Thompson v. Cardona et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
WILLIAM R. THOMPSON,
Plaintiff,
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Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-12664-IT
v. 	*
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NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, LLC, and
NELNET SERVICING, LLC,
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
April 6, 2026
TALWANI, D.J.
Pending before the court are Defendants Navient Solutions, LLC’s (“Navient”) and
Nelnet Servicing, LLC’s (“Nelnet”) Motions to Dismiss [Doc. Nos. 14 and 16] seeking dismissal
pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) of Plaintiff William R. Thompson’s pro se Verified
Complaint [Doc. No. 1]. For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are
GRANTED.
I. 	Standard of Review
In evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court assumes “the truth
of all well-pleaded facts” and draws “all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Nisselson
v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 150 (1st Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual material to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations . . . [f]actual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Id. at 555 (internal citations omitted). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
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draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In general, a complaint filed pro se is “liberally construed” and held to “less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)
(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). That does not mean that pro se plaintiffs
need not plead facts sufficient to state a claim, but it does afford them some leniency when
facing a motion to dismiss. See Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1980).
II. 	Factual Background as Alleged in the Complaint
Plaintiff alleges that he took out student loans from the U.S. Department of Education,
Navient, and Nelnet, between 1986 and 1989, and again in 2012. Verified Compl. ¶ 9 [Doc. No.
1]. Plaintiff alleges further that the U.S. Department of Education is in the business of issuing
and managing loans, and that Nelnet and Navient are “[m]anager[s] and collector[s] of debt on
behalf of the U.S. Department of Education[.]” Id. ¶¶ 5, 6.1
For many years, Plaintiff made payments on his student loans, but because of health
issues and loss of employment was unable to continue making consistent payments, making
payments only when he was able to do so. Verified Compl. ¶¶ 13, 15 [Doc. No. 1]. After
Defendants hounded Plaintiff for years in attempts to collect repayment, Plaintiff agreed to enter
a new agreement with Defendants as soon as Plaintiff’s income allowed him to do so, and
Defendants agreed to withdraw multiple derogatory marks from Plaintiff’s credit reports
regarding Plaintiff’s unpaid loan balances. Id. ¶¶ 10–12, 181, 185. Plaintiff alleges that
1 Plaintiff named the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Education as a Defendant in this action
but failed to complete service. Accordingly, the court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the
Secretary without prejudice. Electronic Order [Doc. No. 32].
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Defendants never investigated his income, did not withdraw the derogatory marks on Plaintiff’s
credit reports, and did not send him notes memorializing the new agreement between the parties.
Id. ¶¶ 11, 14.
Plaintiff regularly informed Defendants of his declining health. Id. ¶ 17. Defendants’
employees continued to contact Plaintiff seeking repayment through hundreds of phone calls,
letters, and emails. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff alleges that—though his loans to Defendants contained a
hardship provision which noted that his “student loans could be discharged . . . ‘if repayment
would create a hardship on the debtor’”—Defendants did not inform Plaintiff that he was eligible
for hardship forgiveness, examine Plaintiff’s financial circumstances, or investigate Plaintiff’s
ability to pay his debt or his claim of having no income. Id. ¶¶ 20, 24, 26, 29.
On February 6, 2017, Plaintiff retired due to his age and physical disability. Id. ¶ 28. On
or about December 2017, Plaintiff was diagnosed with cataracts and again notified Defendants of
his deteriorating health. Id. ¶¶ 30, 31, 33. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants did not make note of
Plaintiff’s physical hardships in his file. Id. ¶ 40.
In 2020, Plaintiff informed Defendants that he was no longer able to repay his loans. Id.
¶ 43. Defendants were amenable to a new payment plan but did not agree to absolve Plaintiff of
his existing loan obligation. Id. ¶ 44. Plaintiff further alleges that he requested Defendants “that
[his] debts not be reported negatively” on his credit reports but derogatory marks have continued
to be reported on his credit reports to this day. Id. ¶ 51. Plaintiff has also asked repeatedly to
receive an accounting of his student loans from the Defendants but since 1999 (or 2014) has not
been provided such records. Id. ¶¶ 47–48.
Plaintiff is now 70 years old and has recently experienced numerous, significant health
challenges, including a heart attack and open-heart surgery. Id. ¶¶ 57–58, 60. His income is
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limited to social security benefits, and he struggles to afford food and basic costs of living. Id.
