Korn v. Amazon.com, Inc.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:25-cv-10802-WGY Document54_ Filed 02/18/26 Page1of17

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

JUSTIN KORN, individually and on
behalf of himself and all others
Similarly situated,

)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff, )
)
Vv. ) CIVIL ACTION

) No. 25-10802-WGY
AMAZON.COM, INC., )
)
Defendant. )
)

YOUNG, D.J. February 18, 2026

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts generally prohibits the
use of lie detector tests as part of an application for

employment. See generally Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 19B (“the Lie

Detector Statute” or “Section 19B”). The Lie Detector Statute
also requires written notice to potential employees concerning
the use of such tests. Id. § 19B(2) (“the Notice Provision”).
In this removed action, the Plaintiff, Justin Korn
(“Korn”), brings a putative class action against Amazon.com,
Inc. (“Amazon”), claiming damages for Amazon’s failure to comply
with the Notice Provision as part of its application process and

administering a lie detector test. Amazon moves to dismiss the

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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complaint, arguing: (1) Korn was not administered a lie detector
test; (2) Korn is not a “person aggrieved” under the statute;
and (3) Section 19B does not permit a private cause of action
under the Notice Provision. For the reasons stated below, the
motion to dismiss, ECF No. 21, is hereby DENIED.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Procedural History

This putative class action was removed to this Court on
April 3, 2025. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. Korn filed an
amended complaint on June 23, 2025. First Am. Class Action
Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 17. On July 21, 2025, Amazon filed a
motion to dismiss the FAC, which is fully briefed. Def.’s Mot.
Dismiss Pl.’s FAC, ECF No. 21; Mem. Supp. Def’s. Mot. Dismiss
FAC (“Amazon’s Mem.”), ECF No. 22; Mem. Opp’n Def.’s Mot.
Dismiss FAC (“Korn’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 28; Decl. Julian Diamond
Supp. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss FAC, ECF No. 29; Reply Mem. Supp.
Def.’s Mot. Dismiss FAC (“Reply”), ECF No. 31. Amazon has filed
supplemental authority. See ECF Nos. 40, 50, and 53.

B. Facts Alleged

In the summer of 2024, Korn applied for three positions
with Amazon. FAC 7 8. Korn was not provided a notice of his
rights concerning lie detector tests under Section 19B, and he

was required to take a “Workstyle Assessment” that he

[2]

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characterizes as a lie detector test under Section 19B. Id. 4
8, 13-15, 20.

The Workstyle Assessment is alleged to fall within the
definition of a lie detector. Id. {@ 20. Amazon tells its
applicants that the “Workstyle Assessment is an Amazon-custom
assessment derived from [Amazon’s] Leadership Principles. Its
purpose is to guide hiring of people who are engaged, positive,
and have a sense of ownership over their work and events that
happen to them.” Id. @ 21 (footnote omitted). It “ask[s job
applicants] to choose the extent to which a statement represents
{their] work style.” Id. (footnote omitted).

Amazon also tells applicants:

We want to ensure that the assessment experience is

fair for everyone so, for test security purposes,

Amazon uses mechanisms to detect suspicious test

behavior and responses. If suspicious behavior is

detected (e.g., attempts to plagiarize, fabricate, or

use outside assistance), it will impact your current

and possibly future Amazon applications. Possible

responses include invalidating your assessment,

requiring additional assessments, ineligibility for
the current or future roles, and/or legal action.

Id. 4 22 (emphasis omitted). A list of questions is included in
the amended complaint:

- Most projects need a structured plan. / I like
planning, but often address problems as they come.

- I often choose predictability over the unknown. / I
adapt to change quickly.

- I’m about as reliable as everyone else on my team. /
I persist until a task is done.

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- My team relies on me to check for mistakes. / I’1l
occasionally make easy-to-fix mistakes.

- I prefer to focus on the task at hand rather than how
others feel about it. / I consider others’ feelings even
when it’s not necessary.

- I reflect on disappointments as much as others. / I
don’t dwell on my mistakes.

- I rarely miss deadlines. / It makes me feel good when
a plan works out.

- I usually take time to find out how others are
feeling. / Double-checking my work is built into my
process.

