Dias De Souza et al v. American Used Auto Parts, Inc. et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
GUTTEMBERG DIAS DE SOUZA,
LINDOMBERG DIAS DE SOUZA, MELVA
MENDEZ, FRANK CRUZ, MATHEWS
CARDEAL, and SANTIAGO TEJEDA,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
AMERICAN USED AUTO PARTS, INC., NEW
AMERICAN USED AUTO PARTS, INC., D&B
AUTO BODY COLLISION, INC., ALEX
ROSA, an individual, and WENDY DIAZ, an
individual,
Defendants.
Civ. No.: 4:25-cv-40077-MRG
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF No. 18]
GUZMAN, J.
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff-employees Guttemberg Dias De Souza, Lindomberg Dias De Souza, Melva
Mendez, Frank Cruz, Santiago Tejeda, and Mathews Cardeal, bring this suit individually and on
behalf of all other similarly situated putative class members (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) against their
former employers, New American Used Auto Parts, Inc., D&B Auto Body Collision, Inc., Alex
Rosa, and Wendy Diaz (“Defendants”), alleging that Defendants failed to pay legally required
minimum and overtime wages, engaged in unlawful deductions, retaliation, discrimination, and
trafficking-related exploitation. [Am. Compl., ECF No. 16].
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The Amended Complaint alleges eight causes of action:1 Count I: failure to pay overtime
in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. et seq. (on behalf of the named
Plaintiffs and FLSA collective); Count II: failure to pay minimum wage in violation of the
Massachusetts Minimum Fair Wage Law (“MFWL”), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, §§ 1, 7 (on behalf
of the named Plaintiffs and the Massachusetts Overtime Class); Count III: failure to pay overtime
wages in violation of the overtime provisions of the MFWL (“MA Overtime Statute”), Mass. Gen.
Law ch. 151, §§ 1A, 1B (on behalf of the named Plaintiffs and the Massachusetts Overtime Class);
Count IV: unlawful retaliation in violation of the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 215(a)(3) (on behalf of the named Plaintiffs and the Massachusetts Overtime Class); Count V:
unlawful retaliation in violation of both the MFWL, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, §§ 19(1),(5) and
the Massachusetts Wage Act (“MWA”), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148A (on behalf of the named
Plaintiffs and the Massachusetts Employee Class); Count VI: violation of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1595 et seq. (on behalf of the named
Plaintiffs and the Massachusetts Employee Class); Count VII: violation of the Massachusetts Civil
Rights Act (“MCRA”), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, §§ 11H & 11I2; Count VIII: violation of the
Massachusetts Equal Rights Act (“MERA”), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 102.3
1 The Court refers to the counts in the Amended Complaint as “alleged causes of action” without deciding
at this stage in the opinion whether the counts as listed actually state viable causes of action.
2 The Amended Complaint does not specify which plaintiffs or subclass are bringing this claim, so the Court
construes it to allege a claim only on behalf of the named Plaintiffs. If Plaintiffs intend to press these claims
as class claims, they will have to amend the Amended Complaint again to make clear that these claims are
brought on behalf of a class, as well as specify which class they mean. See Maine Ass'n of Retirees v. Bd.
of Trs. of Maine Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., No. 1:12-CV-59-GZS, 2012 WL 5874783, at *2 (D. Me. Nov. 20,
2012)
3 Plaintiffs likewise fail to specify which plaintiffs or subclass are bringing this claim, so the Court construes
the Amended Complaint as alleging a claim only on behalf of the named Plaintiffs. If Plaintiffs intended
otherwise, they will have to move for leave to amend to make this change. See FN 2, supra.
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Before the Court is Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss, where Defendants move to
dismiss only Counts II, III, V, and VI. Defendants argue that such claims are legally insufficient
and must be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
For the reasons set forth below, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, [ECF No. 18], is
DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART.
II. 	BACKGROUND
The following relevant facts are taken primarily from the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint, [Am. Compl.], and are accepted as true for purposes of this motion. Ruivo v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 766 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2014) (explaining that a reviewing court “must separate
the complaint’s factual allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal
allegations (which need not be credited)”). All plausible inferences are made in Plaintiffs’ favor.
Id.
A. Relevant Facts
The corporate Defendants in this case are American Used Auto Parts, Inc., New American
Used Auto Parts, Inc., and D&B Auto Body Collision, Inc., [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3–5]; the individual
Defendants are Alex Marciel Rosa and Wendy Diaz who are joint employers. [Id. ¶¶ 6–7, 43]. The
Defendants run an auto shop business in Massachusetts. [Id. ¶ 42]. Plaintiffs were collectively
employed by Defendants for over twenty years, in positions including office staff, mechanics, and
drivers. [Id. ¶¶ 9, 21]. Plaintiffs allege that during their employment, they regularly worked more
than 70 hours a week without proper remuneration for their overtime hours. [Id. ¶¶ 22–24]. They
further allege that Defendants only paid them their regular hourly rates, failing to provide overtime
wages for hours exceeding forty per workweek. [Id. ¶¶ 23–24]. In addition, Plaintiffs assert that
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Defendants deducted amounts ranging from $50-$250 dollars from employees’ weekly paychecks,
citing payroll service fees as the basis for the deductions. [Id. ¶ 25].
