Presidents' Alliance on Higher Education and Immigration et al v Bondi et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
___________________________________
)
PRESIDENTS’ ALLIANCE ON HIGHER 	)
EDUCATION AND IMMIGRATION and 	)
ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT 	)
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES IN 	)
MASSACHUSETTS, 	)
)
Plaintiffs, 	)
)
v. 	)
)
KRISTI NOEM, in her official 	) 	Civil Action
capacity as Secretary of Homeland 	) 	No. 25-cv-11109-PBS
Security; TODD LYONS, in his 	)
official capacity as Acting 	)
Director of U.S. Immigration and 	)
Customs Enforcement; the 	)
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; 	)
MARCO RUBIO, in his official 	)
capacity as Secretary of State; 	)
and the DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
March 20, 2026
Saris, J.
INTRODUCTION
This 	lawsuit 	arises 	from 	the 	so-called 	“Student 	Criminal
Alien Initiative” (“SCAI”) undertaken by the federal government in
the 	spring 	of 	2025. 	U.S. 	Immigration 	and 	Customs 	Enforcement
(“ICE”) ran a criminal record check on all international students
then in the United States via the National Crime Information Center
(“NCIC”) 	database. 	Approximately 	6,400 	names 	appeared 	in 	the
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database. 	Some 	of 	those 	students 	had 	no 	criminal 	history 	or 	only
infractions 	such 	as 	speeding 	tickets, 	while 	others 	were 	arrested
for minor offenses but never charged in court. Once this list was
compiled, 	the 	U.S. 	Department 	of 	State 	(“DOS”) 	revoked 	en 	masse
the 	nonimmigrant 	visas 	of 	students 	whose 	names 	appeared 	in 	the
NCIC database. DOS then sent many of the affected students a letter
or email notifying them of the visa revocation, implying that the
revocation 	ended 	their 	lawful 	status 	in 	the 	United 	States, 	and
suggesting that they self-deport.
After 	the 	visa 	revocations, 	ICE 	terminated 	the 	Student 	and
Exchange Visitor Information System (“SEVIS”) records of students
whose names appeared in the NCIC database. SEVIS is a system used
by ICE to administer its student visa program. According to DOS’s
Foreign Affairs Manual, “the SEVIS record is the definitive record
of 	student 	. 	. 	. 	status 	and 	visa 	eligibility.” 	9 	Foreign 	Affairs
Manual (“FAM”) 402.5-4(B)(a). As grounds for the terminations, ICE
variously 	cited 	the 	student’s 	failure 	to 	maintain 	status,
identification in criminal records, and/or visa revocation.
Many 	affected 	students 	sued 	to 	challenge 	the 	termination 	of
their SEVIS records. Soon thereafter, ICE agreed to reactivate the
SEVIS 	records 	of 	all 	affected 	students 	retroactively 	to 	the 	date
of 	termination. 	ICE 	also 	issued 	an 	internal 	broadcast 	message
listing 	grounds 	for 	terminating 	a 	SEVIS 	record, 	including 	a 	visa
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revocation 	(the 	“Broadcast 	Message”). 	DOS 	has 	not 	reinstated 	any
of the revoked visas.
Plaintiffs 	Presidents’ 	Alliance 	on 	Higher 	Education 	and
Immigration 	(“Presidents’ 	Alliance”) 	and 	Association 	of
Independent 	Colleges 	and 	Universities 	in 	Massachusetts 	(“AICUM”
and, 	together 	with 	Presidents’ 	Alliance, 	“Plaintiffs”) 	are
membership 	organizations 	representing 	colleges 	and 	universities
across 	the 	nation 	and 	in 	Massachusetts, 	respectively. 	They 	filed
suit 	in 	April 	2025 	to 	challenge 	the 	federal 	government’s 	actions
during the SCAI.1 Plaintiffs’ amended complaint names as defendants
the 	Secretary 	of 	Homeland 	Security, 	the 	Acting 	Director 	of 	ICE,
the 	Secretary 	of 	State, 	the 	U.S. 	Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security
(“DHS”), 	and 	DOS. 	Plaintiffs 	bring 	five 	claims 	under 	the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. These
claims 	allege 	that 	DOS’s 	policy 	of 	revoking 	visas 	based 	on 	NCIC
hits 	without 	any 	individualized 	inquiry 	(the 	“Visa 	Revocation
Policy”) is arbitrary and capricious (Count I); that DHS and ICE’s
policy of terminating SEVIS records based on an NCIC hit and/or a
visa 	revocation 	(the 	“SEVIS 	Termination 	Policy”) 	is 	contrary 	to
law (Count II) and arbitrary and capricious (Count III); that ICE’s
Broadcast Message represents a rule unlawfully promulgated without
1 	The 	original 	complaint 	was 	also 	brought 	on 	behalf 	of 	five
international students who each had their visa revoked and/or their
SEVIS 	record 	terminated 	in 	the 	spring 	of 	2025. 	These 	five
individual plaintiffs have all dropped their claims.
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notice 	and 	comment 	(Count 	IV); 	and 	that 	DOS’s 	policy 	of 	sending
communications to international students whose visas were revoked
is 	arbitrary 	and 	capricious 	and 	contrary 	to 	law 	(Count 	V).
Plaintiffs 	seek 	an 	order 	enjoining, 	vacating, 	and 	declaring
unlawful these various policies.
Defendants 	now 	move 	to 	dismiss 	the 	amended 	complaint 	under
Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	12(b)(1) 	and 	12(b)(6) 	on 	the
grounds 	that 	Plaintiffs 	lack 	Article 	III 	standing, 	that
Plaintiffs’ 	claims 	relating 	to 	the 	SEVIS 	terminations 	are 	moot,
that 	the 	APA 	does 	not 	permit 	judicial 	review 	of 	most 	of 	the
challenged actions, and that Plaintiffs’ claims otherwise fail on
the merits. After hearing, the Court agrees that Count V does not
challenge a final agency action but otherwise rejects Defendants’
arguments. 	The 	Court 	therefore 	ALLOWS 	IN 	PART 	and 	DENIES 	IN 	PART
Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 29).
BACKGROUND
The 	Court 	first 	describes 	the 	statutory 	and 	regulatory
framework 	governing 	student 	visas 	and 	SEVIS. 	The 	Court 	then
explains the factual background of this case as pled in the amended
complaint, see Cheng v. Neumann, 51 F.4th 438, 441 (1st Cir. 2022),
with additional facts relevant to the issue of mootness taken from
other 	portions 	of 	the 	record, 	see 	Nat’l 	Ass’n 	of 	Gov’t 	Emps. 	v.
Yellen 	(“NAGE”), 	120 	F.4th 	904, 	907 	(1st 	Cir. 	2024) 	(noting 	that
courts “may look beyond the complaint when assessing mootness”).
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I. 	Student Visas and SEVIS
A. 	F-1 Student Visas and Status
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101
et 	seq., 	authorizes 	the 	issuance 	of 	a 	nonimmigrant 	visa 	to 	a
noncitizen “who is a bona fide student qualified to pursue a full
course 	of 	study 	and 	who 	seeks 	to 	enter 	the 	United 	States
temporarily 	and 	solely 	for 	the 	purpose 	of 	pursuing 	such 	a 	course
of 	study 	. 	. 	. 	at 	an 	established 	college, 	university, 	. 	. 	. 	or
other academic institution.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i); see id.
§ 	1201(a)(1)(B) 	(authorizing 	visas 	for 	noncitizens 	classified
under § 1101(a)(15)). These student visas are commonly referred to
as “F-1” visas. See 22 C.F.R. § 41.12; Makieh v. Holder, 572 F.3d
37, 	39 	(1st 	Cir. 	2009). 	DOS 	“oversees 	the 	visa 	process 	abroad
through its consular officers,” 9 FAM 102.2-2, who may issue visas
to 	qualifying 	noncitizens. 	See 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1201(a)(1); 	22 	C.F.R.
§ 41.111(a). Consular officers, as well as the Secretary of State,
also 	have 	discretion 	to 	revoke 	visas. 	See 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1201(i); 	22
C.F.R. § 41.122(a).
Admission 	to 	the 	United 	States 	as 	a 	nonimmigrant 	requires
possession 	of 	a 	valid 	visa, 	see 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1182(a)(7)(B)(i)(II),
but 	a 	visa 	“does 	not 	guarantee 	entry,” 	9 	FAM 	401.1-2(a); 	see 	8
U.S.C. 	§ 	1201(h) 	(“Nothing 	in 	this 	chapter 	shall 	be 	construed 	to
entitle any alien, to whom a visa or other documentation has been
issued, to be admitted [to] the United States, if, upon arrival at
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a 	port 	of 	entry 	in 	the 	United 	States, 	he 	is 	found 	to 	be
inadmissible . 	. 	. 	.”). 	When 	an 	F-1 	visa 	holder 	arrives 	at 	the
border, he may be admitted if he 1) possesses a valid passport and
visa, 	2) presents 	a 	“Form 	I-20” 	issued 	by 	his 	school 	documenting
his acceptance, 3) has evidence of adequate financial support, and
4) intends to attend the school specified on his visa. See 8 C.F.R.
§§ 214.1(a)(3)(i), 214.2(f)(1)(i).
The admission of a nonimmigrant to the United States is “for
such 	time 	and 	under 	such 	conditions 	as 	[DHS] 	may 	by 	regulations
prescribe.” 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1184(a)(1). 	“The 	period 	of 	validity 	of 	a
nonimmigrant visa is the period during which the alien may use it
in 	making 	application 	for 	admission” 	and 	“has 	no 	relation 	to 	the
period of time the immigration authorities at a port of entry may
authorize 	the 	alien 	to 	stay 	in 	the 	United 	States.” 	22 	C.F.R.
§ 41.112(a). 	Instead, 	an 	F-1 	visa 	holder 	“may 	be 	admitted 	for 	a
period 	up 	to 	30 	days 	before” 	his 	course 	of 	study 	begins 	and 	may
remain in the country through the “[d]uration of status,” that is,
“the time during which an F-1 student is pursuing a full course of
study 	at 	an 	[approved] 	educational 	institution 	. 	. 	. 	or 	engaging
in authorized practical training following completion of studies.”
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(5)(i); see Silva v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 68, 69
(1st 	Cir. 	2006). 	An 	F-1 	“student 	is 	considered 	to 	be 	maintaining
status if the student is making normal progress toward completing
a course of study.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(5)(i). A student otherwise
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fails 	to 	maintain 	status 	if 	he 	1) 	engages 	in 	“unauthorized
employment,” 	2) willfully 	provides 	false 	information 	to 	DHS, 	or
3) is 	convicted 	of 	“a 	crime 	of 	violence 	for 	which 	a 	sentence 	of
more 	than 	one 	year 	imprisonment 	may 	be 	imposed.” 	Id. 	§ 	214.1(e)-
(g). 	Moreover, 	an 	F-1 	student’s 	nonimmigrant 	status 	“shall 	be
terminated 	by 	the 	revocation 	of 	a 	waiver 	[of 	admissibility]
authorized 	on 	his 	or 	her 	behalf 	under 	[8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1182(d)(3) 	or
(4)]; 	by 	the 	introduction 	of 	a 	private 	bill 	to 	confer 	permanent
resident status on such alien; or, pursuant to notification in the
Federal 	Register, 	on 	the 	basis 	of 	national 	security, 	diplomatic,
or public safety reasons.” Id. § 214.1(d).
“[A]n F-1 student who fails to maintain a full course of study
without the approval of [his school] or otherwise fails to maintain
status” 	does 	not 	receive 	a 	grace 	period 	to 	prepare 	for 	departure
from 	the 	United 	States. 	Id. 	§ 214.2(f)(5)(iv). 	Certain 	students
who 	are 	out 	of 	status 	for 	no 	more 	than 	five 	months, 	however, 	may
seek 	reinstatement 	by 	U.S. 	Citizenship 	and 	Immigration 	Services
(“USCIS”). 	See 	id. 	§ 214.2(f)(16)(i). 	USCIS’s 	decision 	not 	to
reinstate a student is unappealable. See id. § 214.2(f)(16)(ii).
B. 	SEVIS
In 	1996, 	Congress 	directed 	immigration 	authorities 	to
“develop 	and 	conduct 	a 	program 	to 	collect 	from 	approved
institutions 	of 	higher 	education” 	information 	about 	noncitizens
with F-1 student status. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
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Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 641(a)(1), 110
Stat. 	3009, 	3009-704 	(codified 	as 	amended 	at 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1372(a)(1)). This directive led to the creation of SEVIS, which
is “the web-based system that [DHS] uses to maintain information”
about F-1 students. Liu v. Noem, 780 F. Supp. 3d 386, 394 (D.N.H.
2025) 	(alteration 	in 	original) 	(quoting 	U.S. 	Dep’t 	of 	Homeland
Sec., 	About 	SEVIS, 	Study 	in 	the 	States,
https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/site/about-sevis 	(visited 	Apr.
29, 	2025)), 	appeal 	dismissed, 	No. 	25-1643, 	2025 	WL 	3904829 	(1st
Cir. 	Aug. 	14, 	2025); 	see 	22 	C.F.R. 	§ 	62.2 	(defining 	SEVIS 	as 	the
“statutorily 	mandated 	system 	designed 	to 	collect 	information 	on
non-immigrant 	students”). 	ICE 	administers 	SEVIS 	through 	its
Student 	and 	Exchange 	Visitor 	Program 	(“SEVP”) 	and 	uses 	SEVIS 	“to
carry out [its] enforcement functions.” 6 U.S.C. § 252(a)(4); see
9 FAM 402.5-4(A)(a).
The 	federal 	government 	employs 	SEVIS 	for 	various 	purposes
related 	to 	international 	students. 	Schools 	apply 	via 	SEVIS 	for
certification or recertification to host F-1 students. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 214.3(a)(1). Schools also issue in SEVIS a Form I-20 reflecting
a foreign student’s acceptance to a program of study to enable the
student 	to 	obtain 	an 	F-1 	visa. 	See 	id. 	§ 214.2(f)(1)(iii); 	9 	FAM
402.5-5(D)(1)(a). According to DOS’s Foreign Affairs Manual, “the
SEVIS record is the definitive record of student . . . status and
visa eligibility.” 9 FAM 402.5-4(B)(a). As such, consular officers
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“must 	always 	check 	an 	applicant’s 	SEVIS 	status 	before 	issuing 	an
F[-1] 	. 	. 	. 	visa,” 	id.; 	see 	22 	C.F.R. 	§ 	41.61(d), 	and 	“[u]pon
issuance 	of 	an 	F[-1] 	. 	. 	. 	visa, 	notification 	of 	such 	issuance
must be entered into the SEVIS database,” 22 C.F.R. § 41.61(d).
