Ledoux v. SUBCOM, LLC et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DAVID A. LEDOUX, 	*
Plaintiff, 	*
v. 	* 	Civil Action No. RDB-24-2168
SUBCOM, LLC, f/k/a TYCO 	*
ELECTRONICS SUBSEA
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; 	*
TRANSOCEANIC CABLE SHIP
COMPANY, LLC; and 	*
T.E. CONNECTIVITY CORPORATION,
d/b/a C.S. TYCO RELIANCE, INC., 	*
Defendants. 	*
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a maritime action brought by Plaintiff David Ledoux, a captain of M/V
RELIANCE, 	a 	cable-laying 	vessel 	allegedly 	owned 	by 	Defendants 	SubCom, 	LLC
(“SubCom”), Transoceanic Cable Ship Company (“Transoceanic”), and T.E. Connectivity
Corporation, doing business as C.S. Tyco Reliance, Incorporated. On September 30, 2021,
Ledoux anchored M/V RELIANCE fifty-one nautical miles off the coast of Indonesia,
allegedly at the direction of Defendants’ agent, Ben Line Agencies—Singapore. On October
2, 2021, persons claiming to be members of the Indonesian Navy boarded the vessel and
ordered Ledoux to move it to harbor in Batam, Indonesia. Once anchored there, the putative
Indonesian Navy personnel ordered Ledoux to disembark for questioning, allegedly telling
him that he had illegally anchored M/V RELIANCE in Indonesian waters, violating
international law. After disembarking at Batam, Ledoux was arrested and jailed for twenty-one
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days. He claims to have suffered serious injuries from his detention, including physical injury,
extreme weight loss, mental anguish, and post-traumatic stress.
On July 26, 2024, Ledoux filed this lawsuit. (ECF No. 1.) After Defendants moved to
dismiss the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see (ECF No. 10), this
Court granted Ledoux’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint on July 9, 2025.
(ECF No. 17.) Ledoux then filed the operative, six-count Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 18.)
The Amended Complaint alleges Jones Act1 negligence (Count I), unseaworthiness (Counts
III and IV), and general maritime negligence (Count VI) against Defendants SubCom and
Transoceanic. (Id.) It also alleges unseaworthiness (Count II) and general maritime negligence
(Count V) against Defendant T.E. Connectivity Corporation. (Id.) This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1333. The core allegations of the Amended Complaint are
that: (1) Defendants, through their agent, directed Ledoux to anchor in the location that he
anchored; (2) Defendants were or should have been aware of warnings that similar vessels
anchoring in similar locations had been detained, and their captains arrested, by persons
claiming to be part of the Indonesian Navy; and (3) but for Defendants’ failure to alert Ledoux
to the existence of such warnings, he would not have anchored M/V RELIANCE in the
location which he did. (Id.)
1 The Jones Act, part of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30104 et seq.,
provides seamen injured in the course of employment with a negligence cause of action against
their employer. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 416 (2009). Traditionally,
maritime law provided no such cause of action, and Congress enacted the Jones Act
specifically to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). See
O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 40 (1943) (collecting cases).
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Now pending is Defendants SubCom and Transoceanic Cable’s Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2 (ECF No. 19.) The
Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions; no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md.
2025). Defendants assert that the act of state doctrine and the political question doctrine bar
Ledoux’s claims in this case. As this Court has previously noted, the validity or lack thereof of
the actions of the Indonesian government is not the basis of this lawsuit. Ledoux’s claims are
based on the alleged failure of Defendants to notify him of dangers inherent in approaching
the coast of Indonesia. Accordingly, and for the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 19) is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts in the
complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing SD3,
LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015)). Unless otherwise noted,
all facts herein come from the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 18).
I. 	Factual History
Ledoux was employed by Defendants as a seaman—and specifically as captain—
aboard the cable-laying vessel M/V RELIANCE at all times relevant to this case. (ECF No.
18 ¶¶ 4, 8, 10.) M/V RELIANCE is registered with the United States Coast Guard, and bears
Coast Guard number 9236494. (Id. ¶ 5.) Defendants SubCom and Transoceanic Cable are
2 As of January 14, 2026, Defendant T.E. Connectivity has not filed any response in
this case, nor has any attorney entered an appearance on its behalf.
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Delaware limited liability companies with their principal places of business in New Jersey. (Id.
¶¶ 5–6.) Defendant T.E. Connectivity Corporation, doing business as C.S. Tyco Reliance, is a
Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 7.) Ledoux
alleges that each Defendant owns or operates M/V RELIANCE and that all Defendants do
business at 1011 East McComas Street in Baltimore, Maryland. (Id. ¶¶ 5–7.)