- I put failures behind me quickly. / I’m always looking
for new ways to do things.

- I’m known for getting work done. / A plan increases
efficiency.

- I don’t think much about other people’s feelings. /
Rechecking your work is a usually waste of time.

- It’s easy to bounce back from failure. / I’m energized
by change.

- I can always be trusted to fulfill my obligations. / I
usually make careful plans to avoid problems.

- I take a personal interest in others’ feelings. / I
usually double-check my work.

- Constant change is exhausting. / I sometimes focus too
much on past mistakes.

- I would never miss a deadline without a good reason. /
Making a detailed plan jumpstarts my momentum.

- I take time to better understand my coworkers. /
People should take more time reviewing their work.

- I’m often the first to try new things. / I focus more
on future possibilities than past problems.

- I always plan and prioritize my work tasks. / Meeting
commitments is a top priority.

- I sometimes notice if things are missing. / I can
sense when others are upset.

- I like surprises. / Usually I don’t dwell on the past.
- Typically, I am disciplined about getting work done. /
I usually create a plan before starting my work.

- Checking your work is important. / It’s important to
understand people’s emotions in order to help.

- I sometimes have a hard time putting failure behind
me. / Frequent changes are usually disruptive.

- I do my best, even on trivial tasks. / I produce my
best work when working from a detailed plan.

- It’s easy for me to recognize others’ feelings. /
Getting the details right is critical to making a point.

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- Setbacks are hard to manage. / New situations are
uncomfortable.

- I’m quick to list the steps to achieve a goal. / I
follow through on my obligations.

- I spot errors that others overlook. / I make an effort
to ask people how they are doing.

- I’m confident that I can handle any challenge. / I
adjust quickly to new settings.

- I persist through challenging tasks. / A good plan
makes any project go smoothly.

- I check my work for quality on highly visible
projects. / I cheer up my coworkers when they feel down.

- I occasionally like to try new approaches. / I recover
from setbacks about as quickly as others.

- I always prefer working from a plan. / I usually can
be counted on to get the job done.

- I sometimes check information I receive. / I try to
understand other people’s feelings and emotions.

- Setbacks usually don’t impact my effort. / Changing my
routine inspires me.

Id. 7 24. Korn claims that, “Amazon states that it ‘use[s]
online assessments as one way to help us get to know [job
applicants] better, and we design them to measure key
characteristics required for success ina role. .. . [W]Jork
style assessments .. . are centered around our peculiar culture
and Leadership Principles[.] [. . .] We want to get to know the
authentic you[.]’ In line with this, Amazon’s Leadership

Principles provide, inter alia, that: ‘Leaders . .. work

vigorously to earn and keep customer trust[;]’ and ‘Earn
Trust[.] [. . .-] Leaders . . . speak candidly[.]’” Id. @ 25
(footnote omitted).

On these same allegations, and additional class action

allegations, Korn seeks to bring a class action for those who

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applied for a Massachusetts-based position, and a subclass for
those who completed the assessment. Id. 4% 27-33. The first
amended complaint seeks declaratory, compensatory, and
injunctive relief and counts for unlawfully administering a lie
detector test and the failure ‘to advise Korn of his rights under
Massachusetts law. See count I (Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief), id. G21 34-37; count II (Violation of Mass. GEN. Laws ch.
149, § 19B(2) (administered lie detector)), id. If 38-45; count
III (Violation of Mass. Gren. Laws ch. 149 § 19B(2) (b) (Notice
Violation)), id. 41 46-50.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Standard of Review

“To assess whether a complaint can withstand a Rule
12(b) (6) motion, [the court] ‘must accept as true all well-
pleaded facts indulging all reasonable inferences in [the moving

party’s] favor.’” Lavigne v. Great Salt Bay Cmty. Sch. Bd., 146

F.4th 115, 123 (lst Cir. 2025) (quoting Fantini v. Salem State

Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 26 (lst Cir. 2009) (citation omitted)).
This liberal “pleading standard ‘requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

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B.

