Cardoso v. Hyde et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
____________________________________
)
GOMES CARDOSO, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
) Civil Action No. 25-CV-13935-AK
v. )
)
PATRICIA HYDE, Field Office Director )
of Enforcement and Removal Operations, )
Boston Field Office, Immigration and )
Customs Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, )
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland; )
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND )
SECURTY; PAMELA BONDI, U.S. )
Attorney General; EXECUTIVE OFFICE )
FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW; )
WARDEN, Plymouth County Correctional )
Facility, )
)
Respondents. )
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
PETITIONER’S WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
ANGEL KELLEY, D.J.
Petitioner Gomes Cardoso filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Dkt. 1] under 8
U.S.C. § 2241 against several officials of the United States (“Respondents”). Petitioner alleges
that his ongoing detention in Plymouth County Correctional Facility violates the Immigration
and Nationality Act, its implementing regulations, and the Due Process Clause. For the
following reasons, Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Dkt. 1] is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Angola, with no criminal record, who has been in immigration
detention since December 6, 2025. Petitioner entered the United States without inspection on or
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around August 11, 2024. Initially, he was briefly detained at a facility near the Mexico-Texas
border. On August 12, 2024, the Department of Homeland Security issued Petitioner a Notice
and Order of Expedited Removal, which determined that Petitioner was inadmissible under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). [Dkt. 10-1].
Petitioner sought, and received a credible fear hearing, in which an asylum officer
determined that he demonstrated a credible fear of persecution or torture. On September 30,
2024, Petitioner received a Notice to Appear, which charged Petitioner as inadmissible under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). [Dkt. 10-2]. The Notice to Appear
noted that it was being issued in a “removal proceeding[] under section 240 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. § 1229a]” and that, at that time, Petitioner had “not been admitted
or paroled.” [Id.]. Thereafter, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) released
Petitioner on parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). Petitioner has since been living in
Lewiston, Maine, where he works at a bakery. Petitioner is in removal proceedings before the
Chelmsford Immigration Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, and has a pending I-589,
Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal.
On December 6, 2025, Petitioner was arrested as he was about to enter his car in the
parking lot outside his apartment building. He was taken so quickly that he left his car running.
He was provided no notice of or explanation for his arrest. After a series of transfers, Petitioner
is now detained at the Plymouth County Correctional Facility. Since his detention, ICE did not
set bond for Petitioner and he has been unable to obtain review of his custody by an Immigration
Judge.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
Section 2241 confers jurisdiction on this Court to order the release of any person who is
held in the custody of the United States in violation of the “laws . . . of the United States” or the
United States Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). The burden rests on the person in custody to
prove his detention is unlawful. Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing
Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941)).
III. DISCUSSION
“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including
[noncitizens], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). Respondents argue that Petitioner only has those
rights conferred to him by statute because he is an applicant for admission. [Dkt. 10 at 10 (citing
Dep’t of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020)). Contrary to Respondents’
contentions, Thuraissigiam stands for the limited principle that those “at the threshold of initial
entry” stand on a different footing for due process purposes than noncitizens “who have
established connections in this country.” 591 U.S. at 107.
Petitioner is not seeking “initial entry” into the United States. He has lived in the United
States under humanitarian parole since August 2024 and is in the midst of removal proceedings.
As such, he has full due process rights. See Rincon v. Hyde, No. CV 25-12633-BEM, 2025 WL
3122784, at *6-7 (D. Mass. Nov. 7, 2025) (noncitizen paroled under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) has
due process rights); Tenemasa-Lema v. Hyde, No. CV 25-13029-BEM, 2025 WL 3280555, at *4
(D. Mass. Nov. 25, 2025) (same); Destino v. FCI Berlin, No. 1:25-CV-374-SE-AJ, 2025 WL
4010424, at *7 (D.N.H. Dec. 24, 2025) (same); Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, No. 2:25-CV-
6065 (NJC), 2025 WL 3314420, at *26 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025) (same); Aviles-Mena v.