Beyond the allegations of improper wage practices, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants
retaliated against employees through physical and legal means when Plaintiffs challenged
Defendants’ authority or attempted to resign. [Id. ¶¶ 28–35]. Plaintiff Dias De Souza alleges that
Defendant Rosa tried to physically attack him when Dias De Souza told the Defendants he would
seek a legal remedy for his lost wages, and for those similarly situated. [Id. ¶ 28]. In approximately
late February to early March 2025, Plaintiff Cardeal notified Defendants of his intent to resign,
and, in response, Defendant Rosa filed a police report with the Worcester Police Department
accusing Cardeal of theft. [Id. ¶¶ 30–31]. Plaintiffs allege that in the suit, Defendants demanded
nearly $13,000 from Cardeal, claiming that he had stolen from them. [Id. ¶ 32]. Plaintiffs assert
that the outstanding complaint against Cardeal negatively impacted his prospective employment
with a state agency. [Id. ¶¶ 34–35].
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants created a hostile work environment through
discriminatory and coercive practices. [Id. ¶¶ 36–41]. Defendants made racially derogatory
remarks, including referring to employees as “monkeys” and wrote such remarks on employees’
paychecks. [Id. ¶¶ 36–37]. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants sexually harassed some female
employees and reduced their pay when they resisted Defendants’ advances. [Id. ¶ 38]. Certain
employees with histories of substance abuse were allegedly supplied with drugs during their
employment, and in some instances, Defendants required payments from immigrant employees as
a condition of continued employment. [Id. ¶¶ 39–40]. Defendants purportedly pressured immigrant
employees to work excessive hours, citing their immigration status as a justification for the
overtime work. [Id. ¶ 41].
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B. Procedural History
Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing a complaint in this Court on June 9, 2025. [ECF
No. 1]. In July 2025, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and filed an answer. [ECF Nos.
13, 15]. On July 23, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, which became the operative
pleading. [ECF No. 16]. In response, Defendants timely filed an answer to the amended complaint
on July 29, 2025, together with a renewed motion to dismiss. [ECF Nos. 17, 18]. Plaintiffs filed
an opposition to the renewed motion to dismiss on August 12, 2025. [ECF No. 19].
III. 	Legal Standards
To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). On a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the factual allegations in the
complaint are accepted as true, and the Court draws “all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.” Trans-Spec Truck Serv., Inc. v. Caterpillar Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing
Garita Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. Ponce Fed. Bank, F.S.B., 958 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1992)). The
plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement; it requires only enough facts to
allow the Court to reasonably infer liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Bare allegations and legal conclusions and/or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action” will not suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although a complaint “does not need
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligations to provide the grounds of [their] entitlement to
relief requires more than labels and conclusions.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). While a
plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences from the facts alleged, his legal conclusions are not
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entitled to deference, and the court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
In their Renewed Motion to Dismiss, Defendants move this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’
state and federal claims for Counts II, III, V and VI on four grounds: (1) failing to state a claim
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); (2) failing to obtain the requisite right to sue letters; (3) failing
to pierce the corporate veil by naming two individuals as parties in this lawsuit; and (4) failing to
file a complaint on behalf of one of the Defendants within the statute of limitations. [ECF No. 18
at 1–2]. Although the arguments made by Defendants are sparse,4 the Court must do its diligence
to analyze the contested claims at this juncture.
A. Counts II, III, & V
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ state-law wage claims must be dismissed because
Plaintiffs “failed to properly bring this action before the Massachusetts Attorney General or obtain
the requisite right-to-sue letters,” pursuant to Mass. Gen Laws ch. 149, § 150 and Mass. Gen. Laws
c. 151, § 20. [ECF No. 18 at 4]. As a preliminary matter, Defendants’ citations to Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 149, § 150 and Mass. Gen. Laws c. 151, § 20 do not cover all the state-law wage claims in the
Amended Complaint. First, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, § 20 does not require administrative
exhaustion; indeed, there is no language in the statute that could reasonably be construed as an
exhaustion requirement.5 The sole mention of the attorney general (“AG”) stipulates that the AG
4 The Court notes that Defendants’ renewed motion to dismiss is little more than a bullet-pointed outline,
contains only one citation to case law, and is generally deficient in raising substantive arguments in support
of the motion to dismiss. [See ECF No. 18]. Still, in an effort to promote efficient resolution of this case,
the Court endeavors to construe Defendants’ conclusory arguments liberally where Plaintiffs have plainly
failed to state a claim.