The Lie Detector Statute

The Court starts with the Lie Detector Statute, which

provides

in relevant parts:

Lie detector tests; use as condition of employment;

penalty;

(1)

(2)

(4)

civil action

As used in this section the term “lie detector test”
shall mean any test utilizing a polygraph or any other
device, mechanism, instrument or written examination,
which is operated, or the results of which are used or
interpreted by an examiner for the purpose of
purporting to assist in or enable the detection of
deception, the verification of truthfulness, or the
rendering of a diagnostic opinion regarding the
honesty of an individual.

It shall be unlawful for any employer or his agent,
with respect to any of his employees, or any person
applying to him for employment, including any person
applying for employment as a police officer, to
subject such person to, or request such person to take
a lie detector test within or without the
commonwealth, or to discharge, not hire, demote or
otherwise discriminate against such person for the
assertion of rights arising hereunder. This section
shall not apply to lie detector tests administered by
law enforcement agencies as may be otherwise permitted
in criminal investigations.

(b) All applications for employment within the
commonwealth shall contain the following notice which
shall be in clearly legible print:

“It is unlawful in Massachusetts to require or
administer a lie detector test as a condition of
employment or continued employment. An employer who
violates this law shall be subject to criminal
penalties and civil liability.”

°

Any person aggrieved by a violation of subsection (2)
may institute within three years of such violation and

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prosecute in his own name and on his own behalf, or
for himself and for other similarly situated, a civil
action for injunctive relief and any damages thereby
incurred, including treble damages for any loss of
wages or other benefits. The total awarded damages
shall equal or exceed a minimum of five hundred
dollars for each such violation. A person so aggrieved
and who prevails in such action shall be entitled to
an award of the costs of the litigation and reasonable
attorney fees.

Mass. GEN. Laws ch. 149 § 19B (emphasis added).

Cc. Korn Has Plausibly Pleaded that he was Administered a
Lie Detector Test under Section 19B

Though Amazon attempts to minimize its software’s purpose,
Korn has pleaded sufficient facts at the motion to dismiss stage
to fall within the definition of a lie detector test. Under
Section 19B(1):

.the term “lie detector test” shall mean any test

utilizing a polygraph or any other device, mechanism,

instrument or written examination, which is operated,

or the results of which are used or interpreted by an

examiner for the purpose of purporting to assist in or

enable the detection of deception, the verification of

truthfulness, or the rendering of a diagnostic opinion

regarding the honesty of an individual.
Id. § 19B(1) (emphasis added).

Amazon claims that: (1) the software is not for the purpose
of detecting deception, verifying truthfulness, or rendering an
opinion as to a person’s honesty; and (2) even if it could be

considered a lie detector test, there is no allegation that

Amazon actually used the assessment. Amazon Mem. at 4-7.

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As to the first argument, Amazon claims that the software
is a personality test, similar to the Minnesota Multiphasic

Personality Inventory at issue in Auguste v. G4S Secure

Solutions (USA), Inc., SUCV 14-3311-BLS1 (Mass. Sup. Ct. April

25, 2016) (Kaplan, J.), ECF 22-1. See Amazon’s Mem. 7; Reply at
4.
In Auguste, a prospective security guard completed an

online application with the defendant. Auguste, SUCV 14-3311-

BLS1 at 2. After an interview, he was granted employment
pending pre-employment screening. Id. Part of that screening
as an armed position was a psychological examination provided by
a third party. Id. at 3. Part of that evaluation was
completion of a modified version of the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory-2 (“MMPI-2”), along with an interview with
a psychologist. Id. The application did not include a lie
detector notice under Section 19B. Id. The plaintiff was
cleared for the position and began working. Id.

As a procedural matter, as Korn points out, the Auguste
decision relates to a motion for summary judgment -- a different
legal standard, and made upon a factual record after discovery.
See Korn’s Opp’n. at 3. As to the substance, taking all
inferences in favor of Korn, as this Court must, the first
amended complaint provides a description of the Amazon Workstyle

Assessment that plausibly pleads it is a lie detector test, not

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an MMPI-like tool. Id. at 2. In its reply, Amazon argues that
“[w])hether in the MMPI or a workplace-oriented personality test,
internal validation measures are not ‘used . . . for the purpose
of’ detecting lies and thus do not satisfy § 19B(1).” Reply at
4. Again, the allegations are sufficient to fall within the
broad definition of a lie detector test at least at the motion
to dismiss stage, taking all reasonable inferences in favor of
Korn.