On September 30, 2021, while Ledoux was employed as captain of and seaman on
M/V RELIANCE, Defendants’ agent, Ben Line Agencies—Singapore, instructed Plaintiff to
anchor the vessel fifty-one nautical miles off the coast of Indonesia. (Id. ¶¶ 13–14.) Ledoux
alleges that Defendants did not inform him that Protection and Indemnity Clubs3 (“P&I
Clubs”) had warned Defendants “about the Indonesian Navy detaining vessels and seaman
[sic] which the Indonesian Navy claimed were anchored illegally.” (Id. ¶ 15.) Ledoux alleges
that many of those detentions occurred in the same area in which Defendants and their agent
directed him to anchor M/V RELIANCE. (Id. ¶ 16.) Defendants failed to provide Ledoux
with notice of the P&I Clubs’ warnings or copies of the warnings themselves. (Id. ¶ 17.) He
claims that but for the failure to provide these warnings, he would not have anchored M/V
RELIANCE in the instructed location. (Id. ¶ 18.)
On October 2, 2021, while still anchored fifty-one miles off the Indonesian coast,
armed Indonesian Navy personnel boarded M/V RELIANCE and told Ledoux that the vessel
was illegally anchored in Indonesian waters. (Id. ¶ 19.) They ordered Ledoux to move the vessel
and anchor it in the harbor of Batam, Indonesia. (Id. ¶ 20.) The naval personnel claimed that
3 “Protection and Indemnity Clubs are associations of ship owners who band together
to provide insurance.” Liberty Woods Int’l, Inc. v. Motor Vessel Ocean Quartz, 219 F. Supp. 3d 494,
495 n.1 (D.N.J. 2016).
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M/V RELIANCE would be inspected at Batam for its seaworthiness. (Id.) Once M/V
RELIANCE was anchored at Batam, the Indonesian Navy personnel ordered Ledoux to
disembark and go ashore for questioning. (Id. ¶ 21.) In Batam, the Indonesian Navy arrested
Ledoux and placed him in a jail, alleging that he had illegally anchored in Indonesian waters
and violated the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.4 (Id. ¶ 22.)
Ledoux spent twenty-one days in an Indonesian jail. (Id. ¶ 23.) The Amended
Complaint alleges that the jail’s conditions were “horrible”: Ledoux claims he was assaulted,
suffered physical injuries from the assault, and also faced “extreme weight loss”; burns;
diarrhea from unclean food and water and stress; “major stomach and body cramps”;
“constant insect bites”; “back, arm, and leg pain”; “exposure to mosquitoes, roaches[,] and
other insects”; lack of sleep, mental anguish, and subsequent post-traumatic stress. (Id. ¶¶ 23–
26.) He alleges that he is expected to experience “permanent physical limitations, pain and
suffering, sleep issues[,] emotional distress[,] and loss of enjoyment of life.” (Id. ¶ 27.)
II. 	Procedural History
On July 26, 2024, Ledoux filed a three-count complaint against SubCom, LLC,
Transoceanic Cable Ship Company, LLC, and T.E. Connectivity Corporation, doing business
as C.S. Tyco Reliance, Incorporated. (ECF No. 1.) He alleged Jones Act negligence (Count I),
unseaworthiness (Count II), and general maritime negligence (Count III). (Id.) The crux of his
4 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397, is an international treaty ratified by 171 parties as of September 22, 2025. See United
Nations – Oceans & Law of the Sea, Chronological List of Ratifications, Accessions, and Successions,
https://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm
(Sep. 22, 2025). The United States is not party to the Convention but has recognized that its
“‘baseline provisions reflect customary international law.’” United States v. Beyle, 782 F.3d 159,
166 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588 n.10 (1992)).
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allegation against Defendants is that they failed to warn him of the P&I Clubs’ warnings that
other vessels had been detained by personnel claiming to represent the Indonesian Navy and
that but for Defendants’ failure to provide such warning, Ledoux would not have anchored
M/V RELIANCE in the instructed location. See generally (id.).
On September 27, 2024, Defendants SubCom and Transoceanic filed a Motion to
Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 10.) After the parties
had fully briefed the Motion to Dismiss, see (ECF Nos. 13, 14), Ledoux filed on December 23,
2024, a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 15.)
