Baca Bances v. Noem et al

1:25-cv-13840Mad22 de jan. de 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
___________________________________
)
LORENZO CARLOS BACA BANCES, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Civil Action
) 	No. 25-cv-13840-PBS
KRISTI L. NOEM, Secretary of the 	)
U.S. Department of Homeland 	)
Security, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
)
ORDER
January 22, 2026
Saris, J.
Petitioner 	Lorenzo 	Carlos 	Baca 	Bances 	(“Petitioner”), 	a
citizen of Peru, brings this habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
to 	challenge 	his 	immigration 	detention 	without 	a 	bond 	hearing.
After 	review 	of 	the 	briefs 	and 	a 	hearing, 	the 	Court 	allows 	the
petition.
As 	brief 	background, 	Petitioner 	entered 	the 	United 	States
without 	inspection 	on 	February 	10, 	2024. 	The 	U.S. 	Department 	of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) apprehended Petitioner the following day
and issued a Notice and Order of Expedited Removal under 8 U.S.C.
§ 	1225(b)(1). 	During 	an 	interview 	with 	an 	immigration 	officer,
Petitioner expressed a fear of persecution and an intent to apply
for 	asylum. 	An 	asylum 	officer 	subsequently 	determined 	that
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Petitioner 	did 	not 	present 	a 	credible 	fear 	of 	persecution.
Petitioner 	challenged 	this 	determination 	before 	an 	immigration
judge, 	who 	vacated 	Petitioner’s 	expedited 	removal 	order 	upon 	a
finding that he had established a credible fear of persecution. On
April 	10, 	2024, 	DHS 	issued 	a 	notice 	to 	appear 	commencing 	removal
proceedings 	against 	Petitioner 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1229a. 	About 	a
week 	later, 	DHS 	released 	Petitioner 	on 	humanitarian 	parole 	under
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Petitioner’s humanitarian parole expired
after one year, but DHS did not take Petitioner back into custody
in April 2025.
On October 24, 2025, Petitioner was arrested by local police
on charges arising out of a traffic stop. DHS detained Petitioner
about a month later. Petitioner requested a bond hearing before an
immigration 	judge, 	who 	denied 	the 	request 	on 	the 	basis 	that
Petitioner is statutorily ineligible for release on bond.
The government argues that Petitioner is subject to mandatory
detention without a bond hearing under § 1225(b)(1). The government
emphasizes that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) provides that when a grant
of humanitarian parole terminates, the noncitizen “shall forthwith
return 	or 	be 	returned 	to 	the 	custody 	from 	which 	he 	was 	paroled.”
The 	Court 	assumes 	for 	present 	purposes 	that, 	as 	the 	government
contends, 	this 	provision 	means 	that 	upon 	the 	termination 	of
humanitarian 	parole, 	a 	noncitizen 	reverts 	to 	the 	detention
authority to which he was subject at the time he was paroled. Even
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if 	that 	were 	true, 	the 	Court 	rejects 	the 	government’s 	antecedent
argument that Petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(1) at the time he was released on humanitarian parole in
April 2024.
The 	key 	question 	is 	whether 	§ 	1225(b)(1) 	mandates 	detention
of a noncitizen like Petitioner who is issued an expedited removal
order, 	is 	found 	by 	an 	asylum 	officer 	not 	to 	have 	a 	credible 	fear
of persecution, and is then placed in standard removal proceedings
following an immigration judge’s reversal of the negative credible
fear 	determination 	and 	vacatur 	of 	the 	expedited 	removal 	order.
Section 1225(b)(1) contains two relevant detention provisions. The
first 	states 	that 	“[i]f 	the 	[asylum] 	officer 	determines 	at 	the
time 	of 	the 	interview 	that 	an 	alien 	has 	a 	credible 	fear 	of
persecution 	. 	. 	. 	, 	the 	alien 	shall 	be 	detained 	for 	further
consideration 	of 	the 	application 	for 	asylum.” 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). The second provides that “[a]ny alien subject
to 	the 	procedures 	[for 	when 	the 	asylum 	officer 	makes 	a 	negative
credible 	fear 	determination] 	shall 	be 	detained 	pending 	a 	final
determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to
have such a fear, until removed.” Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).
