Egypt House v. Kelley et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
_______________________________________
)
EGYPT HOUSE, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
) 	Civil Action No.
v. 	) 	25-10597-BEM
)
JOHN P. KELLEY, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
_______________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
MURPHY, J.
This action arises out of a dispute before the Massachusetts Appellate Tax Board
concerning Plaintiff Egypt House’s entitlement to tax abatement on religious grounds. Before the
Court are Defendants’ two motions to dismiss. Dkts. 120, 152. For the reasons set forth below,
Defendants’ motions will be granted.
I. 	Background
The Court need not explain in depth every step of this contentious litigation, which has
paid visits to state court, federal district and appellate courts, and the state tax board. The factual
and procedural background as relevant to the motions currently before the Court are set forth
below.
Plaintiff Egypt House sought an abatement of local property taxes under Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 59, § 5, on the ground that it was using its property for religious purposes. The Massachusetts
Appellate Tax Board (“ATB”), which hears and decides state and local tax appeals, issued an order
permitting an inspection of the property pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 58A, § 8A, which
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provides that, “[b]efore the hearing of a petition for the abatement of a tax upon real estate, . . . the
appellant shall permit the appellee personally or by attorneys, experts or other agents, to enter upon
such real estate or upon any premises where such personal property is situated and examine and
inspect such real estate or personal property, including any property which the appellant claims is
exempt from taxation.”
On March 13, 2025, shortly before the inspection was slated to take place, Plaintiff brought
suit against, among others, the Town of Marblehead (the “Town”); the Town Administrator;
individuals serving as counsel to the Town; the Board of Assessors for the Town (the “Board of
Assessors”); current and former members of the Board of Assessors; and the Chairman of the
ATB. 	Dkt. 110 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”). 	Subsequently, three Defendants conducted an
inspection of Egypt House, which included photography of the rooms, allegedly over the
objections of Egypt House clergy.1 Id. ¶¶ 57–58, 66–67, 69.
On October 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed its fourth amended complaint.2 	Compl. 	The
Complaint asserts seventeen counts: violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of rights under
the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments (Counts 1–7); municipal liability (Counts 8
and 9); violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of equal protection (Count
10); violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986 for neglect to prevent conspiracy (Count 11); violation of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (Count 12); violation of the Freedom
of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (Count 13); deprivation of rights under Part I, articles
1 The three Defendants were John P. Kelley, Todd Laramie, and Matthew D. Provencher.
2 The Court dismissed the initial complaint for failing to meet the fundamental pleading requirements of
Rule 8. Dkt. 95. After the Court accepted Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, Dkt. 96, and subsequent corrected
version, Dkt. 99, Plaintiff improperly filed a third amended complaint, Dkt. 103, in violation of Rule 15(a)(1), which
the Court struck from the record, Dkts. 104. 	In permitting this fourth amended complaint, Dkt. 110, the Court
cautioned that Plaintiff’s repeated failures to comply with this Court’s filing procedures and orders would result in
dismissal, Dkt. 109.
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II and III of the Massachusetts Constitution (Counts 14 and 15); impairment of civil rights under
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11I (Count 16); and defamation per se (Count 17).
On October 28, 2025, Defendants Adam J. Costa, Lisa L. Mead, and Matthew D.
Provencher (together, “Attorney Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss. 	Dkt. 120. 	On
December 11, 2025, Karen Bertolino, Board of Assessors for the Town, John P. Kelley, Thatcher
W. Kezer, III, Todd Laramie, Jonathan Lederman, Douglas E. Percy, Town of Marblehead,
Michael Tumulty, William J. Willis (together, “Town Defendants”) filed their own motion to
dismiss. Dkt. 152. A hearing was held on February 5, 2026, and the Court took the motions under
advisement.
II. 	Discussion
A. 	Tax Injunction Act
As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Tax
Injunction Act of 1937 (“TIA”), which directs that “district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or
restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”3 28 U.S.C. § 1341; see also Bank of New
Eng. Old Colony, N.A. v. Clark, 986 F.2d 600, 602 (1st Cir. 1993) (The TIA “is jurisdictional in
nature, and therefore serves to oust the federal courts of jurisdiction in those cases which fall within
its reach.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
“Since the passage of § 1983, [in 1871,] Congress and this Court repeatedly have shown
an aversion to federal interference with state tax administration. The passage of the [TIA] in 1937
is one manifestation of this aversion.” Nat’l Priv. Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515
3 “For purposes of the TIA, state taxation includes local taxation.” Peckham v. Bd. of Selectmen, 2017 WL
2937933, at *5 (D. Mass. Mar. 23, 2017) (citing Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 100 n.1 (2004)).
