John & Jane, LLC v. Isabel

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:24-cv-11508-PBS Document 81 Filed 10/14/26 Page1of12

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

JOHN & JANE, LLC,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action
Vv. No. 24-cv-11508-PBS
RUSSELL ISABEL,

Defendant.

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

October 14, 2026
Saris, J.

INTRODUCTION

In this action, Plaintiff John & Jane, LLC (“J&J”), the owner
of a scallop fishing vessel, alleged that Defendant Russell Isabel,
who served as the master aboard the vessel on a voyage in August
2022, breached their contract by failing to indemnify JéJ in
connection with an assessment imposed by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”) after Isabel harvested
scallops in an area forbidden under federal law. The Court
previously granted summary judgment to J&J on its breach of

contract claim, see John & Jane, LLC v. Isabel, 822 F. Supp. 3d

195, 208 (D. Mass. 2026), appeal dismissed, No. 26-1515 (1st Cir.

July 22, 2026), and entered judgment in the amount of $40,651.25,

see Dkt. 55. Citing a fee-shifting provision in the contract, J&J

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

Case 1:24-cv-11508-PBS Document 81 Filed 10/14/26 Page 2of12

now moves for an award of $56,173.79 in attorney’s fees and
expenses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). After review
of the parties’ briefing and the record, the Court ALLOWS JéJ’s
motion for attorney’s fees and expenses (Dkt. 58) in the amount of

$33,624.00 in fees and $2,283.92 in expenses.

DISCUSSION

J&J requests attorney’s fees and expenses under the following
provision in its binding contract with Isabel:

If it shall be necessary for either the Owner or Master
to employ an attorney to enforce its rights pursuant to
their Agreement because of default of the other party,
the defaulting party, as finally determined in any
settlement, judgement [sic], or arbitration award
related to such default, shall reimburse the non-
defaulting party for reasonable attorney’s fees and
expenses.

Dkt. 1-1 { 13. Isabel does not dispute that he is a “defaulting
party” as determined by the Court’s final judgment in J&J’s favor
on its breach of contract claim. The fees and expenses J&J seeks

to recoup under this provision are as follows:

. Billed Hourly Requested
Timekeeper Hours Rate Amount

Samuel P. Blatchley 58.70 $300.00 $17,610.00

Thomas L. Harshaw 115.30 $250.00 $28,825.00

“VCR” 5.90 $300.00 $1,770.00
“LMH” 3.60 $165.00 $594.00
“RLF” (Law Clerk) 3.30 $195.00 $643.50
“BTS” 1.30 $250.00 $325.00
“RIK” (Law Clerk) 3.50 $195.00 $682.50

“CJL” (Law Clerk) 10.20 $210.00 $2,142.00
“CCB” (Law Clerk) 1.20 $210.00 $252.00
“TAH” 2.75 $210.00 $577.50

TOTAL ATTORNEY’S FEES $53,421.50

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Requested
Expense Type Amount
Filing fee $405.00
E-Discovery Management $270.00
Westlaw fees $1,851.15
Delivery fees $226.14
TOTAL EXPENSES $2,752.29
TOTAL FEES & EXPENSES $56,173.79

The Court first addresses attorney’s fees before turning to
the issue of expenses.

I. Attorney’s Fees

As an initial matter, the Court summarily rejects Isabel’s
frivolous argument that it cannot award attorney’s fees because no
statute authorizes fee-shifting in this case. Courts may award
attorney’s fees when, as here, a contract provides for fee-

shifting. See Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 576 U.S. 121, 126

(2015) (explaining that under the American Rule, “[eJach litigant
pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or
contract provides otherwise” (emphasis added) (quoting Hardt v.

Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 253 (2010))).

The parties’ contract entitles J&J to its “reasonable
attorney’s fees.” Dkt. 1-1 { 13. Courts typically use the lodestar

method to calculate reasonable attorney’s fees. See Garcia v. State

Ins. Fund Corp., 169 F.4th 13, 27 (lst Cir. 2026). Under this

method, the “court ‘multipl[ies] the number of hours productively
spent by a reasonable hourly rate to calculate a base figure.’”

