minority ZIP codes” and no agents in “majority-
white areas were terminated, even with comparable loss ratios.” (Id. ¶ 23(b).)
On May 14, 2020, Mr. Marrion acted in his capacity as “Vice President and Branch
Manager of Erie’s Silver Spring Branch”9 to issue a termination notice (“Termination Letter”)
to Ms. Ross, which terminated two agency agreements—dated January 23, 2012, and March
6, 2012, respectively—between Plaintiffs and Erie Defendants.10 (Id. ¶ 18); see also (ECF No.
27 Ex. A (Termination Letter).) These terminations suspended Plaintiffs’ binding authority—
8 According to the MIA Determination Letter, an “[a]dverse loss ratio is a metric used to reflect the degree of
an insurer’s profitability . . . an Insurer’s loss ratio is largely a function of its own business decisions, specifically,
its underwriting eligibility guidelines (which risks it is willing to write) and its rating plan (how much it charges
to write those risks).” (ECF No. 27 Ex. B at 10.)
9 As noted above, Plaintiffs do not clearly define “Erie” but rather assert that “Defendant entities are related
and affiliated entities whose acts complained of were committed as if a single entity, and will be referenced
hereinafter as ‘Erie’.” (ECF No. 27 ¶ 11.) Thus, it is not entirely clear which Erie Defendant Mr. Marrion
served.
10 The Termination Letter provided notice of termination of (1) “the Agency Agreement dated January 23,
2012 between [Ms. Ross] and Erie Insurance Exchange, Erie Insurance Company, Erie Insurance Company of
New York, Erie Insurance Property & Casualty Company, Flagship . . . and Erie Family Life Insurance
Company”; and (2) “the Agency Agreement dated March 6, 2012 between [Ross Insurance] and Erie Insurance
Exchange, Erie Insurance Company, Erie Insurance Company of New York, Erie Insurance Property &
Casualty Company, Flagship . . . and Erie Family Life Insurance Company.” (ECF No. 27 Ex. A at 1.)
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including their authority “to write or bind any new business on behalf of ERIE without
specific written approval of ERIE”—and took effect on August 21, 2020. (ECF No. 27 ¶¶
18, 19; ECF No. 27 Ex. A at 4.) Plaintiffs allege that this suspension “intentionally constrained
and limited [Ms.] Ross’s ability to do business and earn income on the basis of her race.” (ECF
No. 27 ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Marrion cited “low engagement in training” and
“missed meetings” to terminate them, but internal documents show that (1) Erie Defendants
used “‘proxy metrics’ to terminate urban agents while concealing reliance on loss ratios,” and
(2) non-minority agents with worse attendance faced no discipline. (Id. ¶ 25.)
Plaintiffs further allege that during performance reviews they faced criticism for “not
matching the Erie Corp culture,” which Plaintiffs allege was a subjective standard not applied
to agents in majority-white areas. (Id. ¶ 27.) Similarly, Plaintiffs allege that Erie Defendants
denied Ms. Ross access to Erie Defendants’ “Agents Giving Back program, which provided
$1,000–$5,000 annually to agents in majority-white areas for community outreach;” denied
marketing support for new customers; and prevented her from qualifying for bonuses based
on unlawful applications of loss ratios. (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiffs further allege that Erie Defendants’
“Agent Front Line Underwriting Guide” instructed agents to reject applicants in urban areas
using stricter criteria than filed guidelines, which reduced policies in majority-Black ZIP codes
by 23 percent between 2016 and 2020. (Id. ¶ 26(a).) Relatedly, Plaintiffs allege that agents
serving Baltimore City faced loss ratios 35 percent higher than suburban agents, but they still
were held to uniform benchmarks. (Id. ¶ 26(b).)
On May 24, 2023, the Maryland Insurance Administration (“MIA”) determined that
Erie Defendants’ termination of Plaintiffs’ agency agreements impermissibly relied on loss
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ratios and proxy metrics in violation of Maryland Insurance Article §§ 27-503(d), (f).11 (ECF
No. 27 ¶ 21; ECF No. 27 Ex. B.) The MIA issued a Determination Letter explaining its
conclusions and ordering Erie Defendants to reinstate Plaintiffs’ agency agreements and
commissions, but Erie Defendants did not comply with such orders. (ECF No. 27 ¶ 21(b);
ECF No. 27 Ex. B.) Plaintiffs allege that such ongoing failure to restore the agency agreements
and commissions constitutes an ongoing harm. (ECF No. 27 ¶ 29.) Defendants assert that
the MIA’s Determination Letter “is presently on appeal.” (ECF No. 34-1 at 28.)
II. Maryland Insurance Administration Market Conduct Report
In response to complaints by Plaintiffs and two insurance brokerages in 2021, the MIA
conducted a market conduct examination of “Erie Insurance Group”12 for the period between
2016 and 2020. (ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 30, 31.) This examination allegedly uncovered unlawful
practices that disproportionately affected urban areas such as Baltimore City, Maryland. (Id. ¶
30); (ECF No. 27 Ex. C). According to the resulting Market Conduct Report (“Report”), this
examination revealed that Erie Insurance Group violated Maryland law by instructing agents
to engage in “front-line underwriting” to reject qualified applicants—that is, applicants who
met filed underwriting eligibility guidelines—who may be unprofitable for the companies.
(ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 32, 33.) The MIA examination revealed that Erie Insurance Group penalized
agents whose business resulted in loss ratios that deviated from the companies’ statewide goals
11 The Amended Complaint contains no allegations regarding whether or when Plaintiffs filed a complaint
before the MIA. For completeness, the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ original Complaint alleged that they reported
their grievances to the MIA. See (ECF No. 25 at 4 (citing ECF No. 1 ¶ 17)).
12 According to the Market Conduct Examination Report attached as Exhibit C to Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint, the MIA examined the practices of Erie Insurance Company, Erie Insurance Exchange, and Erie
Family Life Insurance Company. (ECF No. 27 Ex. C at 1.) For clarity, and because not all Erie Defendants in
this case are named in the MIA Market Conduct Examination, this Court refers to the Erie companies subject
to the MIA’s market conduct examination as “Erie Insurance Group” or “subject Erie companies.”
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by (1) reducing commissions; (2) terminating agency agreements; (3) restricting agents’ binding
authority; (4) reducing or eliminating access to customer leads and imposing additional
business requirements on such agents; and (5) limiting or restricting access to business
development programs and canceling opportunities for incentive or bonus pay based on
unlawful applications of loss ratio metrics. (Id. ¶ 35(a)–(e).)
Additionally, the MIA examination revealed that the application of uniform, statewide
loss ratio standards to all Maryland insurance agencies disadvantaged agencies such as Ross
Insurance, which wrote business in high-loss regions with large minority populations. (Id.
¶ 36.) Between January 2016 and December 31, 2020, for example, the number of new
Personal Private Auto insurance policies issued in Maryland declined by 23.57 percent, but
Baltimore City faced an even steeper decline of 41.31 percent. (ECF No. 27 Ex. C at 35.)
Plaintiffs allege that they personally experienced many of these findings, and the MIA
comparison revealed that agencies such as Plaintiffs faced higher penalty rates than other
agencies. (ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 35(f), 38.) Although Erie Insurance Group filed a Written Response
disputing the MIA’s findings, it did not formally appeal the Market Conduct Report. (ECF
No. 27 Ex. Q.)
III. Procedural History
In November 2022, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Original Defendants in this Court
(Civil No. JRR-22-2868) (“Ross I”).13 (ECF No. 25 at 5.) In Ross I, Plaintiffs alleged racial
13 Although these facts are not alleged in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, this Court draws them from its prior
Memorandum Opinion (ECF No. 25), which included them as relevant procedural background. A motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is ordinarily limited to the pleadings, and a Court must convert such a motion to a
motion for summary judgment if it wishes to consider matters outside the pleadings. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).
A court may, however, “take judicial notice of its own records,” including its own prior opinions and filings,
without converting a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) to a motion for summary judgment. Mitchell v. Henderson, 128
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discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; intentional interference with economic
relations; and respondeat superior as to the Erie Defendants. (Civ. No. JRR-22-2868, ECF
No. 1 ¶¶ 43–90.) Ross I was dismissed without prejudice on March 8, 2023, based on Plaintiffs’
failure to exhaust their administrative remedies before the MIA.14 (Civ. No. JRR-22-2868,
ECF No. 41 at 77–88.) On August 20, 2024, Plaintiffs initiated the instant action by filing a
three-Count Complaint in this Court, once again alleging against Defendants race
discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count I); intentional interference with
economic relations (Count II); and respondeat superior (Count III). (ECF No. 1.) By
Memorandum Opinion (ECF No. 25) and Order (ECF No. 26) dated March 31, 2025, this
Court dismissed those claims with leave to amend the § 1981 claim in Count I.
On April 14, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 27) in which they
allege race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Erie Defendants (Count I)
and against Mr. Marrion (Count II). (ECF No. 27.) In Count I, they allege that Erie
Defendants’ termination, commission reductions, and policy of redlining were motivated by
racial animus because (1) 100 percent of terminated agents served minority areas, and
(2) internal communications reveal that executives connected terminations to “‘historically
unprofitable’ urban/minority areas.” (Id. ¶ 40.) Moreover, they allege that these policies
F. Supp. 2d 298, 301 (D. Md. 2001). Accordingly, in this case, the Court considers the filing of Ross I without
converting Defendants’ Motion to a motion for summary judgment.
14 Plaintiffs do not argue that their claim relates back to Ross I for the purposes of the parties’ limitations
dispute, discussed infra. As Judge Bredar of this Court has noted, “numerous courts have recognized that the
‘dismissal of an earlier suit . . . without prejudice does not authorize a subsequent suit brought outside of the
otherwise binding period of limitations.” Degross v. Off. Depot, LLC, Civ. No. JKB-22-0291, 2023 WL 2456830,
at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 10, 2023) (quoting In re Franklin Sav. Corp., 385 F.3d 1279, 1286 (10th Cir. 2004) (collecting
cases)); see also Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982)); Goff v. United States, 659 F.2d 560, 562
(5th Cir. 1981).