As for the second argument, taking all inferences in favor
of the plaintiff, the first amended complaint does in fact
plausibly plead usage of the information. See Korn’s Opp’n 5

(citing FAC 9 4); FAC QI] 25-26. Cf. St. Cyr v. JPMorgan Chase

Bank, N.A., No. CV 25-11751-BEM, 2025 WL 2977935, at *3 (D.

Mass. Oct. 22, 2025) (Murphy, J.) (ruling allegations did not
support inference that HireVue was a lie detector based upon
allegations solely concerning HireVue’s representations of
possible uses by employers of the test itself).

The Court rules that Korn has plausibly pleaded that the
Workstyle Assessment is a lie detector test and alleged usage of
the information collected from the test under Section 19B.

B. Korn Is a “Person Aggrieved” under the Lie Detector
Statute

Korn has also pleaded plausibly facts supporting treating

him as a “person aggrieved” under Section 19B(4). The Court

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begins, as it must, with the statute. Specifically, Section
19B(4) provides that “[a]ny person aggrieved by a violation of
subsection (2) may institute [. . .] a civil action .. .” Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 19B(4) (emphasis added). Amazon argues that
Korn lacks statutory standing, and that under Massachusetts law,
to be a “person aggrieved” requires “substantial injury”, citing

Ginther v. Comm’r of Ins., 427 Mass. 319, 322 (1998); Harvard L.

Sch. Coal. for C.R. v. President & Fellows of Harv. Coll., 413

Mass. 66, 69 (1992); Board of Health of Sturbridge v. Board of

Health of Southbridge, 461 Mass. 548, 559 (2012); Boston Edison

Co. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 374 Mass. 37, 46 (1977). Amazon’s

Mem. 7-8. While these cases do address “substantial injury,”
none interpret the statute at issue.

In the absence of binding First Circuit or Massachusetts
authority, the Court looks to decisions from the Massachusetts
Superior Court -- in particular here, the Business Litigation

Session! of that court -- which has most recently consolidated a

1 ‘The Business Litigation Session of the Superior Court
(BLS) provides a forum for business and commercial disputes
which, because of their complexity, will benefit from
individualized and collaborative case management. The BLS
consists of two full time sessions committed to the timely and
efficient resolution of commercial disputes and other complex
cases.” See https://www.mass.gov/info-details/about-the-
superior-court-business-litigation-session; see also, Charles
Gallagher, 106 Mass. L. Rev. 16, 22 (2026) (reviewing the history
and structure of the BLS, and describing it as “a specialized,
efficient and sophisticated forum for resolving complex
commercial disputes”). The Court views the BLS consolidation of

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number of Notice Provision cases under Massachusetts law, and
ruled that a plaintiff is not a “person aggrieved” solely on a

notice violation because there is no injury. See Ababio v. Nike

Retail Servs., Inc., Mass. Sup. Ct. No. 2584CV01134-BLS-1 (Nov.

25, 2025) (Barry-Smith, J.) (order on four consolidated cases on
the Section 19B notice issue), ECF No. 40-2.2

The Ababio decision is well-reasoned and persuasive,
comparing the statutory language at issue to other statutes, and
concluding that plaintiffs in that case were not “persons
aggrieved” because the alleged notice harm without more is at

best “minimal or slightly appreciable,” and “speculative.” Id.

these matters as a concerted effort to provide a uniform
analysis of Massachusetts law as it applies to these types of
cases; cases that apparently flourish in the courts of the
Commonwealth. See Amazon’s Mem. 2, n.1 (collecting cases).

2 As described in that case:

By order dated April 30, 2025 (Krupp, J.), several
cases in the BLS-1 session seeking to enforce § 19B’s
statutory notice provision were grouped together for
consideration of common issues. Pursuant to that
order, the parties in several cases consolidated their
briefing with respect to the defendants’ motion to
dismiss based on standing. For those cases that did
not resolve following the April 30, 2025 order,
[Justice Barry-Smith] held a hearing on the
defendants’ motion[s] to dismiss, on September 30,
2025.