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U.S. 582, 586 (1995); see also Medina v. Planned Parenthood S. Atl., 606 U.S. 357, 365 (2025).
The TIA is “first and foremost a vehicle to limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction to
interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of taxes.” Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat.
Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 522 (1981). As the Supreme Court observed, “property tax is by far the most
important source of tax revenue for cities and counties” and “[w]e may readily appreciate the
difficulties encountered by the county should a substantial portion of its rightful tax revenue be
tied up in injunction actions.” 	Id. at 527–28; see also Peckham v. Bd. of Selectmen, 2017 WL
2937933, at *5 (D. Mass. Mar. 23, 2017) (explaining that the TIA applies to actions seeking
injunctive, declaratory, or monetary relief (citing Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n, Inc. v.
McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 103, 113 (1981))). It bears noting that the TIA “divests the district court
not only of jurisdiction to issue an injunction enjoining state officials, but also of jurisdiction to
take actions that ‘suspend or restrain’ the assessment and collection of state taxes.” California v.
Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408 (1982) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1341).
In enacting the TIA, “Congress was thinking of cases where taxpayers were repeatedly
using the federal courts to raise questions of state or federal law going to the validity of the
particular taxes imposed upon them.” Wells v. Malloy, 510 F.2d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1975); see also
Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 107 (2004) (providing that the TIA applies in “cases in which state
taxpayers seek federal-court orders enabling them to avoid paying state taxes”). 	Accordingly,
federal courts regularly find that they lack jurisdiction over claims related to the assessment, levy,
and 	collection 	of 	taxes, 	even 	when 	plaintiffs 	raise 	broader 	constitutional 	claims 	about
discrimination. 	In Tomaiolo v. Transamerica Corp., for example, the court found it had no
jurisdiction over a section 1983 suit by property owners who paid property taxes through third
parties and alleged that state law requiring those third parties to make annual, rather than quarterly,
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tax payments violated property owners’ equal protection and due process rights. 131 F. Supp. 2d
280 (D.R.I. 2011), aff’d as modified, Tomaiolo v. Mallinoff, 281 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2022). The court
was unpersuaded by the property owners’ arguments that the TIA did not apply because “they
[we]re challenging not the property tax itself, but the Town Defendants’ improper conduct” or
because “they [we]re not challenging [the state law], but seeking the protection offered by that law
from defendants’ unconstitutional behavior.” Id. at 289–90. The Tomaiolo court concluded that
the property owners were, in fact, “challenging the constitutionality of a local tax system,” which
was barred by the TIA. Id. at 290; see also Marshall v. Town of Middlefield, 2008 WL 5157753,
at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 5, 2008) (court lacked jurisdiction where parties disputed whether Appellant
had paid a prior motor vehicle property tax bill notwithstanding the plaintiff’s “attempts to
characterize his claims as a challenge to the unequal and malicious treatment he received by
Middlefield officials and not as a challenge to the tax itself”), aff’d, 360 F. App’x 227 (2d Cir.
2010); id. (“Basing a complaint upon alleged violation of civil rights, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 or of the Federal Constitution will not avoid the prohibition contained in [the
TIA].”).
On the other hand, claims that do not implicate the assessment, levy, and collection of taxes
are not barred by the TIA, even when they concern state tax law. 	See, e.g., Hibbs, 542 U.S. at
108–11 (holding that the TIA does not bar suit by Arizona taxpayers challenging tax credit for
contributions to parochial schools on Establishment Clause grounds because, if successful, the
result would be the collection of additional taxes); Wells, 510 F.2d at 77 (holding that the TIA did
not bar action to enjoin enforcement of Vermont statute suspending the right to operate a motor
vehicle for people in default of payment of tax because this statute could only produce tax
payments “indirectly through a more general use of coercive power” and therefore did not
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constitute tax “collection”). In short, the Court may not consider claims that challenge how state
and local governments assess and collect taxes—even those that raise constitutional challenges—
but the Court may consider claims the resolution of which would only indirectly implicate the
collection or payment of taxes.
