Millen v. Bristol County District Attorney's Office et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
SHAKEEL DESHAWN MILLEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRISTOL COUNTY DISTRICT
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 25-11669-MJJ
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOUN, D.J.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court lacks jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine and dismisses this action without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Shakeel Deshawn Millen (“Millen” or “Plaintiff”), now in custody at the Bristol County
Jail and House of Correction, filed a Complaint, a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma
pauperis, and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. [Doc. Nos. 1, 3]. By Procedural Order
dated June 10, 2025, the Court denied Millen’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis
and he was ordered to file a new motion with a copy of his prison account statement. [Doc. No.
5]. On June 27, 2025, Millen filed a new Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis with a
copy of his prison account statement. [Doc. Nos. 8, 9].
Millen’s 2-page, typewritten complaint names the following 3 defendants: (1) the Bristol
County District Attorney’s Office; (2) the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”); and
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(3) Jasmine McGinnis of Webster, Massachusetts. [Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 2–4]. Millen asserts this
Court’s federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 seeking “civil rights protections to
the United States Constitution during his criminal prosecution, as well as his constitutional right
under Massachusetts statu[t]e and law of M.G.L. c. 209A.” [Id. at ¶ 5]. Millen alleges that the
Bristol County District Attorney’s Office violated his constitutional rights “throughout it’s
prosecution against the plaintiff.” [Id. at ¶ 6]. According to Millen, “while [he] has been
incarcerated [DCF] has indirectly intervened within the situation through conspiracy along with
the Bristol County District Attorney’s office by using the prosecution as a means to interfere
with the plaintiff’s fundamental parental liberty interest.” [Id. at ¶ 7]. Millen alleges that DCF
intervened “despite [Millen] not being involved with the allegations of abuse and neglect that
warranted the Department[‘]s involvement. [Id.]. Millen alleges that defendant McGinnis,
described as the “alleged victim in the plaintiff’s criminal prosecution,” violated Millen’s
constitutional rights “by filing false police reports to obtain [his] personal belongings, finances
and to harass through fraud on the court resulting in the involved civil and criminal legal
proceedings.” [Id. at ¶ 8].
In his prayer for relief, Millen seeks “an award for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983”
and declaratory relief “to establish the legal status or interpretation of the M.G.L. c. 209A
statu[t]e under the circumstances and facts pertaining to [Millen’s] criminal prosecution which
are ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” [Id. (request for relief)].
II. 	SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT
Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, “and the requirement of subject-matter
jurisdiction ‘functions as a restriction on federal power.’” Fafel v. Dipaola, 399 F.3d 403, 410
(1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
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U.S. 694, 702 (1982)). Consequently, a plaintiff who seeks to bring his suit in a federal forum
bears the burden of establishing that the federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction. See Gordo-
González v. United States, 873 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 2017). “If the court determines at any time
that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3).
In addition, when a prisoner plaintiff files a complaint seeking redress from a
governmental entity or officers or employees of a governmental entity, summonses do not issue
until the Court reviews the complaint and determines that it satisfies the substantive requirements
of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Section 1915A authorizes federal courts to dismiss a complaint sua
sponte if the claims therein lack an arguable basis in law or in fact, fail to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In conducting this review, the Court liberally construes the
complaint because the plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff seeks to have this
federal court review and reject judgments entered in state civil and criminal proceedings.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction to review
the final state judgment where the judgment presents a question of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. §
1257. The Supreme Court has held that the grant of jurisdiction under § 1257 “is exclusive,”
meaning that federal judicial review of final state court judgments “may be had only in [the
Supreme] court.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (quoting D.C. Ct. of Appeals v.
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Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983)). Thus, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,1 a district court
does not have jurisdiction over an action brought by a party who lost in state court and who is
“seeking review and rejection of that judgment” in a lower federal court. Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005); see also Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 235
(2023) (stating that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prohibits federal courts from adjudicating
cases brought by state-court losing parties challenging state-court judgments”). Under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the court lacks jurisdiction to do so. Instead, “the proper forum for
challenging an unlawful state court ruling is the United States Supreme Court, on appeal of the
highest state court’s final judgment.” Davison v. Gov’t of Puerto Rico-Puerto Rico Firefighters
Corps, 471 F.3d 220, 223 (1st Cir. 2006).
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any “person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State ... subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The Commonwealth and state agencies are not “persons” under Section 1983.
Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (“[A] State is not a person within the
meaning of § 1983.”). Thus, DCF and the Bristol County District Attorney’s Office2 are not
“persons” subject to suit within the meaning of § 1983.
1 The term “Rooker-Feldman doctrine” is shorthand reference to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 28
U.S.C. § 1257 in District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) and Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
2 To the extent Millen seeks to name an individual prosecutor as defendant, “prosecutors are absolutely
immune in exercising the core prosecutorial functions of ‘initiating prosecution and ... presenting the
State's case.’” Penate v. Kaczmarek, 928 F.3d 128, 135 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 431 (1976)).
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Moreover, private conduct, no matter how wrongful, is generally beyond the reach of §
1983. González-Maldonado v. MMM Healthcare, Inc., 693 F.3d 244, 247-48 (1st Cir. 2012);
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). "To act under color of state
law for [Section] 1983 purposes does not require that the defendant be an officer of the state."
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). However, the alleged misconduct resulting in a
deprivation of a plaintiff's rights must be fairly attributable to the State. See Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., Inc., 547 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). Here there are no facts alleged that defendant McGinnis,
a private person, acted under the “color of state law” within the meaning of § 1983.
In addition, “only those individuals who participated in the conduct that deprived the
plaintiff of his rights can be held liable.” Cepero-Rivera v. Fagundo, 414 F.3d 124, 129 (1st Cir.
2005). In other words, a commissioner or other supervisory employer cannot be held liable under
§ 1983 based solely on the misconduct of a subordinate; the supervisor must have had some form
of direct involvement in the alleged misconduct. See id. at 129-30; Ouellette v. Beaupre, 977
F.3d 127, 140 (1st Cir. 2020) (stating that “respondent superior” does not apply to § 1983 actions
and, therefore, “a § 1983 claim premised on a theory of supervisory liability must plead an
‘affirmative link between the behavior of a subordinate and the action or inaction of his
supervisor.’” (quoting Feliciano-Hernández v. Pereira-Castillo, 663 F.3d 527, 533 (1st Cir.
2011))).
A civil rights conspiracy claim under § 1983 involves “‘a combination of two or more
persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful
means, the principal element of which is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong
against or injury upon another, and an overt act that results in damages.’” Sánchez v. Foley, 972
F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Est. of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155, 178 (1st Cir.
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2008)). The plaintiff must show both a “conspiratorial agreement” and “an actual abridgment of
some federally-secured right.” Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2001). A
conspiracy may be a “matter of inference.” Estate of Bennett, 548 F.3d at 178. However, “a
claim of conspiracy to deprive a plaintiff of civil rights will not survive a motion to dismiss if it
makes conclusory allegations without making supporting factual assertions.” Diaz v. Devlin, 229
F.Supp.3d 101, 111 (D. Mass. 2017) (citing Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir.
1977).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court hereby orders:
(1) 	This action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
(2) 	In view of the dismissal of this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, no
action is taken on plaintiff’s motion [Doc. No. 3] for appointment of counsel and motion [Doc.
No. 8] for leave to proceed in forma pauperis..
(3) 	The Clerk shall enter a separate order of dismissal.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Myong J. Joun
Myong J. Joun
United States District Judge
Dated: November 13, 2025
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