5 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, § 20 reads as follows:
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may take an assignment of an employee’s wage claim in trust and bring a legal action on their
behalf. Second, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150 applies to only certain causes of action under
specific state laws that are enumerated in the statute. The only claim in the Amended Complaint
which falls in this list of applicable state laws is Count V: unlawful retaliation in violation of both
the MFWL, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, §§ 19(1), (5) and the Massachusetts Wage Act (“MWA”),
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148A.6 While the statute does not refer specifically to causes of action
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, §§ 1, 1A, 1B, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) has
also recognized the exhaustion requirement in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150 for violations of
those statutes. See Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc., 990 N.E.2d 1054, 1060, 1062 (Mass.
2013). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims under those provisions, Count II and III, are subject to the
exhaustion requirement. Accordingly, upon its own research for supporting law, the Court
concludes Defendants have properly challenged Counts II, III, and V.
Having determined that the exhaustion provision of Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 149, § 150
(“Section 150”) applies to all three counts challenged by the Defendants, the Court turns to the
substance of that provision. Section 150 requires an individual alleging a violation of the wage
statutes alleged in Counts II, III, and V to first file a complaint with the Massachusetts AG. Mass.
Gen. Laws. ch. 149, § 150. The plaintiff must then wait ninety days before filing suit, although
If a person is paid by an employer less than the minimum fair wage to which the person is
entitled under or by virtue of a minimum fair wage regulation, . . . the person may institute
and prosecute in his own name and on his own behalf, or for himself and for others similarly
situated, a civil action for injunctive relief, for any damages incurred and for the full
amount of the minimum wages less any amount actually paid to him by the employer. . . .
At the request of any employee paid less than the minimum wage to which he or she is
entitled the attorney general may take an assignment of such wage claim in trust for the
assigning employee and may bring any legal action necessary to collect such claim, . . . .
6 The exhaustion provision in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150 only applies to violations of Mass. Gen.
Laws “sections 33E, 52E, 148, 148A, 148B, 148C, 150C, 152, 152A, 159C or 190 or section 19 of
chapter 151.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 150.
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this timeline may be shortened if the AG 	assents to the suit sooner. Id. Section 150 further
stipulates that any private action much be brought within three years of the violation. Id.
i. 	Administrative Exhaustion (M.G.L. c. 149, § 150)
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the exhaustion requirements of
Section 150. Plaintiffs assert that they obtained authorization to sue from the AG in the form of
letters from the Attorney General’s Office (“AGO”). [ECF No. 19 at 7]. Defendants contend that
Plaintiffs’ letters do not grant the Plaintiffs a right to sue but just “detail potential violations.” [ECF
No. 18 at 4]. Defendants also note that only five of the six Plaintiffs obtained letters from the MA
AGO, and that Plaintiff Gutenberg Diaz de Souza failed to provide a letter. [Id.]
In their opposition brief to the Motion to Dismiss, [ECF No. 19], Plaintiffs attached their
receipt for filing with the AGO and the subsequent right-to-sue letters, including one for Plaintiff
Gutenberg Diaz de Souza. [See ECF No. 19-1].7 It is apparent from the letters provided that each
Plaintiff in this case was granted a right-to-sue letter from the MA AGO in compliance with their
administrative requirements. [Id.] Additionally, each right-to-sue letter notes that Plaintiffs “may
bring an action on [their] own or . . . on behalf of other similarly situated workers.” [Id.] Therefore,
claims of similarly situated plaintiffs within the putative class have also met the administrative
requirements.
ii. 	Adequacy of the Attorney General’s Authorization Letters
Defendants contend that the AG’s authorization letters are deficient because they reference
§ 52C violations (personal record-keeping) rather than the minimum wage and overtime payment
violations, or the retaliation claims alleged under Counts II, III, and V. [ECF No. 18 at 4]. This
7 The Court may consider certain documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties,
official public records, documents central to Plaintiffs’ claim, and documents sufficiently referred to in the
complaint. Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3–4 (1st Cir. 1993) (collecting cases). Whether Plaintiffs filed a
notice with the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office is central to Plaintiffs’ claims.
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argument mischaracterizes the function of AG’s authorization letters.8 The filing requirement
serves to provide the Attorney General with notice of potential wage violations so that the office
may investigate or prosecute at their discretion. Once the Attorney General issues an authorization
letter, it merely confirms that the statutory prerequisite has been satisfied and permits the plaintiff
to pursue the claims privately. See Depianti, 990 N.E.2d at 1061 (“The requirement that a plaintiff
file a complaint with the Attorney General before bringing a private suit is intended simply to
ensure that the Attorney General received notice of the alleged violations, so that she may
investigate and prosecute such violations at her discretion.”); Nahigian v. Leonard, 233 F.Supp.2d
151, 164 (D. Mass. 2002) (“the purpose of Section 150's administrative requirement, rather than
giving potential defendants notice and an opportunity to conciliate, seems to be to give
the Attorney General notice that a crime [failure to pay wages] may be occurring” (emphasis in
original)).