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(1) caused a 23 percent decline in policies in majority-Black ZIP Codes versus a 14 percent
increase in majority-white areas, and (2) intentionally economically harmed Plaintiffs by
interfering with Ms. Ross’s ability to write new policies. (Id. ¶ 41.) They allege that Erie
Defendants’ refusal to comply with the MIA’s reinstatement order constitutes ongoing
interference with “Ms. Ross’s ability to make money off of business she developed . . . .” (Id.
¶ 42.)
In Count II, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Marrion personally participated in discriminatory
conduct within the scope of his employment as Vice President and Branch Manager by
(1) drafting and sending the Termination Letter dated May 14, 2020; (2) implementing and
enforcing Erie Defendants’ discriminatory policies against Plaintiffs and others; (3) continuing
his predecessor’s pattern of discriminatory supervision; and (4) applying more stringent
performance standards to Ms. Ross than to non-minority agents. (Id. ¶¶ 45, 46.) Plaintiffs
allege that Mr. Marrion engaged in these discriminatory actions at the direction and on behalf
of “all six Erie entity defendants” such that they are vicariously liable for his conduct. (Id. ¶¶
46–49.) Plaintiffs seek monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief, including
reinstatement of their agency agreement and commissions, damages, and an injunction barring
Erie Defendants from using proxy metrics or loss ratios to discipline agents. (Id. ¶¶ 50–54.)
In response to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Defendants timely filed a Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 34). In short, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ § 1981 claims are time-
barred, inadequately alleged, or, alternatively, subject to various abstention doctrines. See
generally (ECF No. 34-1). Plaintiffs have responded in Opposition (ECF No. 36), and
Defendants have replied (ECF No. 37). This matter is now ripe for review.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure authorizes the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. “‘[T]he purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of a complaint’
and not to ‘resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of
defenses.’” Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Edwards v.
City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)).
To survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl., Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Under the plausibility standard,
a complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter’s Mill Grille, LLC v.
Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). A complaint need not include “detailed factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint must,
however, set forth “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of
action, “even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very
remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotations omitted). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice” to plead a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see A Soc’y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d
342, 346 (4th. Cir. 2011).
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ANALYSIS
In their Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 34) and related briefing, Defendants argue that
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice as time-barred, inadequately
alleged, or, alternatively, subject to various abstention doctrines. See generally (ECF No. 34-1;
ECF No. 37). In Opposition (ECF No. 36), Plaintiffs contend that the continuing violation
doctrine applies to their discrimination claims such that neither claim is time-barred; they have
adequately alleged their § 1981 claims, including individual, corporate, and vicarious liability;
abstention doctrines do not apply to this case; and they have standing to raise each of their
claims. See generally (id. at 1–5). As explained below, Plaintiffs’ claims are untimely as outside
the four-year statute of limitations applicable to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Generally, “[a] motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is intended to test the legal adequacy of the
complaint, and not to address the merits of any affirmative defenses.” Richmond, Fredericksburg,
& Potomac R. Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993). Thus, a court may only address “the
merits of an affirmative defense, such as the defense that the plaintiff’s claim is time-
barred . . . in the relatively rare circumstances where . . . all facts necessary to the affirmative
defense ‘clearly appear[] on the face of the complaint.’” Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464
(4th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (quoting Forst, 4 F.3d at 250); accord Pressley v. Tupperware Long Term
Disability Plan, 553 F.3d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 2009). Additionally, even where consideration of
an affirmative defense is appropriate on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “the defendant must show
‘that the plaintiff’s potential [response] to the affirmative defense was foreclosed by the
allegations in the complaint.’” L.N.P. v. Kijakazi, 64 F.4th 577, 586 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting
Goodman, 494 F.3d at 466). Plaintiffs allege in their Amended Complaint that Defendants
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engaged in a pattern of discrimination dating back to at least 2012; Mr. Marrion drafted and
issued the Termination Letter on behalf of Erie Defendants on May 14, 2020; and the
termination took effect on August 21, 2020.15 (ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 18, 20, 45.) Accordingly, the
last possible date on which any discrimination is alleged is August 21, 2020, and “all facts
necessary to the affirmative defense [that Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred] ‘clearly appear[] on
the face of the complaint.’” Goodman, 494 F.3d at 464 (quoting Forst, 4 F.3d at 250). For this
reason, consideration of Defendants’ asserted limitations defense is appropriate in this case.
Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 based on claims that allege post-contract discrimination
and arose after 1990 are subject to the four-year statute of limitations contained in “28 U.S.C.
§ 1658, which established a catchall four-year statute of limitations for federal claims ‘arising
under’ any act of Congress that was enacted after December 1, 1990, unless the act provided
its own statute of limitations.” Chambers v. North Carolina Dep’t of Just., 66 F.4th 139, 141–42
(4th Cir. 2023) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a)). “Under federal law, a cause of action accrues
when the plaintiff possesses sufficient facts about the harm done to him that reasonable
inquiry will reveal his cause of action.” Nassim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 955
(4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122–24 (1979)). For the
purposes of accrual, “the proper focus is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at
which the consequences of the act became painful.” Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981)
(per curiam) (citing Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980)). For this reason, “a
discriminatory discharge claim accrues when the employee receives notice of the termination,
15 Plaintiffs also attach the Termination Letter as an exhibit to the Amended Complaint, thereby incorporating
it by reference. See (ECF No. 27 Ex. A).
