Corbelle v. Capital One N.A.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-13617-RGS
KELLI L. CORBELLE
v.
CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), N.A.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
January 22, 2026
STEARNS, D.J.
Pro se plaintiff Kelli L. Corbelle filed this lawsuit against Capital One,
N.A. (Capital One) (misnamed Capital One Bank (USA), N.A.) in the Chelsea
District Court on November 5, 2025. Capital One promptly removed the case
to the federal district court.1
This case arises out of Corbelle’s overdue credit card account with
Capital One and her purported attempt to pay off the balance. Corbelle sues
1 Capital One removed the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal
question), citing 15 U.S.C. § 1640, the Truth in Lending Act, based on the
allegations found in Count I of the Complaint. While Massachusetts exempts
certain state-based transactions from the Truth in Lending Act, the “ability
to bring a federal damages action under 15 U.S.C. § 1640 is preserved despite
the Massachusetts exemption . . . .” Belini v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA,
412 F.3d 17, 19 (1st Cir. 2005).
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Capital One for violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1640
(Count I); breach of contract (Count II); breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing (incorporated in Count II); violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
93A (Count III); and violation of the Uniform Commercial Code (Count IV).
Compl. (Dkt. # 1-1) ¶¶ 14-25. As relief, Corbelle seeks compensatory and
statutory damages, as well as (1) declaratory relief that her debt is
discharged, (2) injunctive relief restraining Capital One from “assessing
further charges, fees, or credit reporting,” and (3) “any other relief deemed
just and proper.” Id. ¶¶ 1-5.2
Capital One moves to dismiss all counts pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the court will allow the
motion as to the TILA claim (the sole federal claim) (Count I) and will
remand the remaining state-law claims to the Chelsea District Court.
BACKGROUND
The essential facts, as drawn from the Complaint and viewed in the
light most favorable to Corbelle, are as follows. In December of 2018,
Corbelle opened a credit card account with Capital One. Compl. ¶ 4. On
April 23, 2025, Corbelle sent a document to Capital One purporting to
2 The Complaint labels two paragraphs as Paragraph 1. This citation
refers to Paragraph 1 in the PRAYER FOR RELIEF. Compl. at 9.
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contain a payment in the amount of $17,561.38, the outstanding balance on
Corbelle’s account.3 Id. ¶¶ 5, 22. The document instructed that the attached
“Voucher/ Coupon” would be “considered accepted once sent, regardless of
whether it has been physically received or processed,” and should Capital
One refuse the payment, “the [debt] obligation will be discharged up to the
amount tendered.” Id. at Ex. C. Corbelle alleges that Capital One failed to
reject, process, or return the payment. Id. ¶ 6. On May 8, 2025, Capital One
closed Corbelle’s account for activity “inconsistent with typical customer
account usage” and so notified Corbelle on the same day, adding that she
would still be responsible “for paying the full amount of any remaining
account balance . . . .” Id. at Ex. D.
On June 3, 2025, Corbelle sent a “Debt Validation Request” to Capital
One.4 Id. ¶ 7. Corbelle received at least two email responses from Capital
One regarding the request. In pertinent part, these brief emails stated that
there was currently a “valid contract” between Capital One and Corbelle, that
Capital One did not have a paper or signed copy of Corbelle’s credit card
application because it had been completed online, and that Corbelle (or an
3 The Complaint does not include the actual payment instrument or
images of the instrument that was alleged to be attached to the document.
4 The Complaint does not specify the contents of the Debt Validation
Request.
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authorized third-party) disputed the debt on the account. Id. at Exs. A and
B. Since June, the account balance has continued to accrue interest. Id. ¶ 10.
Third party credit reports reflect the closure of the account and payment
delinquency. Id. ¶ 13.
LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Offering labels and conclusions will
not suffice: A complaint does not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’
devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
557. If the allegations in the complaint are “too meager, vague, or conclusory
to remove the possibility of relief from the realm of mere conjecture,” the
complaint will be dismissed. SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 442 (1st Cir.
2010) (en banc).
At the motion to dismiss stage, the court may take into consideration
“matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case,
and exhibits attached to the complaint,” in addition to the complaint’s
plausible allegations. Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 432 Mass. 474, 477 (2000),
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quoting 5A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 299
(1990).
DISCUSSION
Count I – The TILA
Corbelle seeks statutory damages under the TILA. Compl. ¶ 15. The
“TILA requires creditors to clearly and accurately disclose terms of credit
transactions.” Carye v. Long Beach Mortg. Co., 470 F. Supp. 2d 3, 6 (D.
Mass. 2007), citing Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 412 (1998).5
The statute of limitations under the TILA is “one year from the date of the
occurrence of the violation . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e).
Count I alleges that Capital One “failed to provide required written
disclosures of terms and conditions at account origination . . . .” Compl. ¶ 14.
Capital One argues that this claim is time barred, and the court agrees. See
5 While the parties fail to address this issue, Massachusetts is exempted
from a TILA provision if “state law establishes substantially similar
requirements.” Philibotte v. Nisource Corp. Servs. Co., 793 F.3d 159, 167
n.12 (1st Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). Because Corbelle fails to
allege which provision of the TILA was violated, there can be no analysis of
whether the TILA or a parallel provision in Massachusetts law applies.
However, even if an exemption applies, at least two elements of the TILA are
preserved. First, “a debtor’s ability to bring a federal damages action under
15 U.S.C. § 1640 is preserved . . . .” Belini v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA, 412
F.3d 17, 19 (1st Cir. 2005). Second, “the federal statute of limitations applies
to the federal claim, even where a state exemption applies . . . .” Philibotte,
793 F.3d at 163, citing McKenna v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 693 F.3d 207,
211 (1st Cir. 2012).
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15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). Corbelle’s first allegation concerns Capital One’s alleged
failure to provide written disclosures upon Corbelle’s opening the account,
which occurred in December of 2018. Compl. ¶ 4. Any claim therefore
expired in December of 2019.
There are two remaining TILA-based claims in Count I stemming from
activity occurring within the one-year statute of limitations. The Complaint
states that Capital One “admitted” that it is unable to produce either (1) a
signed credit card application or (2) “complete Truth-in-Lending
documentation.” Id. ¶ 14. Capital One argues that these claims lack the
requisite specificity to survive a motion to dismiss. The court agrees. The
Complaint fails to identify any provision of the TILA that requires Capital
One to produce a signed copy of the credit card application, nor does it
explain why the Truth-in-Lending disclosure is deficient. Corbelle did not
elaborate on her TILA claims in her opposition brief, nor even mention the
TILA. See generally Opp’n (Dkt. # 7). The Twombly-Iqbal standard
requires more than conclusory allegations that the TILA was violated. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679 (“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”).
ORDER
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For the foregoing reasons, Capital One’s motion to dismiss Corbelle’s
TILA claim (Count I) is ALLOWED. At this early stage of the litigation, the
court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Corbelle’s
remaining state-law claims. See Camelio v. Am. Fed’n, 137 F.3d 666, 672 (1st
Cir. 1998) (“[T]he balance of competing factors ordinarily will weigh strongly
in favor of declining jurisdiction over state law claims where the foundational
federal claims have been dismissed at an early stage in the litigation.”).6 The
Clerk will enter judgment for Capital One on Count I of the Complaint and
remand the remaining claims to the Chelsea District Court.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns__________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
6 While federal district courts are vested with diversity jurisdiction over
state-law claims between citizens of different states, such jurisdiction
attaches only where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28
U.S.C. § 1332. That is not the case here, as is evident on the face of the
Complaint.
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