Pressman v. SN Servicing Corporation et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
_______________________________________
)
LISA JO PRESSMAN, individually and as 	)
Trustee of the Red Rock Realty Trust, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
) 	Civil Action No.
v. 	) 	24-12885-FDS
)
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 	)
as Trustee of the Dwelling Series IV Trust, 	)
and SN SERVICING CORPORATION, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
_______________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTION TO INTERVENE AND
DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SAYLOR, J.
This is an action challenging the validity of a foreclosure proceeding. Plaintiff Lisa Jo
Pressman seeks to set aside the foreclosure and sale of her property at 30 Red Rock Street, Lynn,
Massachusetts. She is proceeding pro se. Defendants SN Servicing Corporation and U.S. Bank
National Association, as Trustee of the Dwelling Series IV Trust, are the loan servicer and
mortgagee, respectively. AlboHomeImp, LLC, the purchaser of the subject property, has moved
to intervene.
The amended complaint asserts claims for breach of contract; promissory estoppel;
negligent misrepresentation; breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing;
wrongful foreclosure; violation of the Massachusetts consumer protection statute, Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 93A; and violation of due process. Before the Court are defendants’ motion for
summary judgment as to all counts, AlboHomeImp’s motion to intervene, and AlboHomeImp’s
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motion for summary judgment as to wrongful foreclosure. For the following reasons, the
motions will be granted.
I. 	Background
A. 	Factual Background
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
Lisa Pressman’s mother, Barbara Pressman, owned a home at 30 Red Rock Street in
Lynn, Massachusetts. On May 19, 2010, she executed a Home Equity Line of Credit agreement
for $100,000 with Sovereign Bank. (Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A, Dkt. No. 31-1). That loan was
secured by a mortgage on 30 Red Rock Street. (Id. Ex. B, Dkt. No. 31-2). The mortgage was
recorded on June 7, 2010, in Essex County in book 29512, page 280. (Id.). In February 2011,
Barbara Pressman transferred the property to herself as Trustee of Red Rock Realty Trust. (Id.
Ex. C, Dkt. No. 31-3). In early 2012, Barbara Pressman passed away. (Id. Ex. D, Dkt. No. 31-
4).
After her mother’s death, Lisa Pressman became the sole beneficiary of Red Rock Realty
Trust and appointed herself trustee. (Id. Ex. E, Dkt. No. 31-5). On January 5, 2018, she entered
into an assumption and modification agreement with Santander Bank, the successor to Sovereign
Bank. (Id. Ex. F, Dkt. No. 31-6). She “expressly assume[d] the Mortgage and Note” originally
taken out by Barbara Pressman subject to certain modifications. (Id. at 2). At that point, the loan
was in default with an outstanding balance of more than $125,000. (Id. at 3-4). She agreed to a
modified principal balance of $125,057.87 and a loan repayment schedule. (Id. at 4). That
assumption and modification agreement was then recorded. (Id.). By January 12, 2018, Barbara
Pressman’s account with Santander showed no balance due. (Opp’n Ex. C, Dkt. No. 45).
On December 12, 2019, SN Servicing Corporation took over servicing Lisa Pressman’s
note and mortgage. (Fogleman Aff. ¶ 12, Dkt. No. 31; Mot. Summ. J. Ex. G, Dkt. No. 31-7). In
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November 2022, SN Servicing took out force-placed insurance on 30 Red Rock Street.
(Fogleman Aff. ¶ 25). According to defendants, the cost of that insurance was never included in
Pressman’s monthly payments. (Id. ¶ 26).
Meanwhile, in February 2020, Santander assigned the mortgage encumbering 30 Red
Rock Street to U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee of Lodge Series IV Trust (“Lodge”).
(Mot. Summ. J. Ex. I, Dkt. No. 31-9). That assignment conveyed the “Mortgage having been
given to secure payment of $100,000.00, (Original Principal Amount) which Mortgage is of
record in Book, Volume, or Liber No. 29512, at page 280 . . . of the records of Essex County,
State of MA, together with the note(s) and obligations therein described and the money due.”