Additionally, SEVIS contains information about F-1 students’
identity and address, entry into the United States, and enrollment
and 	academic 	status 	in 	an 	educational 	program. 	See 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1372(c)(1). 	Designated 	School 	Officials 	(“DSOs”) 	at 	schools
approved 	to 	host 	F-1 	students 	“must 	. 	. 	. 	update 	and 	maintain
student 	records 	in 	[SEVIS].” 	Kim 	v. 	Holder, 	737 	F.3d 	1181, 	1182
n.2 (7th Cir. 2013); see 8 C.F.R. § 214.3(l)(1)(iii) (tasking DSOs
with ensuring “timely and complete recordkeeping and reporting to
DHS”). 	For 	example, 	each 	term, 	DSOs 	must 	report 	whether 	an 	F-1
student 	has 	actually 	enrolled 	in 	a 	full 	courseload 	and 	confirm
that 	SEVIS 	reflects 	the 	student’s 	estimated 	program 	completion
date. 	See 	8 	C.F.R. 	§ 	214.3(g)(2)(iii)(A), 	(D). 	DSOs 	must 	note 	in
SEVIS any approval for a student to take a reduced courseload, to
transfer to another school, or to engage in off-campus employment.
See id. § 214.2(f)(6)(iii)(E), (8)(ii), (9)(ii)(D). DSOs also must
update 	SEVIS 	to 	recommend 	that 	a 	student 	participate 	in 	optional
practical 	training 	and 	to 	reflect 	any 	change 	in 	a 	student’s 	name
or 	address. 	See 	id. 	§§ 	214.2(f)(11)(ii)(B), 	(17),
214.3(g)(2)(ii)(B). 	And 	schools 	must 	report 	when 	a 	student 	fails
to maintain status, fails to complete his program, graduates early,
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or is subject to disciplinary action due to a criminal conviction.
See id. § 214.3(g)(2)(ii)(A), (C)-(D).
In 2010, SEVP issued guidance to DSOs to inform them “of the
visa revocation process, how to record such an action in a [SEVIS]
record, and how to respond to law enforcement inquiries involving
students 	whose 	visas 	have 	been 	revoked.” 	Student 	& 	Exch. 	Visitor
Program, 	U.S. 	Immigr. 	& 	Customs 	Enf’t, 	Policy 	Guidance 	1004-04 	–
Visa 	Revocations 	1 	(June 	7, 	2010), 	https://perma.cc/ZM2S-R6Z6.
This guidance stated that if an F-1 student visa is revoked “while
the 	nonimmigrant 	is 	in 	the 	United 	States 	and 	in 	status,” 	the
“[v]isa 	revocation 	is 	not, 	in 	itself, 	a 	cause 	for 	termination 	of
the 	student’s 	SEVIS 	record.” 	Id. 	at 	3. 	ICE 	has 	removed 	this
guidance from its website. See Öztürk v. Trump, __ F. Supp. 3d __,
__ n.3 (D. Mass. 2025) [2025 WL 3514320, at *2 n.3], appeal filed,
No. 26-1135 (1st Cir. Feb. 7, 2026).
II. 	Student Criminal Alien Initiative
In 	mid-March 	2025, 	DHS 	and 	DOS 	undertook 	an 	effort 	referred
to internally as the “Student Criminal Alien Initiative” (“SCAI”).
Dkt. 14 ¶ 31. Over multiple weeks, ICE employees ran the names of
the 	1.3 	million 	international 	students 	then 	in 	the 	United 	States
through the NCIC database, which contains records of individuals’
interactions 	with 	law 	enforcement 	such 	as 	convictions, 	arrests,
charges, and citations. Approximately 6,400 of the names returned
positive hits, and about 3,000 of those students had a valid visa
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at the time. Among these students were individuals with no criminal
history, individuals with only minor infractions such as speeding
tickets, 	and 	individuals 	arrested 	for 	minor 	offenses 	but 	never
charged in court.
ICE 	sent 	DOS 	a 	list 	of 	the 	6,400 	student 	visa 	holders 	whose
names appeared in the NCIC database. DOS then revoked many, if not
all, of the valid visas issued to those students. Plaintiffs allege
that DOS revoked those visas solely because the students appeared
in the NCIC database and not based on any individualized assessment
of 	whether 	revocation 	was 	warranted. 	In 	some 	cases, 	DOS 	did 	not
notify 	the 	student 	or 	his 	or 	her 	school 	about 	the 	revocation. 	In
other cases, DOS sent a letter or email informing the student that
his 	or 	her 	visa 	had 	been 	revoked 	and 	that 	DOS 	had 	notified 	ICE.
The letter also stated the following:
Remaining 	in 	the 	United 	States 	without 	a 	lawful
immigration 	status 	can 	result 	in 	fines, 	detention,
and/or deportation. It may also make you ineligible for
a 	future 	U.S. 	visa. 	Please 	note 	that 	deportation 	can
take place at a time that does not allow the person being
deported 	to 	secure 	possessions 	or 	conclude 	affairs 	in
the United States. Persons being deported may be sent to
countries other than their countries of origin.
Given 	the 	gravity 	of 	this 	situation, 	individuals 	whose
visa was revoked may wish to demonstrate their intent to
depart 	the 	United 	States 	using 	the 	CBP 	Home 	App 	at
https://www.cbp.gov/about/mobile-apps-
directory/cbphome.
Id. ¶ 49.
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ICE 	then 	terminated 	the 	SEVIS 	records 	of 	thousands 	of
international students whose names appeared in the NCIC database.
The 	affected 	individuals 	included 	undergraduate 	and 	graduate
students 	and 	recent 	graduates 	working 	in 	the 	United 	States 	via
optional 	practical 	training. 	Plaintiffs 	again 	allege 	that 	ICE
terminated 	these 	SEVIS 	records 	without 	any 	individualized
assessment 	of 	whether 	each 	student 	had 	been 	convicted 	of 	a 	crime
or whether termination was otherwise warranted. In many cases, DHS
did 	not 	notify 	the 	affected 	students 	or 	their 	schools 	about 	the
SEVIS terminations, which were instead discovered by the schools’
DSOs. ICE listed a variety of reasons for the terminations in the
SEVIS 	records, 	including 	“Otherwise 	Failing 	to 	Maintain 	Status”
with 	either 	the 	explanation 	“[i]ndividual 	identified 	in 	criminal
records 	check 	and/or 	has 	had 	their 	visa 	revoked” 	or 	a 	narrative
citing deportability provisions for failure to maintain status and
foreign 	policy 	grounds. 	Id. 	¶ 39 	(alteration 	in 	original). 	On 	or
about April 8, 2025, ICE updated many terminated SEVIS records to
include 	a 	new 	notation 	reading 	“OTHER 	- 	Individual 	identified 	in
criminal 	records 	check 	and/or 	has 	had 	their 	visa 	revoked.” 	Id.
¶ 40. 	Some 	terminated 	records 	contain 	no 	notation 	or 	explanation
at all.
These 	visa 	revocations 	and 	SEVIS 	terminations 	triggered 	a
nationwide 	tsunami 	of 	lawsuits 	filed 	by 	affected 	F-1 	students.
See, 	e.g., 	Mekarthi 	v. 	Noem, 	796 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	488, 	489-90 	(N.D.
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Ill. 2025); Doe v. Noem, 783 F. Supp. 3d 907, 917 (W.D. Va. 2025);
Doe 	#1 	v. 	Noem, 	781 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	246, 	258-59 	(D.N.J. 	2025); 	Doe
1 v. 	Bondi, 	785 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	1268, 	1276 	(N.D. 	Ga. 	2025); 	Liu, 	780
F. Supp. 3d at 395; Doe 4 v. Lyons, 783 F. Supp. 3d 1281, 1286-87
(W.D. 	Wash. 	2025); 	Doe 	#1 	v. 	Trump, 	785 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	575, 	581 	(D.
Ariz. 2025); Beyhaqi v. Noem, 779 F. Supp. 3d 919, 921 (S.D. Tex.
2025). On April 26, 2025, ICE issued a “Broadcast Message” entitled
“SEVIS 	Notice 	- 	Policy 	Regarding 	Termination 	of 	Records” 	to 	“All
SEVP Personnel.” Dkt. 30-7 at 2. The Broadcast Message states that
“SEVP 	can 	terminate 	[SEVIS] 	records 	for 	a 	variety 	of 	reasons,
including, 	but 	not 	limited 	to 	the 	following 	reasons: 	. 	. 	. 	U.S.
Department of State Visa Revocation (Effective Immediately).” Id.
The 	Broadcast 	Message 	later 	reiterates 	that 	if 	DOS 	“revokes 	a
nonimmigrant 	visa 	effective 	immediately, 	SEVP 	may 	terminate 	the
nonimmigrant’s 	SEVIS 	record 	based 	on 	the 	visa 	revocation 	with
immediate 	effect, 	as 	such 	a 	revocation 	can 	serve 	as 	a 	basis 	of
removability 	under 	INA 	§ 	237(a)(1)(B).” 	Id. 	at 	3. 	The 	Broadcast
Message 	includes 	a 	disclaimer 	that 	it 	“is 	not 	. 	. 	. 	a 	rule 	or 	a
final 	action 	by 	SEVP” 	and 	“is 	not 	intended 	to, 	does 	not, 	and 	may
not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law by any party.” Id.
SEVP 	then 	reactivated 	the 	SEVIS 	records 	that 	had 	been
terminated 	during 	the 	SCAI. 	While 	the 	SEVIS 	records 	reflect 	the
initial 	terminations 	and 	subsequent 	reactivations, 	the
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reactivations 	are 	“retroactive 	to 	the 	date 	of 	the 	initial
terminations, 	such 	that 	there 	is 	no 	gap 	or 	lapse 	in 	the 	affected
SEVIS records.” Dkt. 30-6 ¶ 13. SEVP mailed each student a letter
stating that his or her SEVIS record had been reactivated and that
ICE 	would 	not 	use 	the 	termination 	of 	a 	SEVIS 	record 	during 	the
SCAI 	“as 	a 	basis 	for 	denial 	of 	future 	immigration 	benefits 	or 	a
determination 	that 	one 	did 	not 	maintain 	his 	or 	her 	nonimmigrant
status during that time period.” Id. ¶ 15.
Significantly, DOS has not reinstated the revoked F-1 visas.
An 	ICE 	official 	who 	oversees 	SEVP 	has 	stated 	under 	oath 	that
“[c]onsistent with its new SEVIS policy, ICE will not re-terminate
SEVIS 	records 	based 	solely 	on 	the 	NCIC 	record 	that 	led 	to 	the
initial termination or solely on any related visa revocation that
is effective upon departure.” Dkt. 30-6 ¶ 11.
III. Presidents’ Alliance and AICUM
Presidents’ 	Alliance 	is 	a 	nonprofit 	association 	of 	leaders
from almost 600 public and private colleges and universities across
the 	country. 	Its 	member 	institutions 	enroll 	over 	five 	million
students, 	including 	international 	students. 	Presidents’ 	Alliance
convenes 	these 	leaders 	to 	address 	immigration 	issues 	impacting
students and educational institutions, supports educational access
and 	post-graduate 	opportunities 	at 	American 	institutions 	for
immigrant 	and 	international 	students, 	and 	advocates 	for 	issues
concerning immigrant and international students.
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AICUM 	is 	an 	advocacy 	organization 	representing 	fifty-seven
private 	colleges 	and 	universities 	in 	Massachusetts. 	More 	than
280,000 students, including international students, attend AICUM’s
member institutions annually. AICUM advocates on issues related to
higher 	education, 	including 	protecting 	the 	interests 	of
international students at its member institutions.
During the SCAI, DHS terminated the SEVIS records and revoked
the 	visas 	of 	students 	at 	member 	institutions 	of 	both 	Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs expended resources to assist its members in responding
to 	the 	visa 	revocations 	and 	SEVIS 	terminations. 	Presidents’
Alliance has “divert[ed] significant time and resources away from
its 	planned 	initiatives” 	in 	order 	to 	“manage 	the 	surge 	of 	urgent
concerns 	from 	member 	institutions.” 	Dkt. 	14 	¶ 	54. 	These 	efforts
have 	“include[d] 	preparing 	rapid-response 	materials, 	convening
emergency 	briefings, 	issuing 	updated 	guidance 	to 	institutional
leaders, 	and 	coordinating 	closely 	with 	external 	legal 	experts.”
Id. 	Presidents’ 	Alliance 	has 	responded 	to 	“a 	surge 	in
individualized 	requests 	for 	technical 	assistance, 	legal
interpretation, 	and 	institutional 	messaging 	support 	from 	member
institutions 	seeking 	clarity, 	coordination, 	and 	guidance” 	about
the 	federal 	government’s 	actions. 	Id. 	¶ 55. 	For 	its 	part, 	AICUM
conducted outreach to its members to determine how it could provide
support and contacted elected officials on behalf of its members.
AICUM 	opted 	not 	to 	increase 	membership 	dues 	for 	the 	fiscal 	year
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starting June 2025 due to the “immense financial strain the current
federal regulatory landscape has created.” Id. ¶ 56.
Staff at member institutions responded to the terminations by
preparing remote instruction for graduate students with terminated
SEVIS records, counseling international students and faculty with
questions 	about 	the 	federal 	government’s 	actions, 	and 	arranging
trainings 	for 	international 	students. 	At 	one 	community 	college
that is a member of Presidents’ Alliance, twelve students had their
SEVIS 	records 	terminated. 	The 	college’s 	international 	program
staff spent about half their time in March and April 2025 notifying
affected 	students, 	assessing 	immigration 	options 	for 	individual
students, 	arranging 	online 	coursework 	for 	students 	who 	had 	left
campus, 	and 	conducting 	trainings 	for 	students 	and 	faculty. 	Some
Presidents’ 	Alliance 	and 	AICUM 	member 	colleges 	provided 	summer
housing and financial assistance to international students afraid
to travel abroad.
Following the SEVIS terminations, some international students
at 	Presidents’ 	Alliance 	and 	ACIUM 	member 	institutions 	left 	the
United States out of fear of deportation, including at least four
students 	at 	one 	member 	institution 	and 	several 	at 	another 	member
university. 	Member 	institutions 	have 	faced 	a 	drop 	in 	enrollment
among 	current 	students 	who 	have 	departed 	the 	United 	States 	and
among 	prospective 	students 	seeking 	to 	begin 	a 	course 	of 	study 	in
the fall of 2025. Approximately 80% of international students pay
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full tuition, and the uncertainty created by the SCAI has affected
member institutions’ ability to plan and budget.
DISCUSSION
Defendants 	move 	to 	dismiss 	the 	amended 	complaint 	under 	Rule
12(b)(1) 	for 	lack 	of 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	and 	under 	Rule
12(b)(6) 	for 	failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim. 	The 	Court 	addresses 	these
two sets of arguments in turn.