The following claims, clothed though they are in claims of religious discrimination and
civil rights violations, take issue with the processes by which Town Defendants assessed and levied
taxes against Plaintiff and seek federal court interference therein, and thus are barred by the TIA:
Counts 1 and 2. 	Plaintiff’s first two claims allege section 1983 violations of the First
Amendment. 	At bottom, however, the claims challenge the denial of a religious tax exemption
under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 59, § 5, and the procedures used to conduct the statutorily authorized
inspection. 	See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 77 (“Defendants violated the Free Exercise Clause by denying
[Plaintiff]’s tax exemption based on its Orthodox Catholic religious character while granting
exemptions to other religious organizations.”); id. ¶ 78 (“[Plaintiff] qualified for Commonwealth
of Massachusetts tax exemptions under any or all of M.G.L. c. 59, § 5, Clauses Tenth and
Eleventh.”); id. ¶ 80 (“There is no basis at all for Defendants’ denial of the requested exemptions
and Defendants have provided no reason for their denials.”); id. ¶ 81 (“Defendants do not have
written criteria for their review of tax exemption requests.”); id. ¶ 83 (“Defendants violated the
Free 	Exercise 	Clause 	by 	forcing 	photography 	[during 	the 	inspection] 	that 	constitutes
desecration.”); id. ¶ 87 (“Defendants treated other similarly situated religious organizations
differently from [Plaintiff] when they granted their tax exemptions while denying the same benefits
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to [Plaintiff].”); id. ¶ 88 (“The attempts by Defendants Provencher and Costa to compel disclosure
of confessional communications constitutes an egregious establishment clause violation.”).4
Count 3. 	Plaintiff brings a section 1983 claim alleging that Town Defendants violated
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy “by conducting an unreasonable search that
exceeded the scope of lawful tax assessment inspection.” Id. ¶ 90. Like Counts 1 and 2, this claim
centers on the process by which state officers evaluated Plaintiff’s eligibility for a tax abatement.
Count 4. Plaintiff brings a section 1983 claim alleging that Town “Defendants effectuated
a taking by depriving [Plaintiff] of its rightful exemption while granting exemptions to similarly
situated properties.” 	Id. ¶ 94. 	Plaintiff may not clothe a claim about the denial of a state tax
exemption in Fifth Amendment taking language to sidestep the TIA bar.
Count 5. Plaintiff brings a section 1983 claim alleging that Town “Defendants grant tax
exemptions to religious organizations operating commercial enterprises within exempt structures,
while denying exemptions to [Plaintiff] based solely on its Orthodox Catholic religious character,”
thereby violating Plaintiff’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. ¶ 101. Like Counts 1
and 2, discussed above, this claim impermissibly challenges the denial of a religious tax
exemption.
Count 6. 	Plaintiff brings a section 1983 claim alleging that Town Defendants violated
Plaintiff’s right to procedural due process. 	Id. ¶ 109. 	Plaintiff again takes issue with the
procedures by which Town Defendants evaluate applicants for tax exemptions on religious
grounds, alleging that “Defendants’ determinations were made without any meaningful process
whatsoever; determinations were made on a discretionary basis without any reference to any
4 The allegations in paragraphs 83 and 88 of the Complaint were later disclaimed and resulted in Plaintiffs’
motion for emergency relief, Dkt. 115, being stricken from the record, Dkt. 129, and the imposition of attorney fees
against Plaintiffs, Dkt. 144.
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objective criteria; in this instance, determinations were made solely based upon [Plaintiff’s]
disfavored religious affiliation.” Id. ¶ 110. Such claims are barred by the TIA.
Counts 8 and 9. Plaintiff alleges violations of section 1983 under a theory of municipal
liability because the Board of Assessors’ “decisions to deny [Plaintiff’s] exemption while granting
others’ represents official municipal policy.” Id. ¶ 119. Plaintiff points, specifically, to the Town’s
practices related to inspecting Plaintiff’s premises and the Town’s “refus[al] to follow the practice
of other Massachusetts municipalities that accommodate identical religious restrictions.” 	Id.
