Coleman v. Lynds

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
WAYLAND X. COLEMAN,
Petitioner,
v.
JOANN LYNDS,
Respondent.
Civil Action No. 24-30043-MGM
MEMORANDUM & ORDER REGARDING
RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION
(Dkt. No. 16)
December 8, 2025
MASTROIANNI, U.S.D.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner, Wayland Coleman, was found guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of
deliberate premeditation and unlawful possession of a firearm on October 29, 1998, and sentenced to
life in prison without possibility of parole. Trial counsel continued representing Petitioner after the
verdict. During his direct appeal, Petitioner filed a motion asking counsel to withdraw and requesting
that a different attorney screen his case for potential ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) affirmed his conviction without ruling on the motion
to withdraw. More than twenty years later, Petitioner asked the SJC to grant his original motion for
new counsel and withdraw the rescript entered in his direct appeal.
The SJC declined to revisit the motion to withdraw or the 2001 decision affirming Petitioner’s
conviction in an order issued on March 31, 2023. Petitioner continued seeking relief in state court and
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also filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with this court on March 27, 2024. Respondent
moved to dismiss, arguing the petition is time-barred.1 After review, the court concludes the petition
is timely and denies Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 16).
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 30, 1998, the day after the jury rendered its verdict, Petitioner’s trial counsel filed
a timely notice of appeal, and a motion to set aside the verdict of murder and enter a finding of not
guilty or order a new trial, or, alternatively, reduce the verdict to manslaughter. Petitioner’s counsel at
trial, and for the duration of the appeal, was also the chairman of the Committee for Public Counsel
Services (“CPCS”). Well after counsel filed the appellate brief, and just two weeks before oral
argument, Petitioner filed a motion asking counsel to withdraw and requesting appointment of new
counsel to review whether he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial.
The SJC did not rule on Petitioner’s motion prior to the scheduled oral argument, and
Petitioner’s trial counsel appeared to argue the direct appeal. During oral argument, the SJC asked
about Petitioner’s motion and counsel responded: “I do not see any reason at this point for me to
withdraw unless the Court thinks it is appropriate.” (Oct. 1, 2021, Mem of Dec., Worcester Super. Ct.,
Dkt. 16-4, 34.) He went on to explain that CPCS was “not in the habit of paying for representation
twice unless the Court feels that it’s under the circumstances necessary.” (Id.) Trial counsel also
expressed his belief that he “could still be an advocate with the defendant’s best interests in mind,”
and opined that “every conceivable issue that could be raised” had been raised and the appeal “covered
all the bases.” (Id.) The SJC stated that it would take Petitioner’s motion under advisement before
permitting trial counsel to argue the appeal. (Id.) On May 17, 2001, the SJC issued a decision affirming
1 Respondent also argued that Grounds One and Two of the petition were not yet exhausted. This argument
became moot when the SJC denied Petitioner’s gatekeeper application on July 9, 2024.
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Petitioner’s conviction. Commonwealth v. Coleman, 747 N.E.2d 666 (Mass. 2001). The opinion did not
mention Petitioner’s motion, and there is no evidence the SJC ever acted on the motion. The rescript
was received by the trial court on June 20, 2001, and the case was referred to CPCS for review. (Super.
Ct. Docket Sheet, Dkt. No. 20-1.)
Proceeding pro se, Petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the trial court on August 30,
2001. (Id.) He had previously filed the motion with the SJC on August 17, 2001, but the SJC had
returned the motion to Petitioner and directed him to file it with the trial court. (Oct. 1, 2021, Mem
of Dec., Worcester Super. Ct., Dkt. 16-4 at 2.) The trial court determined Petitioner’s motion did not
comply with Rule 30(b) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure and denied the motion
without prejudice on September 19, 2001. (Super. Ct. Docket Sheet, Dkt. No. 20-1.) Almost seven
months later, on May 3, 2002, Petitioner, still proceeding pro se, filed a renewed motion for new trial.
(Id.) The motion identified three grounds for a new trial, asserted that Petitioner’s inability to obtain
alternate appellate counsel had deprived him of a fair appeal, and requested that he be permitted to
amend his motion “when an attorney has made inquiry into his claims and is present to help him on
the motion.” (New Trial Mot., May 3, 2002, Dkt. No. 24-1 at 2.) Petitioner’s motion was accompanied
by a lengthy memorandum.