(Id.). In February 2022, Lodge assigned the mortgage to U.S. Bank Trust Association as Trustee
of the Dwelling Series IV Trust (“U.S. Bank”). (Id. Ex. K, Dkt. No. 31-11). It also conveyed the
mortgage with an original loan amount of $100,000 recorded in Essex County in book 29512,
page 280. (Id.). Neither assignment mentioned Lisa Pressman or her mortgage modification.
(Id. Ex. I, Ex. K). Both assignments were recorded. (Id. Ex. I, Ex. K).
The record suggests that Pressman has been delinquent since at least March 2019. It
appears that she has not made her monthly loan payment of $1,005.37, in full or in part, since
then. (Opp’n Ex. H, Dkt. No. 45). Pressman has not presented any evidence to the contrary.
Although the record is not clear, it appears that in 2021 SN Servicing began a foreclosure
process on 30 Red Rock Street. Sometime in 2022, Lisa Pressman applied for Homeowner
Assistance Fund (“HAF”) relief. HAF was created by Congress to mitigate financial hardship
associated with the coronavirus pandemic, and SN Servicing had entered into a collaboration
agreement with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to facilitate the distribution of those funds.
(Mot. Summ. J. Ex. J, Dkt. No. 31-10).
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The parties dispute what happened next. According to Pressman, her application was
delayed because SN Servicing did not timely provide HAF reinstatement figures. (Opp’n Ex. G,
Dkt. No. 45). SN Servicing contends that HAF never requested reinstatement figures.
(Fogleman Aff. ¶ 28). Nonetheless, SN Servicing provided the reinstatement figures to HAF in
January 2023 and updated figures in May 2023. (Id. ¶¶ 30-32). It is undisputed that by May
2023, HAF had informed Pressman that it could not provide financial assistance until she paid
her pre-2020 balance of $10,945. (SOF ¶ 28, Dkt. No. 30).
Pressman then applied for Residential Assistance for Families (“RAFT”) funds.1 On
September 11, 2023, RAFT informed Pressman that it would cover up to $7,000 of her pre-2020
arrears, leaving a balance of approximately $4,000. (SOF ¶ 31). Pressman never received those
funds. She alleges that SN Servicing and U.S. Bank ignored requests from RAFT to confirm the
availability of HAF funding and the remaining balance. (Am. Compl. ¶ 25, Dkt. No. 25). Those
allegations, however, are not supported by the evidence. For its part, SN Servicing contends that
it was never contacted by RAFT. (Fogleman Aff. ¶ 33).
In July 2024, defendant U.S. Bank submitted a mortgagee’s affidavit with the
Massachusetts land court alleging that Pressman had been given notice to cure default in
compliance with Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 244, § 35A. (Mot. Summ. J. Ex. M, Dkt. No. 31-13). On
September 20, 2024, U.S. Bank sent to Pressman by certified mail a notice of foreclosure
informing her that a foreclosure auction was scheduled for October 30, 2024. (Id. Ex. N, Dkt.
No. 31-14).
1 RAFT is a Massachusetts-run program that “provides short-term emergency funding to help . . . with
eviction, foreclosure, loss of utilities, and other housing emergencies.” M ASS. GOV, Apply for RAFT (Emergency
Help for Housing Costs), https://www.mass.gov/how-to/apply-for-raft-emergency-help-for-housing-costs
[https://perma.cc/5N2W-FWB5].
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On October 28, 2024, Pressman sought a temporary restraining order in state court to
prevent the foreclosure sale. (State Ct. R., Dkt. No. 8). U.S. Bank then postponed the auction to
December 10, 2024. (Mot. Summ. J. Ex. O, Dkt. No. 31-15). It sent plaintiff a notice of the
postponement by first-class mail. (Id.).
On December 10, 2024, 30 Red Rock Street was sold at auction to AlboHomeImp, LLC.
(Id. Ex. Q, Dkt. No. 31-17).