Ababio, No. 2584CV01134-BLS-1 Decision & Ord. at 4. The Ababio
Decision and Order also applies to: Qi Shi v. Bloomingdales,
LLC, Mass. Sup. Ct. No. 2584CV1138-BLS-1; Lamas v. Warby Parker,
Inc., Mass. Sup. Ct. No. 2584CV1164-BLS-1; and Alexandrovicz v.
Walmart, Inc., Mass. Sup. Ct. No. 2584CV1352-BLS-1.

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at 11. In particular, the court compared Section 19B to
relevant provisions of: (1) the Zoning Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
40A, § 17; (2) the Massachusetts Administrative Procedures Act,
Mass. GEN. Laws ch. 30A, § 14; (3) Employment Discrimination under
Mass. GEN. Laws ch. 151B, § 5; and (4) Appeals from Insurance
Commissioner Decisions under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 175, § 206D(f) (1).
Id. at 8-11. The court concluded that under Massachusetts law
there are five “criteria to qualify as a person aggrieved”:

¢ Plaintiff must suffer some infringement of their legal
rights;

* The asserted right or interest must be one the statute is
designed to protect — that is, within the statute’s zone of

concern,

* The harm alleged must be caused by the statutory
violation;

* The harm alleged must be more than minimal or slightly
appreciable; and

* The harm asserted must not be speculative.

Id. at 11.

The Ababio court ruled that while the first three criteria
had been shown, the “plaintiffs [could not] show that they
suffered a harm from defendants’ violation of the notice
provision that is more than minimal or slightly appreciable, or
a harm that is more than speculative,” and therefore “they [did]
not qualify as ‘persons aggrieved’ by a violation of the Lie

Detector Statute.” Id. at 13. Having failed in their burden by

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pleading only a notice violation, the actions were dismissed for
lack of statutory standing as “persons aggrieved” under
Massachusetts law. Id.

In a footnote, however, the Ababio court further explained
that the result would likely be different if the notice
violation was -- as here -- combined with the use of a lie
detector test. In that situation, according to that court, a
plaintiff is aggrieved and has two claims: one for lack of
notice and another for being administered a lie detector test:

A different conclusion is likely if a company violates
the Lie Detector Statute by using lie detectors and
failing to provide the required notice to applicants.
In those circumstances, it is easy to imagine how
violation of the notice provision could lead to
appreciable harm to an applicant. That person, having
not received the disclosure that employers cannot use
lie detector tests, might be exposed to a lie detector
test in violation of the statute, or worse, subject to
a negative employment consequence as a result of the
impermissible lie detector test. Had the person been
properly armed with knowledge of his rights due to the
statutory disclosure, the person presumably could
avoid being subject to the unlawful lie detector test.
In that manner, violation of the notice provision
would have caused an appreciable harm to employees or
unhired applicants to a company that impermissibly
used lie detector tests. This discussion likewise
highlights that the inclusion of “person aggrieved” in
subsection 4 does not render the civil claim for
statutory damages a dead letter when based upon a
violation of the notice provision. If a job applicant
does not receive the statutory notice concerning lie
detector tests, and then is subject to an unlawful lie
detector test, then that person’s lawsuit under §
19B(4) presumably could seek statutory damages for
each of the two violations of subsection 2: the use of
the lie detector test and the failure to provide the
required notice.

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Ababio, No. 2584CV01134-BLS-1, Decision & Ord. at 12 n. 2.

This Court agrees with Justice Barry-Smith’s thoughtful
analysis, adopts it, and applies it here. As posited in the
footnote 2 Ababio hypothetical, Korn is a “person aggrieved”
under Section 19B because he has sufficiently pleaded a notice
violation and a lie detector test administration. See
generally, FAC. Accordingly, Korn, as a “person aggrieved”
under the Lie Detector Statute, has statutory standing under
Massachusetts law.?3

Cc. Korn has a Private Right of Action to Enforce the

Notice Provision of the Statute in Concert with the
Lie Detector Test Administration Claim.