I. 	Jurisdiction
A. 	Article III Standing
Defendants 	first 	contend 	that 	Plaintiffs, 	both 	membership
organizations, lack Article III standing to bring this action. The
Court first lays out the legal standard for establishing standing
and then applies that standard to the allegations in this case.
1. 	Legal Standard
Under 	Article 	III’s 	case-or-controversy 	requirement, 	the
plaintiff 	must 	possess 	standing 	to 	bring 	its 	lawsuit, 	i.e., 	“a
‘“personal 	stake”’ 	in 	the 	case.” 	TransUnion 	LLC v. 	Ramirez, 	594
U.S. 	413, 	423 	(2021) 	(quoting 	Raines v. 	Byrd, 	521 	U.S. 	811, 	819
(1997)). 	To 	meet 	this 	burden, 	the 	“plaintiff 	must 	show 	(i) that
[it] suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized,
and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by
the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed
by judicial relief.” Id.
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“An 	organization 	with 	individual 	members 	may 	establish
Article III standing” in two ways. Doe v. Trump, 157 F.4th 36, 47
(1st 	Cir. 	2025), 	petition 	for 	cert. 	filed, 	No. 	25-899 	(U.S. 	Jan.
30, 	2026); 	see 	Students 	for 	Fair 	Admissions, 	Inc. 	v. 	President 	&
Fellows 	of 	Harvard 	Coll., 	600 	U.S. 	181, 	199 	(2023). 	First, 	the
organization 	may 	“satisfy[] 	the 	three 	elements 	of 	. 	. 	. 	standing
based 	on 	an 	‘injury 	in 	fact’ 	of 	its 	own.” 	Doe, 	157 	F.4th 	at 	47
(quoting 	FDA 	v. 	All. 	for 	Hippocratic 	Med., 	602 	U.S. 	367, 	393
(2024)). This type of standing, known as organizational standing,
requires 	that 	the 	organization 	itself 	“satisf[ies] 	the 	usual
standards for injury in fact, causation, and redressability.” All.
for 	Hippocratic 	Med., 	602 	U.S. 	at 	394. 	Alternatively, 	the
organization 	“may 	establish 	‘associational 	standing’ 	to 	sue 	in 	a
‘representational 	capacity.’” 	Doe, 	157 	F.4th 	at 	47 	(quoting
Hunt v. 	Wash. 	State 	Apple 	Advert. 	Comm’n, 	432 	U.S. 	333, 	343, 	345
(1977)). 	For 	this 	form 	of 	standing, 	“the 	organization 	must 	show
that ‘(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their
own 	right; 	(b) 	the 	interests 	it 	seeks 	to 	protect 	are 	germane 	to
the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor
the 	relief 	requested 	requires 	the 	participation 	of 	individual
members in the lawsuit.’” Id. (quoting Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343). The
first factor is satisfied if one member of the organization would
have standing to sue on its own. See Housatonic River Initiative v.
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U.S. EPA, 75 F.4th 248, 265 (1st Cir. 2023); Equal Means Equal v.
Ferriero, 3 F.4th 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2021).
The 	plaintiff 	bears 	the 	burden 	of 	establishing 	standing 	and
must 	meet 	this 	burden 	“with 	the 	manner 	and 	degree 	of 	evidence
required at the successive stages of the litigation.” TransUnion,
594 U.S. at 431 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
561 (1992)). When, as here, a defendant moves to dismiss for lack
of standing based on the face of the complaint, courts credit all
well-pleaded 	facts 	in 	the 	complaint, 	draw 	all 	reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and ask whether the plaintiff
has plausibly alleged the three elements of standing. See Wiener v.
MIB 	Grp., 	Inc., 	86 	F.4th 	76, 	83 	(1st 	Cir. 	2023). 	In 	a 	multi-
plaintiff action, “only one plaintiff needs standing for a suit to
proceed.” Bost v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 146 S. Ct. 513, 519
n.3 	(2026). 	But 	“plaintiffs 	must 	demonstrate 	standing 	for 	each
claim 	that 	they 	press.” 	Conservation 	L. 	Found., 	Inc. 	v. 	Acad.
Express, LLC, 129 F.4th 78, 85 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting TransUnion,
594 	U.S. 	at 	431). 	Additionally, 	“[p]ast 	harm 	is 	insufficient 	to
‘confer standing to seek forward-looking declaratory or injunctive
relief’; there must be ‘ongoing injury or a sufficient threat that
the 	injury 	will 	recur.’” 	NAGE, 	120 	F.4th 	at 	910 	(quoting 	Roe 	v.
Healey, 	78 	F.4th 	11, 	21 	(1st 	Cir. 	2023)). 	The 	Court 	measures
Plaintiffs’ standing as of the filing of the amended complaint in
June 2025. See Conservation L. Found., 129 F.4th at 85-86.
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2. 	Analysis
Plaintiffs 	argue 	that 	they 	have 	adequately 	pled 	that 	both
Presidents’ 	Alliance 	and 	AICUM 	have 	organizational 	and
associational 	standing. 	The 	Court 	holds 	that 	Plaintiffs 	have
plausibly pled Presidents’ Alliance’s organizational standing and,
thus, need not tackle Plaintiffs’ other theories. See Bost, 146 S.
Ct. at 519 n.3 (explaining that “only one plaintiff needs standing
for a suit to proceed”); Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Kennedy, __ F.
Supp. 	3d 	__, 	__ 	(D. 	Mass. 	2026) 	[2026 	WL 	33719, 	at 	*6] 	(noting
that 	the 	court 	did 	not 	have 	to 	“address 	whether 	any
[o]rganizational 	[p]laintiff 	ha[d] 	associational 	standing” 	after
finding that one “ha[d] demonstrated organizational standing”).
“It 	is 	well-accepted 	in 	the 	standing 	context 	that
organizations may have interests of their own, separate and apart
from 	the 	interests 	of 	their 	members.” 	Mass. 	Delivery 	Ass’n 	v.
Coakley, 	671 	F.3d 	33, 	44 	n.7 	(1st 	Cir. 	2012). 	As 	one 	example,
courts 	have 	long 	held 	that 	an 	organization 	has 	standing 	if 	“the
challenged conduct frustrated [its] organizational mission[]” and
it “diverted resources to combat that conduct.” Town of Milton v.
FAA, 	87 	F.4th 	91, 	99 	(1st 	Cir. 	2023) 	(quoting 	Friends 	of 	the
Earth v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 992 F.3d 939, 942 (9th Cir. 2021));
see Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982). But
“an 	organization 	may 	not 	establish 	standing 	simply 	based 	on 	the
‘intensity 	of 	[its] 	interest,’” 	its 	“strong 	opposition 	to 	the
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government’s 	conduct,” 	or 	“simply 	a 	setback 	to 	[its] 	abstract
social 	interests.” 	All. 	for 	Hippocratic 	Med., 	602 	U.S. 	at 	394
(first 	quoting 	Valley 	Forge 	Christian 	Coll. 	v. 	Ams. 	United 	for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982); and
then quoting Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 379). It follows that “an
organization cannot establish standing if the ‘only injury arises
from 	the 	effect 	of 	[a 	challenged 	action] 	on 	the 	organization[’s]
lobbying 	activities, 	or 	when 	the 	service 	impaired 	is 	pure 	issue-
advocacy.’” Equal Means Equal, 3 F.4th at 30 (first alteration in
original) (quoting People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 797 F.3d 1087, 1093-94 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
The 	Supreme 	Court 	recently 	refined 	these 	principles 	of
organizational 	standing 	in 	Alliance 	for 	Hippocratic 	Medicine.
There, a number of pro-life doctors and medical associations sued
the 	U.S. 	Food 	and 	Drug 	Administration 	(“FDA”) 	to 	challenge 	its
relaxation 	of 	regulatory 	requirements 	that 	facilitated 	access 	to
mifepristone, an abortion drug. See All. for Hippocratic Med., 602
U.S. at 372-73. The Court held that the medical associations lacked
standing 	to 	sue. 	See 	id. 	at 	393-96. 	The 	associations 	argued 	that
they 	had 	standing 	because 	“FDA 	ha[d] 	impaired 	their 	ability 	to
provide 	services 	and 	achieve 	their 	organizational 	missions.” 	Id.
at 	394 	(cleaned 	up). 	The 	Court 	disagreed, 	explaining 	that 	the
associations could not “assert standing simply because they object
to 	FDA’s 	actions.” 	Id. 	The 	associations 	also 	claimed 	standing
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“based on their incurring costs to oppose FDA’s actions,” including
performing their own studies about mifepristone in order to “better
inform 	their 	members 	and 	the 	public 	about 	mifepristone’s 	risks,”
“drafting 	citizen 	petitions 	to 	FDA,” 	and 	“engaging 	in 	public
advocacy 	and 	public 	education.” 	Id. 	These 	expenditures 	did 	not
support 	standing, 	the 	Court 	concluded, 	because 	“an 	organization
that 	has 	not 	suffered 	a 	concrete 	injury 	caused 	by 	a 	defendant’s
action cannot spend its way into standing simply by expending money
to 	gather 	information 	and 	advocate 	against 	the 	defendant’s
action.” Id.
In 	so 	concluding, 	the 	Court 	rejected 	both 	the 	associations’
analogy to Havens Realty and their assertion that “standing exists
when 	an 	organization 	diverts 	its 	resources 	in 	response 	to 	a
defendant’s actions.” Id. at 395. The Court explained that Havens
Realty 	addressed 	whether 	HOME, 	which 	both 	was 	“an 	issue-advocacy
organization” 	and 	“operated 	a 	housing 	counseling 	service,” 	had
standing to sue an apartment building owner under the Fair Housing
Act 	for 	providing 	false 	information 	about 	apartment 	availability
to 	HOME’s 	black 	employees. 	Id. 	HOME 	had 	standing, 	the 	Court
stressed, 	because 	the 	owner’s 	provision 	of 	false 	information 	to
HOME’s 	employees 	“directly 	affected 	and 	interfered 	with 	HOME’s
core business activities” of “provid[ing] counseling and referral
services 	for 	low- 	and 	moderate-income 	homeseekers.” 	Id. 	(quoting
Havens 	Realty, 	455 	U.S. 	at 	379). 	By 	contrast, 	“FDA’s 	actions
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relaxing 	regulation 	of 	mifepristone 	have 	not 	imposed 	any 	similar
impediment to the medical associations’ advocacy businesses.” Id.
In 	this 	case, 	Plaintiffs 	allege 	that 	Presidents’ 	Alliance
“supports 	the 	educational 	access, 	success, 	and 	post-graduate
pathways 	of 	immigrants, 	refugee, 	and 	international 	students 	at
U.S. colleges and universities.” Dkt. 14 ¶ 5. Presidents’ Alliance
expended resources to assist member institutions in responding to
the 	visa 	revocations 	and 	SEVIS 	terminations 	affecting 	their
students. 	Specifically, 	Presidents’ 	Alliance 	has 	“divert[ed]
significant time and resources away from its planned initiatives”
in 	order 	to 	“manage 	the 	surge 	of 	urgent 	concerns 	from 	member
institutions.” Id. ¶ 54. These efforts have “include[d] preparing
rapid-response 	materials, 	convening 	emergency 	briefings, 	issuing
updated 	guidance 	to 	institutional 	leaders, 	and 	coordinating
closely with external legal experts.” Id. Presidents’ Alliance has
responded 	to 	“a 	surge 	in 	individualized 	requests 	for 	technical
assistance, 	legal 	interpretation, 	and 	institutional 	messaging
support 	from 	member 	institutions 	seeking 	clarity, 	coordination,
and guidance” about the federal government’s actions. Id. ¶ 55.
The 	parties 	debate 	whether 	this 	diversion 	of 	resources 	is
sufficient 	to 	establish 	standing 	under 	Alliance 	for 	Hippocratic
Medicine. The issue is a difficult one, as the Supreme Court “left
unclear the line that divides spending that satisfies Article III
from 	spending 	that 	does 	not” 	in 	the 	context 	of 	organizational
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standing. Tenn. Conf. of the NAACP v. Lee, 139 F.4th 557, 565 (6th
Cir. 	2025). 	One 	court 	has 	read 	Alliance 	for 	Hippocratic 	Medicine
to 	foreclose 	any 	organizational 	standing 	argument 	that 	relies 	on
a 	voluntary 	diversion 	of 	resources 	in 	response 	to 	the 	challenged
conduct. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Ezell, No. 25-cv-
10276, 2025 WL 470459, at *1-2 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 2025) (rejecting,
in 	the 	context 	of 	a 	motion 	for 	preliminary 	relief, 	the 	argument
that 	labor 	unions 	representing 	government 	employees 	had 	standing
to 	challenge 	a 	government 	employment 	directive 	that 	“subject[ed]
them 	to 	upstream 	effects 	including 	a 	diversion 	of 	resources 	to
answer members’ questions about the directive”). Other courts have
permitted 	such 	an 	injury 	to 	support 	standing 	post-Alliance 	for
Hippocratic Medicine if the diversion of resources furthers a core
business 	activity 	of 	the 	organization 	that 	is 	not 	issue 	advocacy
or 	lobbying 	and, 	thus, 	is 	not 	merely 	an 	effort 	to 	oppose 	the
challenged conduct. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, __ F. Supp.
3d 	at 	__ 	[2026 	WL 	33719, 	at 	*5-6] 	(holding 	that 	a 	professional
medical 	association 	had 	standing 	to 	challenge 	the 	federal
government’s 	changes 	to 	COVID 	vaccine 	recommendations 	and 	the
vaccine advisory committee based on its diversion of resources to
counsel 	its 	members 	about 	the 	changes 	in 	order 	to 	further 	its
public health mission).
The 	Court 	adopts 	the 	latter 	reading 	of 	Alliance 	for
Hippocratic 	Medicine. 	Before 	that 	case 	was 	decided, 	the 	First
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Circuit 	had 	recognized 	an 	organization’s 	standing 	if 	“the
challenged conduct frustrated [its] organizational mission[]” and
it “diverted resources to combat that conduct,” Town of Milton, 87
F.4th 	at 	99 	(quoting 	Friends 	of 	the 	Earth, 	992 	F.3d 	at 	942), 	as
long 	as 	the 	harm 	was 	not 	to 	“the 	organization[’s] 	lobbying” 	or
“pure issue-advocacy” activities, Equal Means Equal, 3 F.4th at 30
(quoting People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 797 F.3d at
1093-94). 	Alliance 	for 	Hippocratic 	Medicine 	is 	not 	inconsistent
with 	those 	principles, 	as 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	noted 	multiple 	times
that 	the 	expenditure 	of 	resources 	in 	that 	case 	did 	not 	support
standing because the expenditure solely represented opposition to
the 	challenged 	conduct. 	See 	602 	U.S. 	at 	394 	(framing 	the 	medical
associations’ argument for standing as resting on “their incurring
costs 	to 	oppose 	FDA’s 	actions”); 	id. 	(stating 	that 	“an
organization . 	. 	. 	cannot 	spend 	its 	way 	into 	standing 	simply 	by
expending 	money 	to 	gather 	information 	and 	advocate 	against 	the
defendant’s 	action”); 	id. 	at 	395 	(refusing 	to 	recognize 	a 	theory
of standing that “would mean that all the organizations in America
would have standing to challenge almost every federal policy that
they 	dislike, 	provided 	they 	spend 	a 	single 	dollar 	opposing 	those
policies”).
