Raymond v. Registry of Motor Vehicles

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CHRIS J. RAYMOND,
Plaintiff,
v.
REGISTRY OF MOTOR VEHICLES,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 25-30022-MGM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR HEARING
(Dkt. Nos. 21 & 24)
January 13, 2026
MASTROIANNI, U.S.D.J.
Chris J. Raymond (“Plaintiff”), acting pro se, brings this action against the Massachusetts
Registry of Motor Vehicles (“RMV” or “Defendant”), alleging claims arising from Defendant’s
suspension of Plaintiff’s Massachusetts driver’s license. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) Defendant filed a
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, arguing this court (1) lacks jurisdiction pursuant to the
Eleventh Amendment and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and (2) the facts alleged by Plaintiff do not
support double jeopardy or due process claims. (Dkt. No. 21.) In his opposition, Plaintiff
supplemented some of the factual allegations in his Complaint. He also asserted that his claims fall
within the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
is inapplicable because he is challenging actions taken by the RMV, not seeking review of a state court
decision. Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Fix Case for Status Conference. (Dkt. No. 24.) For the
reasons that follow, the court will grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and find moot Plaintiff’s
Motion to Fix Case for Status Conference.
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II. MOTION TO DISMISS
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and as such can only act where they have
subject matter jurisdiction. “The party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that
the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case.” Amoche v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 556 F.3d
41, 48 (1st Cir. 2009). Generally, jurisdictional questions raised pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), including
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity issues, are resolved prior to the court addressing merits
arguments raised under Rule 12(b)(6). Mulero-Carrillo v. Román-Hernández, 790 F.3d 99, 105 (1st Cir.
2015).
Should the court determine subject matter jurisdiction exists, a complaint is also subject to
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), unless it alleges facts that “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In other words, to survive a motion to
dismiss, the factual allegations in the complaint must “nudge[] [the] claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. The court accepts as true all well-
pleaded factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, but “do[es] not
credit legal labels or conclusory statements.” Cheng v. Neumann, 51 F.4th 438, 443 (1st Cir. 2022).
III. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS APPLICABLE TO COMPLAINTS FILED BY PRO SE PLAINTIFFS
“Our judicial system zealously guards the attempts of pro se litigants on their own behalf.”
Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997). Recognizing the difficulties pro se plaintiffs face,
the courts construe pro se complaints liberally. Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 772 F.3d 63, 75 (1st
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Cir. 2014). “However, pro se status does not insulate a party from complying with procedural and
substantive law.” Ahmed, 118 F.3d at 890.
IV. PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENT OF HIS CLAIMS1
The facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint are as follows. Plaintiff is a disabled veteran.
((Compl., Dkt. No. 1, 6.) Approximately twelve years ago, the RMV suspended Plaintiff’s driver’s
license,2 and his license continues to be suspended. (Id.) On an unspecified date prior to the
suspension, a judgment entered against Plaintiff in Greenfield District Court for Operating Under
the Influence (“OUI”) on or about July 1, 2012 (Id. at 6-7.) The district court judgment designated
the OUI as a second offense. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff previously had an OUI offense in January 1991 and
has a record of refusing chemical tests to determine his blood alcohol on May 9, 1992, October 22,
1992, and July 1, 2012. (Id. at 7.) Although the Greenfield District Court ruling designated the 2012
OUI as a second offense, the RMV subsequently determined that Plaintiff had three offenses and
suspended his license. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff was not “served any documents or paperwork from the
State Police or the [RMV]” before his license was suspended. (Id.) In his opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff describes a previous, unsuccessful effort to challenge the suspension
through an administrative proceeding. After the RMV suspended Plaintiff’s license, he continued to
work, but he could not receive promotions because he lacked a valid driver’s license. (Id. at 7.) In
2022, he retired from his career for health reasons. (Id.)
Plaintiff claims Defendant violated his right to due process secured by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments when it suspended his Massachusetts driver’s license. He also contends he
1 As required at this stage, the court considers, and credits, the factual allegations contained in Plaintiff’s
Complaint.
2 Plaintiff does not specify the date his license was suspended, though his timeline and request for damages
suggest the suspension occurred approximately twelve years before he filed his Complaint.
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was subjected to a malicious prosecution in violation of Massachusetts law. Plaintiff seeks more than
$336,000 in monetary damages from the RMV, and an order requiring the RMV to (1) reinstate his
license without requiring payment of fines or installation of an ignition interlock device and (2)
remove entries in his driving record for the three chemical test refusals and two OUIs. (Id. at 4, 7.)
V. DISCUSSION
“The Eleventh Amendment bars a state from being sued in federal court by its own citizens,
citizens of another state, or citizens of a foreign nation.” Cotto v. Campbell, 126 F.4th 761, 767 (1st Cir.
2025). Suits against state agencies are also barred. Id. In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the
Supreme Court recognized a “critical exception” to Eleventh Amendment immunity that “permits
federal courts to issue prospective relief that enjoins state officials from committing future violations
of federal law, but not retrospective relief that makes reparation for the past.” Cotto, 126 F.4th at 767
(internal quotations and alterations omitted). In order to fit within the exception, a plaintiff must both
(1) allege a state official is violating federal law on an ongoing basis and (2) seek a prospective remedy.
Id. at 767-68. Even construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, his claims do not fit within the
Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Plaintiff has brought his claim directly against a state agency, the Massachusetts RMV, rather
than an individual official. He alleges a past violation of federal law—due process violations when his
license was the suspended approximately twelve years ago—rather than an ongoing violation of federal
law. Any argument that the continued suspension of his license is itself an ongoing violation is
foreclosed by case law establishing that a continued failure to return wrongfully withheld property
does not convert a past breach of federal law into “an ongoing violation for Ex parte Young purposes.”
Id. at 769. Finally, Plaintiff seeks money damages, which are a form of retrospective relief outside the
scope of Ex parte Young. Having determined Plaintiff’s claims against the RMV do not fall within the
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Ex parte Young exception to the operation of the Eleventh Amendment, the court concludes it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby ALLOWS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.
No. 21). Plaintiff’s Motion to Fix Case for Status Conference (Dkt. No. 24) shall be terminated as
moot. This case may now be closed.
It is So Ordered.
/s/ Mark G. Mastroianni _
MARK G. MASTROIANNI
United States District Judge
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