Screening counsel was appointed the same day, and, at the request of screening counsel, the
court issued an order on May 14, 2002 stating the court would not act on the motion before September
3, 2002. (Mass. Trial Court Docket, Dkt. No. 20-1.) On August 23, 2002, Petitioner requested the
court extend the time during which it would not rule on the Motion for New Trial for an additional
60 to 90 days. (Mot. for Ext. of Time, Aug. 23, 2002, Dkt. No. 24-2 at 1.) The court granted the
motion, without identifying a new date after which the court would rule on the motion. (Mass. Trial
Court Docket, Dkt. No. 20-1.) Two months later, on October 31, 2002, screening counsel entered an
appearance in the case and filed a motion for funds to retain an investigator. (Id.) An affidavit of
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indigency was filed on December 9, 2002 and the court granted the motion for funds on February 28,
2003. (Id.) The docket shows no further activity in the case until new counsel filed a Notice of Limited
Appearance on January 31, 2019. (Id.)
On July 1, 2020, Petitioner filed another motion for new trial. The motion asserted Petitioner
had been deprived of effective assistance of counsel during his trial and on direct appeal. Following a
non-evidentiary hearing, Judge Ritter of the Worcester Superior Court issued a lengthy decision on
October 1, 2021. The decision reviewed and rejected Petitioner’s arguments that trial errors warranted
a new trial, and also considered Petitioner’s argument that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
during his appeal. (Oct. 1, 2021, Mem of Dec., Worcester Super. Ct., Dkt. 16-4.) Judge Ritter
concluded that the loyalty of Petitioner’s counsel was divided during the direct appeal, but explained
the court had no jurisdiction to review the SJC’s original handling of the conflict issue. Counsel for
Petitioner understood the decision as suggesting Petitioner make a direct application to the SJC.
On March 28, 2022, Petitioner filed a new motion directly with the SJC. The motion requested
the SJC (1) revisit the Petitioner’s motion requesting his trial attorney withdraw as appellate counsel,
(2) withdraw the rescript, and (3) permit Petitioner to pursue a reopened direct appeal with the
assistance of new counsel. A year later, on March 31, 2023, the SJC ruled that Petitioner had “failed
to demonstrate . . . either a potential or an actual conflict” occurred when he was represented by trial
counsel during his direct appeal. (SJC Order of Mar. 31, 2023, Dkt. No. 3 at 24.) The SJC also
explained the motion for rescript was procedurally improper and Petitioner should have utilized the
gatekeeper procedure to appeal the Superior Court decision denying his July 1, 2021 Motion for New
Trial. Believing the SJC had misunderstood the type of relief sought by Petitioner, Counsel filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on August 7, 2023.
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Petitioner then returned to the Superior Court and, on September 11, 2023,2 filed a motion
asking the court to reconsider the previous denial of his motion for new trial, vacate the original guilty
verdict, reinstate the judgment, and re-sentence Petitioner to enable him to take a new direct appeal
from his conviction. (Mot. to Vac., Dkt. No. 20-8.) After that motion was denied on October 23,
2023, Petitioner pursued an appeal by filing a gatekeeper application with the SJC pursuant to Mass.
Gen. Laws c. 278, § 33E. While the gatekeeper application was pending, Petitioner filed his petition
with this court on March 27, 2024. The SJC, acting through a single justice, denied the gatekeeper
application on July 9, 2024, concluding it was both untimely and did not raise a new or substantial
question that warranted review by the full court. (SJC Order of July 9, 2024, Dkt. No. 22-1.)
III. TIMELINESS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT
“Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality of a state prisoner’s conviction and
sentence are guided by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the finality
and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our system of federalism.”
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9 (2012). “Congress enacted [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)] on April 24, 1996, in part to combat increasingly pervasive abuses of the
federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction.” Neverson v. Bissonnette, 261 F.3d 120, 124 (1st Cir. 2001). One of
the ways AEDPA restricts the authority of federal courts to consider habeas petitions filed by state
prisoners is by imposing a one-year limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
The limitations period generally begins to run on “the date on which the judgment became
final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). When a direct appeal is taken in Massachusetts and litigated through the SJC,
2 Petitioner’s motion is dated September 7, 2023, but the state court docket shows that it was filed on
September 11, 2023. (Mass. Trial Court Docket, Dkt. No. 20-1.)
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the conviction becomes final when the period for seeking certiorari expires 90 days after the date of
the SJC decision. David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 345 (1st Cir. 2003). A properly filed application for post-
conviction relief tolls the limitations period while the application is pending before the state court.
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 635 (2010); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (“The time during which a properly
filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward [the one-year limitations period].”) Whether
a motion for post-conviction relief is properly filed is determined by applying state law. Holmes v.
