Cafarella v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
THOMAS CAFARELLA,
Plaintiff,
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Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-11032-IT
v. 	*
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MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY,
Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
March 31, 2026
TALWANI, D.J.
Plaintiff Thomas Cafarella brings this action against his former employer, Defendant
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”). Plaintiff alleges Defendant discriminated
against him on the basis of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (“ADEA”), and the Massachusetts Fair Employment Practices Law, Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(1B) (“Chapter 151B”). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant
retaliated against him for pursuing a claim under the Massachusetts Wage Act in violation of
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, §§ 27C, 148, and 148A, and for complaining about age discrimination,
in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, §§ 4(4) and 4(4A), and the ADEA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(d).
For the reasons below, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 81] is
GRANTED on all counts and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Retaliation Counts
[Doc. No. 70] is DENIED as moot.
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I. 	Factual Background
A. Plaintiff’s Tenure at MIT Health Prior to the Events at Issue
MIT Health provides medical services to MIT students, faculty, and staff. Pl.’s Resp. to
Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 2 (“Pl.’s Resp. SUMF”) [Doc. No. 92].
Plaintiff, who was born in 1963, began his employment with Defendant as an Office Manager in
MIT Health’s dental practice in 2007, when he was 44 years old. Id. ¶ 3; Def.’s Responses to
Pl.’s Additional Statement of Facts ¶ 122 (“Def.’s Resp. Additional SUMF”) [Doc. No. 105].
In or about 2008, Plaintiff’s title changed from “Office Manager, Dental” to
“Administrative Coordinator, Medical” but his responsibilities remained the same. Pl.’s Resp.
SUMF ¶ 6.1 As an Administrative Coordinator, Plaintiff was responsible for the day-to-day
operations of the practice including supervising desk staff, working with dental practice
clinicians and support staff, and serving as the administrative manager. Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶¶ 7,
14.
In a 2018 reorganization, Defendant created a new, clinical Dental Practice Manager role,
to oversee day-to-day operations. Tetreault Decl. ¶ 17 [Doc. No. 82-3] (Declaration of former
Director of Human Resources for MIT Health, Catherine Tetreault); Tetreault Dep. at ECF 17
[Doc. No. 82-2]. The position assumed many of the responsibilities of Plaintiff’s position of
Administrative Coordinator but had additional clinical responsibilities. Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶¶ 22,
1 MIT uses both “Job Titles” and “Position Titles” in its personnel records and the parties have
not explained the difference between those titles. According to Plaintiff’s “Appointment
History,” his Job Title already was “Administrative Coordinator, Medical” when he was hired in
2007, and that Job Title did not change in 2008 when the “Office Manager – Dental” Position
Title was dropped. Plaintiff’s Position Title did change in September 2008 with a “change in
Title/Job Code” (but no change in pay) to Special Projects Officer, Dental. Tetreault Dep. at ECF
97 [Doc. No. 82-2] (Plaintiff’s personnel file, appointment history). Plaintiff’s Position Title
remained “Special Projects Officer, Dental” until his termination. Id.
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24–25 [Doc. No. 92]. On January 7, 2019, Defendant promoted Kathleen Sullivan, a dental
hygienist, to the role. Id. ¶ 21. Sullivan was 54 years old at the time of her promotion. Id. ¶ 22.
Also as part of the reorganization, effective December 1, 2018, Defendant reclassified
Plaintiff and the Administrative Coordinator for the medical practice groups, Phyllis Winn,
changing their job title from Administrative Coordinator, Medical, to Special Projects Officer
(“SPO”). Id. ¶¶ 14, 17, 23; Tetreault Dep. at ECF 40 [Doc. No. 82-2] (Letter).2 The SPO role
was a Grade Level 8 position, Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶ 23 [Doc. No. 92], and the reclassification was
without any pay increase, see Tetreault Dep. at ECF 97 [Doc. No. 82-2] (Plaintiff’s personnel
file, appointment history). The position overview for the new role stated that the SPO
manages the coordination of various projects and/or programs that support the
needs of the Service Area(s) or department. The primary responsibility for this role
is to work directly with MIT Medical leadership to coordinate, drive, and track
various projects of different complexity and size that support strategic objectives,
process improvements, and other objectives that result in bringing efficiencies and
effectiveness. The Special Projects Officer uses established project management
tools, philosophies, and methodologies. Projects and initiatives may span service
areas 	or 	may 	be 	area 	specific. 	All 	require 	close monitoring 	and 	frequent
communication to see each to success. This role works closely with the Practice
Manager role (Nurse, Dental, etc.) to ensure consistency in determining needs,
solutions, 	and 	implementation 	methodologies. 	The 	Special 	Projects 	Officer
interfaces with all levels of the organization to ensure adoption, full utilization, and
completion of project objectives. This role has a matrix reporting to the Chief of
Staff office.