B. 	Procedural History
On October 28, 2024, plaintiff filed a complaint in state court. (State Ct. R.). She sought
a preliminary injunction to prevent the foreclosure of 30 Red Rock Street. (Id.). Defendants
removed the case to this court on November 20, 2024, and opposed plaintiff’s motion for
preliminary relief. (Dkt. No. 9). On December 10, 2024, this court denied plaintiff’s motion.
(Dkt. No. 12).
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on March 19, 2025. (Dkt. No. 20). That complaint
asserts claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful foreclosure, violation of Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and violation of due process. The parties then conducted discovery. On
June 25, 2025, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts. (Dkt. No. 29).
On August 19, 2025, AlboHomeImp, LLC moved to intervene as of right or, in the
alternative, permissively. (Dkt. No. 39). While that motion remained pending, AlboHomeImp
moved for partial summary judgment as to Count 5 (wrongful foreclosure). (Dkt. No. 46).
II. 	Motion to Intervene
AlboHomeImp has moved to intervene as a matter of right. Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(a), “[o]n timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who . . . claims
an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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24(a). AlboHomeImp is the record owner of the subject property and is currently seeking
possession of the premises from plaintiff through the Housing Court. (Mot. Intervene 1, Dkt.
No. 39). Plaintiff nevertheless contends that the Court should deny the motion as untimely
because it allegedly knew about the federal case for more than six months before seeking to
intervene. (Opp’n Mot. Intervene 3, Dkt. No. 43).
Timeliness must be assessed by the totality of the circumstances. R & G Mortg. Corp. v.
Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 584 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2009). In making the assessment, the
court must consider “four factors . . . : (i) the length of time that the putative intervenor knew or
reasonably should have known that his interests were at risk before he moved to intervene; (ii)
the prejudice to existing parties should intervention be allowed; (iii) the prejudice to the putative
intervenor should intervention be denied; and (iv) any special circumstances militating for or
against intervention.” Id.
It is not clear from this record when AlboHomeImp first learned of the federal case.
Assuming, without deciding, that it did know about the case for six months before moving to
intervene, the first factor weighs against AlboHomeImp. See id. (finding a delay of
approximately two and one-half months unreasonable). The other factors, however, heavily
favor granting the motion. There is little prejudice to existing parties, as there is no settlement
agreement and AlboHomeImp does not seek to reopen discovery. See id. (“[T]he status of the
litigation at the time of the request for intervention is ‘highly relevant.’” (quoting Banco Popular
de Puerto Rico v. Greenblatt, 964 F.2d 1227, 1231 (1st Cir. 1992)). And, as the record owner of
the subject property, AlboHomeImp would be substantially harmed if the Court granted
plaintiff’s requested relief. Because the balance of the harms cut sharply in favor of
AlboHomeImp, the Court will grant the motion to intervene.
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III. 	Motion for Summary Judgment
A. 	Standard of Review
The role of summary judgment is “to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order
to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816,
822 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990)).
Summary judgment shall be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine
issue is “one that must be decided at trial because the evidence, viewed in the light most
flattering to the nonmovant, would permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue in favor of
either party.” Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990)
(citation modified). In evaluating a summary judgment motion, the court indulges all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See O’Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st
Cir. 1993). When “a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse
party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (citation modified). The nonmoving party may
not simply “rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading,” but instead must “present
affirmative evidence.” Id. at 256-57.
In addition, any document filed by a pro se party is “to be liberally construed.” Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
“Nonetheless, even a pro se litigant must meet the specificity requirement of Federal Rule 56, at
least when the litigant becomes aware that specific facts must be provided to defeat a motion for
summary judgment.” Posadas de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Radin, 856 F.2d 399, 401 (1st Cir. 1988).
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B. 	Analysis
1. 	Counts 1, 2, and 3: Breach of Contract, Promissory Estoppel, and
Negligent Misrepresentation
Counts 1, 2, and 3 allege that plaintiff suffered harm relating to agreements, promises, or
representations that defendants allegedly made. Plaintiff asserts that defendants agreed or
promised not to foreclose on her home, not to include force-placed insurance on her home, to
work with her to avoid foreclosure, and to respond to requests to process her HAF application.
