Carvalho v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
DAVID J. CARVALHO, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	25-cv-11829-IT
)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, 	)
et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
January 21, 2026
Talwani, D. J.
On July 2, 2025, Plaintiff David Carvalho, proceeding pro se, filed a civil complaint [Doc.
No. 1] and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. No. 2]. The case was assigned to a
Magistrate Judge, who granted Carvalho’s motion for leave to proceed without payment of fees.
Mem. & Order 1 [Doc. No. 9]. Because Carvalho was proceeding without prepayment of the filing,
the Magistrate Judge conducted a preliminary review of his complaint. Id. at 1–2 (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)).
As the Magistrate Judge explained, Carvalho’s Complaint [Doc. No. 1] named ten
Defendants: Commonwealth of Massachusetts; City of New Bedford; New Bedford Police
Department; Health Resources in Action Hospital (“HRI”); New Bedford Police Officers Scott
DeCosta and Antone Pauline; Joseph Demertin, M.D.; Blake An-Ansari, Social Worker; Jacob
Matthew, Psychiatrist; and Maura Healey, Former Attorney General of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. Mem. & Order at 2 [Doc. No. 9]. The Magistrate Judge recounted the factual
allegations of the Complaint [Doc. No. 1]:
Although the allegations in the complaint are not always clear, it appears that the
Case 1:25-cv-11829-IT Document 18 Filed 01/21/26 Page 1 of 4

2
pleading concerns the following: (1) on July 15, 2022, Carvalho was wrongfully
stopped from protesting and raising awareness of an “attempted murder and 3,000
check fraud against [him]” while on a 10–15 foot radio tower (with a safety harness)
in violation of the First Amendment [Doc. No. 1-1 at 3]; (2) Carvalho voluntarily went
to the hospital after this incident, where Officer Pauline falsely told hospital employees
that Carvalho had a “suicide intent” [id.]; (3) staff at the hospital “disagreed” with
Carvalho’s story, threatened him, and forced him to take medication [id. at 3–4]; (4)
Carvalho was transferred to HRI, where he was wrongfully held, contracted COVID,
and was never able to meet with Dr. Matthew, Dr. Joseph, or An-Ansari [id. at 4]; and
(5) when Carvalho went to the New Bedford Police Station on August 12, 2022[,] to
file criminal charges, Officer DeCosta refused to take a report [id. at 5].
Mem. & Order 2–3 [Doc. No. 9]. The Complaint asserted that the Defendants’ actions violated
Carvalho’s rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution. Compl. 3–4 [Doc. No. 1].
As the Magistrate Judge explained, “to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a
complaint must contain a ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’” Mem. & Order at 3 [Doc. No. 9] (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The
Magistrate Judge detailed the purpose of this requirement and then explained why the pleading
failed to meet this standard. See id. at 3–6. The Magistrate Judge directed Carvalho to file an
amended complaint by October 25, 2025, that cured these deficiencies. Id. at 6. To date, Carvalho
has failed to file an amended complaint.
Instead, on October 15, 2025, Carvalho filed an Opposition to Defendants Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. No. 11], even though Defendants have not yet been served, have not appeared, and
have not filed a motion to dismiss in this case. Construing Carvalho’s filing as a response to the
September 10, 2025 Memorandum and Order [Doc. No. 9], the Magistrate Judge explained that
Carvalho’s response failed to cure the pleading deficiencies and recommended that this action be
dismissed. R. & R. at 2, 5–6 [Doc. No. 13].
Plaintiff has now filed an Objection [Doc. No. 16] to the recommended dismissal. But none
of Carvalho’s arguments meet the pleading deficiencies first identified by the Magistrate Judge in
Case 1:25-cv-11829-IT Document 18 Filed 01/21/26 Page 2 of 4