¶ 120. Plaintiff argues alternatively that liability is established through a “pattern and practice of
Defendants in coordinating the systematic violation of Plaintiff’s rights to practice its faith in
accordance with its beliefs.” Id. ¶ 122. These, too, are barred by the TIA because they challenge
the denial of the tax abatement and the associated procedures and practices.
Counts 14 and 15. Plaintiff alleges in Count 14 that Defendants’ “refus[al] to recognize
the religious organization exemption from taxation” “impaired [Plaintiff] from serving its religious
purpose” in violation of Part I, article II of the Massachusetts Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 159–60. Plaintiff
likewise alleges in Count 15 that Defendants coerced Plaintiff into desecrating its chapel during
the statutorily authorized inspection and favored other religions over Orthodox Catholicism, in
violation of Part I, article III of the Massachusetts Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 164–65. These claims are
barred for substantially the same reasons as Counts 1 and 2.
Count 16. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Provencher and Costa took actions to “compel
disclosure of confessional communications [which] constitutes threats and intimidation designed
to chill religious exercise” in violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. Id. ¶ 169; see Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11I. 	Any information Defendants sought was, again, part of Defendants’
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statutorily authorized efforts to inspect Plaintiff’s property and determine eligibility for a tax
abatement.5
At bottom, Plaintiff, who proactively sought a tax abatement on religious grounds under
state law, takes issue with the procedures used to determine eligibility and the outcome of that
application. Adjudicating any one of these claims would require that this Court weigh in on the
scope and propriety of procedures used by municipal actors to evaluate eligibility for state tax
exemptions. Were Plaintiff to prevail, this Court would necessarily be forced to “take actions that
suspend or restrain the assessment and collection of state taxes,” which runs squarely in the face
of the TIA. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 408 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Finally, this Court has no reason to doubt that a “speedy and efficient remedy” is available
in Massachusetts courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Indeed, ATB rulings are subject to appellate review
by the Massachusetts Appeals Court and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 58A, § 13. Accordingly, the TIA bars this Court from exercising jurisdiction over Counts
1–6, 8, 9, and 14–16.6
B. 	Failure to State a Claim
For 	the 	remaining 	claims, 	this 	Court 	must 	determine 	whether 	Plaintiff’s 	factual
allegations—disregarding all “conclusory” statements—“state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “The inquiry
is usually limited to the facts alleged in the complaint, incorporated into the complaint, or
5 Moreover, the Court struck Plaintiff’s ex parte emergency motion seeking to, inter alia, “prevent Defendants
from compelling disclosure of the names of worshippers, pilgrims, and penitents,” Dkt. 115, because of “material
misrepresentations to the Court,” Dkt. 129 at 1. Namely “as it turns out, Defendants simply did not . . . seek a list of
those who worshipped at the site, much less a list of those who sought confession.” Id. at 2.
6 Even were these claims not barred by the TIA, they are barred by principles of comity because they
challenge the validity of a local tax system in federal court. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n, Inc. v. McNary,
454 U.S. 100, 115–16 (1981).
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susceptible to judicial notice,” Whelden v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 494 F. Supp. 3d 68, 73 (D. Mass.
2020) (citing In re Colonial Mortg. Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 2003)), “but the court
may also consider other documents the authenticity of which is not disputed by the parties,
documents central to the plaintiff’s claim, and documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint,”
id. (citing Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993)).
Count 7. 	Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s substantive due process
rights. 	Compl. ¶¶ 111–16. 	“[C]onscious-shocking conduct is an indispensable element” when
making a claim under substantive due process, which “functions to protect individuals from
particularly offensive actions on the part of government officials.” Pagan v. Calderon, 448 F.3d
16, 32 (1st Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “In order to shock the conscience, conduct must at the
very least be extreme and egregious, or, put another way, truly outrageous, uncivilized, and
intolerable.” Id. (cleaned up). Even assuming Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants used state
power to discriminate against Plaintiff on religious grounds are true, Compl. ¶¶ 115–16,
“[s]ubstantive due process is an inappropriate avenue of relief when the governmental conduct at
issue is covered by a specific constitutional provision.” Pagan, 448 F.3d at 33.