The 	amended 	complaint 	plausibly 	alleges 	that 	Presidents’
Alliance has standing to bring this lawsuit. Presidents’ Alliance
has not diverted resources merely to efforts to oppose the federal
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government’s 	visa 	revocations 	and 	SEVIS 	terminations, 	thereby
manufacturing standing to sue. Instead, Plaintiffs allege that in
addition 	to 	its 	advocacy 	work, 	Presidents’ 	Alliance 	provides
support 	to 	U.S. 	colleges 	and 	universities 	with 	respect 	to
opportunities for international students. The visa revocations and
SEVIS 	terminations 	have 	triggered 	a 	flood 	of 	requests 	for
assistance from member institutions and caused the organization to
divert 	resources 	from 	its 	other 	initiatives 	in 	order 	to 	offer
guidance to its members on responding to the federal government’s
actions. In short, Presidents’ Alliance’s “diversion of resources
goes 	beyond 	mere 	advocacy 	as 	to 	be 	sufficient 	for 	organizational
standing.” Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, __ F. Supp. 3d at __ [2026 WL
33719, 	at 	*6]. 	And 	this 	injury 	also 	satisfies 	the 	causation 	and
redressability 	requirements: 	the 	visa 	revocations 	and 	SEVIS
terminations 	predictably 	prompted 	the 	flood 	of 	requests 	for
assistance 	from 	member 	institutions 	and 	the 	need 	for 	Presidents’
Alliance 	to 	expend 	resources 	in 	response, 	and 	an 	order 	striking
down 	the 	policies 	authorizing 	those 	revocations 	and 	terminations
would reduce or eliminate those requests.
Defendants 	separately 	contend 	that 	Presidents’ 	Alliance 	was
not 	suffering 	an 	ongoing 	injury 	when 	the 	amended 	complaint 	was
filed 	in 	late 	June 	2025, 	and 	thus 	lacks 	standing 	to 	seek 	the
prospective 	relief 	sought 	in 	this 	lawsuit, 	because 	ICE 	at 	that
point had already reactivated the SEVIS records terminated during
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the SCAI. See Conservation L. Found., 129 F.4th at 85-86 (measuring
standing as of the date the operative amended complaint was filed).
A 	fair 	reading 	of 	Plaintiffs’ 	allegations 	indicates 	that
Presidents’ 	Alliance’s 	diversion 	of 	resources 	to 	support 	its
member 	institutions 	continued 	past 	ICE’s 	reactivation 	of 	SEVIS
records in late April and early May 2025. DOS has never reinstated
the 	F-1 	visas 	it 	revoked 	or 	withdrawn 	the 	letters 	and 	emails 	it
sent 	to 	affected 	students 	about 	those 	revocations. 	And, 	as
discussed 	in 	more 	detail 	below 	in 	the 	context 	of 	Defendants’
arguments 	about 	mootness, 	ICE’s 	reversal 	does 	not 	provide
assurance that it will not again terminate SEVIS records based on
an 	NCIC 	hit 	and/or 	a 	visa 	revocation. 	Indeed, 	the 	Broadcast
Message, which ICE has never disavowed, expressly authorizes SEVP
to terminate a SEVIS record based on a visa revocation.
While it is unnecessary to decide the issue of associational
standing, 	the 	Court 	pauses 	to 	note 	one 	flaw 	in 	Plaintiffs’
arguments on that issue. As noted, associational standing requires
that 	at 	least 	one 	member 	of 	the 	organization 	would 	have 	standing
to 	sue 	on 	its 	own. 	See 	Housatonic 	River, 	75 	F.4th 	at 	265. 	In
discussing this requirement, Plaintiffs assert that “at least one
member 	must 	be 	named” 	but 	deny 	“that 	each 	named 	member’s 	injury
must be separately alleged.” Dkt. 32 at 21. The First Circuit has
explained, 	though, 	that 	an 	organization 	seeking 	to 	show
associational standing “must, at the very least, ‘identify a member
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who has suffered the requisite harm,’” Draper v. Healey, 827 F.3d
1, 3 (1st Cir. 2016) (cleaned up) (quoting Summers v. Earth Island
Inst., 	555 	U.S. 	488, 	499 	(2009)), 	unless 	“all 	the 	members 	of 	the
organization 	are 	affected 	by 	the 	challenged 	activity,” 	Capen 	v.
Campbell, 134 F.4th 660, 668 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting Summers, 555
U.S. at 498-99). The contours of this obligation to name names are
murky, but simply listing an organization’s members by linking to
a 	website 	and 	making 	general 	allegations 	of 	injuries 	suffered 	by
some of those members is likely insufficient. See Fac., Alumni, &
Students 	Opposed 	to 	Racial 	Preferences 	v. 	Harvard 	L. 	Rev. 	Ass’n,
No. 	18-12105, 	2019 	WL 	3754023, 	at 	*6 	(D. 	Mass. 	Aug. 	8, 	2019)
(leaving open whether this rule “mandate[s] the naming of names at
the 	pleading 	stage” 	but 	emphasizing 	that 	an 	organization 	must
“supply some degree of descriptive information” about the standing
of one or more specific members). Given the divided caselaw on the
extent 	to 	which 	resource 	diversion 	can 	support 	organizational
standing, 	Plaintiffs 	may 	wish 	to 	press 	associational 	standing 	at
the summary-judgment stage. If so, they likely must either provide
more detailed factual information about the harms suffered by one
or 	more 	specific 	members 	of 	Presidents’ 	Alliance 	and/or 	AICUM 	or
present 	evidence 	that 	every 	member 	of 	one 	or 	both 	organizations
has suffered harm from the challenged policies.
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B. 	Mootness
Defendants 	next 	contend 	that 	the 	Court 	lacks 	jurisdiction
over Counts II and III because those claims are moot. See Roe, 78
F.4th 	at 	21 	n.8 	(“[M]ootness 	raises 	a 	jurisdictional
question . . . .”). 	Counts 	II 	and 	III 	challenge 	ICE’s 	SEVIS
Termination Policy -- i.e., its alleged policy of terminating SEVIS
records 	based 	on 	an 	NCIC 	hit 	and/or 	a 	visa 	revocation 	-- 	as
contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. Defendants emphasize
that 	ICE 	reactivated 	all 	the 	SEVIS 	records 	terminated 	during 	the
SCAI 	by 	early 	May 	2025 	and 	made 	the 	reactivations 	retroactive 	to
the 	date 	of 	termination. 	Defendants 	also 	stress 	that 	an 	ICE
official 	has 	stated 	under 	oath 	that 	“ICE 	will 	not 	re-terminate
SEVIS 	records 	based 	solely 	on 	the 	NCIC 	record 	that 	led 	to 	the
initial termination or solely on any related visa revocation that
is effective upon departure.” Dkt. 30-6 ¶ 11.
“The doctrine of mootness enforces the mandate ‘that an actual
controversy must be extant at all stages of the review, not merely
at 	the 	time 	the 	complaint 	is 	filed.’” 	Lowe 	v. 	Gagné-Holmes, 	126
F.4th 	747, 	755 	(1st 	Cir.) 	(quoting 	Mangual 	v. 	Rotger-Sabat, 	317
F.3d 45, 60 (1st Cir. 2003)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2795 (2025).
Thus, 	“a 	case 	is 	moot 	when 	the 	issues 	presented 	are 	no 	longer
live,” when “the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome,” 	or 	when 	“the 	court 	cannot 	give 	any 	effectual 	relief 	to
the 	potentially 	prevailing 	party.” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Bayley’s
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Campground, Inc. v. Mills, 985 F.3d 153, 157 (1st Cir. 2021)). The
burden 	of 	demonstrating 	mootness 	rests 	“on 	the 	party 	raising 	the
issue.” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Bos. 	Bit 	Labs, 	Inc. 	v. 	Baker, 	11 	F.4th 	3, 	8
(1st Cir. 2021)).
A defendant cannot, however, “‘automatically moot a case’ by
the simple expedient of suspending its challenged conduct after it
is sued.” FBI v. Fikre, 601 U.S. 234, 241 (2024) (quoting Already,
LLC 	v. 	Nike, 	Inc., 	568 	U.S. 	85, 	91 	(2013)). 	Under 	the 	voluntary
cessation 	doctrine, 	a 	claim 	is 	not 	moot 	if 	two 	conditions 	are
satisfied: 	(1) 	“a 	defendant 	voluntar[ily] 	ceases 	the 	challenged
practice 	in 	order 	to 	moot the 	plaintiff’s 	case” 	and 	(2) “‘there
exists 	a 	reasonable 	expectation 	that 	the 	challenged 	conduct 	will
be repeated’ after the suit’s ‘dismissal.’” NAGE, 120 F.4th at 912
(alteration 	in 	original) 	(quoting 	Bos. 	Bit 	Labs, 	11 	F.4th 	at 	9);
see 	Lowe, 	126 	F.4th 	at 	758 	(clarifying 	that 	both 	conditions 	must
be met for this doctrine to save a claim from mootness). This rule
“exists 	to 	stop 	a 	scheming 	defendant 	from 	trying 	to 	‘immuniz[e]
itself 	from 	suit 	indefinitely’ 	by 	unilaterally 	changing 	‘its
behavior 	long 	enough 	to 	secure 	a 	dismissal’ 	and 	then 	backsliding
when 	the 	judge 	is 	out 	of 	the 	picture.” 	NAGE, 	120 	F.4th 	at 	912
(alteration in original) (quoting Bos. Bit Labs, 11 F.4th at 10).
The 	defendant 	bears 	the 	burden 	of 	proving 	that 	one 	or 	both
conditions 	of 	the 	voluntary 	cessation 	test 	is 	not 	satisfied. 	See
Lowe, 	126 	F.4th 	at 	756, 	758. 	Put 	simply, 	“a 	defendant 	claiming
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that 	its 	voluntary 	compliance 	moots 	a 	case 	bears 	the 	formidable
burden 	of 	showing 	that 	it 	is 	absolutely 	clear 	the 	allegedly
wrongful 	behavior 	could 	not 	reasonably 	be 	expected 	to 	recur.”
Corrigan v. Bos. Univ., 98 F.4th 346, 353 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting
Friends 	of 	the 	Earth, 	Inc. 	v. 	Laidlaw 	Env’t 	Servs. 	(TOC), 	Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000)).
Defendants 	have 	failed 	to 	meet 	this 	burden.2 	First,
Defendants’ reactivation of the SEVIS records and their disavowal
of 	any 	intent 	to 	re-terminate 	those 	records 	were 	likely 	a 	result
of pending litigation. Defendants’ reversal followed the filing of
a torrent of lawsuits about the SEVIS terminations during the SCAI,
including this action, and numerous adverse judicial rulings. See,
e.g., 	Doe 	4, 	783 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	1300; 	Doe 	#1, 	785 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at
588; Beyhaqi, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 923; Doe 1 v. Bondi, 780 F. Supp.
2 	Many 	district 	courts 	have 	held 	under 	the 	voluntary 	cessation
doctrine 	that 	the 	reactivation 	of 	SEVIS 	records 	did 	not 	moot
individual 	suits 	brought 	by 	students 	whose 	SEVIS 	records 	were
terminated during the SCAI. See, e.g., Bushireddy v. Lyons, No. 25-
1102, 2026 WL 759480, at *6-7 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2026); Doe v. Noem,
No. 25-cv-00023, 2026 WL 562452, at *6-7 (W.D. Va. Feb. 28, 2026);
Roe v. Noem, No. 25-cv-40, 2026 WL 194636, at *5-6 (D. Mont. Jan.
26, 	2026); 	Saxena 	v. 	Noem, 	No. 	25-cv-05035, 	2026 	WL 	84248, 	at 	*5
(D.S.D. 	Jan. 	12, 	2026); 	Vemula 	v. 	Noem, 	No. 	25-cv-04561, 	2025 	WL
3527141, 	at 	*4-5 	(N.D. 	Ill. 	Dec. 	9, 	2025); 	Zhou 	v. 	Lyons, 	__ 	F.
Supp. 	3d 	__, 	__ 	(C.D. 	Cal. 	2025) 	[2025 	WL 	3691816, 	at 	*6]; 	Du 	v.
U.S. 	Dep’t 	of 	Homeland 	Sec., 	No. 	25-cv-644, 	2025 	WL 	1549098, 	at
*6-7 (D. Conn. May 31, 2025). But see He v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05333,
2026 	WL 	37999, 	at 	*2 	(W.D. 	Wash. 	Jan. 	6, 	2026) 	(finding 	an
individual student’s suit to be moot without mentioning voluntary
cessation and noting that the student did not oppose the motion to
dismiss).
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3d 1277, 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2025); Doe v. Noem, 781 F. Supp. 3d 1055,
1071 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Doe v. Noem, 778 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1167-68
(W.D. 	Wash. 	2025). 	Defendants 	argue 	that 	the 	fact 	that 	“ICE
reactivated 	the 	SEVIS 	records 	across 	the 	board, 	regardless 	of
whether 	the 	students 	were 	involved 	in 	pending 	litigation,”
demonstrates that their reversal had nothing to do with litigation.
Dkt. 	40 	at 	5. 	This 	argument 	is 	not 	credible, 	especially 	because
the government was facing at least two lawsuits -- this action and
one 	in 	the 	Northern 	District 	of 	California, 	see 	Chen 	v. 	Noem,
No. 25-cv-03292, 2025 WL 1150697, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2025)
-- 	seeking 	either 	policy-wide 	or 	nationwide 	relief. 	Cf. 	Diamond
Alt. 	Energy, 	LLC 	v. 	EPA, 	606 	U.S. 	100, 	122 	(2025) 	(“Judges 	‘are
“not 	required 	to 	exhibit 	a 	naiveté 	from 	which 	ordinary 	citizens
are free.”’” (quoting Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 785
(2019))).