¶ 65. Plaintiff accordingly is unable to pay his loans. Id. ¶ 60.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants have continued to call, email, and write to Plaintiff to pursue
loan repayment. Id. ¶¶ 56, 69. He notes Defendants have not inquired about Plaintiff’s age,
health, or income since he first took out these loans in the 1980’s. Id. ¶¶ 20, 24, 26, 39, 52.
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that despite having over the years informed Defendants he was
unable to work or repay his loans, Defendants never advised Plaintiff that he was possibly
eligible for a hardship discharge pursuant to the hardship provision of his loan agreement, nor
did they encourage him to apply for loan forgiveness. Id. ¶¶ 18–19, 27, 29, 35–37.
Plaintiff alleges that because of Defendant’s constant communications while he has been
unable to repay these loans, he has suffered stress, inability to sleep, humiliation, inability to
travel or tend to his own well-being, and inability to enjoy his usual activities. Id. ¶¶ 66–67, 95,
109–111, 120.
III. 	Discussion
Plaintiff has brought nineteen claims against Defendants Nelnet and Navient. The court
addresses each claim in turn.
A. 	Count I: Breach of Contract
Count I of Plaintiff’s complaint alleges Defendants breached the parties’ contract.
Verified Compl. ¶¶ 79–80 [Doc. No. 1].
To state a claim for breach of contract under Massachusetts law, a plaintiff must “show
that (1) a valid contract between the parties existed, (2) the plaintiff was ready, willing, and able
to perform, (3) the defendant was in breach of the contract, and (4) the plaintiff sustained
damages as a result.” Bose Corp. v. Ejaz, 732 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Singarella v.
City of Boston, 342 Mass. 385, 387, 173 N.E.2d 290, 291 (1961)).
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Plaintiff alleges that he entered into a contract with the “U.S. Department of Education
and its agents” (who the court understands to be Nelnet and Navient) in 1989 and 2012. Verified
Compl. ¶¶ 77, 83 [Doc. No. 1]. But even if the court could construe this allegation as sufficiently
alleging that a contract or contracts existed between Plaintiff and Navient or Nelnet, Plaintiff’s
allegations that he fully performed his duties and responsibilities and that Defendants breached
that contract are insufficient where Plaintiff does not specify what contract term he satisfied and
what contract terms were breached by the Defendants. Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants
“breached the contract by engaging in the civil wrongs and tortious behavior” described earlier in
the Complaint, id. ¶ 80, is too vague to further his claim.
Accordingly, Count I is DISMISSED as to both Defendants.
B. 	Count II: Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Verified Compl. ¶¶ 82–87 [Doc. No. 1].
Every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which
requires that “neither party shall do anything that will have the effect of destroying or injuring
the right of the other party to its fruits of the contract[.]” Druker v. Roland Wm. Jutras
Associates, Inc., 370 Mass. 383, 385, 348 N.E.2d 763, 765 (1976). The purpose of the covenant
is not to “create rights and duties not otherwise provided for in the existing contractual
relationship,” but to ensure that the “parties remain faithful to the intended and agreed
expectations of the parties in their performance.” Uno Rests., Inc. v. Boston Kenmore Realty
Corp., 441 Mass. 376, 385, 805 N.E.2d 957, 964 (2004).
Assuming that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the existence of a contract, Plaintiff has
not sufficiently alleged what actions by Defendants injured his rights to the fruits of his contract.
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At most, Plaintiff appears to suggest Defendants failed to inform Plaintiff that he was eligible for
hardship forgiveness. Id. ¶¶ 62–63. But Plaintiff has provided no basis for the court to conclude
that Defendants had a duty to investigate Plaintiff’s eligibility for potential relief, to inform
Plaintiff of his eligibility, or to modify the payment terms. See George v. Stonebridge Mortg.
Co., LLC, 988 F.Supp.2d 142, 150 (D. Mass. 2013) (dismissing a claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing where plaintiffs failed to allege that defendants were
under any obligation to modify their mortgage terms). Where Plaintiff cannot establish that
Defendants acted in a manner that interfered with the intended and agreed upon expectations of
the parties, Count II is DISMISSED.