On July 9, 2025, this Court entered a Memorandum Order granting Ledoux’s Motion
to Amend (ECF No. 15) and denying as moot the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10). (ECF
No. 17.) On the same day, Ledoux filed the operative, six-count Amended Complaint. (ECF
No. 18.) The Amended Complaint alleges Jones Act negligence (Count I), unseaworthiness
(Counts III and IV), and general maritime negligence (Count VI) against SubCom and
Transoceanic; as well as unseaworthiness (Count II) and general maritime negligence (Count
V) against T.E. Connectivity. See generally (id.).
On 	July 	23, 	2025, 	Defendants 	SubCom 	and 	Transoceanic 	Cable 	(hereinafter,
“Defendants”) filed the pending Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 19.) They raise four arguments
for dismissal. First, Defendants assert that the act-of-state doctrine bars Ledoux’s claims. (Id.
at 11–16.) Second, they argue that this case is not justiciable under the political question
doctrine. (Id. at 16–19.) Third, they argue that Ledoux breached his duty to anchor M/V
RELIANCE in a safe and lawful location, making recovery barred under the primary duty
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rule. (Id. at 19–24.) Fourth, and finally, Defendants argue that they had no duty to warn or
prevent lawful government activity. (Id. at 24–26.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. 	Rule 12(b)(1)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) governs motions to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by
preponderance of the evidence, the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Demetres v. E. W.
Constr., Inc., 776 F.3d 271, 272 (4th Cir. 2015). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). As
relevant here, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated that “the
political question doctrine [is] an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.” Hencley v. Fluor Corp.,
120 F.4th 412, 422 n.3 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 840 F.3d
147, 154–55 (4th Cir. 2016); Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 407 n.9
(4th Cir. 2011)). Accordingly, political-question-doctrine challenges are best construed as
invoking Rule 12(b)(1). Under Rule 12(b)(1), a court may “may consider evidence outside the
pleadings without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”
Al Shimari, 840 F.3d at 154 (citing In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit. Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir.
2014)).
II. 	Rule 12(b)(6)
A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the “sufficiency of a complaint,” but does not “resolve
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contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Presley
v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006). To survive a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must set forth “‘a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A complaint must contain “more than labels and
conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555. A complaint need not include “detailed factual allegations,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678,
but it must contain “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of
action, “even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very
remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. When considering a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may not ordinarily consider evidence outside of the pleadings.
Doriety ex rel. Crenshaw v. Sletten, 109 F.4th 670, 679 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)).
ANALYSIS
SubCom and Transoceanic’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) raises four arguments. (ECF No. 19-1.) First, they assert that the act-of-
state doctrine bars Ledoux’s claims. (Id. at 11–16.) Second, they argue that this case is not
justiciable under the political question doctrine. (Id. at 16–19.) Third, they argue that Ledoux
breached his duty to anchor M/V RELIANCE in a safe and lawful location and recovery is
barred under the primary duty rule. (Id. at 19–24.) Fourth, and finally, they argue that they had
no duty to warn or prevent lawful government activity. (Id. at 24–26.) Defendants assert these
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arguments as to Counts I, III, IV, and VI. See generally (id.). They make no arguments as to
Counts II and V, which are lodged at T.E. Connectivity Corp. (ECF No. 18.) As such, this
decision does not discuss Counts II and V.
I. 	Act of State Doctrine
Defendants first assert that the Amended Complaint is barred by the act of state
doctrine. (ECF No. 19-1 at 11–15.) Defendants argue that Ledoux’s twenty-one-day detention
was an official act of Indonesia. (Id. at 15.) They also argue that resolving Ledoux’s claims
would require this Court to determine the legality of the detention. (Id.) The act of state
doctrine does not allow such determinations by federal courts, but it is inapplicable here
because resolving Ledoux’s claims would not require this Court to rule on the validity of his
detention. Therefore, the act of state doctrine is not cause for dismissal. Quite simply, this
case is based on Ledoux’s claim that Defendants failed to notify him of dangers in approaching
the Indonesian coast. The legality or illegality of actions by the Indonesian government is not
the basis of this lawsuit.
The act of state doctrine prevents federal courts from “declaring invalid the official act
of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory.” W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Env’t
Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990); accord Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 423 (1964); Hourani v. Mirtchev, 796 F.3d 1, 11–12 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The doctrine is a
function of the separation of powers, Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 404, reflecting the notion that
the Executive Branch’s ability to achieve its goals in foreign affairs may be impeded by the
Judiciary adjudicating the “validity of foreign acts of state.” Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423. As the
Supreme Court held in Kirkpatrick, however, a federal court only applies the doctrine when it
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“must decide—that is, when the outcome of the case turns upon—the [legal] effect of official
action by a foreign sovereign.” Id. at 406. When a federal court does not need to determine
the validity of a foreign sovereign’s conduct, the act of state doctrine does not apply. Id.