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Torres-Rivera v. O’Neill-

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Cancel, 	524 	F.3d 	331, 	336 	(1st 	Cir. 	2008)). 	The 	court 	then 	“may
adjust 	the 	amount 	upward 	or 	downward 	if 	circumstances 	warrant.”
Id. Ultimately, the “task in fashioning a reasonable fee . . . ‘is
to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.’” Pérez-
Sosa v. Garland, 22 F.4th 312, 322 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting Fox v.
Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011)).
A. 	Hourly Rates
The 	Court 	starts 	with 	the 	hourly 	rates. 	A 	reasonable 	hourly
rate “is often benchmarked to the prevailing rates in the community
for 	lawyers 	of 	like 	qualifications, 	experience, 	and 	competence.”
Id. 	at 	321 	(quoting 	Cent. 	Pension 	Fund 	of 	the 	Int’l 	Union 	of
Operating 	Eng’rs 	& 	Participating 	Emps. 	v. 	Ray 	Haluch 	Gravel 	Co.,
745 	F.3d 	1, 	5 	(1st 	Cir. 	2014)). 	To 	determine 	this 	benchmark,
“courts 	look 	to 	a 	constellation 	of 	factors, 	including 	the 	rate
that 	the 	particular 	attorney 	‘actually 	charges 	to 	clients 	in 	the
ordinary 	course 	of 	[his] 	practice’ 	and 	‘data 	evidencing 	the
prevailing 	market 	rate 	for 	counsel 	of 	comparable 	skill.’” 	Id. 	at
325 (quoting Hutchinson ex rel. Julien v. Patrick, 636 F.3d 1, 16
(1st 	Cir. 	2011)). 	The 	party 	seeking 	fees 	bears 	“the 	burden 	of
establishing the prevailing hourly rate (or schedule of rates) in
the 	community 	for 	the 	performance 	of 	similar 	legal 	services 	by
comparably 	credentialled 	counsel.” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Hutchinson, 	636
F.3d at 16).
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Two 	attorneys, 	Samuel 	P. 	Blatchley 	and 	Thomas 	L. 	Harshaw,
billed most of the fees sought by J&J. Attorney Blatchley, who has
nineteen years of experience in maritime law and ordinarily charged
an hourly rate of $450.00, charged $300.00 per hour for work billed
to this matter. Attorney Harshaw, an associate who worked on this
matter 	beginning 	in 	his 	first 	year 	of 	practice, 	charged 	$250.00
per hour and did not increase his rate during the pendency of the
case 	even 	though 	his 	firm 	now 	charges 	$355.00 	per 	hour 	for 	his
time. 	In 	support 	of 	these 	rates, 	J&J 	submitted 	declarations 	from
Attorneys 	Blatchley 	and 	Harshaw 	attesting 	to 	their 	rates’
reasonableness. J&J also submitted an order from 2016 approving a
$300.00 hourly rate for Blatchley as an associate and hourly rates
of 	$350.00 	and 	$475.00 	for 	partners 	for 	maritime-related 	work 	in
a bankruptcy matter in Rhode Island.
Given their relative positions and levels of experience, the
Court 	finds 	that 	Attorney 	Blatchley’s 	and 	Attorney 	Harshaw’s
hourly rates are reasonable and consistent with prevailing rates.
Isabel 	principally 	complains 	that 	J&J 	has 	not 	submitted 	third-
party 	affidavits 	attesting 	to 	the 	reasonableness 	of 	these 	rates.
While “a party requesting attorneys’ fees [must] adduce evidence,
‘other 	than 	his 	own 	attorneys’ 	affidavits,’ 	to 	establish 	‘the
prevailing 	hourly 	rate,’” 	affidavits 	from 	third-party 	attorneys
“are by no means the only acceptable form of evidence.” Sullivan v.
Dumont Aircraft Charter, LLC, 695 F. Supp. 3d 173, 191-92 (D. Mass
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2023) (quoting Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1168 (1st Cir.