Spencer (Holmes I), 685 F.3d 51, 60 (1st Cir. 2012). Additionally, the limitations period is not
jurisdictional, and a court may apply equitable tolling when a petitioner “shows ‘(1) that he has been
pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and
prevented timely filing.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).
IV. DISCUSSION
Petitioner’s conviction became final on August 15, 2001, 90 days after the SJC issued its
decision on May 17, 2001. Although nearly 23 years passed before Petitioner sought relief in federal
court, he contends fewer than 300 days of the one-year limitations period have elapsed: 260 days
between August 15, 2001 and May 3, 2002, and additional days between August 7, 2023 and September
11, 2023.3 He argues statutory tolling applies to exclude the periods from May 3, 2002 through October
1, 2021 and September 7, 2023 through the date he filed this petition. The Petitioner also asks the
court to apply equitable tolling to exclude the period between October 1, 2021 and August 7, 2023.
3 Petitioner’s calculations include an additional 31 days for this period; the court calculates that this period
adds 35 days towards the one-year limitations period.
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A. Statutory Tolling
Under AEDPA, statutory tolling excludes any time during which a “properly filed application
for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). “[A]n
application for state post-conviction relief is pending from the time it is first filed until the time it is
finally disposed of and further appellate review is unavailable under the particular state’s procedures.”
Drew v. MacEachern, 620 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2010) (quotations and alterations omitted). The final
disposition must resolve the application and foreclose any further review of the application. Id.
(recognizing that a “gatekeeper petition ceased to be pending for purposes of § 2244(d)(2) when it
was dismissed for lack of prosecution” because the dismissal was “final and unreviewable”).
Statutory tolling clearly applies to the period between September 11, 2023, the date Petitioner
filed his motion to vacate with the Superior Court, and March 27, 2024, the date he filed his petition
with this court. The motion was procedurally proper and remained pending until July 9, 2024, when a
single justice of the SJC denied Petitioner’s motion for leave to appeal the denial of the motion to
vacate. Since the motion was a properly filed application for post-conviction relief and was not fully
disposed of until after the pending petition was filed, statutory tolling under AEDPA applies to the
full period.
Petitioner asserts statutory tolling also excludes the much lengthier period from May 3, 2002,
when he filed a renewed motion for new trial, through October 1, 2021, the date the Superior Court
ruled on his superseding motion for new trial (filed by new counsel). Respondent contends Petitioner’s
May 3, 2002 Motion for New Trial was not properly filed and did not remain pending until the
Superior Court ruled on the superseding motion. Massachusetts courts have recognized that a motion
may be merely a placeholder, rather than a properly filed motion, if the motion fails to “indicate the
grounds on which it is based” within the time permitted for filing the motion. Commonwealth v. DeJesus,
795 N.E.2d 547, 551-52 (Mass. 2003). Respondent does not argue Petitioner’s May 3, 2002 motion
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lacked the substantive components necessary for the Superior Court to review and rule on it, but
contends the court should, nonetheless, treat the motion as an improperly filed “placeholder” because
Petitioner never asked the court to rule on the motion.
The motion identified several grounds for relief, which were developed in the accompanying
memorandum. Petitioner initially asked the court to allow him to amend once his claims could be
reviewed by counsel. Screening counsel requested the court delay a ruling for a brief period and
Petitioner subsequently asked the court to extend the time by sixty to ninety days. Those modest
requests did not convert the properly filed motion into a mere placeholder or prevent the court from
deciding the motion. Statutory tolling under AEDPA commences when an application for post-
conviction relief is properly filed in state court and continues until the state court finally disposes of
the motion. There is no separate requirement that petitioners take steps to ensure state courts reach a
final disposition within a reasonable amount of time. Federal courts apply state law to determine
whether an application for post-conviction relief was properly filed and when a final disposition
occurred. Applying Massachusetts law here, the court finds Petitioner’s May 3, 2002 Motion for New
Trial was properly filed and remained pending until the final disposition of the superseding Motion
for New Trial. The full period, from May 3, 2002 through October 1, 2021 is excluded when
calculating the expiration of the one-year filing period under AEDPA.
Excluding the period from May 3, 2002 through October 1, 2021, only 260 days of the one-
year period elapsed between August 15, 2001 and October 1, 2021. Another 35 days elapsed from
August 7, 2023 through September 11, 2023, and statutory tolling applied to the period from
September 11, 2023 through the filing of the petition. Since fewer than 300 days elapsed during those
periods, the timeliness of the petition depends on how much, if any, of the time between October 1,
2021 and August 7, 2023, is excluded through equitable tolling.