Kirkpatrick originated as a civil suit between two bidders for a contract with the Nigerian
Air Force for construction and equipment of an aeromedical center at a Nigerian Air Force
base. Id. at 401–02. The defendants had bribed Nigerian government officials to win the
contract, a fact they admitted when they pleaded guilty to federal criminal charges. Id. at 402.
Nigerian law prohibits bribery in connection with government contracts. Id. Plaintiff, another
company that had bid for the contract, brought a civil suit for damages related to not winning
the contract. Id. The defendants moved to dismiss, invoking the act of state doctrine. Id. After
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the act of state doctrine did
not apply, the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. at 403–04. There, they argued
that “the facts necessary to establish [the plaintiff’s] claim would also establish that the contract
was unlawful.” Id. at 406. A unanimous Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that the legality of
the Nigerian contract “is simply not a question to be decided in the present suit, and there is
thus no occasion to apply the rule of decision that the act of state doctrine requires.” Id. The
Court made clear that the “doctrine has no application to the present case because the validity
of no foreign sovereign act is at issue.” Id. at 409–10.
Similarly, consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Kirkpatrick, the act of state
doctrine has no application to this case. Ledoux alleges that personnel of the Indonesian Navy
arrested and jailed him for twenty-one days in poor conditions causing severe personal injury.
(ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 22–23.) He asserts that his detention was caused both by (1) Defendants’
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agent, Ben Line Agencies—Singapore, instructing him to anchor M/V RELIANCE fifty-one
nautical miles off the Indonesian coast and (2) Defendants’ failure to warn Ledoux of the
foreseeable danger of arrest and incarceration created by anchoring the vessel there. See (id.
¶¶ 13–18, 30, 52, 63, 85). Even assuming without deciding that Ledoux’s detention was an
official act of Indonesia, that act does not trigger the doctrine because this Court would not
need to determine the act’s validity to resolve Ledoux’s claims. To succeed on his claims
against Transoceanic and SubCom, Ledoux would be required to prove, at the very least, two
facts. First, he would need to show that he was detained and jailed by persons who claimed to
be part of the Indonesian Navy. Second, he would be required to prove that Defendants or
their agents, Ben Line Agencies—Singapore, failed to warn him that anchoring M/V
RELIANCE fifty-one nautical miles off the Indonesian coast would create a danger of
detention.5 In turn, to prove a failure to warn, Ledoux would need to show that his detention
was foreseeable to Defendants given the location at which Ben Line Agencies—Singapore
directed Ledoux to anchor the vessel on September 30, 2021, and the P&I Clubs’ warnings
about other similar detentions. See Daigle v. Point Landing, Inc., 616 F.2d 825, 827 (5th Cir. 1980)
(“Liability for failure to warn thus arises from foreseeability, or the knowledge that particular
conduct will create danger.”). At no point, however, would Ledoux need to prove, nor this
5 The Court notes that Ledoux would likely have to style and prove this fact differently
for his unseaworthiness claim, as proving unseaworthiness would require him to show that
Defendants did not keep M/V RELIANCE in “a seaworthy condition.” Mitola v. Johns Hopkins
Univ. Applied Physics Lab’y, 839 F. Supp. 351, 357 (D. Md. 1993). Counts III and IV of the
Amended Complaint allege that M/V RELIANCE was not seaworthy because the vessel
lacked “proper procedures for being informed about P&I Club warnings and warnings issued
by other entities concerning anchoring off the coast of Indonesia.” (ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 51, 63.)
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Court decide, that any official Indonesian act was valid or invalid. Accordingly, just as in
Kirkpatrick, the act of state doctrine does not apply to this case.
Defendants contend that, if the Amended Complaint survives the Motion to Dismiss,
they will implead Indonesia pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(c).6 (ECF No. 19-
1 at 6–7, 11–12.) With Indonesia having been impleaded, they argue, this Court would
“unquestionably” be required to rule on the validity of an official act of a foreign sovereign—
the detention and arrest of Ledoux—thereby triggering the act of state doctrine. (Id. at 7.) This
argument is simply without merit. Without ruling in advance on the question of impleader in
this case, the Court would note that Defendants cannot create a foreign sovereignty issue
based upon Ledoux’s clear claims of failure to be notified. The ability of Defendants to seek
to implead the Indonesian government may await further rulings of this Court. Rule 14(c) does
not affect the Court’s conclusion that the act of state doctrine does not apply.