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs state that they “submitted their statutory claims with
the Office of the Attorney General and requested a Right-to-Sue letter.” [Am. Compl. ¶ 48]. The
subsequent responses from the Attorney General acknowledged receipt of Plaintiffs’ request for
their right-to-sue and provided written assent to proceed. [ECF No. 19-1]. The notice function has
therefore been satisfied.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss as to Counts II, III and V is
DENIED.
B. Count VI: TVPRA Claim
8 Moreover, Defendants’ argument rests on a factual premise that is not borne out by the record, as none
of the Attorney General’s authorization letters actually reference a violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149,
§ 52C. [See ECF No. 19-1].
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In 	Count 	VI, 	Plaintiffs 	assert 	claims 	under 	the 	Trafficking 	Victims 	Protection
Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1595 et seq., based on allegations of forced labor.
[Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28–35, 39–41, 68–70]. Defendants advance three overarching arguments for
dismissal: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (“Section 1589”) provides only criminal penalties without a private
right of action; (2) any civil claim is premature absent pending criminal proceedings; and (3) the
action should have been filed under seal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). [ECF No. 18 at 2–3].
The Court addresses each argument before turning to the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ factual
allegations.
i. 	Private Right of Action
Defendants’ arguments concerning the private right to action enumerated under 18 U.S.C.
1595 demonstrate a misunderstanding about the statutory framework of the TVPRA. Congress
passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (“TVPA”), establishing various criminal
offenses concerning human trafficking. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000); 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7114. One of those offenses was providing or
obtaining forced labor, which became a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (“Section 1589” or
“§ 1589”). Three years later, Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act of 2003 (“TVPRA”) which created a private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1595, providing
victims of the various human trafficking violations enumerated by the TVPA a cause of action and
civil remedy against perpetrators of the violations.9 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (2003); Nestle USA, Inc. v. Doe, 593 U.S. 628,
638 (2021) (opinion of Thomas, J.) (outlining the history of the TVPA and TVPRA); see McLeod
9 The TVPRA was amended in January 2006, Pub. L. 109-164, section 1(a), 119 Stat. 3558, and again in
December 2008, Pub. L. 110-457, section 1(a), 122 Stat. 5044 (Dec. 23, 2008). Congress has modified the
language and protections of these statutes under varying names over the course of the last twenty-five years.
Nestle USA, Inc. v. Doe, 593 U.S. 628, 638 (2021).
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v. Fessenden Sch., 624 F. Supp. 3d 36, 42 (D. Mass. 2022); see also Ricchio v. Bijal, Inc., 424 F.
Supp. 3d 182, 193 (D. Mass. 2019) (noting that the differences in mens rea requirements between
the criminal provision of the TVPA and civil provision of the TVPRA in subsequent amendments).
In 2008, Congress amended Section 1595 to expand the private right to allow plaintiffs to sue
defendants who are not just direct perpetrators of human trafficking violations, but also those who
are involved indirectly with such violations. Nestle USA, 593 U.S. at 638 (2021) (citations
omitted); 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a); F.C. v. Jacobs Sols. Inc., 790 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1174 (D. Co. 2025)
(“The TVPRA . . . allows [] plaintiffs to sue those who knowingly benefit from participation in a
venture that engages in forced labor or trafficking when the beneficiary had actual or constructive
knowledge of such practice.” (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590, 1595)). Accordingly, Section 1589
defines the substantive criminal offense of forced labor and Section 1595 independently provides
the separate civil enforcement mechanism that allows victims to sue for violations. 18 U.S.C. §§
1589, 1595.
In their motion to dismiss, Defendants misconstrue the statutory relationship between §
1589 and § 1595(a) and inappropriately rely on a non-operative complaint in their pleading. [ECF
No. 18 at 3]. Plaintiffs’ original complaint brought Count VI, their TVPRA claim, under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1589 rather than 18 U.S.C. § 1595 et seq. Defendants’ reliance on the original complaint
mischaracterizes the operative pleading. See InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 145 (1st Cir.
2003) (explaining that “[a]n amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, and facts that
are neither repeated nor otherwise incorporated into the amended complaint no longer bind the
pleader.”). In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs invoke 18 U.S.C. § 1595 et seq. and expressly
reference both § 1589 as the substantive violation and § 1595(a) as the civil enforcement
mechanism. [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 16, 68–70]. Therefore, Plaintiffs have pleaded their claim correctly.