Counts 10 and 11. Plaintiff alleges that a subset of Defendants engaged in a conspiracy in
violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. 	Compl. ¶¶ 124–31. 	A claim for conspiracy under
section 1985 requires “plausibly alleg[ing] facts indicating an agreement among the conspirators
to deprive the plaintiff of [its] civil rights.” 	Parker v. Landry, 935 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2019).
“Vague and conclusory allegations about persons working together, with scant specifics as to the
nature of their joint effort or the formation of their agreement, will not suffice to defeat a motion
to dismiss.” Alston v. Spiegel, 988 F.3d 564, 578 (1st Cir. 2021). Plaintiff’s allegations that certain
Defendants 	were 	in 	“consistent 	communication 	during 	the 	period 	at 	issue 	and 	worked
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cooperatively to discriminate against [Plaintiff],” Compl. ¶ 126, are precisely the kind of vague
and conclusory allegations that cannot survive. 	Because a viable section 1985 claim is a
prerequisite to a section 1986 claim, Plaintiff’s section 1986 claim (Count 11) must also be
dismissed. See Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 470 (1st Cir. 1975).
Count 12. Plaintiff next alleges a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), which “prohibits local governments from ‘impos[ing] or
implement[ing] a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious
exercise 	of 	a 	person, 	including 	a 	religious 	assembly 	or 	institution,’ 	outside 	of 	narrow
circumstances.” 	St. Paul’s Found. v. Ives, 29 F.4th 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc(a)(1)). Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants substantially burdened Egypt House’s religious
exercise through the individualized assessment and collection of real estate taxes on Egypt House,
as well as by publicly creating negative associations about the Orthodox Catholic faith through
official press releases and malicious behavior by its elected officials, employees, and volunteers,”
Compl. ¶ 136.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants imposed any land use
regulation. 	See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5) (defining “land use regulation” as “a zoning or
landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or
development of land (including a structure affixed to land)”). An assessment for a tax exemption
does not dictate the permissible use of the land; it is merely a determination of how the land is
already being used.7 See St. Paul’s Found. v. Baldacci, 540 F. Supp. 3d 147, 152–53 (D. Mass.
7 In opposing Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he claims challenge conditions imposed
during the assessment, not the assessment itself.” 	Dkt. 171 at 13. 	But “conditions imposed during the [tax]
assessment” are not a regulation at all and are even further removed from “a zoning or landmarking law” under
RLUIPA. Moreover, a challenge to the conditions of the tax assessment would run afoul of the TIA. See supra
Section II.A.
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2021) (“Courts that have addressed the issue generally hold that a ‘government agency implements
a “land use regulation” only when it acts pursuant to a “zoning or landmarking law” that limits the
manner in which a claimant may develop or use property in which the claimant has an interest.’”
(citations omitted)) (collecting cases), aff’d on other grounds sub nom., St. Paul’s Found. v. Ives,
29 F.4th 32 (1st Cir. 2022). 8 But even if the Court were to consider either the assessment or the
tax exemption a land use regulation, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations—that Town Defendants’
denial of the tax exemption and creation of “negative public associations” “threatens the continued
existence of Egypt House,” Compl. ¶ 136–37—fail to demonstrate a substantial burden. See Signs
for Jesus v. Town of Pembroke, NH, 977 F.3d 93, 111 (1st Cir. 2020) (discussing factors relevant
to “whether a particular regulation imposes a substantial burden”); C.L. for Urb. Believers v. City
of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[The challenged provisions] do not render
impracticable the use of real property . . . for religious exercise . . . That [plaintiffs] expended
8 Plaintiff also references RLUIPA’s anti-discrimination provision, Compl. ¶ 135, alleging that “Defendants
discriminated against Egypt House by subjecting it to taxation while allowing denominationally favored churches
absolute exemption,” id. ¶ 138. In its opposition, however, Plaintiff only defends its allegations as to substantial
burden. Dkt. 171 at 12–13. Regardless, the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a violation of this
provision for the same reasons as the substantial burden provision: Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants imposed
any land use regulation. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc(b)(2) (“No government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation that discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination.”).