II. 	Political Question Doctrine
Defendants’ second argument for dismissal is that this case is not justiciable because it
presents a political question. (ECF No. 19-1 at 16.) As noted above, the Fourth Circuit
considers “the political question doctrine as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.” Hencley,
120 F.4th at 422 n.3 (citing Al Shimari, 840 F.3d at 154–55; Taylor, 658 F.3d at 407 n.9).
Therefore, Defendants’ political-question-doctrine argument is better understood as seeking
6 Rule 14(c) governs third-party practice in admiralty and maritime cases. It provides,
in relevant part, that when “a plaintiff asserts an admiralty or maritime claim under Rule 9(h),
the defendant . . . may, as a third party plaintiff, bring in a third-party defendant who may be
wholly or partly liable—either to the plaintiff or the third-party plaintiff—for remedy over,
contribution, or otherwise on account of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(c). Ledoux has filed this case under Rule 9(h).
(ECF No. 18 ¶ 1.)
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dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), not Rule 12(b)(6) because, under Rule 12(b)(1), a party seeks
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. When ruling on a 12(b)(1) motion, a district
court “may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the motion to dismiss
into a motion for summary judgment.” Al Shimari, 840 F.3d at 154 (citing In re KBR, Inc., Burn
Pit. Litig., 744 F.3d at 333).
In support of their political-question-doctrine argument, Defendants include in their
Motion to Dismiss excerpts of a June 10, 2022, article about Ledoux’s detention from gCaptain,
a maritime news website. (ECF No. 19-1 at 17–18 (quoting ECF No. 10 Ex. 2 (gCaptain
Article)). The article states that Ledoux had “extensive contact with the [United States
Department of State] attaché in Jakarta” while jailed by the Indonesian Navy (Id.) Relying on
that article, Defendants contend that the State Department was “actively involved in
monitoring [Ledoux’s] detention conditions” while “considering and protecting” the United
States’ foreign policy goals for Indonesia. (Id. at 8.) Defendants argue that, if this case survives
the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court will be “require[d]” to “express negative opinions” of
“the actions taken by Indonesia” and its Navy. (Id. at 18.) They argue that such adjudication
“risks impeding or upsetting the sensitive and critical relationship . . . between the United
States and Indonesia.” (Id.) Thus, they assert that this case presents a political question
depriving the Court of jurisdiction. (Id. at 16.) Although certain facts underlying this case may
contain political implications, the case is very simply not a political question. Accordingly, this
Court has jurisdiction over Ledoux’s claims.
“In general, the Judiciary has a responsibility to decide the cases properly before it.”
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 194 (2012). The political question doctrine
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is a “narrow exception” to that rule reflecting the separation of powers. Id. at 195. It “deprives
courts of jurisdiction over ‘controversies which revolve around policy choices and value
determinations constitutionally committed’ to Congress [or the Executive.]” Al Shimari, 840
F.3d at 154 (quoting Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)).
In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), the Supreme Court laid out six factors to
determine whether a case presents a nonjusticiable political question. The factors address
whether there is: (1) “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department”; (2) “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving the issue”; (3) “the impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion”; (4) “the impossibility of a
court’s undertaking independent resolution of the issue without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government”; (5) “an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made”; or (6) “the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.” Id. In addition to
these six factors, Baker made clear that politically-charged cases are not always political
questions. Id. at 217 (“The doctrine of which we treat is one of ‘political questions,’ not one
of ‘political cases.’”). More recently, in Zivitofsky, the Court reaffirmed that principle, stating
that courts are not excused from doing their usual work “merely because the issues have
political implications.” 566 U.S. at 196. Further, and as relevant here, it is “error to suppose
that 	every 	case 	or 	controversy 	which 	touches 	foreign 	relations 	lies 	beyond 	judicial
cognizance.” Baker, 396 U.S. at 211.