Second, 	Defendants 	have 	not 	proven 	“that 	it 	is 	absolutely
clear 	the 	allegedly 	wrongful 	behavior 	could 	not 	reasonably 	be
expected to recur.” Corrigan, 98 F.4th at 353 (quoting Friends of
the 	Earth, 	528 	U.S. 	at 	190). 	Plaintiffs 	challenge 	DHS’s 	alleged
policy of terminating SEVIS records based on an NCIC hit and/or a
visa 	revocation. 	The 	ICE 	official’s 	declaration 	states 	that 	“ICE
will not re-terminate SEVIS records based solely on the NCIC record
that led to the initial termination or solely on any related visa
revocation that is effective upon departure.” Dkt. 30-6 ¶ 11. This
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statement 	promises 	only 	that 	ICE 	will 	not 	use 	the 	past 	NCIC 	hits
identified 	during 	the 	SCAI 	and 	the 	resulting 	visa 	revocations 	as
grounds to re-terminate a SEVIS record; it makes no representation
that 	ICE 	will 	not 	terminate 	SEVIS 	records 	in 	the 	future 	based 	on
other existing or new NCIC hits or new visa revocations. In short,
the 	government’s 	ambiguous 	“declaration 	falls 	short 	of
demonstrating that it cannot reasonably be expected to do again in
the 	future 	what 	it 	is 	alleged 	to 	have 	done 	in 	the 	past.” 	Fikre,
601 	U.S. 	at 	242. 	It 	is 	significant 	for 	the 	mootness 	inquiry 	that
Defendants have not restored the visas that were revoked.
Additionally, 	the 	Broadcast 	Message, 	which 	reflects 	ICE’s
current 	position 	on 	SEVIS 	terminations, 	states 	that 	“SEVP 	can
terminate [SEVIS] records for a variety of reasons, including, but
not 	limited 	to 	the 	following 	reasons: 	. 	. 	. 	U.S. 	Department 	of
State Visa Revocation.” Dkt. 30-7 at 2. The Broadcast Message thus
expressly 	authorizes 	ICE 	to 	terminate 	a 	SEVIS 	record 	based 	on 	a
visa revocation and does not bar ICE from doing the same based on
a student’s minor interaction with the criminal justice system.
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	concludes 	under 	the 	voluntary
cessation doctrine that Counts II and III are not moot.3
3 Because the voluntary cessation doctrine saves Count II and III
from 	mootness, 	the 	Court 	need 	not 	address 	Plaintiffs’ 	argument
that 	the 	capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review 	exception 	to
mootness also applies to those claims.
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II. 	Merits
Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ amended complaint
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). To survive such
a 	motion, 	a 	complaint 	must 	allege 	“a 	plausible 	entitlement 	to
relief.” 	Bell 	Atl. 	Corp. v. 	Twombly, 	550 	U.S. 	544, 	559 	(2007).
“While 	a 	complaint 	attacked 	by 	a 	Rule 	12(b)(6) 	motion 	to 	dismiss
does 	not 	need 	detailed 	factual 	allegations, 	a 	plaintiff’s
obligation 	to 	provide 	the 	grounds 	of 	his 	entitlement 	to 	relief
requires 	more 	than 	labels 	and 	conclusions, 	and 	a 	formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.
at 	555 	(cleaned 	up). 	This 	standard 	requires 	a 	court 	to 	“separate
the 	complaint’s 	factual 	allegations 	(which 	must 	be 	accepted 	as
true) 	from 	its 	conclusory 	legal 	allegations 	(which 	need 	not 	be
credited).” Kando v. R.I. State Bd. of Elections, 880 F.3d 53, 58
(1st 	Cir. 	2018) 	(quoting 	Morales-Cruz v. 	Univ. 	of 	P.R., 	676 	F.3d
220, 	224 	(1st 	Cir. 	2012)). 	The 	court 	must 	then 	determine 	whether
the factual allegations permit it “to draw the reasonable inference
that 	the 	defendant 	is 	liable 	for 	the 	misconduct 	alleged.”
Germanowski v. 	Harris, 	854 	F.3d 	68, 	72 	(1st 	Cir. 	2017) 	(quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).4
4 The First Circuit has held that this “plausibility standard does
not 	apply 	to 	a 	complaint 	for 	judicial 	review 	of 	final 	agency
action” 	under 	the 	APA 	and 	that 	a 	Rule 	12(b)(6) 	motion 	in 	this
context generally must “claim[] that the underlying premise of the
complaint is legally flawed (rather than factually unsupported).”
Atieh 	v. 	Riordan, 	727 	F.3d 	73, 	76 	& 	n.4 	(1st 	Cir. 	2013). 	The
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A. 	Visa Revocations (Count I)
In Count I, Plaintiffs challenge DOS’s Visa Revocation Policy
-- 	i.e., 	its 	alleged 	policy 	of 	revoking 	visas 	based 	on 	NCIC 	hits
without any individualized inquiry -- as arbitrary and capricious
under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Defendants assert that judicial review
of 	this 	claim 	is 	unavailable 	because 	1) 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1201(i)
“preclude[s] 	judicial 	review,” 	5 	U.S.C. 	§ 701(a)(1); 	2) visa
revocations 	are 	“committed 	to 	agency 	discretion 	by 	law,” 	id.
§ 701(a)(2); and 3) Plaintiffs have not identified a final agency
action.5 The Court addresses these three arguments seriatim.
1. 	5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)
The APA contains a “strong presumption” that agency action is
subject 	to 	judicial 	review. 	Union 	of 	Concerned 	Scientists 	v.
Wheeler, 	954 	F.3d 	11, 	17 	(1st 	Cir. 	2020) 	(quoting 	Mach 	Mining,
plausibility standard may still apply, however, in APA cases where
the scope of judicial review is not limited to the administrative
record. 	See 	Bos. 	All. 	of 	Gay, 	Lesbian, 	Bisexual 	& 	Transgender
Youth v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 557 F. Supp. 3d 224,
243 	n.7 	(D. 	Mass. 	2021). 	The 	parties 	do 	not 	grapple 	with 	how
Atieh’s 	holding 	applies 	to 	this 	case 	and, 	regardless, 	the 	Court
does not discern any fact-laden issue raised in Defendants’ motion
whose outcome would be different under Atieh’s approach.
5 	Although 	Defendants 	raise 	these 	limitations 	on 	judicial 	review
under 	Rule 	12(b)(6), 	the 	First 	Circuit 	has 	sometimes 	framed 	them
as implicating a court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Doe v. Noem, 152
F.4th 	272, 	284 	(1st 	Cir. 	2025) 	(§ 701(a)(2)); 	Bernardo 	ex 	rel. 	M
& 	K 	Eng’g, 	Inc. 	v. 	Johnson, 	814 	F.3d 	481, 	483-84 	(1st 	Cir. 	2016)
(§ 701(a)(1)); Puerto Rico v. United States, 490 F.3d 50, 70 (1st
Cir. 	2007) 	(final 	agency 	action). 	For 	present 	purposes, 	it 	does
not matter whether these limitations on judicial review affect the
Court’s jurisdiction or the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims.
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LLC v. 	EEOC, 	575 	U.S. 	480, 	486 	(2015)). 	This 	“presumption 	may 	be
rebutted,” 	however, 	if 	a 	“relevant 	statute 	precludes 	review.”
Weyerhaeuser 	Co. 	v. 	U.S. 	Fish 	& 	Wildlife 	Serv., 	586 	U.S. 	9, 	23
(2018); see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (barring APA claims “to the extent
that 	. 	. 	. 	statutes 	preclude 	judicial 	review”). 	Defendants 	argue
that 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1201(i), 	which 	authorizes 	the 	Secretary 	of 	State
and 	consular 	officers 	to 	revoke 	a 	visa, 	precludes 	review 	of
Plaintiffs’ 	claim 	challenging 	DOS’s 	alleged 	policy 	of 	revoking
visas 	based 	on 	NCIC 	hits. 	That 	provision 	states 	in 	relevant 	part
as follows:
After 	the 	issuance 	of 	a 	visa 	or 	other 	documentation 	to
any alien, the consular officer or the Secretary of State
may at any time, in his discretion, revoke such visa or
other 	documentation. 	. 	. 	. 	There 	shall 	be 	no 	means 	of
judicial 	review 	. 	. 	. 	of 	a 	revocation 	under 	this
subsection, 	except 	in 	the 	context 	of 	a 	removal
proceeding 	if 	such 	revocation 	provides 	the 	sole 	ground
for removal under [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B)].”
8 U.S.C. § 1201(i).
Plaintiffs do not deny that § 1201(i) may bar a claim seeking
judicial 	review 	of 	DOS’s 	decision 	to 	revoke 	an 	individual 	visa.
See, 	e.g., 	Joorabi 	v. 	Pompeo, 	464 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	93, 	101 	(D.D.C.
2020); 	Castellanos 	v. 	Pfizer, 	Inc., 	555 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	1343, 	1348
(S.D. 	Fla. 	2008). 	But 	analogizing 	to 	McNary 	v. 	Haitian 	Refugee
Center, 	Inc., 	498 	U.S. 	479 	(1991), 	Plaintiffs 	contend 	that
§ 1201(i)’s prohibition on judicial review does not apply to their
claim because they challenge DOS’s alleged policy of revoking visas
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based 	on 	NCIC 	hits 	rather 	than 	individual 	visa 	revocation
decisions. The Court agrees.
In McNary, the Supreme Court was confronted with a provision
that 	precluded 	“judicial 	review 	of 	a 	determination 	respecting 	an
application for adjustment of status” under an amnesty program for
certain 	agricultural 	workers. 	498 	U.S. 	at 	491 	(quoting 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1160(e)(1)). 	Similarly, 	in 	Reno 	v. 	Catholic 	Social 	Services,
Inc., the Court interpreted a provision limiting “judicial review
of 	a 	determination 	respecting 	an 	application 	for 	adjustment 	of
[temporary 	resident] 	status.” 	509 	U.S. 	43, 	54 	(1993) 	(quoting 	8
U.S.C. 	§ 	1255a(f)(1)). 	In 	each 	case, 	the 	Court 	held 	that 	the
jurisdictional 	bar 	at 	issue 	“applie[d] 	only 	to 	review 	of 	denials
of individual . . . applications,” id. at 56 (second alteration in
original) 	(quoting 	McNary, 	498 	U.S. 	at 	494), 	and 	not 	to 	“general
collateral challenges to . . . practices and policies used by the
agency” in reaching the individual decisions. McNary, 498 U.S. at
492; 	see 	Reno, 	509 	U.S. 	at 	55-56. 	Critical 	to 	these 	holdings 	was
the 	Court’s 	reasoning 	that 	each 	statute’s 	“reference 	to 	‘a
determination’ 	describes 	a 	single 	act 	rather 	than 	a 	group 	of
decisions or a practice or procedure employed in making decisions.”
Reno, 509 U.S. at 56 (quoting McNary, 498 U.S. at 492).
The 	same 	logic 	applies 	here. 	Section 	1201(i) 	refers 	to 	“the
issuance of a visa,” authorizes the revocation of “such visa,” and
then 	bars 	“judicial 	review 	. 	. 	. 	of 	a 	revocation 	under 	this
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subsection.” 8 U.S.C. § 1201(i) (emphasis added). As in McNary and
Reno, 	this 	provision’s 	consistent 	use 	of 	the 	singular 	makes
manifest 	that 	it 	“describes 	a 	single 	act 	rather 	than 	a 	group 	of
decisions or a practice or procedure employed in making decisions.”
Reno, 509 U.S. at 56 (quoting McNary, 498 U.S. at 492). Plaintiffs’
claim 	does 	not 	contest 	the 	revocation 	of 	any 	individual 	visa;
instead, Plaintiffs challenge a group of decisions to revoke visas
pursuant to a broad policy of doing so based on NCIC hits. Section
1201(i) does not preclude judicial review of this claim.
2. 	5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)
Defendants 	further 	contend 	that 	judicial 	review 	is
unavailable under the APA for Count I because the claim challenges
“action 	. 	. 	. 	committed 	to 	agency 	discretion 	by 	law.” 	5 	U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(2). 	This 	“quite 	narrow[]” 	exception 	to 	judicial 	review
does 	not 	encompass 	every 	action 	involving 	the 	exercise 	of 	agency
discretion. Weyerhaeuser Co., 586 U.S. at 23. Rather, § 701(a)(2)
“applies only to those rare administrative decisions traditionally
left 	to 	agency 	discretion, 	or 	when 	the 	relevant 	statute 	is 	drawn
so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to
judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” New York v. Trump, __
F.4th __, __ (1st Cir. 2026) [2026 WL 734941, at *9] (cleaned up)
(first 	quoting 	Dep’t 	of 	Homeland 	Sec. 	v. 	Regents 	of 	the 	Univ. 	of
Cal., 	591 	U.S. 	1, 	17 	(2020); 	and 	then 	quoting 	Union 	of 	Concerned
Scientists, 	954 	F.3d 	at 	17). 	The 	agency 	actions 	to 	which 	the
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Supreme Court has applied this exception to judicial review include
“a 	decision 	not 	to 	institute 	enforcement 	proceedings” and 	“a
decision by an intelligence agency to terminate an employee in the
interest 	of 	national 	security.” 	Dep’t 	of 	Com., 	588 	U.S. 	at 	772;
see 	Weyerhaeuser 	Co., 	586 	U.S. 	at 	23 	(listing 	as 	other 	examples
“the 	allocation 	of 	funds 	from 	a 	lump-sum 	appropriation” 	and 	“a
decision not to reconsider a final action”).
In 	Count 	I, 	Plaintiffs 	allege 	that 	DOS’s 	Visa 	Revocation
Policy is arbitrary and capricious under the APA because the policy
“lacks a rational connection between the facts relied upon and the
decision made” and “represents a sudden and unexplained departure
from 	prior 	policy 	and 	practice.” 	Dkt. 	14 	¶¶ 	74-75. 	Defendants
assert 	that 	this 	claim 	is 	unreviewable 	under 	§ 	701(a)(2) 	because
§ 	1201(i) 	gives 	DOS 	unfettered 	discretion 	to 	revoke 	a 	visa 	and
provides 	no 	meaningful 	standard 	for 	a 	court 	to 	apply. 	Plaintiffs
respond that § 701(a)(2) does not bar judicial review of this claim
because they challenge a broad policy about visa revocations based
on 	NCIC 	hits 	rather 	than 	a 	decision 	to 	revoke 	an 	individual 	visa
governed by § 1201(i).
“[T]he APA provides for judicial review of both procedure and
substance.” 	Union 	of 	Concerned 	Scientists, 	954 	F.3d 	at 	19; 	see 	5
U.S.C. 	§ 	706(2)(A), 	(C)-(D). 	DOS’s 	Foreign 	Affairs 	Manual, 	for
example, 	provides 	guidance 	on 	the 	procedures 	and 	grounds 	for
revocation 	of 	nonimmigrant 	visas 	by 	a 	consular 	officer 	or 	the
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agency. See 9 FAM 403.11-3 to -5. The policy of revoking a student
visa based solely on an NCIC hit without individualized review is
plausibly 	contrary 	to 	these 	standards 	and 	implicates 	reliance
interests of F-1 visa holders. Whether this guidance provides law
to 	apply 	in 	adjudicating 	Plaintiffs’ 	challenge 	to 	the 	Visa
Revocation 	Policy 	is 	not 	addressed 	in 	the 	parties’ 	briefing.