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-55).
Defendants counter that plaintiff has not identified which contractual term they have
allegedly breached; which promise they made that induced forbearance; or which allegedly false
representation they made. (Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 8-13, Dkt. No. 30). Plaintiff’s opposition did
not identify the specific basis for these claims, and the Court is not able to discern the basis from
the evidence presented.
Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiff may have relied on defendant’s statements
concerning force-placed insurance, she cannot demonstrate any damages. The force-placed
insurance was not included in plaintiff’s monthly payment, and therefore was not part of the
delinquency that led to foreclosure. (Fogleman Aff. ¶ 26). Plaintiff has not presented any
contrary evidence.
2. 	Count 4: Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Count 4 alleges that defendants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing by failing to help plaintiff secure HAF relief and misrepresenting their intent to foreclose
on her property. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 56-62).2
2 In addition, mortgagees have “a duty to ‘act in good faith and must use reasonable diligence to protect the
interests of the mortgagor’ in the context of an extrajudicial foreclosure and exercise of power of sale.” Santos v.
U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 687, 701 (2016) (quoting Williams v. Resolution GGF Oy, 417 Mass. 377,
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The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which is implied in every contract, “provides
that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right
of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.” Weiler v. PortfolioScope, Inc., 469 Mass.
75, 82 (2014) (citation modified). “Conceptually, claims for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing are distinct from simple breach of contract claims . . . .” Christensen
v. Kingston Sch. Comm., 360 F. Supp. 2d 212, 229 (D. Mass. 2005). For one thing, a complaint
need not allege a breach of an express term of the contract. See Speakman v. Allmerica Fin. Life
Ins., 367 F. Supp. 2d 122, 132 (D. Mass. 2005). Rather, it must allege that defendant acted in
“bad faith or [with] an absence of good faith,” see Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d
224, 238 (1st Cir. 2013), to “unfairly leverag[e] the contract terms for undue economic
advantage,” Blake v. Pro. Coin Grading Serv., 898 F. Supp. 2d 365, 389 (D. Mass. 2012). The
requirement of good-faith performance is, however, circumscribed by the obligations set forth in
the contract, and “the covenant may not be invoked to create rights and duties not contemplated
by the provisions of the contract or the contractual relationship.” Speakman, 367 F. Supp. 2d at
132.
There are two contracts at issue: the assumption and modification agreement between
plaintiff and Santander (and, by assignment, U.S. Bank) and the HAF collaboration agreement
between the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and SN Servicing.
Even assuming that defendants’ failure to timely process plaintiff’s HAF application
constitutes a breach of the implied covenant that plaintiff has standing to enforce, she cannot
382-383 (1994)). “Typically, this entails mak[ing] reasonable efforts to sell the property for the highest value
possible.” Id. (quoting Armand v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 2012 WL 2244859, at *5 (D. Mass. June 15, 2012)
(alteration in original)). Here, plaintiff does not allege that defendants did not make reasonable efforts in the sale of
the property. Her allegations concerning defendants’ bad faith and therefore must fall within the doctrine of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
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establish that she incurred damages as a result. HAF ultimately determined that plaintiff was not
eligible for relief because she had pre-2020 arrears. Thus, assuming that defendants did not
provide timely responses, those responses did not contribute to that unfavorable resolution.
Plaintiff alleges that she nonetheless may have been able to pay the pre-2020 arrears
through $7,000 of RAFT relief and the assistance of a friend who was willing to lend her the
remainder. (Am. Compl. ¶ 25; Opp’n Summ. J. 12, Dkt. No. 44). She maintains that she did not
receive the RAFT funding because defendants did not confirm the availability of HAF funding.
However, plaintiff has not submitted any evidence of defendants’ alleged failure to send her (or
RAFT) the required documents or of the availability of a loan from her friend. To the contrary,
defendant SN Servicing maintains, without contradiction, that it was never contacted by RAFT.