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The parties’ briefing of this issue fails to analyze the Baker factors and instead centers
on the present applicability of a 2014 decision of this Court, Du Daobin v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 2
F. Supp. 3d 717 (D. Md. 2014). See (ECF No. 19-1 at 18–19; ECF No. 22-1 at 6–7; ECF No.
23 at 6–8). The Court first explains why Du Daobin is inapposite here and then turns to an
analysis of the relevant Baker factors.
a. 	Du Daobin
Du Daobin concerned China’s Golden Shield, an Internet-surveillance system used by
the Chinese government. Id. at 720. Plaintiffs in that case were Chinese nationals and self-
proclaimed dissidents who claimed to have been detained, subjected to forced labor, and
tortured because of their dissident views as a result of the Golden Shield program. Id. The
defendants, Cisco, an American technology company, and its chief executive officer, were
alleged to have made the Golden Shield for China “specifically for the purpose of facilitating
[the Chinese government]” in torturing dissidents. Id. The plaintiffs filed an eleven-count
lawsuit, alleging violations under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Du Daobin, 2 F.
Supp. 3d at 721. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the act of
state doctrine and political question doctrine, among other proffered theories of relief. Id. at
722. This Court held in Du Daobin that the political question doctrine applied and rendered
the case nonjusticiable, pointing specifically to the fourth, fifth, and sixth Baker factors. Id. at
724–25. The Court explained that “[t]o adjudicate this question would require the Judiciary to
determine whether the U.S. rules and regulations surrounding the export of products to China
are sound,” which would in turn “demonstrate a lack of respect for both the Executive and
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Legislative branches,” “question a political decision already clearly made,” and “introduce the
possibility of additional voices where only a single voice should be heard.” Id. at 725.
Du Daobin is inapposite for at least two reasons. First, the plaintiffs in that case brought
their claims under the Alien Tort Statute, which provides that “[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The Alien Tort Statute often
implicates the political question and act of state doctrines because of its orientation towards
non-citizens and concomitant foreign policy implications. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol., Inc.,
569 U.S. 108, 116 (2013); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004). Therefore, in Kiobel,
the Supreme Court instructed district courts to exercise special caution towards Alien Tort
Statute claims because they present “‘the danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the
conduct of foreign policy.’”7 Id. at 726 (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108,
116 (2013)). Here, Ledoux’s Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, and general maritime
negligence claims raise none of the same foreign policy or separation of powers concerns
inherent to Alien Tort Statute lawsuits. This fact alone makes Du Daobin inapplicable here.
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, in order for the plaintiffs in Du Daobin to
have been successful in their claims against Cisco, they would have needed to show that Cisco
had knowledge that the Golden Shield would be used by the Chinese government to monitor
and torture dissidents. That is, they would have needed to prove that Cisco was entwined in
7 As Du Daobin explained, “even before [the Supreme Court decided] Kiobel [in 2013],
a number of courts considering [Alien Tort Statute] claims had dismissed [them] on political
question grounds.” 2 F. Supp. 3d at 724 (citing Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 984 (9th
Cir. 2007); Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
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alleged international law violations by a foreign government. As this Court has already
explained, Ledoux does not need to make any similar showing. He needs only show the fact
of his detention, without any question of its propriety. As such Du Daobin is inapposite here.
b. 	Relevant Baker
Factors
As noted above, the Supreme Court in Baker explained that nonjusticiable political
questions often evince one or more of its six independent factors. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; accord
In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d at 217. None of the factors is met in this case. First,
there is no “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment” of any issue “to a coordinate
political branch.” Baker, 396 U.S. at 217. Ledoux’s case alleges Jones Act negligence,
unseaworthiness, and general maritime negligence—private law issues or tort squarely
entrusted to the federal courts in the Constitution.
Second, there is no “lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving” this case. Id. As explained above, federal courts have “a superabundance of tools”
to resolve tort actions. Cawthorn v. Amalfi, 35 F.4th 245, 256 (4th Cir. 2022). Additionally, there
is no shortage of cases from explaining and drawing the contours of the legal standards for
each of Ledoux’s claims. As regards Jones Act negligence, see, for example, Martin v. Harris,
560 F.3d 210, 216 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted); Hernandez v. Trawler Miss Vertie
Mae, Inc., 187 F.3d 432, 436 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal citation omitted). For unseaworthiness,
see, for example, Dise v. Express Marine, Inc., 476 F. App’x 514, 519–20 (4th Cir. 2011);
Hernandez, 187 F.3d at 439 (citing Gosnell v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 782 F.2d 464, 467 (4th Cir.
1986)); Mitola, 839 F. Supp. at 357; Carney v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 2d 715, 717 (D. Md.
2009). Finally, for general maritime negligence, see, for example, Mullinex v. John Crane Inc., No.
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18-cv-00033, 2021 WL 8129699, at *1–2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 25, 2021) (collecting cases). The
second Baker factor is simply not met here.