Furthermore, as pled in the amended complaint, Count I appears to
be a “pure APA” claim, i.e., a claim that “alleges a violation of
the 	reasoned 	decision-making 	standards 	of 	the 	APA 	alone” 	without
reference 	to 	“an 	additional 	set 	of 	statutory 	or 	regulatory
requirements to guide [the court] in assessing the propriety of an
agency’s 	procedures 	in 	a 	matter.” 	Union 	of 	Concerned 	Scientists,
954 F.3d at 21-22. The First Circuit has not decided whether courts
may 	adjudicate 	such 	a 	claim, 	see 	id. 	at 	22, 	and 	the 	parties 	have
not briefed the issue. The Court denies the motion to dismiss Count
I as unreviewable pursuant to § 701(a)(2).
3. 	Final Agency Action
Defendants’ last argument in support of dismissal of Count I
is 	that 	Plaintiffs 	do 	not 	challenge 	a 	final 	agency 	action. 	While
Defendants 	frame 	this 	argument 	in 	terms 	of 	the 	APA’s 	test 	for
finality, 	the 	crux 	of 	their 	position 	is 	that 	the 	alleged 	policy
regarding visa revocations is not even a discrete “agency action,”
let alone a final one. Defendants point out that Plaintiffs do not
challenge any DOS regulation or official guidance and contend that
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their 	claim 	impermissibly 	concocts 	a 	policy 	out 	of 	DOS’s 	general
practices.
The 	APA 	authorizes 	judicial 	review 	of 	“final 	agency 	action
for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 704; 	see 	Harper 	v. 	Werfel, 	118 	F.4th 	100, 	116 	(1st 	Cir. 	2024),
cert. 	denied, 	145 	S. 	Ct. 	2867 	(2025). 	The 	APA 	defines 	an 	“agency
action” to “include[] the whole or a part of an agency rule, order,
license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or
failure 	to 	act.” 	5 	U.S.C. 	§ 551(13). 	The 	term 	“‘action’ 	. 	. 	. 	is
meant to cover comprehensively every manner in which an agency may
exercise its power.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457,
478 	(2001). 	To 	be 	reviewable 	under 	the 	APA, 	however, 	an 	agency
action 	must 	be 	“discrete.” 	New 	York 	v. 	Trump, 	133 	F.4th 	51, 	67
(1st 	Cir. 	2025) 	(quoting 	Norton 	v. 	S. 	Utah 	Wilderness 	All.
(“SUWA”), 	542 	U.S. 	55, 	64 	(2004)). 	A 	plaintiff 	therefore 	may 	not
bring 	a 	“broad 	programmatic 	attack” 	under 	the 	APA, 	i.e., 	a
challenge to “a variety of programmatic deficiencies” or to “‘all
aspects 	of’ 	a 	program.” 	Id. 	(first 	quoting 	SUWA, 	542 	U.S. 	at 	64;
and then quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 890
n.2, 	891 	(1990)); 	see 	New 	York 	v. 	Kennedy, 	155 	F.4th 	67, 	76 	(1st
Cir. 	2025). 	Nor 	may 	an 	APA 	claim 	rest 	on 	“generalized 	complaints
about 	agency 	behavior.” 	Cobell 	v. 	Kempthorne, 	455 	F.3d 	301, 	307
(D.C. Cir. 2006).
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Count 	I 	is 	not 	an 	impermissible 	programmatic 	attack 	or
generalized 	complaint 	about 	agency 	behavior. 	Rather, 	Plaintiffs
challenge 	a 	specific 	DOS 	policy 	of 	revoking 	visas 	based 	on 	NCIC
hits without any individualized inquiry. At this stage, the Court
may 	plausibly 	infer 	the 	existence 	of 	such 	a 	policy 	from 	the
allegation 	that 	DOS 	revoked 	the 	F-1 	visas 	of 	many 	students 	based
on their inclusion on the list of NCIC hits generated by ICE even
though some of those students had no more than a speeding ticket.
See 	Garro 	Pinchi 	v. 	Noem, 	__ 	F. 	Supp.3d 	__, 	__ 	(N.D. 	Cal. 	2025)
[2025 WL 3691938, at *21] (relying on “circumstantial evidence” to
find that an “informal or unwritten” agency policy likely existed);
Nava v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 435 F. Supp. 3d 880, 901-02 (N.D.
Ill. 	2020) 	(similar). 	This 	policy 	is 	a 	discrete 	agency 	action
reviewable 	under 	the 	APA. 	See 	Am. 	Ass’n 	of 	Univ. 	Professors 	v.
Rubio (“AAUP”), 780 F. Supp. 3d 350, 385 (D. Mass. 2025) (rejecting
argument that the plaintiffs brought an impermissible programmatic
attack because they “allege[d] a specific ‘policy of revoking the
visas 	and 	green 	cards 	of 	faculty 	and 	students 	engaged 	in 	pro-
Palestinian 	advocacy,’ 	not 	a 	constellation 	of 	independent
decisions 	or 	a 	general 	drift 	in 	agency 	priorities”). 	Defendants
stress 	that 	this 	policy 	is 	not 	memorialized 	in 	any 	regulation,
official 	guidance, 	or 	other 	writing, 	but 	“[a]gency 	action
generally 	need 	not 	be 	committed 	to 	writing 	to 	be 	final 	and
judicially 	reviewable.” 	Bhd. 	of 	Locomotive 	Eng’rs 	& 	Trainmen 	v.
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Fed. R.R. Admin., 972 F.3d 83, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2020); see Am. Fed’n
of 	Gov’t 	Emps. 	v. 	U.S. 	Off. 	of 	Pers. 	Mgmt., 	786 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	647,
691 	(S.D.N.Y. 	2025); 	AAUP, 	780 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	385; 	Nava, 	435 	F.
Supp. 3d at 902.
To the extent Defendants also contend that this agency action
is 	not 	reviewable 	because 	it 	is 	not 	final, 	the 	Court 	again
disagrees. 	For 	purposes 	of 	the 	APA, 	an 	agency 	action 	is 	final 	if
two 	conditions 	are 	met: 	(1) 	the 	action 	“must 	mark 	the
‘consummation’ 	of 	the 	agency’s 	decisionmaking 	process”; 	and
(2) “the 	action 	must 	be 	one 	by 	which 	‘rights 	or 	obligations 	have
been 	determined,’ 	or 	from 	which 	‘legal 	consequences 	will 	flow.’”
Harper, 118 F.4th at 116 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
178 	(1997)); 	see 	Corner 	Post, 	Inc. v. 	Bd. 	of 	Governors 	of 	Fed.
Rsrv. Sys., 603 U.S. 799, 808 (2024). Courts apply this test in a
“pragmatic” fashion. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578
U.S. 	590, 	599 	(2016) 	(quoting 	Abbott 	Lab’ys 	v. 	Gardner, 	387 	U.S.
136, 149 (1967)).
The Visa Revocation Policy satisfies both prongs of the test
for 	finality. 	There 	is 	no 	indication 	that 	DOS’s 	policy 	was 	“of 	a
merely 	tentative 	or 	interlocutory 	nature.” 	Harper, 	118 	F.4th 	at
116 	(quoting 	Bennett, 	520 	U.S. 	at 	178). 	Indeed, 	DOS 	proceeded 	to
revoke 	many 	students’ 	visas, 	which 	it 	has 	never 	restored. 	DOS’s
policy 	thus 	represents 	the 	conclusion 	of 	its 	decisionmaking 	on
this 	issue. 	See 	New 	York, 	155 	F.4th 	at 	76 	(deeming 	an 	agency
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statement to be a final action because “it was followed, just days
later, 	by” 	agency 	conduct 	implementing 	the 	statement). 	And 	DOS’s
policy of revoking visas has immediate legal consequences for the
affected students, as a noncitizen without a valid visa may not be
admitted to the country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(B)(i)(II).
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	denies 	Defendants’ 	motion 	to 	dismiss
Count I.
B. 	SEVIS Terminations (Count II-IV)
Plaintiffs 	bring 	two 	claims 	challenging 	DHS’s 	SEVIS
Termination 	Policy, 	that 	is, 	DHS’s 	alleged 	policy 	of 	terminating
SEVIS records based on an NCIC hit and/or a visa revocation. Counts
II 	and 	III 	allege 	that 	this 	policy 	is, 	respectively, 	contrary 	to
law and arbitrary and capricious under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Count
IV 	also 	relates 	to 	SEVIS 	terminations, 	alleging 	that 	ICE
promulgated 	the 	Broadcast 	Message 	without 	following 	the 	required
notice-and-comment process.
Defendants 	raise 	three 	sets 	of 	arguments 	for 	dismissal 	of
these 	claims. 	The 	Court 	first 	addresses 	an 	assertion 	about 	the
nature 	of 	a 	SEVIS 	record 	that 	permeates 	Defendants’ 	motion 	and
then turns to Defendants’ specific arguments.
1. 	SEVIS Record vs. F-1 Nonimmigrant Status
Defendants’ 	motion 	repeatedly 	distinguishes 	between 	an 	F-1
student’s 	SEVIS 	record 	and 	nonimmigrant 	status. 	For 	example,
Defendants 	claim 	that 	SEVIS 	“is 	a 	tool 	used 	by 	DHS 	and 	[DOS] 	to
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support other functions” and that “[h]ow DHS maintains, modifies,
and 	uses 	the 	records 	in 	its 	law 	enforcement 	database 	is 	separate
and apart from nonimmigrant status.” Dkt. 30 at 33. Defendants add
that “[c]hanging a SEVIS record from ‘active’ to ‘terminated’ does
not 	terminate 	a 	student’s 	nonimmigrant 	status” 	and 	is 	instead 	“a
record 	keeping 	action 	conducted 	under 	DHS’s 	authority 	to 	collect
information 	and 	maintain 	records 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1372.” 	Id. 	at
35-36.6
The Court need not conclusively resolve Defendants’ argument
at this stage. At the very least, the argument presents “a factual
dispute 	that 	cannot 	be 	resolved 	on 	a 	Rule 	12(b)(6) 	motion.”
Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 772 F.3d 63, 77 (1st Cir. 2014).7
6 	In 	support 	of 	this 	argument, 	Defendants 	have 	submitted
declarations 	from 	two 	DHS 	officials 	reflecting 	this 	distinction.
See 	Dkt. 	30-5 	¶ 	7 	(USCIS 	official 	stating 	that 	“USCIS 	does 	not
equate SEVIS record termination with termination of an alien’s F-
1 nonimmigrant status”); Dkt. 30-6 ¶ 9 (ICE official stating that
“[t]erminating 	a 	record 	in 	SEVIS 	does 	not 	terminate 	an 	alien’s
nonimmigrant 	status 	in 	the 	United 	States” 	and 	that 	“SEVP 	did 	not
terminate the nonimmigrant status of any alien by terminating the
SEVIS 	record”). 	Courts 	normally 	may 	not 	consider 	declarations
submitted 	with 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	under 	Rule 	12(b)(6). 	See
Courthouse News Serv. v. Quinlan, 32 F.4th 15, 21 (1st Cir. 2022).
The Court need not determine whether it is appropriate to consider
the 	declarations 	submitted 	by 	Defendants 	for 	purposes 	of 	this
argument because the outcome of this motion does not turn on their
contents.
7 	The 	federal 	government 	has 	pressed 	this 	purported 	distinction
between 	an 	F-1 	student’s 	SEVIS 	record 	and 	nonimmigrant 	status 	in
defending 	against 	lawsuits 	filed 	by 	individual 	students 	whose
SEVIS 	records 	were 	terminated 	during 	the 	SCAI. 	Courts 	have
uniformly 	rejected 	the 	distinction 	in 	those 	cases. 	See, 	e.g.,
Shaik v. Noem, 801 F. Supp. 3d 825, 836 (D. Minn. Aug. 11, 2025),
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Plaintiffs 	have 	specifically 	alleged 	that 	“an 	active 	SEVIS
record 	is 	indispensable 	to 	-- 	or 	. 	. 	. 	the 	equivalent 	of 	-- 	an
international 	student’s 	F-1 	status.” 	Dkt. 	14 	¶ 22 	(cleaned 	up).
This 	allegation 	is 	amply 	supported 	by 	various 	official 	sources
promulgated 	by 	the 	relevant 	agencies. 	According 	to 	DOS’s 	Foreign
Affairs Manual, for instance, “the SEVIS record is the definitive
record of student . . . status.” 9 FAM 402.5-4(B)(a). An official
DHS website with information on the rules governing international
students states the following:
Once [a DSO] terminate[s] a student’s SEVIS record, the
student is no longer in an authorized period of stay in
the 	United 	States. 	Any 	associated 	F-2 	. 	. 	. 	dependent
records are also terminated. If the student is still in
the 	United 	States, 	they 	lose 	all 	employment
authorization they received while in student status. An
F 	. 	. 	. 	student 	who 	is 	out 	of 	nonimmigrant 	status 	must
leave the United States, while a student outside of the
country 	cannot 	reenter 	the 	United 	States 	using 	the
terminated SEVIS record.
U.S. 	Dep’t 	of 	Homeland 	Sec., 	Maintaining 	Accurate 	SEVIS 	Records,
Study 	in 	the 	States,
https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/schools/report/maintaining-
accurate-sevis-records (last visited Mar. 20, 2026); see Melino v.
Bos. 	Med. 	Ctr., 	127 	F.4th 	391, 	394 	n.1 	(1st 	Cir. 	2025) 	(taking
judicial notice of the contents of government websites). The same
appeal 	dismissed, 	No. 	25-2981 	(8th 	Cir. 	Jan. 	26, 	2026); 	Doe, 	783
F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	924-26; 	Doe 	v. 	Trump, 	784 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	1297, 	1308-
09 	(N.D. 	Cal. 	2025); 	Doe 	4, 	783 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	1294; 	Doe 	#1, 	785
F. Supp. 3d at 584-85; Doe, 781 F. Supp. 3d at 1066 n.1.
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website reiterates elsewhere that “[w]hen an F-1[] SEVIS record is
terminated,” 	the 	“[s]tudent 	loses 	all 	. 	. 	. 	employment
authorization,” 	the 	“[s]tudent 	cannot 	re-enter 	the 	United 	States
on the terminated SEVIS record,” and “[ICE] agents may investigate
to 	confirm 	the 	departure 	of 	the 	student.” 	U.S. 	Dep’t 	of 	Homeland
Sec., 	Terminating 	a 	Student, 	Study 	in 	the 	States 	(May 	19, 	2025),
https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/sevis-help-hub/student-
records/completions-and-terminations/terminate-a-student. 	These
agency 	sources 	suggest 	that 	the 	termination 	of 	a 	student’s 	SEVIS
record reflects the termination of his or her nonimmigrant status.
