Ahianyevi v. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Field Office Director et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
_______________________________________
)
SAEED SENYO AHIANYEVI, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
) 	Civil Action No.
v. 	) 	1:26-cv-10494-MRG
)
PATRICIA HYDE, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
_______________________________________)
ORDER CONCERNING SERVICE OF PETITION
AND STAY OF TRANSFER OR REMOVAL
GUZMAN, J.
Petitioner Saeed Senyo Ahianyevi, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241, contending that he is being unlawfully confined and seeking his release from
custody. Upon review of the petition, the Court hereby directs and orders as follows:
I. 	Service of Petition
To ensure that the relevant government officials have notice of this order, the Clerk shall
serve a copy of the petition upon Respondent and the United States Attorney for the District of
Massachusetts.
II. 	Response to Petition
Respondents shall determine whether Petitioner is a member of the class certified in
Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, No. 25-CV-12664-PBS (D. Mass.), and, if so, notify the Court no
later than 3 p.m. on February 3, 2026. 	If Petitioner is found to be a member of the Guerrero
Orellana certified class, Respondents shall, at the same time, notify the Court as to whether
Petitioner is being detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) as interpreted in Matter of Yajure
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Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), and include with their response, at least, copies of any
Notices to Appear, Warrants for Arrest of Alien, or Notices of Custody Determination issued in
connection with Petitioner’s current detention.
Respondents shall provide any further answer to the Petition, if necessary, no later than
3 p.m. on February 6, 2026. If Respondents contend that Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(6), and if more than six months have elapsed since the beginning of Petitioner’s
“removal period,” see id. § 1231(a)(1), Respondents are directed to include in their response, at
least, any materials relevant to the question of whether Petitioner’s removal is “reasonably
foreseeable,” see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001).
III. 	Jurisdiction
The protections of the Constitution apply to all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States, including citizens and noncitizens alike, and including those persons who are present in the
United States without authorization. 	See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (noting that
“[a]liens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as
‘persons’ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments”).
Although a federal district court does not generally have subject-matter jurisdiction to
review orders of removal issued by an immigration court, see generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252, it does
have habeas jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of immigration-related detention. 	28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(a); Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 33 (1st Cir. 2021).
Here, it appears that the relief sought is not review of an immigration order or an injunction
or stay preventing the execution of such an order. Instead, the petition alleges that Petitioner was
subject to arrest and detention in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States. The
Court thus preliminarily concludes that it has subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the petition.
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Even if this Court ultimately concludes that it does not have jurisdiction over this petition,
the Court nonetheless has power to act to preserve the status quo in the near term. A federal court
“always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction,” including its own subject-matter
jurisdiction. Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209, 218–19 (2021) (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536
U.S. 622, 628 (2002)). In order to give the Court an opportunity to consider whether it has subject-
matter jurisdiction, and if so to determine the validity of the habeas petition, the Court may order
Respondents to preserve the status quo. See United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330
U.S. 258, 293 (1947) (ruling that “the District Court ha[s] the power to preserve existing conditions
while it [is] determining its own authority to grant injunctive relief,” unless the assertion of
jurisdiction is frivolous). Such an order is valid unless and until it is overturned, even when the
issuing court ultimately lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to determine the merits of the underlying
action. See id. at 294–95. That principle applies with even greater force where the action enjoined
would otherwise destroy its jurisdiction or moot the case. 	See United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S.
563, 573 (1906).
IV. 	Order
In order to provide an opportunity for a fair and orderly consideration of this matter and to
resolve any contested issues, and unless otherwise ordered by the Court, it is hereby ORDERED
as follows:
A. 	Stay of Transfer or Removal
The parties represented at a hearing before Judge Landya B. McCafferty that Petitioner is
currently being held within Massachusetts. Petitioner shall not be transferred to another district
unless Respondents provide advance notice of the intended move. 	Such notice shall be filed in
writing on the docket in this proceeding and shall state the reason why Respondents believe that
such a movement is necessary and should not be stayed pending further court proceedings. Once
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that notice has been docketed, Petitioner shall not be moved out of the District for at least 72 hours
from the time of that docketing.
If Respondents contest that Petitioner is presently confined in the District of Massachusetts,
Respondents shall file a notice in writing on the docket stating the name and location of the facility
in which Petitioner is confined. Such notice shall be provided promptly after Respondents become
aware of that fact.
Petitioner shall not be deported, removed, or otherwise transferred outside the United
States until further order of this Court.
B. 	Measurement of Time Periods
If either of the time periods stated in hours “would end on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, the period continues to run until the same time on the next day that is not a Saturday,
Sunday, or legal holiday.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(2)(C).
If either of the time periods stated in days “would end on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or
legal holiday.” Id. 6(a)(1)(C).
Any of the time periods may be shortened or extended as may be appropriate by further
order of the Court.
SO ORDERED
Dated: January 30, 2026
/s/ Margaret R. Guzman
Margaret R. Guzman
United States District Judge
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