(Fogleman Aff. ¶ 33). On the record before the Court, plaintiff cannot establish that she suffered
any damages relating to how defendants processed her HAF application.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that defendants misrepresented their intent to foreclose
on the property. Although defendant SN Servicing discussed the possibility of a reverse
mortgage with plaintiff, it explicitly stated that “the investor is not going to agree to postpone the
sale for a pending closing.” (Opp’n Ex. R, Dkt. No. 45). Moreover, with limited exceptions not
relevant here, under Massachusetts law “there is no duty to negotiate for loan modification once
a mortgagor defaults.” MacKenzie v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 738 F.3d 486, 493 (1st Cir. 2013)
(quoting Peterson v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 2011 WL 5075613, at *6 (D. Mass. Oct. 25, 2011)).3
Absent such a provision, it had no obligation to postpone the sale to enable plaintiff to secure a
reverse mortgage.
3 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, § 35B imposes a duty to “take[] reasonable steps and made a good faith effort
to avoid foreclosure” for certain categories of mortgages that do not seem to apply here.
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3. 	Count 5: Wrongful Foreclosure Based on Bad Faith
Count 5 sets forth a series of allegations that are either entirely conclusory or overlap
with other counts. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 63-74). One allegation, liberally construed, asserts a claim
for violation of the Massachusetts statute governing nonjudicial foreclosures. Specifically,
plaintiff alleges that defendant U.S. Bank did not hold a valid assignment of the mortgage.
In Massachusetts, a mortgagee may foreclose without prior judicial authorization under
the “statutory power of sale” granted by the mortgage. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, § 21 and
ch. 244, § 14.4 That “substantial power” comes with strict statutory requirements. U.S. Bank
Nat. Ass’n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 646 (2011). As relevant here, only “the mortgagee or his
executors, administrators, successors or assigns” may exercise the power of sale. Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 183, § 21. Foreclosure by power of sale undertaken by any other party is void. Ibanez,
458 Mass. at 647.
Plaintiff maintains that defendant U.S. Bank did not hold a valid assignment of her
mortgage and therefore did not have the authority to foreclose on her home. The assignments
from Santander to U.S. Bank and from U.S. Bank to Lodge refer only to Barbara Pressman and
the original mortgage principal amount. Plaintiff contends that they are invalid because they do
not include plaintiff’s name, the modified principal amount, or the loan number. Further, she
contends that the assignment from Lodge to U.S. Bank was conducted without a valid power of
attorney.
4 Under the statute, the mortgagee is “the person or entity then holding the mortgage and also either holding
the mortgage note or acting on behalf of the note holder.” Eaton v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 462 Mass. 569, 571
(2012).
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A threshold issue is whether plaintiff has standing to challenge the validity of
assignments of a mortgage to which she was neither a party nor beneficiary. Under
Massachusetts law, “a mortgagor has standing to challenge the assignment of a mortgage on her
home to the extent that such a challenge is necessary to contest a foreclosing entity’s status qua
mortgagee.” Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Nebraska, 708 F.3d 282, 291 (1st Cir. 2013). In
other words, “a mortgagor has standing to challenge a mortgage assignment as invalid,
ineffective, or void (if, say, the assignor had nothing to assign or had no authority to make an
assignment to a particular assignee)” but “does not have standing to challenge shortcomings in
an assignment that render it merely voidable at the election of one party but otherwise effective
to pass legal title.” Id.
Plaintiff has not established why an assignment referring only to the original mortgagor,
the mortgage principal, and the recording information is void or otherwise invalid under
Massachusetts law. In Massachusetts, “a mortgage is a transfer of legal title in a property to
secure a debt.” Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 649. The mortgagee maintains legal title to the land until
the mortgage is foreclosed or the debt is paid. Faneuil Invs. Grp. v. Board of Selectmen of
Dennis, 458 Mass. 1, 6 (2010).