1989)). For instance, courts often look to the rates lawyers have
received 	in 	comparable 	matters. 	See 	Hutchinson, 	636 	F.3d 	at 	16;
Alexander 	v. 	Mass. 	Dep’t 	of 	Corr., 	734 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	133, 	140 	(D.
Mass. 	2024). 	A 	court’s 	approval 	in 	2016 	of 	partner 	and 	associate
rates 	for 	maritime 	work 	that 	were 	higher 	than 	those 	charged 	by
Attorneys 	Blatchley 	and 	Harshaw 	in 	this 	case 	provides 	sufficient
evidence 	that 	their 	hourly 	rates 	of 	$300.00 	and 	$250.00 	are
reasonable. Moreover, Attorneys Blatchley and Harshaw seek fees at
an hourly rate lower than the rates their firm ordinarily charges
for their work.
J&J also requests attorney’s fees for eight other timekeepers
with rates ranging from $165.00 to $300.00 per hour. Four of those
timekeepers, 	who 	charged 	between 	$195.00 	and 	$210.00 	per 	hour,
were 	law 	clerks. 	The 	Court 	deems 	an 	hourly 	rate 	of 	$100.00 	to 	be
“more 	reflective 	of 	prevailing 	market 	rates” 	for 	law 	clerks,
Alexander, 	734 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	143, 	which 	reduces 	the 	total 	award
for 	these 	timekeepers 	from 	$3,720.00 	to 	$1,820.00. 	As 	for 	the
remaining four timekeepers, J&J has not identified their positions
and, 	thus, 	has 	failed 	to 	meet 	its 	burden 	of 	justifying 	the
reasonableness 	of 	their 	fees. 	The 	Court 	therefore 	will 	not 	award
the $3,266.50 in fees incurred by these four timekeepers.
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B. 	Number of Hours
Turning to the number of hours billed, the Court must “exclude
‘those 	hours 	that 	are 	“excessive, 	redundant, 	or 	otherwise
unnecessary.”’” 	García, 	169 	F.4th 	at 	27 	(quoting 	Pérez-Sosa, 	22
F.4th at 321). Isabel asks the Court to exclude time J&J’s counsel
dedicated 	to 	(1) 	the 	pre-litigation 	administrative 	proceedings
brought by NOAA and a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request
to 	NOAA, 	(2) 	a 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	12(c) 	motion 	that
was 	never 	filed, 	and 	(3) 	disputes 	between 	the 	parties 	over
compliance 	with 	Local 	Rules 	7.1(a)(2) 	and 	56.1 	and 	a 	threat 	of
sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
Some 	of 	Isabel’s 	proposed 	reductions 	have 	merit. 	The 	fee-
shifting provision in the contract allows a party to recover fees
“[i]f 	it 	shall 	be 	necessary 	for 	either 	[party] 	to 	employ 	an
attorney to enforce its rights pursuant to their Agreement because
of default of the other party.” Dkt. 1-1 ¶ 13. The fees J&J incurred
during 	the 	NOAA 	proceedings 	served 	to 	resolve 	the 	enforcement
action, not to enforce J&J’s right to indemnification from Isabel
in connection with those proceedings. J&J is therefore not entitled
to recover the approximately $2,260.00 in attorney’s fees included
in 	its 	request 	that 	related 	to 	resolving 	the 	NOAA 	proceedings.1
1 	The 	parties’ 	contract 	separately 	provides 	that 	“[i]n 	the 	event
that 	any 	actions 	of 	the 	Master 	subjects 	[sic] 	the 	Vessel 	or 	her
Owner 	to 	any 	administrative, 	judicial 	or 	criminal 	penalty, 	he 	or
she shall indemnify and hold Owner harmless from such penalty and
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The Court also eliminates the approximately $3,965.00 in fees J&J’s
counsel billed to draft the Rule 12(c) motion that was never filed.