C. 	Count III: Negligent Misrepresentation
To state a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the
defendant:
(1) in the course of its business, (2) supplied false information for the guidance of
others[,] (3) in their business transactions, (4) causing and resulting in pecuniary
loss to those others, (5) by their justifiable reliance upon the information, and (6)
that 	it 	failed 	to 	exercise 	reasonable 	care 	or 	competence 	in 	obtaining 	or
communicating the information.
Cummings v. HPG Intern., Inc., 244 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff states generally that Defendants made “oral and written statements in letters, text
messages and voicemail messages to plaintiff which . . . negligent[ly] misrepresented the factual
reality[.]” Verified Compl. ¶ 89 [Doc. No. 1]. Where Plaintiff does not specify what those
statements were, or in what way they were false, he has not plausibly alleged that Defendants
supplied false information. Accordingly, Count III is DISMISSED.
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D. 	Count IV: Invasion of Privacy
Plaintiff contends Defendants have invaded his privacy by “constantly publishing private
and false facts” about Plaintiff, including by misrepresenting Plaintiff’s “credit standing.”
Verified Compl. ¶ 100 [Doc. No. 1]. Plaintiff additionally alleges Defendants invaded his
privacy by depicting Plaintiff in a false light. Id. ¶ 101.
There is no common-law claim for invasion of privacy in Massachusetts. Alberts v.
Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 69–70, 479 N.E.2d 113, 120–21 (1985); Hayes v. Mirick, 378 F. Supp. 3d
109, 116 n.2 (D. Mass. 2019). Massachusetts, however, does provide for a statutory invasion of
privacy claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214 § 1B. Spencer v. Roche, 755 F. Supp. 2d 250, 271
(D. Mass. 2010), aff'd, 659 F.3d 142 (1st Cir. 2011).2 The statute provides that “[a] person shall
have a right against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with his privacy.” Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 1B. Accordingly, the statute “protects people from ‘disclosure of facts . . .
that are of a highly personal or intimate nature when there exists no legitimate, countervailing
interest.’” Dasey v. Anderson, 304 F.3d 148, 153–54 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Bratt v. Int'l Bus.
Machs. Corp., 392 Mass. 508, 518, 467 N.E.2d 126, 133–34 (1984)). At the same time, “serious
or substantial interferences which are reasonable or justified” are not prohibited. Schlesinger v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 409 Mass. 514, 518, 567 N.E.2d 912, 914 (1991).
“Massachusetts does not recognize a cause of action for false light invasion of privacy.” Dasey,
304 F.3d at 154.
2 Though Plaintiff does not assert a claim under this statute, federal courts may recharacterize the
legal label attached to a pro se litigant’s motion to avoid unnecessary dismissal. Greenspan v.
Masmarques, 2024 WL 1258062 at *16 (D. Mass Mar. 25, 2024) (citing Castro v. United States,
540 U.S. 375, 381–82 (2003)). The court does so here.
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Here, Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that Defendants engaged in an “unreasonable,
substantial or serious interference” of Plaintiff’s right to privacy. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214,
§ 1B.
Moreover, even if Defendant’s credit reporting would fall under this category, such a
claim is preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). Under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681t(b)(1)(F), the FCRA preempts state law “relating to the responsibilities of persons who
furnish information to consumer reporting agencies.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F); Clark v.
Zwicker & Assocs., P.C., No. 22-CV-10931-ADB, 2024 WL 2025568, at *6 (D. Mass. May 7,
2024). This provision therefore precludes Plaintiff’s claim under M.G.L. 214 § 1B. Count IV is
therefore DISMISSED.
E. 	Count V: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Under Massachusetts law, to state a claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
(“IIED”) a complaint must allege (1) that the defendant intended to inflict emotional distress or
that they knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of their
conduct; (2) that the conduct was “extreme and outrageous”; (3) that the actions of the defendant
were the cause of the plaintiff’s distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the
plaintiff was “severe” and of a nature “that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.”
Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 144–45, 355 N.E.2d 315, 318–19 (1976). “The
standard for making a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is very high[.]” Doyle
v. Hasbro, Inc., 103 F.3d 186, 195 (1st Cir. 1996). Accordingly, “[l]iability has been found only
where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in
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a civilized community.” Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 400 Mass. 82, 99, 508 N.E.2d 72, 82 (1987)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (A.L.I. 1965)).
In support of his claim for IIED, Plaintiff states that Defendants “engaged in a 30 year
long and regular pattern of intentional outrageous and extreme conduct” but provides no details
as to what this conduct was beyond the phone calls, emails, and writings to collect the debt.