Plaintiff’s assumption and modification agreement did not purport to replace or otherwise
discharge the original mortgage. (Mot. Summ. J. Ex. F). Rather, the agreement acknowledges
that the original “[m]ortgage and [n]ote are in full force and effect.” (Id. at 3). While it did
increase the principal balance to reflect the debt then owed under the original mortgage, such a
change in principal does not create an entirely new obligation. See MacKenzie, 738 F.3d at 495
(“[T]he change in the amount of principal was the result of the capitalization of unpaid interest.
In other words, the entire principal balance under the . . . Agreement was debt owed under the
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original mortgage; it was not a new obligation replacing the original obligation.”).
Consequently, the original mortgage continued to encumber 30 Red Rock Street after plaintiff
entered into the assumption and modification agreement. There was no new mortgage.
Plaintiff points to the fact that Barbara Pressman’s loan account with Santander showed a
zero-dollar balance following the assumption and modification agreement as evidence that she
entered into a new mortgage. She contends that defendants thus foreclosed on a loan that was
paid-in-full. She does not allege, however, that the note has actually been paid in full, and
indeed “recognizes that there is a balance owed.” (Opp’n AlboHomeImp Mot. Summ. J. 5, Dkt.
No. 55). The fact that Barbara Pressman’s account was closed does not mean that the secured
debt was paid and the mortgagee’s legal interest in the property extinguished. Rather, by
assuming the mortgage and the note, plaintiff became personally responsible for the existing
mortgage debt. The administrative act of adjusting the account of Barbara Pressman, who was
deceased, did not void the assumption and modification agreement or discharge the debt.
In addition, there is no dispute that the assignment was in writing and was signed. “[T]he
assignment of a mortgage is a conveyance of an interest in land that requires a writing signed by
the grantor.” Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 649 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, § 3). “Other than the
requirement of a writing, there are no magic words or strict formalities to be observed in such an
assignment.” Azevedo v. U.S. Bank N.A., 167 F. Supp. 3d 166, 171 (D. Mass. 2016); see Mass.
Gen. Laws c. 183, § 28 (“In an assignment of a mortgage of real estate the word ‘assign’ shall be
a sufficient word to transfer the mortgage . . . . ”). Moreover, the assumption and modification
agreement was recorded on February 2, 2018. Future assignees therefore had constructive notice
of the modified terms.
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Furthermore, plaintiff does not have standing to challenge whether the power of attorney
in the assignment from Lodge to U.S. Bank was defective. See Pabla v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n
as Tr. for Structured Asset Sec. Corp. Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-7XS, 2024
WL 4505216, at *4 (D. Mass. Oct. 16, 2024) (holding that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge
a mortgage assignment because “defects alleged in the power of attorney would, at most, render
the . . . Assignment voidable”); see also Wilson v. HSBC Mortg. Services, Inc., 744 F.3d 1, 13
(1st Cir. 2014) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge a mortgage assignment
executed by a person with purported authority because the assignment was binding on the
assignor and therefore at most voidable). Any defect in the power of attorney would render the
assignment voidable.
Consequently, because there is no evidence suggesting the relevant assignments were
void, plaintiff does not have standing to challenge their validity.
4. 	Count 6: Unfair and Deceptive Business Practices in Violation of
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A
Count 6 alleges that defendants’ conduct constituted an unfair or deceptive act or practice
in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Before bringing a Chapter 93A claim, “a plaintiff must
mail to the defendant a ‘written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and reasonably
describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon.’” Rodi v. Southern New Eng. Sch.
of L., 389 F.3d 5, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3)). That “notice
requirement . . . is a ‘prerequisite to suit’” and “must be alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint.” Id.
(quoting Entrialgo v. Twin City Dodge, Inc., 368 Mass. 812, 812 (1975)).
Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the ground that the complaint does not
allege plaintiff sent a Chapter 93A demand letter. (Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 17-18). Indeed, the
complaint itself alleges that plaintiff “has yet to send [a] demand to the Defendants,” and there is
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no evidence in the record to suggest otherwise. (Am. Compl. ¶ 79). “That is sufficient ground to
justify dismissal of the Chapter 93A claim.” Rodi, 389 F.3d at 19 (collecting cases). The Court
will therefore grant summary judgment as to Count 6.