See 	Montanez 	v. 	Simon, 	755 	F.3d 	547, 	555 	(7th 	Cir. 	2014);
Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 880 (2d Cir. 1998); Gross v.
Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 320 F. Supp. 3d 240, 245 (D. Mass.
2018).
The 	Court 	rejects 	the 	remaining 	reductions 	proposed 	by
Isabel. 	It 	was 	reasonable 	for 	J&J’s 	counsel 	to 	submit 	a 	FOIA
request 	to 	NOAA 	during 	this 	litigation 	and 	to 	defend 	themselves
against opposing counsel’s threat of Rule 11 sanctions. Moreover,
while 	the 	Court 	ultimately 	declined 	to 	resolve 	the 	parties’
arguments 	regarding 	compliance 	with 	Local 	Rules 	7.1(a)(2) 	and
56.1, 	see 	John 	& 	Jane, 	822 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	202-03, 	J&J 	reasonably
raised 	these 	arguments 	in 	connection 	with 	the 	summary 	judgment
briefing.
Isabel 	next 	contends 	that 	the 	Court 	should 	reduce 	J&J’s 	fee
award 	by 	50% 	to 	account 	for 	“non-core” 	work. 	When 	awarding 	fees,
a 	court 	may 	“set 	two 	separate 	hourly 	rates 	for 	a 	particular
attorney -- one for ‘core’ tasks like ‘legal research, writing of
legal 	documents, 	court 	appearances, 	negotiations 	with 	opposing
shall 	reimburse 	each 	of 	them 	for 	such 	penalties, 	fines 	or 	other
expenses or costs.” Dkt. 1-1 ¶ 14. J&J does not cite this provision
in its motion as the basis for an entitlement to fees incurred to
resolve 	the 	NOAA 	proceedings, 	so 	the 	Court 	does 	not 	consider 	the
issue.
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counsel, 	monitoring, 	and 	implementation 	of 	court 	orders’ 	and 	a
lower 	one 	for 	‘non-core’ 	tasks, 	which 	are 	‘less 	demanding,’ 	such
as 	‘letter 	writing 	and 	telephone 	conversations.’” 	Pérez-Sosa, 	22
F.4th at 327-28 (quoting Matalon v. Hynnes, 806 F.3d 627, 638 (1st
Cir. 	2015)). 	“Non-core 	work 	is 	usually 	compensated 	at 	two-thirds
the billing rate approved for core legal work.” Alexander, 734 F.
Supp. 	3d 	at 	142 	(quoting Parker 	v. 	Swansea, 	310 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	376,
391 	(D. 	Mass. 	2004)). 	There 	is, 	however, 	no 	“rigid 	requirement
that 	a 	district 	court 	employ 	a 	core/non-core 	analysis 	when
adjudicating 	a 	fee 	petition,” 	and 	a 	court 	may 	instead 	“employ 	an
across-the-board 	rate 	cut” 	to 	reflect 	billing 	for 	less 	demanding
tasks. Matalon, 806 F.3d at 639.
Upon review of J&J’s counsel’s billing records, some entries
may 	reflect 	non-core 	work, 	mainly 	internal 	and 	external
correspondences. 	However, 	Isabel 	has 	not 	identified 	the 	specific
entries he contends constitute non-core work, and evaluating J&J’s
counsel’s 	records 	is 	further 	complicated 	by 	their 	use 	of 	block
billing where “a single time entry lumped together multiple tasks.”
García, 	169 	F.4th 	at 	28. 	Under 	these 	circumstances, 	the 	Court
applies a global reduction of 20% to J&J’s request for attorney’s
fees to account for both non-core work and block billing. See Dairy
Farmers 	of 	Am., 	Inc. 	v. 	Bernon 	Land 	Tr., 	LLC, 	No. 	22-cv-10422,
2025 	WL 	3012877, 	at 	*9 	(D. 	Mass. 	Oct. 	28, 	2025) 	(applying 	a 	20%
global 	reduction 	“to 	account 	for 	the 	time 	that 	[the 	plaintiff’s]
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counsel devoted to non-core work and to sanction their use of block
billing”).
II. 	Expenses
J&J 	requests 	the 	following 	$2,752.29 	in 	expenses: 	(1) 	the
$405.00 filing fee, (2) $270.00 for use of an electronic discovery