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges as part of its RLUIPA claim that “Defendants Board of Assessors . . . refuse to
change the use designation [from the Massachusetts State Building Code] to reflect the correct use and occupancy
because of Egypt House’s disfavored religious affiliation.” Compl. ¶ 146. But this provision of the building code
does not constitute a “land use regulation,” and Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants’ actions related to the building
code sought to limit Plaintiff’s religious exercise in any way. See id. ¶¶ 146–47; Baldacci, 540 F. Supp. 3d at 153–54
(“[Plaintiff] has not alleged sufficient facts to suggest that the Town functionally utilized its building permit process,
or the interim code review imposed by [defendant], to make its zoning decisions or that the process was disingenuously
used to limit or prohibit [plaintiff] from using the Property as intended.”).
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considerable time and money so to do does not entitle them to relief under RLUIPA’s substantial
burden provision.”).9
Count 13. 	Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
(“FACE”) Act. As relevant here, the FACE Act prohibits use of “force or threat of force or . . .
physical obstruction” intended to “injure[], intimidate[], or interfere[] with” the exercise of “First
Amendment right of religious freedom at a place of religious worship.” 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(2).
The statute specifically defines “intimidate” as “placing a person in reasonable apprehension of
bodily harm to him- or herself or to another.” Id. § 248(e)(3). Plaintiff contends that Defendants’
“refus[al] to discuss necessary procedural guidelines in connection with Defendants’ . . . site
inspection that would have enabled the inspection to be narrowly tailored to respect the
requirements of Orthodox Catholic canon law” constitutes “force and intimidation” and that
“Defendants use[d] force and intimidation to interfere with religious exercise at Egypt House by
threatening property seizure, unless Egypt House submitted to religious desecration.” 	Compl.
¶¶ 151–52. 	But the alleged misconduct—namely, “forced photography” and “inspection of
consecrated space,” id. ¶¶ 156–57—falls far short of the statutory requirements. Because Plaintiff
has failed to allege that Defendants attempted to “interfere with” Egypt House’s religious freedom
“by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction,” Count 13 is dismissed.
9 Neither requiring a tax assessment to receive a tax exemption nor denying said tax exemption for failing to
allow the assessment can be said to “substantially burden” Plaintiff’s religious exercises. See Roman Cath. Bishop of
Springfield v. City of Springfield, 724 F.3d 78, 99 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[T]he mere existence of some expenses does not
put ‘substantial pressure on [the religious institution] to modify its behavior’” (quoting Bethel World Outreach
Ministries v. Montgomery Cnty. Council, 706 F.3d 548, 556 (4th Cir. 2013))); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of
Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (“‘[S]ubstantial burden’ requires something more than an incidental
effect on religious exercise.”); Stuart Circle Parish v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Richmond, 946 F. Supp. 1225, 1237
(E.D. Va. 1996) (“It is well established that there is no substantial burden placed on an individual’s free exercise of
religion where a law or policy merely ‘operates so as to make the practice of [the individual’s] religious beliefs more
expensive.’” (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961) (plurality opinion))).
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Count 17. 	Plaintiff brings a claim for defamation per se, which requires demonstrating
“(1) that the defendant published a false statement about him to a third party and (2) that the false
statement either caused the plaintiff economic loss or was of the type that is actionable without
proof of economic loss.” R.I. Seekonk Holdings, LLC v. Hines, 425 F. Supp. 3d 37, 47 (D. Mass.
2019) (cleaned up). “Of relevance here is the principle that a statement normally is not actionable
unless it contains an objectively verifiable assertion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Doe v. Stonehill Coll., Inc., 55 F.4th 302, 339 (1st Cir. 2022). 	Here, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Tumulty called Father Andrew “Friar Tumma Tumulty” and a “fake monk,” Compl. ¶¶
70–71, neither of which “contains an objectively verifiable assertion,” R.I. Seekonk, 425 F. Supp.
3d at 47; see also Van Liew v. Eliopoulos, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 114, 120 (2017) (“If a challenged
statement is plainly an opinion or subjective view, rather than a statement of fact, it is not
actionable as a matter of law.”). Count 17 must therefore be dismissed.
III. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED.
So Ordered.
/s/ Brian E. Murphy
Brian E. Murphy
Dated: April 3, 2026 	Judge, United States District Court
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