5. 	Count 7: Violation of Notice and Due Process
Count 7 alleges that defendants did not comply with the notice requirements set forth in
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, § 14. (Am. Compl. at 9). Specifically, plaintiff alleges that she was
not notified by registered mail of the December 10, 2024 sale nor was notice of that sale
published for three successive weeks. The complaint alleges that that failure deprived plaintiff
of her due-process rights.
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protect against certain
types of government action. See Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952)
(Fifth Amendment); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (Fourteenth Amendment).
Defendants are private parties acting on their own behalf. Thus, their conduct cannot constitute a
due-process violation.
Nonetheless, failure to strictly adhere to any of § 14’s notice requirements may void the
foreclosure sale. Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 647-48. Under that provision, foreclosure by power of
sale
shall [not] be effectual . . . unless, previous to such sale, notice of the sale has been
published once in each of 3 successive weeks, the first publication of which shall be not
less than 21 days before the day of sale, in a newspaper published in the city or town
where the land lies or in a newspaper with general circulation in the city or town where
the land lies and notice of the sale has been sent by registered mail to the owner or
owners of record of the equity of redemption as of 30 days prior to the date of sale, said
notice to be mailed by registered mail at least 14 days prior to the date of sale to said
owner or owners . . . .
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, § 14.
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Plaintiff has not alleged that notice of the original October 30, 2024 sale was
noncompliant. It is undisputed that plaintiff received notice by registered mail of the October 30
sale. (Mot. Summ. J. Ex. N). It is also undisputed that notice of the October 30 sale was
published in a Lynn newspaper on October 9, 16, and 23. (Id. Ex. Q). After those notices,
defendant SN Servicing postponed the auction to December 10, 2024. (Id. Ex. O). It notified
plaintiff by first-class mail of the postponement. (Id.).
“[P]ostponement of a foreclosure sale does not require renewed compliance with § 14
and public proclamation.” Malanowski v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. Tr. Option One Mortg. Corp.
Tr. 2005-1 Asset-Backed-Certificates, Series 2005-1, 654 F. Supp. 3d 25, 31 (D. Mass. 2023)
(collecting cases). Rather, “noticing of a postponement of a foreclosure sale falls under the good
faith and commercial reasonableness obligations of a mortgagee.” Stephens-Martin v. Bank of
N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., 2015 WL 732087, at *11 (Mass. Land Ct. Feb. 20, 2015) (citing Fitzgerald
v. First Nat. Bank of Bos., 46 Mass. App. Ct. 98, 101 (1999)).
Under the circumstances, notifying plaintiff of the postponement by first-class mail
complied with those obligations. She did receive actual notice of the postponement, as she
sought a preliminary injunction preventing defendants from foreclosing on December 10, 2024.
See Chaves v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 335 F. Supp. 3d 100, 108 (D. Mass. 2018) (“‘The main purpose’
of both the newspaper publication and mailing requirements ‘is to provide notice to those
affected by the foreclosure sale and to facilitate proof of notice.’ . . . [T]hese purposes ‘were
fully achieved’ when the plaintiff ‘had actual notice of the sale at least seven days before the
scheduled [sale] date.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Hull v. Attleboro Sav. Bank, 33
Mass. App. Ct. 18, 25 (1992))).
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Accordingly, because the October 30, 2024 sale notices complied with § 14 and
defendants provided reasonable notice of the December 10, 2024 postponement, the Court will
grant the motion for summary judgment as to Count 7.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to intervene of defendant-intervenor
AlboHomeImp, LLC is GRANTED. The motion for summary judgment of defendants U.S.
Bank and SN Servicing is GRANTED in its entirety, and the motion for summary judgment on
Count 5 of defendant-intervenor AlboHomeImp, LLC is GRANTED.
So Ordered.
/s/ F. Dennis Saylor IV
F. Dennis Saylor IV
Dated: March 27, 2026 	United States District Judge
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