Verified Compl. ¶ 104 [Doc. No. 1]. As to those communications, Plaintiff offers no details as to
why those attempts to collect payment on his loans would meet the high standard required to
state a claim. See also Koufos v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 939 F.Supp.2d 40, 53 (D. Mass. 2013)
(continued threats to collect upon and enforce a legally enforceable debt, including threatened
home foreclosure, insufficient to state a claim of IIED). Count V is DISMISSED.
F. 	Count VI, VII, VIII, IX: Negligence Claims
The elements of a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim include “(1) negligence;
(2) emotional distress; (3) causation; (4) physical harm manifested by objective
symptomatology; and (5) that a reasonable person would have suffered emotional distress under
the circumstances[.]” Doe v. Trustees of Boston College, 892 F.3d 67, 95 (1st Cir. 2018)
(quoting Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 557, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (1982)). To state a
negligence claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.
Mackenzie v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 738 F.3d 486, 495 (1st Cir. 2013). Courts have held that under
Massachusetts law, “[t]he relationship between a borrower and lender does not give rise to a duty
of care[.]” Id.; see also Keenan v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 246 F. Supp. 3d 518, 526 (D. Mass.
2017) (finding no duty of care existed between plaintiff-borrower and defendants, including
Wells Fargo, the loan servicer). Where Plaintiff has failed to establish Defendants, as his lenders
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or, in the alternative, his loan servicers, owed him a duty of care, Plaintiff cannot state a
negligence claim, Count VI is DISMISSED.
Plaintiff additionally brings claims for negligent hiring, training, and supervision. Like
negligence claims generally, a plaintiff asserting a negligent hiring claim “must establish that the
defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, and that a breach of that duty proximately caused
injury to the plaintiff.” Petrell v. Shaw, 453 Mass. 377, 385, 902 N.E.2d 401, 408 (2009). As
noted, a lender does not owe a duty of care to a borrower by sole virtue of being Plaintiff’s
lender. However, employers whose employees are “‘brought in contact with members of the
public in the course of the employer’s business’ . . . have a ‘duty to exercise reasonable care in
the selection and retention of [their] employees.’” Doe v. Bradshaw, 203 F. Supp. 3d 168, 187
(D. Mass. 2016) (quoting Foster v. Loft, Inc., 26 Mass.App.Ct. 289, 290, 526 N.E.2d 1309, 1310
(1988)). “An employer must use due care to avoid the selection or retention of an employee
whom he knows or should know is a person unworthy, by habits, temperament, or nature, to deal
with the persons invited to the premises by the employer.” Id. (quoting Foster v. Loft, Inc., 26
Mass.App.Ct. 289, 290–91, 526 N.E.2d 1309, 1310–11 (1988)); see also Armstrong v. Lamy,
938 F. Supp. 1018, 1046 (D. Mass. 1996). Meanwhile, to establish a claim for negligent training
or supervision, “a plaintiff must show that the employer became aware or should have become
aware of problems with an employee that indicated his unfitness, and the employer fails to take
further action such as investigating, discharge or reassignment.” Helfman v. Ne. Univ., 485
Mass. 308, 326, 149 N.E.3d 758, 775 (2020) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff states that Defendants’ employees “[made] wrong decisions” and were
“incompetent[,]” and that Defendants failed to use reasonable care to select competent
employees. Verified Compl. ¶¶ 127–29 [Doc. No. 1]. He further claims that Defendants’ failure
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to train resulted in employees “making wrong decisions in their interactions with [him,]” and that
Defendants should have known that their employees were unfit because they lacked training and
supervision. Id. ¶¶ 134, 136, 141.
However, Plaintiff has not identified any wrong decisions by their employees that were
known to Defendants. See Foster, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 291, 526 N.E.2d at 1311 (1988) (finding
that knowledge of past acts of impropriety, violence, or disorder is sufficient to find that an
employer knew or should have known that an employee was unfit). Further Plaintiff does not
address in what manner Defendants’ employees’ training or supervision was deficient.
Plaintiff further objects that Defendants “treat[ed] Plaintiff like a criminal” and that
Defendants knew or should have known that some of their employees “would be likely to be
callous[.]” Verified Compl. ¶¶ 67, 69, 127 [Doc. No. 1]. But even read in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, the complaint’s statements are conclusory and do not plausibly allege the
elements of these claims.