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Defendants argue in the alternative that if the TVPA provides a private right of action, any civil
action under 18 U.S.C § 1595(a) “must be stayed pending criminal investigation or prosecution”
and that Plaintiffs may only assert a TVPA claim after the conclusion of a criminal matter brought
by the Attorney General’s Office. [ECF No. 18 at 3]. Defendants’ interpretation of the law is
erroneous.
Despite 	Defendants’ 	unsupported 	assertions 	to 	the 	contrary, 	Section 	1595(a)
unambiguously creates a private right of action without requiring any accompanying criminal
proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a); B.D.G. v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., No. 2:22-CV-3202, 2023 WL
5935646, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 2023) (“A § 1595(a) claim can stand alone, and civil
defendants need not have committed the underlying criminal sex trafficking offense under § 1591.”
(citations omitted)); Charles Doyle, C ONG . R SCH. S ERV., R40190, The William Wilberforce
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-457): Criminal Law
Provisions (2026), at 15–16. In the present case, there is no reference to a criminal action or
investigation which would impact this ongoing civil matter. If there were, the matter would not be
dismissed but rather stayed pending the final adjudication of the criminal case. 18 U.S.C §
1595(b)(1) (“Any civil action filed under subsection (a) shall be stayed during the pendency of any
criminal action arising out of the same occurrence in which the claimant is the victim.” (emphasis
added)). 	However, there is no requirement under the TVPRA for a criminal case to be brought
prior to filing a civil action.
ii. 	There is no obligation on Plaintiffs to seal the matter.
Defendants additionally argue, without any support from case law, that Plaintiffs’ TVRPA
claim should be dismissed because Plaintiffs did not file it under seal. [ECF No. 18 at 3].
Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot proceed with a civil action under § 1595(a)
unless the action is sealed pending the outcome of a criminal indictment against Defendants. [Id.]
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As discussed above, there is no requirement for a criminal action to be initiated prior to a civil
plaintiff suing under the TVPRA’s private right of action in Section 1595. Defendants’ arguments
regarding criminal proceedings and sealing requirements are unpersuasive and irrelevant to this
case.
iii. 	Sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ TVPRA Claim
To pursue a civil remedy for a forced labor claim under § 1595(a), Plaintiffs must allege
facts showing that Defendants either directly perpetrated a violation of the TVPA or “knowingly
benefit[ed], . . . from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has
engaged in an act in violation of [the TVPA].” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (emphasis added). For the
burden of proof in a civil matter, “[t]he phrase ‘knew or should have known,’ echoes common
language used in describing an objective standard of negligence.” Riccho v. Bijal, Inc., 424 F.
Supp. 3d 182, 193 (D. Mass. 2019) (citing M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F. Supp.
3d 959, 965 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (allowing claims of liability under the TVPRA to proceed against
two hotels and finding that the statute “invokes a negligence standard.”) (citing cases)).
The relevant criminal provision of the TVPA that provides the reference violation for
Plaintiffs’ civil suit is the provision prohibiting forced labor, 18 U.S.C. § 1589. This provision
prohibits knowingly obtaining labor through,
(1) force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that
person or another person;
(2) serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or another person;
(3) abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or
(4) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that failure
to perform labor would result in serious harm or physical restraint.
18 U.S.C. § 1589(a); see United States v. Papantoniadis, 165 F. 4th 65, 97 (1st Cir. 2026) (affirming
the district court’s conviction of a criminal defendant charged with forced labor under 18 U.S.C. §
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1589(a)). The phrase “serious harm” in the context of forced labor, extends to non-physical
coercion, including financial or reputational harm and threats of deportation. See Papantoniadis,
165 F. 4th at 77–78 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c); United States v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 145, 151 (1st
Cir. 2024), vacated on other grounds, 545 U.S. 1101 (2005); United States v. Chaudhri, 134 F.4th
166, 186–87 (4th Cir. 2025)).
For liability to attach under Section 1595(a), Plaintiffs must connect the alleged conduct to
one of the violations of Section 1989 and provide sufficient facts to allege causation between the
coercion and the Plaintiffs’ continued labor. See Adia v. Grandeur Management Inc., 933 F.3d 89,
93 (2nd Cir. 2019) (finding that plaintiff plausibly alleged claims for forced labor under subsection
1589(a)(3) by providing the court with explicit threats made by his employer to “expose him to
deportation” finding that the threats “constituted a claim of abuse of the legal process.”); United
States v. Kalu, 791 F.3d 1194, 1212 (10th Cir. 2015) (finding that threats that immigrant nurses’
visas would be revoked and that they would be deported and financially ruined were sufficient to
constitute threats of serious harm under the TVPA); Elat v. Ngoubene, 993 F. Supp. 2d 497, 525
(D. Md. 2014) (collecting cases) (“[I]n the majority of the cases in which the plaintiffs alleged
threats of deportation in a TVPRA claim . . ., the courts noted that the defendants made multiple
threats of deportation, often accompanied by threats of other harm, and/or threatened to take action
to have the plaintiffs deported.”).