3
her September 2025 Memorandum and Order [Doc. No. 9]. First, Plaintiff asserts that his “protest
on the tower was . . . a form of speech and assembly, and the government’s restriction was not
reasonable.” Obj. ¶ 1 [Doc. No. 16]. But as the Magistrate Judge explained,
“[T]he ‘guarantees of the First Amendment have never meant that people who want
to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and
however and wherever they please.’” U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 133 (1981) (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836
(1976)). “[T]he State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve
the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)). Where,
as here, the speech in question did not occur in a traditional or designated place for
assembly and debate, the government’s decision to restrict access to that location
“need only be reasonable.” Del Gallo v. Parent, 557 F.3d 58, 73 (1st Cir. 2009)
(emphasis in original) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc.,
473 U.S. 788, 808 (1985)). Prohibiting a citizen from protesting on a radio tower
appears reasonable. Carvalho’s complaint does not provide a basis to conclude
otherwise. Further, under the alleged circumstances, it would have been reasonable
for law enforcement to remove Carvalho from the radio tower out of concern for his
safety, even though Carvalho felt safe in a harness. See United States v. Sok, 115
F.4th 251, 265 (3d Cir. 2024) (“Th[e] community caretaking doctrine . . . is an
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and allows police
with a non-law enforcement purpose to seize or search a person or property in order
to ensure the safety of the public and/or the individual, regardless of any suspected
criminal activity.” (alterations in original) (quoting Vargas v. City of Philadelphia,
783 F.3d 962, 971 (3d Cir. 2015))).
Mem. & Order at 4–5 [Doc. No. 9].
Plaintiff asserts next that his confinement in the hospital without a warrant, probable cause,
or due process violated the 4th and 14th Amendments. Obj. ¶ 2 [Doc. No. 16]. But as the Magistrate
Judge explained,
Carvalho’s claim that his confinement at HRI was unlawful fails to state a claim
because it is entirely conclusory. Involuntary hospitalization is permitted under
Massachusetts law, provided that it complies with state law, see M.G.L. ch. 123, and
federal constitutional protections.
Mem. & Order at 5 [Doc. No. 9]. Carvalho has not identified facts to suggest that his
involuntary hospitalization did not comply with those requirements.
Carvalho objects next that he was threatened with forced medication in violation of his 8th
Case 1:25-cv-11829-IT Document 18 Filed 01/21/26 Page 3 of 4

4
Amendment rights. Obj. ¶ 3 [Doc. No. 16]. But as the Magistrate Judge explained,
Officer Pauline’s alleged statement to hospital employees that Carvalho had a “suicide
intent,” even if untrue, did not violate Carvalho’s constitutional rights, especially
where hospital staff were able to speak to Carvalho and make their own assessment of
his mental state. Carvalho’s claim that he was threatened at the hospital and forcefully
medicated does not state a claim for relief because he does not allege that any of the
defendants engaged in this misconduct.
Mem. & Order at 5 [Doc. No. 9]. Carvalho’s Objection [Doc. No. 16] fails to explain how the
Complaint [Doc. No. 1] has alleged that the Defendants sued here engaged in misconduct.
Finally, Carvalho objects to the Magistrate Judge’s report that Carvalho’s claims were
conclusory and devoid of factual allegations, arguing specifically that his claims against Officer
DeCosta included factual allegations. Obj. ¶ 4 [Doc. No. 16]. But even though some factual
allegations were included (and detailed by the Magistrate Judge), the claim remains conclusory.
Again, as the Magistrate Judge explained:
A private citizen “does not have a constitutional right to have the police investigate
his case at all, still less to do so to his level of satisfaction.” Rossi v. City of Chicago,
790 F.3d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 2015). In addition, a private citizen does not have a
constitutional right to effect the criminal prosecution or incarceration of another
individual. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
Mem. & Order at 5–6 [Doc. No. 9]. Accordingly, Carvalho has failed to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted and his complaint is subject to dismissal.
In sum, on review of Carvalho’s objections, and a de novo review of Carvalho’s Complaint
[Doc. No. 1], the court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, and DISMISSES this action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)((B)(ii) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED
January 21, 2026 	/s/ Indira Talwani
United States District Judge
Case 1:25-cv-11829-IT Document 18 Filed 01/21/26 Page 4 of 4