software, 	(3) 	$226.14 	in 	fees 	for 	three 	deliveries, 	and
(4) $1,851.15 	for 	Westlaw 	research. 	Isabel 	does 	not 	dispute 	that
J&J is entitled to recover the filing fee but argues that the other
expenses 	are 	not 	authorized 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1920 	and 	are
excessive.
28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1920 	does 	not 	bar 	J&J 	from 	recovering 	these
expenses. 	That 	provision 	lists 	the 	limited 	costs 	a 	court 	may 	tax
“absent explicit statutory or contractual authorization.” Morales-
Figueroa 	v. 	Santos, 	989 	F.3d 	58, 	60 	(1st 	Cir. 	2021) 	(quoting
Crawford 	Fitting 	Co. 	v. 	J.T. 	Gibbons, 	Inc., 	482 	U.S. 	437, 	445
(1987)); 	see 	BRT 	Mgmt. 	LLC 	v. 	Malden 	Storage, 	LLC, 	No. 	17-cv-
10005, 	2022 	WL 	20766369, 	at 	*6-7 	(D. 	Mass. 	Jan. 	19, 	2022); 	see
also 	Monsanto 	Co. 	v. 	David, 	516 	F.3d 	1009, 	1017 	(Fed. 	Cir. 	2008)
(“28 U.S.C. § 1920 does not set maximum costs around which private
parties may not contract.”). Here, the parties’ contract entitles
J&J 	to 	all 	“reasonable 	. 	. 	. 	expenses.” 	Dkt. 	1-1 	¶ 	13. 	The 	term
“expense” 	refers 	broadly 	to 	“[a]n 	expenditure 	of 	money, 	time,
labor, or resources to accomplish a result.” Expense, Black’s Law
Dictionary 	(12th 	ed. 	2024); 	see 	10 	Wright 	and 	Miller’s 	Federal
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Practice and Procedure § 2666 (4th ed. 2026) (“‘Expenses[]’ . . .
include 	all 	the 	expenditures 	actually 	made 	by 	a 	litigant 	in
connection with the action.”). J&J’s payments for use of electronic
discovery 	software, 	delivery 	fees, 	and 	legal 	research 	were 	all
expenditures incurred to enforce its rights under the contract.
That 	said, 	the 	Court 	deems 	the 	$226.14 	billed 	for 	three
deliveries to be excessive in the absence of an explanation about
the nature of those deliveries and therefore awards only $50.00 in
delivery 	fees. 	And 	while 	case-specific 	charges 	for 	online 	legal
research are generally compensable, see InvesSys, Inc. v. McGraw-
Hill 	Cos., 	369 	F.3d 	16, 	23 	(1st 	Cir. 	2004), 	the 	Court 	also
eliminates the $292.23 in Westlaw fees that appear related to the
Rule 12(c) motion that was never filed.
III. Summary of Award
In 	summary, 	the 	Court 	imposes 	the 	following 	reductions 	to
J&J’s request for $53,421.50 in attorney’s fees: (1) $3,266.50 in
fees 	incurred 	by 	unknown 	timekeepers, 	(2) 	a 	lower 	hourly 	rate 	of
$100.00 	for 	four 	law 	clerks, 	(3) 	$3,965.00 	in 	fees 	related 	to 	a
Rule 	12(c) 	motion 	that 	was 	never 	filed, 	(4) 	$2,260.00 	in 	fees
incurred 	in 	connection 	with 	the 	NOAA 	proceedings, 	and 	(5) 	an
additional 	20% 	global 	reduction 	to 	account 	for 	non-core 	work 	and
block billing. These reductions bring the fee award to $33,624.00.
The Court also reduces J&J’s request for $2,752.29 in expenses to
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$2,283.92 	to 	eliminate 	excessive 	delivery 	fees 	and 	Westlaw 	fees
related to the Rule 12(c) motion.
ORDER
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	J&J’s 	motion 	for 	attorney’s 	fees
and 	expenses 	(Dkt. 	58) 	is 	ALLOWED 	in 	the 	amount 	of 	$33,624.00 	in
attorney’s fees and $2,283.92 in expenses.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ PATTI B. SARIS
Hon. Patti B. Saris
United States District Judge
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