In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs make vague references to potentially exploitive
conduct but fall short on the information necessary to bridge the plausibility threshold at this stage
of litigation. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “exploited a number of their employees through the
use of force, fraud, or coercion.” [Am. Compl. ¶ 39]. Additionally, Plaintiffs further allege that
Defendants exploited some employees who had “histories of substance abuse disorders by
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purchasing and supplying these employees with drugs to maintain them under their employ.” [Id.]
Further, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “exploited labor through some individuals by trafficking
them into the United States and forcing them to repay their dues in exchange for labor.” [Id. ¶ 40].
At the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiffs must provide “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face,” and to give appropriate notice to the Defendants regarding what
they are expected to defend. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Educadores Puertorriquenos en Accion,
367 F.3d at 68. The TVPRA allegations in the Amended Complaint consist primarily of conclusory
statements without the factual content necessary to evaluate whether these allegations state a claim
under § 1589. [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39–41, 68–70]. Allegations that named Plaintiffs or potential class
members, received drugs from Defendants, without more detail as to how the provision of drugs
compelled labor, fail to state a proper claim under the TVPA. Equally, Plaintiffs do not provide
enough information to support their trafficking allegations such as when it occurred, or whether
this conduct even pertains to the named Plaintiffs in the suit. Therefore, the Amended Complaint
fails to state a proper claim for the trafficking allegations. See McLeod v. Fessenden Sch., 624 F.
Supp. 3d 36, 43 (D. Mass. 2022) (dismissing an action under § 1595(a) because the Plaintiff did
not sufficiently allege facts for the court to infer that a “commercial sex act” occurred in violation
of the TVPA); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
This Court recognizes that Plaintiffs need not prove their claims at the pleading stage.
However, they must allege sufficient factual matter to support a plausible claim. See Ricchio, 853
F.3d at 557 (reversing dismissal of TVPRA claims where factual allegations and reasonable
inferences drawn in plaintiff's favor were “sufficient to pass muster under the plausibility
standard”). Plaintiffs must connect the alleged coercive conduct of Defendants to one of the
prohibited means enumerated in § 1589(a) to compel labor. See Bradley, 390 F.3d 145 at 150–52.
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They have not done so. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss as to Count VI is GRANTED;
however, the Count is dismissed without prejudice and Plaintiffs shall be given leave to amend
their Complaint to provide proper factual support for their claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“The
court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.”); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Rsch., 401 U.S. 321, 330 (1971) (“it is settled that the grant of leave to amend the
pleadings pursuant to Rule 15(a) is within the discretion of the trial court.”)
C. Individual Liability of Defendants Rosa and Dias
According to Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss, this Court should dismiss
individual Defendants Alex Rosa and Wendy Dias because Plaintiffs failed to “pierce the corporate
veil” when naming them as parties in this suit. [ECF No. 18 at 2, 4–5]. Plaintiffs rebut this assertion
and maintain that both Defendants are “individually liable.” [ECF No. 19 at 9–10]. This Court
agrees with the Plaintiffs.
Defendants characterize this case as “a pay dispute” between Plaintiffs and the three
Corporate Defendants, arguing that individual liability requires “commingling of assets” or “acting
with any sense of illegitimacy.” [ECF No. 18 at 4–5 (citing My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland
Farms, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 478, 751 (Mass. 1968))]. Defendants’ arguments are misplaced, as My
Bread Baking Co., addresses the circumstances under which a court may disregard the corporate
form to reach a corporation’s assets or owners. Therefore, the citation to My Bread Baking Co. is
unavailing. The issue before the Court is whether an individual may be liable under the FLSA, the
MERA, MCRA, the MFWL, and the TVPRA.10
10 While Defendants did not expressly challenge individual liability under FLSA, MERA and MCRA, the
Court read Defendants arguments to consider all pending claims against Defendants Rosa and Dias.
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Plaintiffs allege that Rosa and Dias held management roles and functioned as “joint
employers,” and note in their pleadings that Wendy Diaz is registered as the President, Treasurer,
and Secretary; and Alex Rosa is the Vice President and Director, of Defendant New American
Used Auto Parts, Inc. [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 42–47; ECF No. 19-2].11 See Watterson, 987 F.2d at 3–4.
Defendants, on their part, refer to the same Defendants as “principal shareholders,” but give the
Court no information of whether they exerted “operational control,” or qualify as “employers”
under the relevant statutes. [ECF No. 18 at 4–5].