The third through sixth Baker factors follow the first and second. Cawthorn, 35 F.4th at
268 n.2 (Richardson, J., concurring) (explaining that the first two Baker factors are most
important as they form the “Article-III heart of that doctrine that deals with core questions of
justiciability); Kravitz v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 336 F. Supp. 3d 545, 561 (D. Md. 2018) (stating that
the first two factors are “the most important” of the six); Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored
People v. Bureau of Census, 382 F. Supp. 3d 349, 384 (D. Md. 2019) (the same). Those factors—
which concern courts making initial policy determinations, courts not giving due respect to
the political branches, a need for a court to adhere to a prior political decision, and the potential
of courts creating embarrassment from too many pronouncements on one question—are not
present here for the same reasons that the first two are not present. Deciding Ledoux’s claims
requires would not require this Court to make any policy determination nor eschew respect
for the political branches. Similarly, there is no need for any adherence to a political decision
already made as no political decision is relevant to this case. Finally, given that the political
departments of the Government have not spoken on Ledoux’s lawsuit against Defendants, a
decision from this Court would not cause embarrassment. Put plainly, the political question
doctrine has no bearing on this case. Ledoux’s claims are justiciable.
III. 	Primary Duty Rule
Defendants’ third argument for dismissal is that, as captain of M/V RELIANCE,
Ledoux had a primary duty to anchor the vessel in a safe and lawful location. (ECF No. 19-1
at 19.) They contend that “[p]rudent seamanship required [him] to know whether or not he
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was inside” Indonesia’s territorial waters when he anchored the vessel. (Id. at 19–20.) Invoking
the little-used and roundly-critiqued primary duty rule of maritime law, Defendants ask the
Court to find that Ledoux is barred from recovery here.
The primary duty rule states that “a ship’s officer may not recover against his employer
for negligence or unseaworthiness when there is no other cause of the officer’s injuries other
than the officer’s breach of his consciously assumed duty to maintain safe conditions aboard
the vessel.” Robert Force & Martin J. Norris, The Law of Seamen § 30:44 (5th ed. 2025); accord
1 Schoenbaum’s Admiralty & Mar. Law § 6:24 (7th ed. 2026). The rule is obscure, invoked with
exceeding scarcity by the federal courts, and, when invoked, often criticized.8 It originates
from Judge Learned Hand’s opinion for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Walker v. Lykes Brothers S.S. Co., 193 F.2d 772, 774 (2d Cir. 1952). Since then, the
First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have challenged the doctrine
as inconsistent with the concept of comparative negligence and Supreme Court precedent;
have rejected it outright; or have declined to apply it given its shaky standing.9
8 “The primary duty rule is an anomalous concept within maritime tort law,” because
comparative negligence is the standard and has been so since the mid-nineteenth century.
David Gray Carlson, The Primary Duty Rule in Admiralty, 27 Hastings L.J. 835, 835, 838 (1976).
The rule originated in cases brought by railroad employees, working in tandem with the
concept of assumption of risk as a bar to recovery for railroad employees. See Tiller v. Atl. Coast
R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 58–66 (1943) (explaining this history). Congress abolished the primary duty
rule and assumption of the risk for railroad employees through its 1939 amendments to the
Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (amended 1939). Tiller, 318 U.S. at 64–
67. Its application to maritime law came thirteen years later in Walker. Lykes Brothers S.S. Co.,
193 F.3d 772, 774 (2d Cir. 1952), apparently despite Congress’s abolition of the rule for
railroad employees. See Boat Dagny v. Todd, 224 F.2d 208, 211 (1st Cir. 1955) (complaining that
Walker was inconsistent with the 1939 FELA amendments and Tiller).
9 See Boat Dagny, 224 F.2d at 211 (squarely criticizing Walker, just three years later, as
inconsistent with federal law and the Supreme Court’s holding in Tiller v. Atl. Coast R.R., 318
U.S. 54, 66–67 (1943)); Dunbar v. Henry Du Bois’s Sons Co., 275 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1960)
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Furthermore, despite Defendants’ assertions to the contrary, the Fourth Circuit has
never squarely addressed the primary duty rule. Only one Fourth Circuit case discusses Walker,
and only briefly. In Mason v. Lynch Brothers Co., 228 F.2d 709, 711 (4th Cir. 1956), the Fourth
Circuit considered a primary duty rule challenge to a maritime negligence suit. The defendants
invoked Walker as authority for the court to dismiss the lawsuit. The court first recognized the
conflict between Walker and the First Circuit’s 1955 decision in Boat Dagny v. Todd, 244 F.2d
208, 211 (1st Cir. 1955), which criticized Walker as being inconsistent with federal law and
Supreme Court precedent. Rather than weigh in on the circuit split, however, the Mason court
explicitly avoided the question of the primary duty rule. 228 F.2d at 711. Mason explained that
the primary duty rule was inapplicable regardless of its legal validity because the rule applies
to “captains” of “ocean going vessel[s]” and the plaintiff there was merely a seaman operating
as a captain of a tugboat in “very limited operations of short duration.” Id. at 712.
