BOCK v. Odner et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
JOSEPH L. BOCK, as Personal Representative 	)
of the Estate of Paula Garcia Franks, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
)
v. 	) 	Civil No. 3:24-cv-30099-MGM
)
)
DAIMLER TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA 	)
LLC; ELIFE TECH, INC.; ASAP LOGISTICS, 	)
LLP, ESTER CARGO, INC.; CHEVALIER 	)
ODNER; and WEIHUA ZOU, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT DAIMLER TRUCK
NORTH AMERICA LLC’S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER
(Dkt. No. 86)
ROBERTSON, U.S.M.J.
Joseph L. Bock brings this case as Personal Representative of the Estate of Paula Garcia
Franks, his wife, who died from catastrophic injuries she sustained when the motor vehicle in
which she was a backseat passenger was struck from the rear by a Freightliner Corporation truck.
Defendant Daimler Truck North America LLC (“DTNA”) is the successor in interest to
Freightliner Corporation. Before the court is DTNA’s motion asking this court to enter a
protective order governing its production of confidential information in discovery without the
“sharing provision” that Plaintiff seeks.
I. 	Factual Allegations Relevant to the Instant Motion
At the time of the fatal accident, the vehicle in which Garcia was traveling on Interstate
91 North began to decelerate for unknown reasons and was struck from behind by a 2024
Case 3:24-cv-30099-MGM Document 117 Filed 11/26/25 Page 1 of 8

2
Freightliner Cascadia driven by defendant Chevalier Odner. According to Plaintiff, despite
DTNA’s development of the “Detroit Assurance” safety system designed to mitigate against,
reduce the severity of, and potentially avoid collisions with other vehicles via an alert system and
automated braking, the subject truck did not contain any kind of collision mitigation safety
system, such that the vehicle was not reasonably safe.
II. 	Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1) provides that “[a] party or any person from
whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order in the court where the action is
pending …. The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including … requiring that
a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be
revealed or be revealed only in a specialized way.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “‘It is implicit in
Rule 26(c)’s “good cause” requirement that ordinarily (in the absence of good cause) a party
receiving discovery materials might make them public.’” Baker v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 132 F.R.D.
123, 125 (D. Mass. 1990) (quoting Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 790 (1st
Cir. 1988)). “The party or person seeking a protective order, including an order limiting another
party’s right to disseminate information obtained in discovery, has the burden of demonstrating
the existence of good cause.” Polo v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., Case No. 3:16-cv-11400-MGM,
2017 WL 2836996, at *2 (D. Mass. June 30, 2017) (citing Green v. Cosby, No. 14-cv-30211-
MGM, 2015 WL 9594287, at *4-5 (D. Mass. Dec. 31, 2015); Baker, 132 F.R.D. at 125). “‘A
finding of good cause must be based on a particular factual demonstration of potential harm, not
on conclusory statements.’” Baker, 132 F.R.D. at 125 (quoting Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805
F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986)).
Case 3:24-cv-30099-MGM Document 117 Filed 11/26/25 Page 2 of 8

3
III. 	Discussion
By its motion, DTNA asks this court to enter what it characterizes as the Model
Protective Order of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which does
not contain the sharing provision sought by Plaintiff that would permit him to disclose DTNA’s
confidential documents to others involved in “similar litigation.” According to DTNA, the
model order strikes the appropriate balance between Plaintiff’s need for discovery and DTNA’s
need to protect its industry leading confidential information in Advanced Driver Assistance
Systems (“ADAS”) technology from falling into the hands of competitors. For support, DTNA
points to four cases in which courts have rejected similar sharing provisions sought by the
plaintiffs in other litigation against DTNA. See Butler v. Daimler Trucks N. Am. LLC, No. 19-
cv-2377, 2020 WL 128052 (D. Kan. Jan. 10, 2020) (Dkt. No. 86-1 at 33-44); Morris v. Daimler
Trucks N. Am. LLC, No. 3:20-cv-00-246 (S.D. Ill. 2000) (Dkt. No. 86-1 at 22-31); Navarrete v.
Thomas Built Buses, No. 2016-cv-17496 (Jackson Cty., Missouri 2021) (Dkt. No. 86-1 at 46-57);
and United Financial Casualty Company v. Arman Expedite LLC, No. 2:23-cv-00587 (W.D.
Wash.) (Dkt. No. 86-1 at 59-60).
Plaintiff counters that DTNA has raised only a generalized claim of possible harm
insufficient to establish good cause to prohibit Plaintiff from sharing DTNA’s confidential
documents with other lawyers involved in “similar cases,” which he defines as “failure to equip”
litigation involving claims that a Freightliner truck was defective because it was not equipped
with collision avoidance technology limited to Forward Collision Warning (FCW), Automated
Emergency Braking (AEB), Active Brake Assist (“ABA”) and/or “Detroit Assurance.” Plaintiff
posits that the sharing provision will allow his counsel to compare DTNA’s technical
productions in his case with that in other similar cases, to learn how others have used the
Case 3:24-cv-30099-MGM Document 117 Filed 11/26/25 Page 3 of 8