Counts VII, VIII, and IX are therefore DISMISSED.
G. 	Counts X, XI: Libel and Slander
Under Massachusetts law, claims for slander and libel require a false statement. Phelan v.
May Dep’t Stores Co., 443 Mass. 52, 55–56, 819 N.E.2d 550, 553 (2004). Plaintiffs alleges
generally that Defendants “caused writings to be distributed[,]” “made [untrue] statements in
writing to other residents about the plaintiff[,]” and “committed scores of oral defamation[.]”
Verified Compl. ¶¶ 146, 147, 151 [Doc. No. 1]. Plaintiff, however, does not state what the
allegedly false statements were and why they were untrue. Therefore, Counts X and XI must be
DISMISSED.
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H. 	Counts XII, XIII: Lanham Act Claims
Plaintiff brings a claim for false advertising and false representation under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a) (the Lanham Act). The Lanham Act “was designed to protect consumers and
competitors from any duplicitous advertising or packaging which results in unfair competition.”
Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 310 (1st Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff states that “Defendant has made many false statements . . . about the loan and
repayment options and services it advertised to the [Plaintiff,]” Verified Compl. ¶ 156 [Doc. No.
1], but has not alleged with specificity what those false advertisements were. Missing from the
Complaint [Doc. No. 1] are any allegations that Defendants used commercial advertising to
misrepresent their services, or that they caused Plaintiff any confusion about the affiliation of
their services. Because Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim under 15
U.S.C. § 1225, Count XII and XIII are DISMISSED.
I. 	Count XIV: Tortious Interference with an Advantageous Relationship
To state a claim for tortious interference, a plaintiff must allege, inter alia, that he or she
had a contract with a third party. Hamann v. Carpenter, 937 F.3d 86, 90 (1st Cir. 2019).
Establishing a relationship with a third party is essential, because “[a] party cannot ‘tortiously
interfere’ with a contract or business relationship to which he is a party.” Sensitech Inc., v.
LimeStone FZE, 581 F.Supp.3d 342, 348 (D. Mass. 2022) (citing Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 459
Mass. 697, 716, 947 N.E.2d 520, 537 (2011)). Plaintiff alleges only that he had an advantageous
relationship with Defendants and that their employees interfered with that relationship. Verified
Compl. ¶ 173–74 [Doc. No. 1]. Because he has not identified a third party with whom his
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business relationship was harmed, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for tortious interference.
Count XIV is DISMISSED.3
J. 	Count XV: Violation of the FCRA
Under § 1681s–2(a)(1) of the FCRA, “furnishers may not provide inaccurate information
to consumer reporting agencies[.]” Chiang v. Verizon New England Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 35 (1st
Cir. 2010). Furnishers additionally “have specific duties in the event of a dispute over furnished
information” pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(b). Id. Only § 1681s-2(b), however, is subject to a
private cause of action. Id. To invoke a right under this provision, when a consumer seeks to
challenge the accuracy of information in their credit report, a consumer must first notify the
relevant Credit Reporting Agency (“CRA”) of the dispute. Barrepski v. Cap. One Bank, 439 F.
App'x 11, 12 (1st Cir. 2011); Chiang, 595 F.3d at 35. Once the consumer provides such notice,
“the CRA then is required to advise the furnisher of the dispute and to provide the furnisher with
the relevant information.” Barrepski, 439 F. App’x at 12. Only after receiving notice from the
CRA is a furnisher required to conduct an investigation; “notice directly from the consumer is
not enough.” Id.
In his opposition brief, Plaintiff has attached a letter to Equifax, a credit reporting agency,
dated November 2, 2024. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def. Nelnet’s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A [Doc. No. 23-1].
This letter, which Plaintiff sent after he brought this action on October 21, 2024, complains that
Equifax has not deleted the student loans from his credit report. Id. at ECF 2. But the only
3 Plaintiff argues in his Opposition that Defendants have tortiously interfered with Plaintiff’s
future potential opportunities. Pl.’s Mem. Opposing Def. Navient’s Mot. to Dismiss at ECF 14
[Doc. No. 22]. But this claim is also unsuccessful where he has not alleged any such
opportunities here. Singh v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., 308 F.3d 25, 48 (1st
Cir. 2002) (noting that a plaintiff “may not speculate about future business relationships when
alleging this tort”).