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not on the last day of employment.” Smith v. Univ. of Md. Balt., 770 F. App’x 50 (4th Cir. 2019)
(unpublished) (citing Chardon, 454 U.S. at 7–8).
Notwithstanding this four-year limitations period, the continuing violation doctrine
“permits ‘incidents outside of the statutory period to survive if they relate to a timely incident
as a series of separate but related acts amounting to a continuing violation.’” Karim v. Staples,
210 F. Supp. 2d 737, 749 (D. Md. 2002) (quoting Lambert v. Washington Suburban Sanitary
Comm’n, 93 F. Supp. 2d 639, 642 (D. Md. 2000)). Put differently, where a plaintiff alleges a
series of related, repetitive discriminatory acts such as a hostile work environment, her claim
“will not be time barred so long as all acts which constitute the claim are part of the same
unlawful employment practice and at least one act falls within the time period.” Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corps. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002). Significantly, “only where an actual
violation has occurred within the requisite time period . . . can the theory of the continuous
violation doctrine possibly be sustained.” Thompson v. Town of Front Royal, 117 F. Supp. 2d 522,
526 (W.D. Va. 2000) (collecting cases); see also Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174
F.3d 180, 189 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[A] continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful
acts, not continual ill effects from an original violation[.]” (quoting Nat’l Advert. Co. v. City of
Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1166 (4th Cir. 1991))); Hill v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 731 F.2d 175, 180 (4th
Cir. 1984) (“It is only where an actual violation has occurred within that requisite time
period . . . that under any possible circumstances the theory of continuing violation is
sustainable.” (quoting Woodard v. Lehman, 717 F.2d 909, 915 (4th Cir. 1983))).
The parties in this case dispute the date of accrual of Plaintiffs’ § 1981 claims.
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ claims accrued at the latest on May 14, 2020, when
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Defendants issued the Termination Letter. (ECF No. 34-1 at 11–12.) Specifically, Defendants
argue that the limitations period for any claim based on commission reductions in 2012 and
2016 concluded within four years of the date of such reductions, and the limitations period
for any claim based on termination concluded on May 14, 2024, four years after Plaintiffs
received the Termination Letter. (Id. at 8.) Thus, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ claims
are untimely because they did not file this action until August 20, 2024. See generally (id. at 6–
10). In Opposition, Plaintiffs contend that the continuing violation doctrine applies to their
allegations of a pattern of discrimination that continued “through 2021” such that their claims
are timely. (ECF No. 36 at 3.) Defendants reply that the continuing violation doctrine does
not apply to discrete acts of discrimination and a claim based on termination accrues at the
time the termination is issued, not the time it takes effect. (ECF No. 34-1 at 9–10; ECF No.
37 at 5–10.)
As explained above, the continuing violation doctrine cannot apply to “discrete
discriminatory acts,” meaning “that a time-barred discrete act claim remains time-barred even
if it is part of a series of related actions, some of which occurred during the limitations period.”
Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 222 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Morgan, 536 U.S.
at 113). Where the alleged discriminatory conduct constitutes “[d]iscrete acts such as
termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire,” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114,
therefore, a plaintiff “must file a charge of discrimination within the appropriate limitations
period as to each discrete act of discrimination that occurred,” Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370
F.3d 423, 429 (4th Cir. 2004). Conversely, where the challenged acts involve repetitive acts
within the same challenged employment practice, the claim may be subject to the continuing
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violation doctrine. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122. In this case, the termination of Plaintiffs’ agency
agreements constitutes a discrete act not subject to the continuing violation doctrine, while
their allegations of a pattern of discrimination may constitute repetitive acts within the same
challenged employment practice. Accordingly, this Court addresses the limitations period for
each allegation separately and by Count.
I. Count I
As a threshold matter, to the extent Plaintiffs intended to define Erie Defendants to
include Erie Insurance New York,16 any claim against Erie Insurance New York must be
dismissed as abandoned or untimely. First, Plaintiffs do not respond to Defendants’
arguments that Erie Insurance New York should be dismissed because the Amended
Complaint is devoid of substantive allegations against it. See (ECF No. 36 (failing to reference
Erie Insurance New York or otherwise respond to Defendants’ related arguments)). Failure
to respond to a defendant’s arguments for dismissal constitutes abandonment and results in
dismissal of the claim. See Roberts v. Equian, LLC, 793 F. Supp. 3d 643, 662 (D. Md. 2025)
16 It appears that Plaintiffs have failed to allege any claims against Erie Insurance New York, which is referenced
only in the case caption. See (ECF No. 27). As federal courts of appeal, this Court, and other district courts
within the Fourth Circuit have repeatedly recognized, failure to allege substantive allegations against a party
named in a case caption is grounds to dismiss the claims against that purported defendant. See, e.g., Potter v.
Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (“Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part
of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption,
the complaint is properly dismissed[.]”); Hunt v. Greenville Cnty. Sheriffs Dep’t, 6:25-cv-12832-JDA-WSB, 2025
WL 3657149, at *6 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2025) (dismissing claim against defendant named in caption where plaintiff
made no substantive allegations against defendant); Newkirk v. Cir. Ct. of City of Hampton, 3:14CV372-HEH,
2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (dismissing claim where plaintiff “fail[ed] to mention the
[defendants] in the body of his Complaint”); Mpoy v. Montgomery Cnty., Md., Civ. No. BAH-23-1927, 2025 WL
2824884, at *8–9 (D. Md. Sep. 25, 2025) (dismissing claims against defendant where “complaint contains no
specific allegations about [his] actions”). This rule reflects that plaintiffs must allege “enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of action, which requires allegations of a defendant’s conduct.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also A Soc’y Without a Name, 655 F.3d at 346. In this case,
Plaintiffs fail to define Erie Insurance New York as a member of the “Erie Entity Defendants” against which
they allege Count I, see (ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 11, 3–12, at 12), and they do not allege that Erie Insurance New York
engaged in any conduct.
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(collecting cases); Ferdinand-Davenport v. Children’s Guild, 742 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777 (D. Md.
2010); Kitchings v. Shelton, Civ. No. PWG-17-882, 2018 WL 398285, at *6 (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2018)
(collecting cases).
Second, as explained above, actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are subject to a four-year
statute of limitations. James v. Cir. City Stores, Inc., 370 F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 2004). In this
case, Plaintiffs named Erie Insurance New York as a defendant for the first time when they
filed their Amended Complaint. Compare (ECF No. 1 (failing to name Erie Insurance New
York as defendant)) with (ECF No. 27 (listing Erie Insurance New York in case caption but
not in any allegations)). Where a plaintiff newly adds a defendant to an amended complaint,
“such amendment amounts to a new and independent cause of action and cannot be permitted
when the statute of limitations has run.” Philllip v. Sam Finley, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 292, 294 (W.D.
Va. 1967) (quoting Kerner v. Rackmill, 111 F. Supp. 150, 151 (M.D. Pa. 1953)); Locklear v. Bergman
& Beving AB, 457 F.3d 363, 366–67 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining plaintiff may not add new
defendant in amended pleading absent showing that it relates back and failure to add defendant
was mistake under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 15). Plaintiffs have alleged conduct at the
very latest on the date the Termination Letter became effective on August 21, 2020. Plaintiffs
first named Erie Insurance New York as Defendant on April 14, 2025, which is beyond the
four-year limitations period, and they have made no showing of mistake. Plaintiffs have failed
to state a § 1981 claim against Erie Insurance New York, which is DISMISSED as defendant.
a. § 1981 claim against Erie Defendants based on termination
The termination of Plaintiffs’ agency agreements constitutes a discrete act not subject
to the continuing violation doctrine. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114; see also Sims v. Univ. of Md. Med.
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19
Sys. Corp., Civ. No. CCB-19-295, 2022 WL 2275891 (D. Md. June 23, 2022) (“A ‘discrete act’
includes ‘termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire.” (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114)); Whitaker v. Ciena Corp., Civ. No. RDB-18-0044,
2018 WL 3608777, at *4 (D. Md. July 27, 2018) (“In Morgan, the United States Supreme Court
specifically identified ‘termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, [and] refusal to hire’
as discrete acts . . . .” (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114)). Accordingly, to the extent that
Plaintiffs’ § 1981 claim against Erie Defendants in Count I is premised upon the termination
of their agency agreements, it is timely only if it was filed within four years of its accrual. See
Williams, 370 F.3d at 429 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113). The Supreme Court has repeatedly
determined that “a[] . . . wrongful-discharge claim accrues—and the limitations period begins
to run—when the employer notifies the employee he is fired, not on the last day of his
employment.” Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 564 (2016) (first citing Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258–
59; and then citing Chardon, 454 U.S. at 8).
As to a § 1981 claim based on termination, therefore, “the filing period runs from the
time at which [plaintiffs were] informed of the allegedly discriminatory employment decision,
regardless of when the effects of that decision come to fruition.” Price v. Litton Bus. Sys., Inc.,
694 F.2d 963, 965 (4th Cir. 1982); see also Kulshrestha v. Shady Grove Reprod. Science Ctr., P.C., 668
F. Supp. 3d 411, 417 (E.D. Va. 2023) (“Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent makes
clear that ‘a discriminatory discharge claim accrues when the employee receives notice of the
termination, not on the last day of employment.’” (quoting Smith, 770 F. App’x at 50–51)). In
this case, Plaintiffs allege that they were informed of the allegedly discriminatory termination
of their agency agreements on May 14, 2020, when Defendants issued the Termination Letter.