4
materials to conduct corporate depositions and counter technical defenses raised by DTNA, to
discuss the data produced with counsel in similar cases allowing a greater understanding, and to
develop the technical aspects of the case as part of a “team enterprise” (Dkt. No. 88 at 3-4).
According to Plaintiff’s counsel, counsel for DTNA did not raise certain criticisms regarding
Plaintiff’s proposed sharing provision before filing its motion such that Plaintiff could respond to
them. Plaintiff’s current proposed order, attached to his opposition, addresses a number of those
concerns by: incorporating a notice provision giving DTNA 30 days to object before confidential
material is shared; requiring lawyers receiving confidential materials to provide a certification
within 30 days of the conclusion of the “similar litigation” attesting that the documents and any
copies have been destroyed; and including in the certification that counsel must sign to receive
the documents an acknowledgement of this court’s jurisdiction to impose sanctions for any
violation of the protective order (Dkt. No. 88-1). Plaintiff also notes that DTNA agreed to a
sharing provision as recently as May 2024, in the case of Elliott v. DTNA, Court of Common
Pleas, Philadelphia County, C.A. No. 01387 (Dkt. No. 88-2).
This court finds that DTNA has not established its entitlement to the protective order
without the limited sharing provision Plaintiff seeks. The initial premise of DTNA’s argument,
that Plaintiff is asking this court to deviate from the norm, is flawed. There is no model
protective order in the District of Massachusetts. The model order DTNA is proposing appears
to be that of U.S. Magistrate Judge Jennifer C. Boal, which she encourages, but does not require,
the parties appearing in her session to use. Judge Mastroianni, the District Judge presiding in
this case, has no model order for his session and instead encourages parties “to execute
confidentiality agreements in any case where such agreements will facilitate discovery,” without
Case 3:24-cv-30099-MGM Document 117 Filed 11/26/25 Page 4 of 8

5
limiting an individual’s right to seek a protective order from the court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(c).
DTNA claims that Plaintiff has not disputed its showing of the potential for irreparable
harm. When there is a dispute between the parties about the scope of a protective order, the
party seeking confidentiality has the burden of showing good cause for the order it seeks. DTNA
has made no such showing, which is a threshold for the relief it seeks. Baker v. Liggett Grp.,
Inc., 132 F.R.D. 123, 125-26 (D. Mass. 1990); United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics
Corp., 90 F.R.D. 421, 425 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (“The burden on the moving party constitutes a
requirement for a threshold showing that there is ‘good cause’ that the order issue.” (citing
General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 414
U.S. 1162 (1974))).1 DTNA maintains that it is under no obligation to show good cause because
Plaintiff has conceded its existence by agreeing that a protective order is needed. This is not
accurate. DTNA fails to acknowledge that parties often agree to blanket protective orders which,
as the First Circuit has recognized “may be useful in expediting the flow of pretrial discovery
materials ….” Pub. Citizen v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 790 (1st Cir. 1988). That
Plaintiff agreed to a protective order preventing unrestricted access to DTNA’s confidential
documents is not the same as his agreement that all access must be restricted. See Gabriel v.
Superstation Media, Inc., Civil Action No. 13-12787-NMG, 2014 WL 12796359, at *3 (D.
1 DTNA faults Plaintiff for relying on the Hooker decision given its vintage but does not explain
why the reasoning of the Hooker court or its decision are no longer persuasive. In this court’s
view, the passage of time in no way diminishes the accuracy of the Hooker court’s analysis of
the good cause burden on the party seeking Rule 26(c) protection or its observation that, not only
is the disclosure of information garnered through discovery in parallel lawsuits not a reason for a
court to impose a protective order, but also such disclosure and possible collaboration among
plaintiffs’ attorneys is “squarely within the purposes” of the rules, especially “in lawsuits where
the resources available to the parties are uneven.” Hooker, 90 F.R.D. at 425-26.
Case 3:24-cv-30099-MGM Document 117 Filed 11/26/25 Page 5 of 8