Defendants frame this issue as one of corporate veil-piercing, but that framework is
inapplicable. As discussed below, each claim brought by the Plaintiffs impose liability on
individuals who exercise control over employment practices or are defined as an “employer” under
the applicable statute.
i. 	Individual Liability Under the FLSA, MCRA, and MERA
Under the FLSA, individual liability attaches where a person “was in a position to exert
substantial authority over corporate policy relating to employee wages” and caused the corporation
to compensate or not compensate employees in accordance with the statute. Manning v. Boston
Med. Ctr. Corp., 725 F.3d 34, 48-9 (1st Cir. 2013); Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1511 (1st
Cir. 1983) (citing cases); see also Baystate Alt. Staffing, Inc. v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 678 (1st
Cir. 1998) (“Agnew 's economic reality analysis focused on the role played by the corporate officers
in causing the corporation to undercompensate employees . . . . In addition to direct evidence of
11 Courts “may take judicial notice of facts which are capable of being determined by an assuredly accurate
source.” Does 1-6 v. Mills, 16 F.4th 20, 26 n.3 (1st Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs appended
an exhibit of a business entity summary from the website of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts to their opposition brief, which courts in this District consider to be, “an assuredly accurate
source.” Miller v. Siemens Med. Sol. USA, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-12854-JEK, 2025 WL 2625269, at *4 n.2 (D.
Mass. Sept. 11, 2025) (citing cf. Gent v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 611 F.3d 79, 84 n.5 (1st Cir. 2010) (taking
judicial notice of government website)).
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such a role, other relevant indicia may exist as well—for example, an individual's operational
control over significant aspects of the business and an individual's ownership interest in the
business.”). An individual may be jointly and severally liable for unpaid wages if they are
considered an “employer” or “corporate officer with operational control of a corporation’s covered
enterprise.” See Manning, 725 F.3d at 48 (citing cases).
At this stage, the pleading standard is satisfied where the complaint alleges that an
individual was in a position to exert substantial authority over corporate wage policy and caused
the corporation to compensate or not compensate its employees. See Manning,725 F.3d at 47–48.
Rosa and Dias’ management designations from New American Used Auto Parts, Inc.’s business
entity summary and “joint-employer authority,” raises a plausible inference of individual FLSA
liability. [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 42–47]; see Chao v. Hotel Oasis, Inc., 493 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2007)
(affirming the district court judgment that held the president of the corporation personally liable
for violations of the FLSA); see also Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 148
(3rd Cir. 2014) (If a joint employment relationship is established, “each joint employer may be
held jointly and severally liable for the FLSA violations of the other, in addition to direct liability
for its own violations.”); see also Agnew, 712 F.2d at 1511 (citing cases).
The FLSA anti-retaliation provision is even broader and covers “any person” who retaliates
against employees asserting their rights. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
Similarly, the MCRA and MERA impose liability on “any person” who engages in the
prohibited conduct without regard to corporate form. Mass. Gen. Laws c. 12, § 11H; Mass. Gen.
Laws c. 93, § 102 (“All persons within the commonwealth. . . whose rights under the provisions
of subsection (a) have been violated may commence a civil action”).
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ii. 	Individual Liability Under the Massachusetts Fair Wage Law (“MFWL”), Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 151, §§ 1, 7; unlawful retaliation in violation of both the MFWL,
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, §§ 19(1),(5) and the Massachusetts Wage Act (“MWA”),
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148A
The Massachusetts Fair Wage Law (“MFWL”) imposes liability on corporate officers and
agents who control a corporation’s employment practices. O’Leary v. New Hampshire Boring,
Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 4, 12 n.5 (D. Mass. 2016) (Under the Massachusetts Fair Wage Law, “personal
liability attaches to the officer or agent of [the] corporation who pays or agrees to pay any employee
less than the overtime rate of compensation required.”). The Massachusetts Wage Act (“MWA”),
imposes a “categorial liability on a company’s president and treasurer” and any officer or agent
managing a corporation for Wage Act violations. See Segal v. Genitrix, LLC, 87 N.E.3d 560, 567
(Mass. 2017).
Similarly, the retaliation protections for MFWL and MWA, under Chapter 151, § 19
expressly identifies officers and agents as individually liable and provide in relevant part that
“[a]ny employer or the officer or agent of any corporation” who knowingly pays wages below
applicable rates is personally liable. Mass. Gen. Laws c. 151, § 19.
iii. 	The TVPRA
As discussed previously, [supra IV.B.i.], the TVPRA similarly imposes direct individual
liability. Section 1595(a) extends civil liability to “whoever knowingly benefits. . . financially or
by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture” that the person knew or should
have known violated the TVPA. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). The legitimacy of a corporate business does
not preclude a plaintiff from suing individuals whose actions violate the TVPA. See Adia, 933 F.3d
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at 93; see also Paguirigan v. Prompt Nursing Employment Agency LLC, 286 F.Supp.3d 430 (E.D.