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Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06783-RFL, 2025 WL 2578215, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025) (same);
Millan v. Voorhies, No. 4:25-CV-02779, 2026 WL 248376 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2026) (same).
These protections extend to deportation proceedings. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)
(“It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law in
deportation proceedings.”).
To establish whether government conduct in the deportation process violates the Due
Process Clause, courts apply the three-part balancing test established in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 27-28 (1st Cir. 2021) (applying
Mathews to a noncitizen’s detention). The three factors are: (1) “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. This Court will take each factor in turn.
A. Private Interest
Freedom from imprisonment is “the most elemental of liberty interests,” Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004), and “lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process]
Clause protects,” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. For that reason, “civil commitment for any
purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
Petitioner is facing significant deprivation. The government is currently detaining
Petitioner in Plymouth County Correctional Facility. The government is in control of
Petitioner’s daily activities and is keeping him from his family, community, and job.
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Accordingly, the first factor strongly favors Petitioner. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 30
(finding the first factor “weighs heavily” in a noncitizen detainee’s favor).
B. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The second factor focuses on the risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty
interest, and the degree to which alternative procedures may ameliorate that risk. See Mathews,
424 U.S. at 335. Due process protects against immigration detention where detention does not
bear a “reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual [was] committed.” Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 690-91 (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)). Here, Petitioner’s
release on humanitarian parole necessarily required a finding that he posed neither “a security
risk nor a risk of absconding.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b). There is no evidence in the record that the
government reconsidered its prior determination that Petitioner poses no safety or flight risk.
The risk of erroneous deprivation is particularly high when, as is undisputed here,
Petitioner received no meaningful procedural safeguards. See Rincon, 2025 WL 3122784;
Destino, 2025 WL 4010424, at *13 (“[T]he risk of erroneous deprivation of [the petitioner’s]
liberty interest is significant because he has been denied any opportunity to be heard regarding
his confinement.”); Sorosh v. Wofford, No. 1:26-CV-00409 DAD SCR, 2026 WL 323058, at *4
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2026) (“The risk of erroneous deprivation is particularly high when, as is
undisputed here, petitioner received no meaningful procedural safeguards.”). Respondent argues
that Petitioner’s detention is entirely at the government’s discretion. Such absolute discretion,
without notice or reason, poses an undue risk of erroneous deprivation. As a bond hearing
provides minimal administrative burdens while protecting Petitioner’s due process rights, there is
an adequate substitute procedure to protect Petitioner’s rights. Destino, 2025 WL 4010424, at
*14.
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Petitioner’s humanitarian parole was revoked without any notice or opportunity to be
heard. Petitioner has not violated the conditions of his parole and there is no evidence in the
record that he is either a flight risk or a danger to the community. Under such circumstances, the
second factor “weighs heavily” in favor of relief. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 30.
C. Government Interest
As to the third factor, Respondents have not argued that the government has any interest
in Petitioner’s continued detention. Although bond hearings necessitate some administrative
burden, the cost of providing a bond hearing is minimal. Rincon, 2025 WL 3122784, at *9;
Tenemasa-Lema, 2025 WL 3280555, at *10. Further, the government’s interest in detention is
low where, as here, there is no evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the
community. Tenemasa-Lema, 2025 WL 3280555, at *10-11. Simply put, the government has
very little interest in avoiding any opportunity for Petitioner to challenge his detention.
In sum, the Mathews factors weigh definitively in favor of relief, that Petitioner’s
detention without a bond hearing violates his due process rights, and that a bond hearing is an
appropriate and minimally invasive additional procedure to ensure that right. As Petitioner’s
detention is unconstitutional, the Court need not address the parties’ statutory arguments.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Dkt. 1] is
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 19, 2026 /s/ Angel Kelley
Hon. Angel Kelley
United States District Judge
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