6
Mass. Nov. 7, 2014) (stating that parties often agree to, and court enter blanket protective orders;
holding that the party that later seeks to keep information confidential bears the burden of
showing good cause). The burden of showing good cause falls on DTNA, which relied
exclusively on representations by counsel rather than filing an affidavit providing a
particularized showing of the competitive risks DTNA would face from having its confidential
information shared with other plaintiffs’ attorneys litigating similar claims against it.
DTNA faults Plaintiff for not addressing the four recent cases it cited in its brief in which
DTNA is a party and the courts rejected sharing provisions such as those proposed by Plaintiff
here. DTNA claims that this failure is owing to the indistinguishability of the cases. The court
disagrees. In Butler, the court noted that “jurisdictions appear to be split on whether sharing
provisions are appropriate or useful,” but in the District of Kansas, “judges have consistently
rejected the inclusion of sharing provisions in protective orders.” Id., 2020 WL 128052, at *2.
The Butler court rejected the sharing provision sought by the plaintiff in that case based on the
concern that there was a lack of opportunity for DTNA to object to particular disclosures, but
Plaintiff’s proposed order gives DTNA thirty days to object to any proposed sharing. In Morris,
the court apparently was concerned that those with whom the confidential documents might be
shared would be outside of its jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 86 at 7-8). Here, Plaintiff’s proposed order
requires any party with whom the materials are shared to agree to the jurisdiction of this court for
enforcement purposes. Finally, in United Financial Casualty Company, the court found the
plaintiff’s “need to share materials … obtain[ed] through discovery … unlimited and
unspecified” (Dkt. No. 86-1 at 59-60). Not so here. In other words, the decisions are
distinguishable.
Case 3:24-cv-30099-MGM Document 117 Filed 11/26/25 Page 6 of 8

7
The court is wholly unpersuaded by defense counsel’s claim that “Plaintiff stretches the
cords of good faith to their very last thread,” because Plaintiff cited DTNA’s agreement to a
sharing provision in the Elliott case (Dkt. No. 97 at 5). In its original memorandum, DTNA
relegated to a footnote and attempted to differentiate the Elliott case by characterizing it as
arising from “dissimilar and nuanced facts involving, among other things, the roles of original
and successor counsel, none of which are present here” (Dkt. Nos. 86 at 10 n.1; 97 at 5).
Plaintiff is not required to accept Defendant’s attempted characterization of Elliott, nor it is
bound by Defendant’s inclusion of the language in the Elliott agreement that it would have no
“precedential effect in any other proceeding.” 	Plaintiff has not claimed that the inclusion of the
sharing provision in the Elliott agreement has a “precedential effect.” 	Rather, Plaintiff argues,
reasonably, that DTNA’s agreement to a sharing provision in the Elliott case detracts from the
persuasiveness of its current argument that it would suffer irreparable competitive harm if the
confidential materials produced in this case are similarly shared. There is nothing approaching
bad faith about Plaintiff counsel’s raising the Elliott case in support of a sharing provision that
counsel believes will allow him to more effectively represent Plaintiff.
The court finds that DTNA is not entitled to a protective order without the sharing
provision Plaintiff seeks for the reasons it so found in Sweet v. Polaris Indus., Inc., Case 3:21-cv-
40076-MGM, 2022 WL 974139 (Mar. 31, 2022). As in Sweet, while DTNA “has a legitimate
interest in protecting trade secrets and other confidential information, Plaintiff’s proposed
sharing clause does not allow for unfettered dissemination of such material.” Id. at *3. DTNA
has failed to establish the good cause necessary to preclude Plaintiff from the limited sharing of
DTNA’s confidential information with other lawyers involved in similar litigation where DTNA
will have advance notice and the opportunity to object before such sharing takes place. Id.
Case 3:24-cv-30099-MGM Document 117 Filed 11/26/25 Page 7 of 8

8
Finally, inclusion of the sharing provision will serve to equalize the positions of the parties
insofar as counsel for DTNA “already has the ability to share confidential information and confer
with every other lawyer representing [DTNA] in similar cases across the country.” Id.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, Defendant’s motion for protective order (Dkt. No. 86) is
DENIED. The parties shall, on or before December 12, 2025, jointly submit a revised proposed
protective order with a sharing clause in accordance with this ruling.
It is so ordered.
Dated: November 26, 2025 	/s/ Katherine A. Robertson_____
KATHERINE A. ROBERTSON
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 3:24-cv-30099-MGM Document 117 Filed 11/26/25 Page 8 of 8