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B. Equitable Tolling
The Supreme Court has recognized that the AEDPA one-year limitations period is not
jurisdictional. Courts are permitted to apply equitable tolling under certain circumstances. “[E]quitable
tolling requires a habeas petitioner to demonstrate as necessary conditions for relief that (1) he has
been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing
. . . .” Holmes v. Spencer (Homes II), 822 F.3d 609, 611 (1st Cir. 2016). When assessing whether equitable
tolling is appropriate, lower courts must “exercise judgment in light of prior precedent, but with
awareness of the fact that specific circumstances, often hard to predict in advance, could warrant
special treatment in an appropriate case.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 650.
Exhaustion of the state collateral review process is a precondition for seeking habeas relief.
Under Massachusetts law, the ordinary process for seeking collateral review of a conviction for first
degree murder begins with the filing of a motion for new trial with the trial court. After the trial court
rules on the motion, the petitioner must seek review by filing a gatekeeper application with a single
justice of the SJC. In this case, the trial court’s October 1, 2021 ruling denying Petitioner’s motion for
new trial expressly stated that the court lacked jurisdiction to rule in Petitioner’s favor on his argument
that he was denied unconflicted counsel during his direct appeal. Counsel understood that portion of
the ruling as a directive from the state court to depart from the gatekeeper procedure and seek relief
directly from the SJC for that court’s failure to rule on his motion for withdrawal of counsel during
his direct appeal in 2001. Acting on the good-faith belief that the unique facts of his case required him
to exhaust his argument through an alternative process, Petitioner filed a motion directly with the SJC
asking it to act on the outstanding motion to withdraw as counsel and to withdraw the rescript.
The SJC did not reject the motion and quickly return it to Petitioner as it had when Petitioner
filed a procedurally improper motion with the SJC in 2001. In the absence of a similar rejection of his
filing, Petitioner understood that his filing had been accepted. More than a year later, the SJC denied
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relief and informed Petitioner that it considered the motion procedurally improper. Upon reading the
decision, Counsel became concerned that the SJC rejected the filing based on a misunderstanding
regarding the relief sought by Petitioner. Counsel filed a motion for reconsideration, seeking to clarify
Petitioner’s request. Only after the SJC denied that motion on August 7, 2023, did Petitioner realize
his reliance on an alternative process had been misplaced and he had been diligently pursuing relief
through an improper process. Petitioner promptly returned to the Superior Court and completed the
process of exhausting pursuant to the ordinary procedure for obtaining state collateral review.
It is clear that Petitioner’s efforts to exhaust his claims prior to filing his petition with this
court were complicated by state action and the unique procedural history of his case. First, the SJC
failed to rule on Petitioner’s motion for counsel to withdraw during his direct appeal, then when he
tried to raise the issue on collateral review, the Superior Court stated that it lacked jurisdiction to
review the issue. Unsure how to proceed, Petitioner sought relief directly from the SJC and, when the
filing was not quickly rejected, believed the filing was proper, only learning otherwise a year later. See
Holmes I, 658 F.3d at 63 (finding there could be a basis for equitable tolling if state action “led [the
petitioner] to believe that his Motion was in fact properly filed, even though it would later prove to
have been improper”). Once the SJC removed all doubt that Petitioner’s filing was not a procedurally
proper way to exhaust his argument, he quickly returned to Superior Court to ensure he had properly
exhausted before seeking relief here. For these reasons, the court finds Petitioner has been pursuing
his rights diligently and extraordinary circumstances prevented the timely filing of this habeas petition.
See Holmes II, 822 F.3d at 611. Therefore, equitable tolling is appropriately applied to the period
between October 1, 2021 and August 7, 2023.
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V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the court finds the one-year, AEDPA limitations period
ran for 295 days between August 15, 2001 and May 3, 2002 and between August 7, 2023 and
September 11, 2023. Statutory tolling excluded the time between May 3, 2002 and October 1, 2021,
and between September 11, 2023 and March 27, 2024. Finally, the period from October 1, 2021
through August 7, 2023, is equitably tolled. The court, therefore, concludes the Petition Under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. No. 1) was timely filed. Respondent’s Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt. No. 16) is denied, and Respondent is directed to file a substantive response to the
petition within 21 days of this order.
It is So Ordered.
/s/ Mark G. Mastroianni
MARK G. MASTROIANNI
United States District Judge
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