Nelson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
____________________________________
)
KYRA I. NELSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
) Civil Action No. 25-cv-12650-AK
v. )
)
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., )
)
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ON MOTION TO DISMISS
KELLEY, D.J.
Before the Court is Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 34]
Plaintiff’s complaint alleging that Wells Fargo was unlawfully foreclosing on her home (the
Property). The Court assumes familiarity with the facts of the case. A full recitation of the facts
can be found in the Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.
Nelson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 25-cv-12650 (D. Mass. Nov. 18, 2025) [Dkt. 38].
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
complaint must allege sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face” and
actionable as a matter of law. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Reading the complaint as a whole, the court must
accept all factual allegations as true, but it does not need to accept legal conclusions. See
García-Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir. 2013). The court must determine
whether the factual allegations present a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Haley v. City of Bos., 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
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Generally, courts may only consider “facts alleged in the complaint and the exhibits
attached thereto” when considering a motion to dismiss. Freeman v. Town of Hudson, 714 F.3d
29, 35 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993)). Yet, courts may
consider extrinsic documents under certain “narrow exceptions,” including “documents the
authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties; . . . [and] the official public records.” Id. at
36 (quoting Watterson, 987 F.2d at 3).
Here, Defendant has pointed to publicly available legal opinions in support of their
argument that Plaintiff’s action is barred by issue and claim preclusion. The Court may properly
consider these prior opinions at the motion to dismiss phase because they are public records and
not disputed by Plaintiff.
For the reason’s detailed in the Court’s order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order [38], Plaintiff’s claims are barred by both issue and claim preclusion. Several
arguments raised in Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss warrant further explanation.
First, Plaintiff argues that her bankruptcy cases are not final because they are on appeal.
However, in both Massachusetts and federal courts, a “trial court judgment is final and has
preclusive effect regardless of the fact that it is on appeal.” In re Lambert, 459 B.R. 519, 523
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2011) (quoting O’Brien v. Hanover Ins. Co., N.E.2d 39, 44 (Mass. 1998)). See
In re Belmont Realty Corp., 11 F.3d 1092, 1095-96 (1st Cir. 1993).
Second, Plaintiff argues that their familial relationship does not establish privity between
her and her father. As the Court explained in its prior ruling, even if Plaintiff is not in privity
with her father based upon their familial relationship, they are in privity based upon their
relationship as seller and buyer of the Property.
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Finally, Plaintiff also appears to argue that there can be no issue or claim preclusion
because Defendant’s foreclosure is nonjudicial. This argument misunderstands the issue and
claim preclusion doctrines. To assess issue and claim preclusion, courts look to prior cases and
determine whether the issues and claims raised prohibit the court from assessing the case before
it. Here, the Court is not assessing whether the prior cases stop Defendant’s foreclosure, but
whether they stop this Court from addressing the issues and claims raised in this case.
For these reasons and the reasons elaborated in the Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order [Dkt. 38], Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 34] is
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 2, 2025 /s/ Angel Kelley
Hon. Angel Kelley
United States District Judge
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