The 	events 	underlying 	this 	lawsuit 	point 	in 	the 	same
direction. 	When 	ICE 	terminated 	SEVIS 	records 	during 	the 	SCAI, 	it
listed 	“Otherwise 	Failing 	to 	Maintain 	Status” 	as 	the 	reason 	for
the 	termination 	in 	many 	of 	the 	affected 	records. 	Dkt. 	14 	¶ 	39.
DHS’s website states that this termination reason is applicable if
“[t]he student has not maintained status” and “[n]one of the other
terminations 	reasons 	applies.” 	U.S. 	Dep’t 	of 	Homeland 	Sec.,
Termination 	Reasons, 	Study 	in 	the 	States 	(Apr. 	9, 	2025),
https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/sevis-help-hub/student-
records/completions-and-terminations/termination-reasons. 	Even
ICE, 	then, 	apparently 	believed 	that 	terminating 	the 	students’
SEVIS records reflected a change in their nonimmigrant status.
For 	these 	reasons, 	the 	Court 	cannot 	accept 	for 	purposes 	of
this motion Defendants’ distinction between an F-1 student’s SEVIS
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record and nonimmigrant status. With this in mind, the Court turns
to the specific arguments Defendants raise in support of dismissal
of Counts II, III, and IV.
2. 	Final Agency Action
Defendants 	argue 	that 	Counts 	II 	and 	III 	should 	be 	dismissed
because Plaintiffs have failed to identify a final agency action.
Defendants 	contend 	that 	Plaintiffs 	have 	“fabricate[d] 	a 	policy
from their own perception of agency practice” with respect to SEVIS
terminations, 	that 	a 	final 	determination 	of 	a 	student’s
nonimmigrant 	status 	is 	only 	reached 	when 	an 	immigration 	judge
issues 	a 	final 	order 	in 	removal 	proceedings, 	and 	that 	no 	legal
consequences flow from a SEVIS termination. Dkt. 30 at 34.
For reasons similar to those discussed above with respect to
Count 	I, 	the 	Court 	concludes 	that 	Counts 	II 	and 	III 	challenge 	a
final 	agency 	action 	that 	is 	reviewable 	under 	the 	APA. 	Plaintiffs
do 	not 	mount 	a 	broad 	programmatic 	attack 	on 	DHS’s 	management 	of
SEVIS or even to DHS’s SCAI in the spring of 2025. Instead, these
claims 	contest 	a 	discrete 	agency 	action: 	DHS’s 	policy 	of
terminating 	SEVIS 	records 	based 	on 	an 	NCIC 	hit 	and/or 	a 	visa
revocation 	based 	on 	an 	NCIC 	hit. 	Again, 	the 	Court 	may 	plausibly
infer 	the 	existence 	of 	such 	a 	policy 	at 	this 	stage 	from 	the
allegation 	that 	ICE 	terminated 	the 	SEVIS 	records 	of 	thousands 	of
F-1 students with NCIC hits after DOS revoked their visas. And the
absence of a written document that fully memorializes this policy
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is not fatal to the availability of judicial review under the APA.
See Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 972 F.3d at 100; AAUP, 780 F. Supp.
3d at 385.
This policy also satisfies the two-pronged test for finality.
The 	fact 	that 	ICE 	terminated 	the 	SEVIS 	records 	of 	thousands 	of
students 	over 	a 	brief 	period 	of 	time 	shows 	that 	DHS’s 	policy 	was
not 	“of 	a 	merely 	tentative 	or 	interlocutory 	nature” 	but, 	rather,
“mark[ed] 	the 	‘consummation’ 	of 	the 	agency’s 	decisionmaking
process.” 	Harper, 	118 	F.4th 	at 	116 	(quoting 	Bennett, 	520 	U.S. 	at
178). Defendants contend that the “consummation of decisionmaking”
does not occur until an immigration judge issues a final order in
an 	individual 	student’s 	removal 	proceedings. 	Dkt. 	30 	at 	35. 	ICE
need not, however, initiate removal proceedings against a student
whose SEVIS record is terminated. See Jie Fang v. Dir. U.S. Immigr.
& 	Customs 	Enf’t, 	935 	F.3d 	172, 	183 	(3d 	Cir. 	2019). 	As 	discussed
below, 	the 	student 	faces 	immediate 	consequences 	regardless 	of
whether ICE opts to initiate removal proceedings.
Moreover, 	the 	policy 	“gives 	rise 	to 	‘direct 	and 	appreciable
legal 	consequences,’ 	thereby 	satisfying 	the 	second 	prong 	of” 	the
test 	for 	finality. 	Hawkes 	Co., 	578 	U.S. 	at 	598 	(quoting 	Bennett,
520 	U.S. 	at 	178). 	Defendants 	argue 	that 	the 	termination 	of 	a
student’s 	SEVIS 	record 	carries 	no 	legal 	consequences 	because 	it
does not reflect termination of the student’s nonimmigrant status.
The Court does not find this argument persuasive at this stage for
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the 	reasons 	discussed 	above. 	As 	noted, 	an 	official 	DHS 	website
states that following termination of a student’s SEVIS record, the
student 	loses 	all 	employment 	authorization, 	cannot 	re-enter 	the
United 	States, 	and 	may 	be 	investigated 	by 	ICE 	to 	confirm 	his 	or
her 	departure. 	These 	immediate 	effects 	of 	termination 	of 	a 	SEVIS
record are plainly direct legal consequences for the student.
Insofar as Counts II and III challenge the Broadcast Message
as 	a 	final 	agency 	action 	separate 	from 	the 	SEVIS 	Termination
Policy, the Court rejects at this stage Defendants’ argument that
the 	Broadcast 	Message 	is 	not 	final. 	The 	Broadcast 	Message’s
“boilerplate disclaimer[]” that it is not a final action and does
not 	create 	any 	legal 	rights 	or 	benefits 	is 	not 	conclusive 	on 	the
issue. S. Cal. All. of Publicly Owned Treatment Works v. U.S. EPA,
8 F.4th 831, 837 (9th Cir. 2021); see Valero Energy Corp. v. EPA,
927 F.3d 532, 536 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Setting aside this disclaimer,
nothing in the Broadcast Message indicates that it is a preliminary
or temporary statement of ICE’s policy on SEVIS terminations, and
the 	amended 	complaint 	alleges 	that 	ICE 	has 	publicly 	represented
that the Broadcast Message “is currently operative” as a policy on
SEVIS terminations, Dkt. 14 ¶ 46. The Broadcast Message thus seems
to 	have 	“mark[ed] 	the 	‘consummation’ 	of 	the 	agency’s
decisionmaking 	process.” 	Harper, 	118 	F.4th 	at 	116 	(quoting
Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178); see Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA,
934 F.3d 627, 636 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (finding an agency action to be
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51
final 	where 	it 	“c[ould] 	only 	reasonably 	be 	described 	as 	[the
agency]’s last word on” a topic).
Additionally, 	on 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	the 	Court 	cannot
conclude 	that 	the 	Broadcast 	Message 	lacks 	direct 	legal
consequences. 	In 	the 	context 	of 	agency 	guidance 	and 	directives,
this 	prong 	of 	the 	finality 	test 	sometimes 	turns 	on 	whether 	the
challenged action appears to bind the agency. See, e.g., Ctr. for
Biological 	Diversity 	v. 	Haaland, 	58 	F.4th 	412, 	417-18 	(9th 	Cir.
2023); 	Texas v. 	EEOC, 	933 	F.3d 	433, 	441 	(5th 	Cir. 	2019); 	Parsons
v. 	U.S. 	Dep’t 	of 	Just., 	878 	F.3d 	162, 	167 	(6th 	Cir. 	2017); 	Nat’l
Env’t 	Dev. 	Ass’n’s 	Clean 	Air 	Project 	v. 	EPA, 	752 	F.3d 	999, 	1007
(D.C. 	Cir. 	2014). 	The 	Broadcast 	Message 	espouses 	a 	definitive
statement of the reasons ICE may terminate a SEVIS record, some of
which, 	like 	a 	visa 	revocation, 	extend 	beyond 	those 	provided 	in
statute 	or 	regulation. 	See 	infra 	Section 	II(B)(3); 	see 	also
Whitewater Draw Nat. Res. Conservation Dist. v. Mayorkas, 5 F.4th
997, 	1010 	(9th 	Cir. 	2021) 	(finding 	that 	an 	action 	lacked 	legal
effect 	where 	it 	“d[id] 	not 	. 	. 	. 	alter 	the 	legal 	regime 	to 	which
[the agency] [wa]s subject”). While the Broadcast Message does not
use 	“mandatory 	language” 	expressly 	directing 	ICE 	personnel 	to
terminate 	SEVIS 	records 	under 	specific 	circumstances, 	it 	may
“retract 	[ICE’s] 	discretion 	to 	adopt 	a 	different 	view 	of” 	the
legally 	permissible 	reasons 	to 	terminate 	a 	SEVIS 	record. 	Texas,
933 F.3d at 441-42. Determining whether the Broadcast Message “is
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applied 	by 	the 	agency 	in 	a 	way 	that 	indicates 	it 	is 	binding”
requires further factual development. Id. at 441 (quoting Texas v.
United States, 809 F.3d 134, 171 (5th Cir. 2015)).
The Court thus holds that Counts II and III challenge a final
action agency that is reviewable under the APA. See Jie Fang, 935
F.3d at 179-85 (holding that termination of a SEVIS record and F-
1 	student 	status 	was 	a 	final 	agency 	action); 	Öztürk, 	__ 	F. 	Supp.
3d 	at 	__ 	[2025 	WL 	3514320, 	at 	*6] 	(collecting 	cases 	holding 	that
termination 	of 	a 	SEVIS 	record 	is 	a 	final 	agency 	action). 	As 	this
is the sole merits argument Defendants raise with respect to Count
III, the Court denies their motion to dismiss that claim.
3. 	Contrary to Law
In 	Count 	II, 	Plaintiffs 	allege 	that 	DHS’s 	policy 	of
terminating 	SEVIS 	records 	based 	on 	an 	NCIC 	hit 	and/or 	a 	visa
revocation is “not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
Specifically, 	Plaintiffs 	assert 	that 	this 	policy 	violates 	DHS’s
regulations, 	which 	establish 	the 	permissible 	grounds 	upon 	which
ICE 	may 	terminate 	an 	F-1 	student’s 	SEVIS 	record. 	“An 	agency
action . 	. 	. 	must 	be 	set 	aside 	as 	contrary 	to 	law 	when 	it 	is
inconsistent with regulations.” New York v. Trump, __ F. Supp. 3d
__, 	__ 	(D. 	Mass. 	2025) 	[2025 	WL 	3514301, 	at 	*14], 	appeal 	filed,
No. 	26-1174 	(1st 	Cir. 	Feb. 	17, 	2026); 	see 	SUWA, 	542 	U.S. 	at 	65
(noting 	that 	“law,” 	as 	used 	in 	the 	APA, 	“includes 	. 	. 	. 	agency
regulations 	that 	have 	the 	force 	of 	law”); 	Rotinsulu 	v. 	Mukasey,
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515 	F.3d 	68, 	72 	(1st 	Cir. 	2008) 	(“An 	agency 	has 	an 	obligation 	to
abide by its own regulations.”). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs
fail to state a claim in Count II because the regulations on which
they rely concern only the termination of F-1 nonimmigrant status,
not the termination of an F-1 student’s SEVIS record.
DHS’s 	regulations 	authorize 	the 	termination 	of 	an 	F-1
student’s 	SEVIS 	record 	“in 	two 	scenarios: 	(1) 	a 	student 	fails 	to
maintain 	status 	or 	(2) 	[DHS] 	terminates 	status.” 	Doe 	#1, 	781 	F.
Supp. 	3d 	at 	261. 	In 	the 	first 	scenario, 	an 	F-1 	“student 	is
considered to be maintaining status if the student is making normal
progress 	toward 	completing 	a 	course 	of 	study.” 	8 	C.F.R.
§ 214.2(f)(5)(i). “A student who drops below a full course of study
without 	the 	prior 	approval 	of 	the 	DSO 	will 	be 	considered 	out 	of
status,” id. § 214.2(f)(6)(iii),” as will a “student who is unable
to complete the educational program within the time listed on [his
or 	her] 	Form I-20 	. 	. 	. 	and 	who 	is 	ineligible 	for 	[a] 	program
extension,” 	id. 	§ 	214.2(f)(7)(iii). 	A 	student 	also 	fails 	to
maintain 	status 	if 	he 	(1) 	engages 	in 	“unauthorized 	employment,”
(2) willfully 	provides 	false 	information 	to 	DHS, 	or 	(3) 	receives
a 	“conviction 	. 	. 	. 	for 	a 	crime 	of 	violence 	for 	which 	a 	sentence
of more than one year imprisonment may be imposed.” Id. § 214.1(e)-
(g). 	Under 	the 	second 	scenario, 	“the 	nonimmigrant 	status 	of 	an
alien 	shall 	be 	terminated” 	under 	three 	circumstances: 	(a) 	“the
revocation 	of 	a 	waiver 	[of 	admissibility] 	authorized 	on 	[the
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alien’s] 	behalf 	under 	[8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1182(d)(3) 	or 	(4)]”; 	(b) 	“the
introduction of a private bill to confer permanent resident status
on 	such 	alien”; 	or 	(c) 	“pursuant 	to 	notification 	in 	the 	Federal
Register, on the basis of national security, diplomatic, or public
safety reasons.” Id. § 214.1(d).
Plaintiffs 	have 	stated 	a 	claim 	that 	DHS’s 	policy 	of
terminating 	SEVIS 	records 	based 	on 	an 	NCIC 	hit 	and/or 	a 	visa
revocation is contrary to law. 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.1 and 214.2 do not
provide 	that 	DHS 	may 	terminate 	a 	student’s 	SEVIS 	record 	because
his 	or 	her 	F-1 	visa 	is 	revoked. 	Indeed, 	SEVP 	acknowledged 	in
guidance 	issued 	to 	DSOs 	in 	2010 	that 	if 	an 	F-1 	student 	visa 	is
revoked 	“while 	the 	nonimmigrant 	is 	in 	the 	United 	States 	and 	in
status,” 	the 	“[v]isa 	revocation 	is 	not, 	in 	itself, 	a 	cause 	for
termination of the student’s SEVIS record.” Policy Guidance 1004-
04 – Visa Revocations, supra, at 3. And section 214.1(g) requires
a 	“conviction 	. 	. 	. 	for 	a 	crime 	of 	violence 	for 	which 	a 	sentence
of more than one year imprisonment may be imposed” before a student
is 	deemed 	out 	of 	status 	based 	on 	his 	or 	her 	criminal 	history. 	8
C.F.R. 	§ 	214.1(g). 	DHS’s 	policy 	appears 	to 	exceed 	its 	authority
under 	these 	regulations 	because 	it 	authorizes 	SEVIS 	terminations
for students based on the revocation of their visas and on criminal
histories that do not amount to a conviction for a felony crime of
violence.