The 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	held 	that 	these 	provisions 	“mandate
detention 	of 	applicants 	for 	admission 	until 	certain 	proceedings
have concluded.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018).
The 	government 	relies 	on 	Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security 	v.
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Thuraissigiam 	to 	assert 	that 	the 	proceedings 	during 	which 	these
mandatory 	detention 	provisions 	apply 	include 	standard 	removal
proceedings following a positive credible fear determination, but
Thuraissigiam states only that noncitizens “who are found to have
a credible fear may also be detained pending further consideration
of their asylum applications.” 591 U.S. 103, 111 (2020) (emphasis
added). 	District 	courts 	have 	reached 	different 	conclusions 	on
whether these provisions require detention during standard removal
proceedings 	for 	a 	noncitizen 	in 	Petitioner’s 	position. 	Compare
Jimenez 	v. 	FCI 	Berlin, 	Warden, 	799 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	59, 	68-69 	(D.N.H.
2025) 	(holding 	that 	“§ 	1225(b)(1) 	only 	mandates 	detention 	of
noncitizens 	arriving 	in 	the 	United 	States 	during 	the 	pendency 	of
expedited removal proceedings and the credible fear interview and
review 	process”), 	with 	Rincon 	v. 	Hyde, 	__ 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	__, 	__ 	(D.
Mass. 2025) [2025 WL 3122784, at *3] (concluding that the detention
of 	a 	noncitizen 	similarly 	situated 	to 	Petitioner 	“continue[d] 	to
be governed by [§] 1225(b)(1), notwithstanding his case’s transfer
from expedited removal into section 1229a proceedings”).
Reading the relevant provisions in light of their plain text,
see N.H. Lottery Comm’n v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 38, 55 (1st Cir. 2021)
(“[T]he 	plain 	meaning 	of 	a 	statute’s 	text 	must 	be 	given
effect . . . .” 	(first 	alteration 	in 	original) 	(quoting 	Colón-
Marrero v. Vélez, 813 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2016))), the Court holds
that 	§ 	1225(b)(1) 	did 	not 	mandate 	Petitioner’s 	detention 	at 	the
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time 	he 	was 	released 	on 	humanitarian 	parole. 	Section
1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) applies “[i]f the [asylum] officer determines at
the 	time 	of 	the 	interview 	that 	an 	alien 	has 	a 	credible 	fear 	of
persecution,” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), 	but the asylum officer
here 	made 	a 	negative 	credible 	fear 	determination 	in 	Petitioner’s
case. 	See 	Jimenez, 	799 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	69 	(finding
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) 	inapplicable 	for 	this 	reason). 	Nor 	did
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) 	provide 	for 	Petitioner’s 	mandatory
detention 	because 	that 	subsection 	applies 	“pending 	a 	final
determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to
have 	such 	a 	fear, 	until 	removed.” 	Id. 	§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).
When 	Petitioner 	was 	released 	on 	humanitarian 	parole, 	the
immigration 	judge 	had 	already 	reached 	a 	final 	credible 	fear
determination 	and 	concluded 	that 	he 	did 	have 	such 	a 	fear. 	See
Jimenez, 	799 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	69 	(adopting 	this 	interpretation 	of
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV)).
For 	these 	reasons, 	Petitioner 	is 	not 	subject 	to 	mandatory
detention 	under 	§ 	1225(b)(1). 	And 	the 	government 	does 	not 	argue
that any other statutory provision that mandates detention during
removal 	proceedings 	-- 	such 	as 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1225(b)(2) 	or 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1226(c) -- applies to Petitioner. The Court therefore concludes
that 	Petitioner 	is 	subject 	to 	discretionary 	detention 	with 	the
right 	to 	a 	bond 	hearing 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1226(a). 	See 	Guerrero
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Orellana, __ F. Supp. 3d __, __ (D. Mass. 2025) [2025 WL 3687757,
at *2] (describing these detention authorities).
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	ALLOWS 	the 	habeas 	petition 	(Dkt. 	1)
and 	ORDERS 	that 	the 	government 	release 	Petitioner 	unless 	he 	is
provided 	with 	a 	bond 	hearing 	that 	complies 	with 	the 	standards
outlined in Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19 (1st Cir. 2021),
within seven business days of the date of this order.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ PATTI B. SARIS__________
Hon. Patti B. Saris
United States District Judge
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