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Accordingly, their § 1981 claim premised on alleged discriminatory termination accrued on
May 14, 2020, even though the termination did not take effect until August 21, 2020. See Price,
694 F.2d at 965; Smith, 770 F. App’x at 50–51; Green, 578 U.S. at 564. Under the four-year
limitations period applicable to § 1981 claims, therefore, Plaintiffs had to file their claim based
on wrongful termination on or before May 14, 2024. They did not file this action until August
20, 2024. Accordingly, to the extent their § 1981 claim in Count I rests on termination of their
agency agreements, it is time-barred.
b. § 1981 claim based on policy or pattern of discrimination
Plaintiffs’ § 1981 claim in Count I is also time-barred to the extent it rests upon an
alleged pattern of discrimination. As an initial matter, the Fourth Circuit has suggested that
the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to claims based on a “pattern or practice” of
discrimination. Williams, 370 F.3d at 429 (“Although the Court in Morgan left open the
question whether the continuing violation doctrine applies to ‘pattern or practice’ claims, other
courts have declined to extend the limitations period for discrete acts of discrimination merely
because the plaintiff asserts that such discrete acts occurred as part of a policy of
discrimination.” (internal citations omitted)); accord Maisha v. Univ. of North Carolina, 641 F.
App’x 246, 249 (4th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (“General allegations of ‘a pattern or practice of
discrimination’ are insufficient to establish a continuing violation.” (quoting Williams, 370 F.3d
at 429–30)). Even if the continuing violation doctrine could apply to Plaintiffs’ claims of a
policy of discrimination in this case, however, their claim remains untimely because they fail
to allege any wrongful act within the applicable limitations period. See Hill, 731 F.2d at 180.
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21
Under the continuing violation doctrine, a claim “will not be time barred so long as all
acts which constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful employment practice and at least
one act falls within the time period.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122 (emphasis added). Crucially, this
doctrine applies only where one or more of the alleged wrongful acts occurred within the
limitations period. See Thompson, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 526 (collecting cases); Jersey Heights
Neighborhood Ass’n v, 174 F.3d at 189; Hill, 731 F.2d at 180 (quoting Woodard, 717 F.2d at 915).
For Plaintiffs’ § 1981 claim to be timely under the continuing violation doctrine, therefore,
they must allege that at least one wrongful act occurred on or after August 20, 2020, the date
four years before they filed their claim. The latest commission reduction that Plaintiffs allege
occurred in 2016, (ECF No. 27 ¶ 20), eight years before Plaintiffs initiated this action.17
Therefore, the allegations related to reduced commissions cannot render Plaintiffs’ claim of a
pattern of discrimination timely under the continuing violation doctrine.18
Nor can the August 21, 2020, effective date of the termination of Plaintiffs’ agency
agreements render their claim of a pattern of discrimination timely under the continuing
violation doctrine. Although termination is a discrete act such that the continuing violation
doctrine does not apply to wrongful termination claims, a termination itself can constitute an
act within the requisite limitations period for the purposes of applying the continuing violation
17 Plaintiffs also allege that “between 2003 and 2021, Erie reduced Ross’s commissions arbitrarily,” (ECF No.
27 ¶ 16), but they allege that their relationship with Erie Defendants terminated in 2020 (ECF No. 27 ¶ 20).
Additionally, they allege no facts regarding any interaction with Defendants in 2021. Accordingly, based on
Plaintiffs’ allegations, they were not authorized to sell Erie insurance in 2021 and, therefore, their commissions
could not have been reduced in 2021.
18 Separately, to the extent Plaintiffs sought to allege a claim based on discrete acts of commission reductions,
that claim would have accrued at the latest in 2016—the date of the latest alleged commission reduction—and
the statute of limitations would have run in 2020. Accordingly, any claim based on a discrete act of commission
reductions is time-barred.
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doctrine to a broader claim of hostile work environment. See, e.g., Guessous, 828 F.3d at 223
(determining that “non-time-barred discrete acts can be considered part of the ‘series of
separate acts that collectively’ create a hostile work environment, thus rendering a hostile-
environment claim timely under the continuing-violation doctrine”). Termination may form
such an anchor act, however, only where the termination itself is timely within the limitations
period. See id.; U.S. EEOC v. Phase 2 Invs., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 550, 575 (D. Md. 2018) (“A
‘discrete act,’ however, can still comprise part of a hostile work environment claim, so long as it
falls within the filing period.” (emphasis added)).
As explained above, Plaintiffs’ termination does not fall within the limitations period.
For the purposes of limitations, Plaintiffs’ termination occurred when they received the
Termination Letter on May 14, 2020, not when their termination became effective on August
21, 2020. For the same reason, Plaintiffs’ allegation of ongoing harm based on Erie
Defendants’ failure to reinstate their agency agreements after the MIA’s decision in 2024
cannot form an anchor event for the purposes of the continuing violation doctrine.19 In sum,
Plaintiffs allege wrongful conduct that culminated in their receipt of a termination notice on
May 14, 2020, which constitutes the latest possible date on which any § 1981 claim accrued.
The four-year statute of limitations applicable to their § 1981 claims thus began at the latest
on May 14, 2020, and terminated on May 14, 2024, more than three months before they
19 Moreover, it is not clear to this Court that Defendants are required to reinstate the contract under Maryland
law because the MIA’s determination remains subject to an ongoing appeal.
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initiated this action on August 20, 2024. Plaintiffs’ § 1981 claim against Erie Defendants is
time-barred, and Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED as to Count I, which is DISMISSED.20
II. Count II: § 1981 claim against Mr. Marrion
For the same reasons, the § 1981 claim against Mr. Marrion in Count II is untimely.