N.Y. 2017).
Here, Plaintiffs would have to allege that Defendants Rosa and Diaz knowingly benefited
from violations of the TVPRA to hold them individually liable. As noted previously, supra,
Plaintiffs have failed to establish a viable claim under the TVPRA but will be given leave to amend.
Accordingly, the insufficient pleading for this specific claim does not preclude individual liability
under an expanded set of facts.
iv. 	Piercing the corporate veil is not necessary to hold Defendants liable under these
statutes.
Defendants’ veil-piercing objection is a red herring, as Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that the
Individual Defendants meet the role of “employer” for the purposes of their employment-related
claims, or otherwise plead conduct sufficient for individual liability on their non-employment
claims (excluding the TVPRA claim). The complaint alleges that Rosa and Diaz held management
roles and functioned as “joint employers” with respect to the corporate Defendants, [Am. Compl.
¶¶ 42–47], and Plaintiffs argue that the individual defendants “operate Defendant Corporations as
either an alter ego of themselves and/or failed to operate Defendant Corporations as legally
separate entities apart from themselves. [Id. ¶ 47; ECF No. 19 at 10]. Plaintiffs also include the
Business Entity Summary for New American Used Auto Parts, Inc. which lists Defendants in roles
of President, Treasurer, Secretary, Vice President, and Director. [ECF No. 19-2]. Defendants
however, provide no evidence or argument to the Court that Defendants Rosa and Dias did not
exert operational control or authority over the compensation of their employees, or that Defendants
operated the corporations as legally separate entities. [See generally ECF No. 18]. 	While the
allegations are not elaborate, they provide sufficient factual allegations. Absent further argument
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or evidence from Defendants about the propriety of dismissal, the Court refrains from dismissing
the individual Defendants from this action. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have met their burden to
plausibly allege that Defendants Rosa and Dias exert sufficient control to face individual liability
under the relevant statutes.
For the reasons stated, Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Counts II, III, and V regarding
individual defendants Rosa and Dias is DENIED.12
D. Statute of Limitations: Plaintiff Santiago Tejada
Defendants contend that Plaintiff Santiago Tejada last worked for them “approximately [in]
2021” and his claims are time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations. [ECF No. 18 at
5]. Plaintiffs offer a contrary assertion that Plaintiff Tejada, “like the other Plaintiffs, worked for
Defendants for several years, up until as late as 2025.” [ECF No. 19 at 10-11].
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and Defendants bear the burden of
establishing the affirmative defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on statute
of limitations grounds is appropriate only when “the facts establishing the defense are definitively
ascertainable from the complaint” and those facts “suffice to establish the affirmative defense with
certitude.” Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 150 (1st Cir. 2006); Rodi v. S. New Engl. Sch. of
Law, 389 F.3d 5, 12(1st Cir. 2004). Here, Defendants’ assertion that Santiago Tejada terminated
his employment in 2021 is unsupported by evidence in the record. Where such factual questions
remain unresolved, a statute of limitations defense cannot succeed at this pleading stage. See
Echevarria-Roman v. Miami Durable Med. Equip., Inc., No. CV 06-1829 (ADC), 2008 WL
11357918, at *6 (D.P.R. Sept. 18, 2008) (citing Blackstone Realty LLC v. F.D.I.C., 244 F.3d 193,
197 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is. . . well settled that, for dismissal to be allowed on the basis of an
12 As noted, supra, Plaintiffs’ claims for Count VI under the TVPRA are dismissed for other reasons.
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affirmative defense, the acts establishing the defense must be clear ‘on the face of the plaintiff’s
pleadings.’”)).
Therefore, the Court will not bar claims brought by Plaintiff Santiago Tejada at this time
and the motion to dismiss as to Santiago Tejeda is DENIED. Defendants may renew their
arguments for their affirmative defense later in this litigation.
E. Compliance with Local Rule 7.1(a)(2)
It has been brought to the attention of the Court that several motions have been filed where
counsel failed to meet and confer before filing. [ECF No. 19 at 6]. The parties are reminded that
it is their obligation to comply with Local Rule 7.1(a)(2) to avoid unnecessary motion practice.
Failure to comply with Local Rule 7.1(a)(2) may result in denial of the relief sought.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs’ claim under the TVPA is dismissed without prejudice; Plaintiffs
shall have 30 days from today to file a second amended complaint in accordance with this order.
Leave to amend is restricted to two limited purposes: amending Plaintiffs’ TVPRA claim in
accordance with this order, and amending the class allegations as indicated in footnote two. The
Court will not revisit its rulings made here on Plaintiffs’ other claims in a future motion to dismiss.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 20, 2026
/s/ Margaret R. Guzman
Margaret R. Guzman
United States District Judge
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