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Defendants 	cite 	no 	statutory 	or 	regulatory 	authority 	to
support 	ICE’s 	termination 	of 	SEVIS 	records 	on 	such 	grounds.
Instead, 	Defendants 	contend 	that 	these 	“regulations 	relate 	to
nonimmigrant 	status 	and 	have 	nothing 	to 	do 	with 	modifying
(including terminating) database records” in SEVIS. Dkt. 30 at 32.
Put 	differently, 	Defendants 	assert 	that 	“[h]ow 	DHS 	maintains,
modifies, and uses the records in [the SEVIS] database is separate
and 	apart 	from 	nonimmigrant 	status 	and 	the 	laws 	and 	regulations
governing such status.” Id. at 33. Again, the Court cannot accept
this 	contention 	at 	this 	stage. 	As 	pled 	in 	the 	amended 	complaint,
DHS’s 	SEVIS 	Termination 	Policy 	permits 	the 	termination 	of 	SEVIS
records 	reflecting 	the 	termination 	of 	nonimmigrant 	status 	on
grounds 	not 	authorized 	by 	law. 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	denies
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count II.
4. 	Notice and Comment
In Count IV, Plaintiffs allege that the Broadcast Message is
invalid 	because 	ICE 	promulgated 	it 	without 	following 	the 	notice-
and-comment process. Defendants move to dismiss this claim on the
basis that the Broadcast Message is not a legislative rule subject
to the requirements of notice and comment.
“The 	APA 	generally 	requires 	that 	before 	a 	federal 	agency
adopts 	a 	rule 	it 	must 	first 	publish 	the 	proposed 	rule 	in 	the
Federal 	Register 	and 	provide 	interested 	parties 	with 	an
opportunity 	to 	submit 	comments 	and 	information 	concerning 	the
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proposal.” 	N.H. 	Hosp. 	Ass’n 	v. 	Azar, 	887 	F.3d 	62, 	70 	(1st 	Cir.
2018) 	(citing 	5 	U.S.C. 	§ 	553). 	The 	term 	“rule” 	covers 	“the 	whole
or 	a 	part 	of 	an 	agency 	statement 	of 	general 	or 	particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret,
or 	prescribe 	law 	or 	policy 	or 	describing 	the 	organization,
procedure, 	or 	practice 	requirements 	of 	an 	agency.” 	5 	U.S.C.
§ 551(4). 	A 	rule 	is 	“invalid” 	if 	the 	agency 	does 	not 	properly
follow 	the 	notice-and-comment 	process. 	Craker 	v. 	U.S. 	Drug 	Enf’t
Admin., 44 F.4th 48, 55 (1st Cir. 2022).
Only 	some 	rules, 	however, 	are 	subject 	to 	the 	procedural
requirements 	of 	notice 	and 	comment. 	See 	Perez 	v. 	Mortg. 	Bankers
Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015). An agency must engage in the notice-
and-comment 	process 	for 	any 	“legislative” 	or 	“substantive” 	rule,
which is a rule “that ‘creates rights, assigns duties, or imposes
obligations, 	the 	basic 	tenor 	of 	which 	is 	not 	already 	outlined 	in
the 	law 	itself.’” 	N.H. 	Hosp. 	Ass’n, 	887 	F.3d 	at 	70 	(quoting 	La
Casa Del Convaleciente v. Sullivan, 965 F.2d 1175, 1178 (1st Cir.
1992)). 	Such 	rules 	“have 	the 	‘force 	and 	effect 	of 	law.’” 	Azar 	v.
Allina Health Servs., 587 U.S. 566, 573 (2019) (quoting Perez, 575
U.S. 	at 	97). 	By 	contrast, 	the 	APA 	does 	not 	mandate 	notice 	and
comment 	for 	“interpretative 	rules, 	general 	statements 	of 	policy,
or 	rules 	of 	agency 	organization, 	procedure, 	or 	practice.” 	N.H.
Hosp. Ass’n, 887 F.3d at 70 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)).
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Defendants 	first 	argue 	that 	the 	Broadcast 	Message 	is 	not 	a
substantive rule because it was distributed only internally to ICE
personnel 	and 	itself 	states 	that 	it 	is 	not 	“a 	rule” 	and 	“does
not . . . create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law by any party.” Dkt. 30-7 at 3. But “courts have
long 	looked 	to 	the 	contents 	of 	the 	agency’s 	action, 	not 	the
agency’s 	self-serving 	label, 	when 	deciding 	whether 	statutory
notice-and-comment demands apply.” Azar, 587 U.S. at 575. So while
an 	agency’s 	disclaimer 	about 	the 	effects 	of 	its 	statement 	is
relevant to determining whether that statement amounts to a binding
substantive 	rule, 	such 	a 	disclaimer 	is 	not 	dispositive. 	See
Texas v. United States, 50 F.4th 498, 523 (5th Cir. 2022); Cement
Kiln 	Recycling 	Coal. 	v. 	EPA, 	493 	F.3d 	207, 	228 	(D.C. 	Cir. 	2007);
Appalachian 	Power 	Co. 	v. 	EPA, 	208 	F.3d 	1015, 	1022-23 	(D.C. 	Cir.
2000). Nor is the fact that the rule is memorialized in an internal
agency 	document. 	See, 	e.g., 	R.J. 	Reynolds 	Vapor 	Co. 	v. 	FDA, 	65
F.4th 182, 192-94 (5th Cir. 2023) (holding that an internal agency
memorandum 	created 	a 	substantive 	rule 	unlawfully 	enacted 	without
notice and comment); Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165,
168, 171-72 (7th Cir. 1996) (same).
Defendants 	also 	contend 	that 	the 	Broadcast 	Message 	merely
provides 	guidance 	on 	SEVP’s 	management 	of 	an 	internal 	database
and, 	thus, 	is 	a 	“rule[] 	of 	agency 	organization, 	procedure, 	or
practice” excepted from the notice-and-comment process. N.H. Hosp.
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Ass’n, 887 F.3d at 70 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)). This exception
covers 	“internal 	house-keeping 	measures 	organizing 	agency
activities.” Am. Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. NLRB, 57
F.4th 	1023, 	1034 	(D.C. 	Cir. 	2023) 	(“AFL-CIO”) 	(quoting 	Am. 	Hosp.
Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); see Salomon-
Guillen 	v. 	Garland, 	123 	F.4th 	709, 	714 	(4th 	Cir. 	2024). 	Courts
apply 	this 	exception 	if 	a 	rule 	is 	“primarily 	directed 	toward
improving 	the 	efficient 	and 	effective 	operations 	of 	an 	agency.”
AFL-CIO, 57 F.4th at 1034 (quoting Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002,
1023 	(D.C. 	Cir. 	2014)). 	“[T]he 	critical 	feature 	of 	a 	rule 	that”
fits into this “exception is that it covers agency actions that do
not 	themselves 	alter 	the 	rights 	or 	interests 	of 	parties.” 	Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting James V. Hurson Assocs., Inc. v.
Glickman, 	229 	F.3d 	227, 	280 	(D.C. 	Cir. 	2000)); 	see 	Gillette 	v.
Warden 	Golden 	Grove 	Adult 	Corr. 	Facility, 	109 	F.4th 	145, 	157 	(3d
Cir. 	2024); 	In 	re 	Chestek 	PLLC, 	92 	F.4th 	1105, 	1109 	(Fed. 	Cir.
2024). 	But 	for 	the 	reasons 	discussed 	above, 	the 	Court 	cannot
conclude at this stage that termination of a student’s SEVIS record
is an administrative act untethered to the student’s nonimmigrant
status. And if termination of a student’s SEVIS record does reflect
termination 	of 	the 	student’s 	nonimmigrant 	status, 	then 	the
Broadcast 	Message 	is 	not 	a 	rule 	of 	internal 	organization,
procedure, 	or 	practice 	because 	it 	covers 	actions 	that 	affect
students’ substantive rights.
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The 	question 	remains 	whether 	the 	Broadcast 	Message 	is 	a
substantive rule subject to the requirements of notice and comment
or 	either 	an 	“interpretative 	rule[]” 	or 	“general 	statement[] 	of
policy” exempt from those requirements. N.H. Hosp. Ass’n, 887 F.3d
at 70 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)). Defendants have not adequately
briefed these complex issues. Cf. id. (explaining that “the point
at 	which 	a 	rule 	crosses 	th[e] 	line” 	from 	being 	interpretative 	to
legislative 	“is 	a 	question 	‘enshrouded 	in 	considerable 	smog’”
(quoting La Casa Del Convaleciente, 965 F.2d at 1177)). The Court
therefore 	denies 	Defendants’ 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	Count 	IV 	and 	will
address the question of whether ICE had to promulgate the Broadcast
Message via notice and comment at the summary-judgment stage, when
it is hopefully better briefed.
C. 	Letters Regarding Visa Revocations (Count V)
Finally, 	Plaintiffs 	allege 	in 	Count 	V 	that 	DOS 	has 	an
arbitrary 	and 	capricious 	policy 	of 	sending 	letters 	and 	emails 	to
students 	whose 	visas 	were 	revoked 	with 	inaccurate 	information
about 	the 	consequences 	of 	the 	revocation. 	Defendants 	move 	to
dismiss this claim on the basis that the challenged policy is not
a final agency action reviewable under the APA. Applying the two-
pronged 	test 	for 	finality 	under 	the 	APA, 	see 	supra 	Section
II(A)(3), the Court agrees with Defendants.
The 	policy 	challenged 	in 	Count 	V 	is 	neither 	“the
‘consummation’ 	of 	the 	agency’s 	decisionmaking 	process” 	nor 	an
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action 	“from 	which 	‘legal 	consequences 	. 	. 	. 	flow.’” 	Harper, 	118
F.4th 	at 	116 	(quoting 	Bennett, 	520 	U.S. 	at 	178). 	There 	is 	little
doubt that DOS reached the end of its decisionmaking process when
it 	decided 	to 	revoke 	the 	visas 	based 	on 	the 	NCIC 	hits 	and 	that
this 	decision 	had 	legal 	consequences 	for 	the 	affected 	students.
The 	agency 	action 	at 	issue 	in 	this 	claim, 	however, 	is 	not 	DOS’s
alleged policy of revoking visas based on NCIC hits (which is the
subject 	of 	Count 	I) 	but, 	rather, 	its 	alleged 	policy 	of 	sending
inaccurate 	communications 	to 	the 	students 	whose 	visas 	were
revoked. Those communications “merely inform[ed]” the students of
DOS’s decision to revoke their visas. Sinclair Wyo. Refin. Co. v.
U.S. 	EPA, 	72 	F.4th 	1137, 	1144 	(10th 	Cir. 	2023) 	(alteration 	in
original) 	(quoting 	Cherry 	v. 	U.S. 	Dep’t 	of 	Agric., 	13 	F. 	App’x
886, 890 (10th Cir. 2001)). In other words, the visa revocations,
and not the communications, were the final agency action.
It 	is 	troubling 	that 	DOS’s 	communications 	implied 	that 	the
visa revocations stripped the students of lawful status, mentioned
consequences the students could face for remaining in the country,
and 	encouraged 	self-deportation. 	As 	discussed 	above, 	the
implication 	that 	a 	student 	loses 	lawful 	status 	when 	his 	or 	her
visa is revoked does not appear to accurately reflect the law. Cf.
Policy Guidance 1004-04 – Visa Revocations, supra, at 3 (explaining
that 	“while 	the 	nonimmigrant 	is 	in 	the 	United 	States 	and 	in
status,” 	a 	“[v]isa 	revocation 	is 	not, 	in 	itself, 	a 	cause 	for
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termination 	of 	the 	student’s 	SEVIS 	record”). 	But 	the
communications phrased the possible consequences as ones a student
“may” or “can” face, Dkt. 14 ¶ 49, indicating that the government
had 	not 	concluded 	its 	decisionmaking 	process 	as 	to 	the 	students’
legal status and whether any enforcement actions were appropriate.
See Holistic Candlers & Consumers Ass’n v. FDA, 664 F.3d 940, 944
(D.C. Cir. 2012).
Moreover, this aspect of the communications did not determine
rights 	or 	trigger 	legal 	consequences. 	This 	requirement 	for
finality 	is 	not 	satisfied 	when, 	as 	here, 	the 	“agency 	merely
expresses 	its 	view 	of 	what 	the 	law 	requires 	of 	a 	party, 	even 	if
that view is adverse to the party.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798, 808 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
see Advanced Integrative Med. Sci. Inst., PLLC v. Garland, 24 F.4th
1249, 	1259 	(9th 	Cir. 	2022). 	The 	communications 	“impose[d] 	no
obligations, 	prohibitions, 	or 	restrictions.” 	Valero, 	927 	F.3d 	at
536; 	see 	Holistic 	Candlers, 	664 	F.3d 	at 	944 	(reaching 	the 	same
conclusion 	even 	though 	the 	agency 	letter 	at 	issue 	said 	the
recipient 	“should 	take 	prompt 	action 	to 	correct” 	its 	conduct 	and
that 	not 	doing 	so 	“may 	result 	in 	regulatory 	action” 	(emphasis
omitted)). 	Should 	an 	affected 	student 	not 	self-deport 	after
receiving 	such 	a 	communication, 	he 	or 	she 	“would 	face 	liability
only 	for 	[any] 	noncompliance 	with 	the 	underlying 	statutory 	[and
regulatory] 	commands, 	not 	for 	disagreement 	with 	the 	agency’s
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determination” 	in 	the 	communication. 	Advanced 	Integrative, 	24
F.4th at 1259 (quoting Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586, 594 (9th Cir. 2008)).
While the Court readily understands why the affected students
would 	have 	been 	terrified 	upon 	receipt 	of 	these 	communications,
DOS’s policy of sending these letters is not a final agency action
subject 	to 	judicial 	review 	under 	the 	APA. 	The 	Court 	therefore
dismisses Count V.
ORDER
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	Defendants’ 	motion 	to 	dismiss
(Dkt. 29) is ALLOWED as to Count V and otherwise DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ PATTI B. SARIS__________
Hon. Patti B. Saris
United States District Judge
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