As a threshold matter, “‘to make out a claim for individual liability under § 1981, a plaintiff
20 Even if Plaintiffs’ § 1981 claim in Count I were not time-barred, it is not clear that they have alleged facts
sufficient to state a claim for relief. As amended, Section 1981 “prohibit[s] race discrimination post-contract
formation, including in the termination of contracts.” Chambers v. North Carolina Dep’t of Just., 66 F.4th 139, 141
(4th Cir. 2023) (footnote omitted) (citing Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 373 (2004)). “To
succeed on a § 1981 claim, ‘a plaintiff must ultimately establish both that the defendant intended to discriminate
on the basis of race, and that the discrimination interfered with a contractual interest.’” Nadendla v. WakeMed,
24 F.4th 299, 305 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d 427, 434 (4th Cir. 2006)).
A § 1981 “plaintiff must initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for race, it would not have suffered the
loss of a legally protected right.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 341 (2020).
Generally, a contract between an insurance agent and an insurance company may form the basis for a § 1981
claim. See, e.g., Wortham v. Am. Fam. Ins. Grp., 385 F.3d 1139, 1141 (8th Cir. 2004) (explaining § 1981 claim
required insurance agent to allege insurance company “intended to discriminate against her on the basis of
race”); Cruz v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 42 F.4th 1205 (10th Cir. 2022) (reversing summary judgment where agent
brought § 1981 claim against insurance company with which agent had contracted to sell policies). Importantly,
however, in Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance Companies, 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984), the Fourth Circuit determined
that, for prudential reasons, an insurance agent generally lacks standing to allege § 1981 claims based on a
company’s purported redlining practices. See id. at 421–22 (“The district court was correct in concluding that
the plaintiff [an insurance agent] had no standing to attack Nationwide’s alleged redlining practice under the
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1982.”). Specifically, the Fourth Circuit concluded that “[t]he persons
best suited to challenge the redlining practices are those owners of homes and buildings who have been the
direct victims of the alleged discriminatory practice.” Id. at 422. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit rejected the
plaintiff’s argument for standing on the basis that “he was ‘punished’ for trying to vindicate the §§ 1981 and
1982 rights of the home and building owners . . . .” Id. In short, the Fourth Circuit concluded that aggrieved
potential insureds could raise their own claims, and “[d]enying standing to [the insurance-agent plaintiff] does
not insulate Nationwide from legal accountability for any deprivation of § 1981 and § 1982 rights it may have
committed.” Id.; see also Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Marketing Corp., 28 F.3d 1268,
1279–1280 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (evincing agreement with Mackey as to § 1981).
Many of Plaintiffs’ allegations appear to rest on a redlining theory nearly identical to that the Fourth Circuit
rejected in Mackey. They compare their treatment to that of agents serving “majority-white” communities. See
(ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 16, 17, 21, 23, 24, 26, 38.) Indeed, some of their allegations relate solely to purported redlining.
See, e.g., (id. ¶ 41 (“Erie’s policies disparately caused a 23% decline in policies in majority-Black ZIP codes versus
a 14% increase in majority-white areas.”). To the extent Plaintiffs allege that Erie Defendants “interfered with
[their] ability to enter contracts with prospective insureds in the greater Baltimore area” by imposing different
requirements on agents serving “majority-minority” areas, they appear to allege redlining that cannot support a
§ 1981 claim. See Mackey, 724 F.2d at 421. Rather, any § 1981 claim must arise from Plaintiffs’ much more
limited allegations of racial discrimination in their contractual relationship with Erie Defendants, but such
claims are time-barred.
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must demonstrate some affirmative link to causally connect the actor with the discriminatory
action,’ and the claim ‘must be predicated on the actor’s personal involvement.’” Hawthorne v.
Virginia State Univ., 568 F. App’x 203, 204–205 (4th Cir. 2014) (mem.) (unpublished) (quoting
Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 75 (2d Cir. 2000)); accord Alvarez-Soto v. B.
Frank Joy, LLC, 258 F. Supp. 3d 615, 632 (D. Md. 2017). “In other words, the Fourth Circuit
recognizes liability for individual supervisors only when ‘they intentionally cause an employer
to infringe the rights secured by section 1981.’” Harriston v. Target Corp., Civ. No. GLR-23-
2795, 2024 WL 4336093, at *5 (D. Md. Sep. 25, 2024) (quoting Luy v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 326 F.
Supp. 2d 682, 688 (D. Md. 2004)); see also Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, 517 F.2d
1141, 1145 (4th Cir. 1975). “Thus, supervisors may be individually liable under Section 1981
when they ‘authorize, direct, or participate in’ a discriminatory act.” Tibbs v. Balt. City Police
Dep’t, Civ. No. RDB-11-1335, 2012 WL 3655564, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 23, 2012) (quoting Atkins
v. Winchester Homes, Civ. No. CCB-06-278, 2007 WL 269083, at *9 (D. Md. Jan. 17, 2007)).