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dispute raised in that letter is a claim that the Bankruptcy Court discharged Thompson’s student
loans. Id. Where Plaintiff is not claiming here that the loans at issue were discharged by the
Bankruptcy Court (and alleges to the contrary that he has not filed for bankruptcy), see Verified
Compl. ¶ 41 [Doc. No. 1], this letter does not provide the required notice of the dispute currently
before the court.
Accordingly, where Plaintiff has not alleged that he notified any CRA about inaccuracies
related to Defendants’ reporting, nor that a CRA then notified Defendants, Count XV is
DISMISSED.
K. 	Count XVI: Violation of Massachusetts Fair Credit Reporting Act
As relevant to this claim, the Massachusetts Fair Credit Reporting Act establishes that
[e]very person who furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency shall
follow reasonable procedures to ensure that the information reported to a consumer
reporting agency is accurate and complete. No person may provide information to
a consumer reporting agency if such person knows or has reasonable cause to
believe such information is not accurate or complete.
Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 93, § 54A(a). “[T]he FCRA expressly exempts § 54A(a) from its
preemptive reach[.]” Leet v. Cellco P'ship, 480 F. Supp. 2d 422, 433 (D. Mass. 2007). Yet, as
other sessions of this court have found, the FCRA did not exempt from its provisions Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 93, § 54A(g), which “creates a private cause of action for violations of § 54A(a).” Id.;
Gibbs v. SLM Corp., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D. Mass. 2004), aff'd, No. 05-1057, 2005 WL
5493113 (1st Cir. Aug. 23, 2005). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim is preempted. Moreover, even if
Plaintiff’s claim was not preempted, Plaintiff’s claim still could not succeed. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants reported Plaintiff’s loans as overdue, Verified Compl. ¶ 185 [Doc. No. 1], but has not
alleged that this report was false. Accordingly, Count XVI is DISMISSED.
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L. 	Count XVII: Violation of the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
“[T]o bring a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must prove that (1) she was the object
of collection activity arising from consumer debt, (2) defendants are debt collectors as defined by
the FDCPA, and (3) defendants have engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.”
DeCotis v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC, 642 F. Supp. 3d 181, 189 (D. Mass. 2022) (citation
omitted). The FDCPA’s definition for “debt collector” specifically excludes, inter alia, any
person attempting to collect a debt which was originated by such person, and any person
attempting to collect a debt that was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person. 15
U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F); DeCotis, 642 F. Supp. 3d 181, 189 (D. Mass. 2022). Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants originated these loans. Verified Compl. ¶ 9 [Doc. No. 1].4 Accordingly, Defendants
are not debt collectors as defined under the FDCPA. Count XVII is DISMISSED.
M. 	Count XVIII, XIX: Violation of the Massachusetts Debt Collection Statute and
Massachusetts General Law Chapter 93A
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93 § 49, titled “Debt collection in an unfair, deceptive or
unreasonable manner,” provides that:
[n]o one who is a creditor or an attorney for a creditor, or an assignee of a creditor,
of a natural person present or residing in Massachusetts who has incurred a debt
primarily for personal, family or household purposes shall collect or attempt to
collect such debt in an unfair, deceptive or unreasonable manner.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 49. But Section 49 does not provide a private stand-alone right
of action, and claims under Section 49 must be dismissed “except to the extent they form
the basis for liability under [Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 93A.]” O’Connor v. Nantucket Bank,
992 F.Supp.2d 24, 34 (D. Mass. 2014).
4 In the alternative, Defendants would be loan servicers that obtained the loan before Plaintiff
defaulted and accordingly would be covered by the exception.
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As a prerequisite to a Chapter 93A claim, a plaintiff must allege that they sent a demand
letter to the defendant at least thirty days prior to filing a Chapter 93A action. Id. at 38 n.6; Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3); McKenna v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 693 F.3d 207, 217 (1st Cir.
2012). Where Plaintiff does not allege that he sent either Defendant a demand letter, Counts
XVIII and XIX must be DISMISSED.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Navient Solutions, LLC’s (“Navient”) and Nelnet
Servicing, LLC’s (“Nelnet”) Motions to Dismiss [Doc. Nos. 14 and 16] are GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
April 6, 2026 	/s/ Indira Talwani
United States District Judge
Case 1:24-cv-12664-IT Document 34 Filed 04/06/26 Page 16 of 16