Korn has a private right of action to enforce the notice
provision of the statute. Korn starts with the statutory

language that: “Any person aggrieved by a violation of

3. This Court has an independent obligation to inquire into
its subject matter jurisdiction, including Article III standing.
See United States ex rel. Sargent v. Collins, 165 F.4th 102, 107
(lst Cir. 2026); Pagan v. Calderén, 448 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir.
2006). Korn has Article III standing because both a notice
violation and an administration of a lie detector test is
alleged. See Baker v. CVS Health Corp., 717 F. Supp. 3d 188,
192 (D. Mass. 2024) (Saris, J.) (Article III standing found
where no notice was given and administration of a lie detector
test was alleged); cf. Goldstone v. Deloitte Consulting LLP, No.
25-CV-11875-WGY, 2026 WL 296541 (D. Mass. Feb. 4, 2026)
(remanding case for lack of Article III standing); Crane v.
Cheesecake Factory Inc., No. 25-CV-11727-ADB, 2025 WL 4066478,
at *3 (D. Mass. Dec. 8, 2025) (appeal filed) (Burroughs, J.)
(same); Saint Cyr, 2025 WL 2977935, at *4 (D. Mass. Oct. 22,
2025) (appeal filed) (same).

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“ut

subsection (2) may institute . ..a civil action... MASS.
GEN. Laws ch. 149, § 19B(4); FAC @ 6. The pinch point is whether
Section 19B(2) includes subparagraphs (2) (a) and (2) (b).

Amazon argues that section 2 is different from
subparagrapghs 2(a) and 2(b). Amazon Mem. at 10-14. More
specifically, Amazon contends that subsection 2(b) was only
intended for government enforcement. Id. at 13-14. Indeed,
this is in accord with the Auguste court’s ruling that “[t]here
are two types of conduct that will violate § 19B: (i) to request
. . . a job applicant to submit to a lie detector test or (ii)
to discharge, not hire, demote or otherwise discriminate against
a person who refuses to take one.” Auguste, SUCV 14-3311-BLS1
at 14.

This argument, and the Auguste decision generally, was
wholly rejected by the Ababio court. There, the court ruled:

Defendants’ interpretation illogically requires,

without explanation, that [the court] ignore standard

convention with respect to the numbering and ordering

of statutory sections, subsections, and subparagraphs.

Subsection 4’s reference to subsection 2 necessarily
includes all of subsection 2, including its

subparagraphs 2(a) and 2(b). In Baker v. CVS Corp.,
the United States District Court reached the same
conclusion:

“[T]he Lie Detector Statute authorizes suit by
‘[a]Jny person aggrieved by a violation of
subsection (2),’ which includes the notice
requirement.”

717 F. Supp. 3d 188, 193 (D. Mass. 2024) [(quoting
Mass. Gen. Laws ch.149, § 19B(4))]. Moreover, there

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Case 1:25-cv-10802-WGY Document54_ Filed 02/18/26 Page17 of 17

is nothing inherently ambiguous, absurd, or
nonsensical about subsections (3) and (4) providing
criminal and civil remedies for the same scope of
conduct, but using different words to refer to the
prohibited conduct under the statute, where the
meaning of those words is straightforward. See Pyle
v. School Comm. of S. Hadley, 423 Mass. 283, 285
(1996) (“Where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative
intent.”).

Ababio, No. 2584CV01134-BLS-1, Decision. & Ord. at 6-7. This
Court, again, agrees with Justice Barry-Smith’s more recent
analysis of the Lie Detector Statute: under Massachusetts law,
there exists a private right of action for a Section 19B notice
violation, but likely concomitant with statutory standing if it
is brought, as here, in conjunction with a lie detector
administration claim that plausibly pleads injury.
III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court is persuaded by
the Superior Court’s analysis in Ababio, and therefore, Amazon’s
motion to dismiss, ECF No. 21, is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Yillion A Y
sad

of the
UNITED STATES4

4 This is how my predecessor, Peleg Sprague (D. Mass 1841-
1865), would sign official documents. Now that I’m a Senior
District Judge I adopt this format in honor of all the judicial
colleagues, state and federal, with whom I have had the
privilege to serve over the past 47 years.

[17]