Even if the Court were to apply the primary duty rule to this case, however, Ledoux’s
claims would survive the motion to dismiss. As the Seventh Circuit explained in Kelley v. Sun
Transportation Co., 900 F.2d 1027, 1031 (7th Cir. 1990), the primary duty rule only applies if
there is a finding of no negligence or unseaworthiness attributable to the defendant.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has clarified that the rule does not apply where the plaintiff is
(two of three judges expressly rejecting Walker as “incompatible with the congressional
mandate that contributory negligence and assumption of risk shall not bar recovery in a Jones
Act case”); Kendrick v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 669 F.2d 341, 343–44 (5th Cir. 1982) (denouncing
Walker in favor of proportionate fault reduction); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Newman, 243 F.2d
804, 808 (6th Cir. 1957); Kelley v. Sun Transp. Co., 900 F.2d 1027, 1031 (7th Cir. 1990)
(denouncing Walker’s complete-bar rule); Bernard v. Maersk Lines, Ltd., 22 F.3d 903, 907 (9th
Cir. 1994) (same); Villers Seafood Co. v. Vest, 813 F.2d 339, 342–43 (11th Cir. 1987) (specifically
declining to follow Walker’s progeny and limiting the primary duty rule).
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injured by a “dangerous condition that he did not create and, in the proper exercise of his
employment duties, could not have controlled or eliminated.” Bernard v. Maersk Lines, Ltd., 22
F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 1994). Ledoux adequately pleads that Defendants failed to warn him
of the risks of anchoring M/V RELIANCE fifty-one nautical miles off the Indonesian coast
given the P&I Club warnings of Indonesian Navy personnel detaining other ships and
captains. (ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 30, 51, 63, 85.) Further, his Amended Complaint alleges that he did
not create the dangerous condition of the location at which he anchored M/V RELIANCE,
as it was Defendants’ agent, Ben Line Agencies—Singapore, which directed him to anchor in
that spot. (Id. ¶¶ 13–14.)
IV. 	Duty to Warn or Prevent Lawful Government Activity
Defendants SubCom and Transoceanic’s final argument for dismissal is that they had
no duty to warn Ledoux of the risk of detention by persons claiming to be part of the
Indonesian Navy. (ECF No. 19-1 at 24.) They argue that “[c]aptains are responsible for the
lawful operation of their vessel,” “have a duty to know and ‘conform [their] conduct’ to that
law of those seas in which [they] sail[],” and that, accordingly, Defendants had no duty to warn
of lawful governmental activity. (Id. (quoting The Griffin, 63 U.S. 491, 502 (1859)).
Ledoux claims that Defendants were aware of warnings from P&I Clubs “about the
Indonesian Navy detaining vessels and seaman [sic] which the Indonesian Navy claimed were
anchored illegally.” (ECF No. 18 ¶ 15.) He also alleges that many of the detentions that the
P&I Clubs referred to in their warnings were in “the same area [he] was directed to anchor by
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Defendants and their agent.” (Id. ¶ 16.) Finally, he alleges that these warnings were unknown
to him and that but for Defendants failure to warn him, he would not have anchored M/V
RELIANCE in the location instructed by Defendants and their agent. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 17–18.)
Those allegations do not rely on the legality or lack thereof of the Indonesian Navy’s detention
of him. As Defendants state in their brief, liability for failure to warn “arises from
foreseeability, or the knowledge that particular conduct will create danger.” See Daigle v. Point
Landing, Inc., 616 F.2d 825, 827 (5th Cir. 1980). Ledoux has sufficiently alleged that, given
Defendants’ 	putative 	knowledge 	of 	the 	P&I 	Clubs’ 	warnings, 	Ledoux’s 	detention 	at
Defendants’ instructed anchoring location was foreseeable.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 19) is DENIED.
A separate Order follows.
Date: January 14, 2026
Richard D. Bennett
United States Senior District Judge
/s/
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