In this case, the latest alleged discriminatory act in which Mr. Marrion allegedly
participated was the issuance of the Termination Letter on May 14, 2020. Thus, as explained
above, under the four-year limitations period applicable to § 1981 claims, Plaintiffs had to file
their claim against Mr. Marrion no later than May 14, 2024, but they initiated this action only
on August 20, 2024. Even assuming the continuing violation doctrine could apply to Plaintiffs’
claim that Mr. Marrion engaged in a pattern of discriminatory supervision, for the same
reasons discussed above, the August 21, 2024, effective date of the Termination Letter cannot
serve as an anchor event to render that claim timely. That is, for limitations purposes, a
termination occurs on the date the plaintiff becomes aware of the termination, not the date it
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takes effect. See, e.g., Phase 2 Invs., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 575 (requiring anchor event for
continuing violation doctrine to occur within requisite limitations period); Price, 694 F.2d at
965 (recognizing limitations period begins when plaintiff learns of discriminatory decision).
Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED as to Count II, which must be DISMISSED as untimely.21
III. Dismissal with Prejudice
As this Court explained in its prior Memorandum Opinion, leave to amend a complaint
to address deficiencies in the original complaint is freely given pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(a). “Indeed, there is authority that a plaintiff should be given at least one
opportunity to amend a complaint before a dismissal of the case with prejudice.” See Harvey
v. CNN, Inc., 520 F. Supp. 3d 693, 725 (D. Md. 2021) (citing Silva v. Bieluch, 351 F.3d 1045,
1048 (11th Cir. 2003)). Additionally, courts should dismiss claims without leave to amend
where amendment would be futile. Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc’y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 624
(4th Cir. 2015). “Where the statute of limitations bars a cause of action, amendment may be
21 Alternatively, Count II is also subject to dismissal because Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to
state a claim of individual liability against Mr. Marrion. Specifically, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that
Mr. Marrion “intentionally and personally participated in” the discriminatory acts alleged. Brown v. Balt. Police
Dep’t, Civ. No. RDB-11-0136, 2011 WL 6415366, at *8 (D. Md. Dec. 21, 2011). Although Plaintiffs allege that
Mr. Marrion “continued a pattern of discriminatory supervision and discipline against Ross;” issued Plaintiffs
a “warning letter citing pretextual performance issues;” and issued the 2020 Termination Letter, they fail to
allege that he caused any discrimination. As this Court has recognized, individual liability under § 1981 applies
only “where the act or omission resulting in the infringement of rights was intentionally caused by the
supervisor . . . ,” Sellito v. Metropark USA, Inc., Civ. No. RDB-11-0814, 2012 WL 1405949, at *7 (D. Md. Apr.
20, 2012), and “the claim must be predicated on the actor’s personal involvement,” Alvarez-Soto, 258 F. Supp.
3d at 632 (quoting Hawthorne, 568 F. App’x at 204–05). The Amended Complaint is devoid of allegations that
Mr. Marrion intentionally caused Erie Defendants to implement the alleged discriminatory policies, reduce
Plaintiffs’ commissions, or terminate Plaintiffs. Although Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Marrion engaged in each of
these alleged discriminatory acts by acting as Plaintiffs’ supervisor, their claims are not predicated on his
personal involvement. See, e.g., Harriston, 2024 WL 4336093, at *5 (quoting Luy, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 688); Alvarez-
Soto, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 632. Rather, Plaintiffs implicitly acknowledge that the alleged discrimination occurred
without Mr. Marrion’s personal involvement because they allege that he continued his predecessor’s
discrimination. Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim of individual liability under § 1981 against Mr.
Marrion.
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futile and therefore can be denied.” United States v. Pittman, 209 F.3d 314, 317 (4th Cir. 2000)
(collecting cases). As explained above, Plaintiffs’ claims are untimely. Plaintiffs have already
amended their § 1981 claims with leave of this Court, and they have not requested leave to
amend again.22 Accordingly, dismissal of both claims shall be WITH PREJUDICE.23
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expounded above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 34) is
GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (ECF No. 27) is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
A separate Order follows.
___________________________
Richard D. Bennett
United States Senior District Judge
Dated: February 9th, 2026
22 Moreover, this is the second action—after Ross I—in which Plaintiffs have raised their § 1981 claims, and
Defendants argued in their motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ original complaint that the§ 1981 claims were untimely.
Thus, Plaintiffs had notice of arguments related to untimeliness when they drafted their Amended Complaint.
23 Because Plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court does not reach Defendants’
alternative arguments for application of the abstention doctrines elucidated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971) and Burford v. Sun Oil Co. 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Nevertheless, the Court deems it prudent to note that
Plaintiffs are not parties to the pending MIA appeal that undergirds Defendants’ arguments for abstention.
Thus, Plaintiffs would not be able to raise their § 1981 claims in the state proceeding in the manner required
for abstention to apply under Younger. See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423,
432 (1982) (explaining Younger abstention is appropriate only if party seeking federal relief would have adequate
opportunity to raise federal claim in state proceeding). Similarly, “Burford allows a federal court to dismiss a
case only if it presents ‘difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import
whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar,’ or if its adjudication in a federal forum ‘would
be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public
concern.’” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 726–27 (1996) (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v.
Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989)). Although Maryland has a substantial interest in
regulating its insurance industry, Plaintiffs’ § 1981 claims in this case are particular to her contractual
relationship with Erie Defendants.
/s/
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