Tetreault Dep. at ECF 156 [Doc. No. 82-2] (Deposition exhibit, SPO job description). On April
1, 2019, Plaintiff’s job title changed again from Special Projects Officer to “Program/Project
2 According to Plaintiff’s personnel file, while Plaintiff’s “Job Title” changed from
“Administrative Coordinator, Medical” to “Special Projects Officer,” Plaintiff’s “Position Title”
of “Special Projects Officer, Dental” did not change. Tetreault Dep. at ECF 97–98 [Doc. No. 82-
2] (Plaintiff’s Personnel File, Appointment History).
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Administrator[.]” Id. at ECF 97 (Plaintiff’s personnel file, appointment history).3
Defendant expected that the SPO positions would “develop over time” and, in Plaintiff’s
case, “would be a role that department leadership and/or the Dental Practice Manager could rely
on to implement workflows, training, system upgrades and other tasks, according to business
needs.” Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶ 23 [Doc. No. 92].4 Plaintiff’s performance evaluations in the SPO
role were positive and, early in his tenure in the role, suggested there were opportunities for
development. See Aff. of Counsel ISO Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A, at ECF 113,
123 (“Pl.’s Personnel Records”) [Doc. No. 94-1]. Plaintiff’s performance review for 2018 to
2019, reported that “[Plaintiff] is developing his new role as Special Project Officer” and that
Plaintiff “will be assigned projects this year that will enhance his development in his career
path.” Id. at ECF 113.
Plaintiff’s 2020-2021 performance review, from August 2021, contains significantly less
information about Plaintiff’s performance but was similarly positive. Id. at ECF 123. Plaintiff’s
manager noted that Plaintiff was a “very positive, supportive, and caring employee at MIT
Dental Service” and that he was “an asset to the daily function of the department.” Id. His
manager further noted that Plaintiff was “always available to assist in coverage where needed or
support a task that needs to be completed.” Id. At no point through evaluations or otherwise were
any concerns regarding Plaintiff’s work or role presented to Plaintiff. Pichette Decl. Ex. 5, at 3
(“Def.’s Interrogatory Resps.”) [Doc. No. 82-5] (noting “Defendants’ records indicate that
3 Where both parties refer to Plaintiff’s role as Special Projects Officer, consistent with his
position title, see Tetreault Dep. at ECF 97–98 [Doc. No. 82-2] (Plaintiff’s personnel file,
appointment history), notwithstanding the change of job title, the court does so as well.
4 Defendant had similar expectations for Winn’s role. See id. ¶ 17.
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Plaintiff was not issued formal discipline/corrective action during his employment”); Pl.’s
Personnel Records at ECF 110–124 [Doc. No. 94-1].
During this time, Winn’s SPO role developed to become a trainer and administrative
electronic medical records expert. Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶ 18 [Doc. No. 92]. In contrast, the dental
practice used “a well-established medical records system,” such that it was easier for work
associated with systems upgrades to be taken on by other staff members including the front desk
staff and Dental Practice Manager. Id. ¶ 26. The dental practice additionally did not have much
complex project work. Id.
B. Developments in the Second Half of 2021
By the summer of 2021, Sullivan and Dr. Cecilia Stuopis, MIT Health’s Executive
Director, told MIT Medical’s HR Director Tetreault that there did not seem to be enough work to
justify Plaintiff’s full-time work schedule; Tetreault told Sullivan to have Plaintiff write down
his tasks; Plaintiff was in fact so directed, and he did so. Tetreault Decl. ¶¶ 22–23 [Doc. No. 82-
3]; Cafarella Dep. at ECF 57 [Doc. No. 82-1].5
In an August 30, 2021 email, Tetreault noted that Sullivan “is realizing that she can no
longer protect Tom Cafarella. While [Sullivan] is not outright agreeing that this position should
be eliminated, we are very close.” Tetreault Dep. at ECF 169 [Doc. No. 82-2] (Email).
5 Defendant’s further claim that multiple people, including Kathy Sullivan and Dr. Stuopis
“expressed concern and/or frustration about Plaintiff’s conduct,” see Def.’s Interrogatory Resps.
3 [82-5] (emphasis added), finds no evidentiary support in the summary judgment record.
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In November 2021, MIT Health posted a Project Manager role. Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶ 96
[Doc. No. 92]; Giddarie Decl. ¶ 21 [Doc. No. 82-4].6 Plaintiff did not apply for the position, and
the role was filled by a 69 year-old individual. Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶ 96 [Doc. No. 92].
On December 13, 2021, Defendant posted an opening for a Dental Billing Administrator,
a Grade Level 6 position that paid approximately $40,000 less than Plaintiff’s SPO position. Pl.’s
Resp. SUMF ¶ 77. [Doc. No. 92]. Plaintiff did not apply. Id. ¶ 80. On December 17, 2021,
Tetreault requested that the listing be placed on hold because an internal candidate was a finalist.
Giddarie Decl. at ECF 9 [Doc. No. 82-4] (Hiring records for Dental Billing Administrator
position). On December 23, 2021, MIT promoted 40-year-old Sandra Cabral from a front desk
position to the Billing Administrator position. Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶¶ 76, 79 [Doc. No. 92];
Tetreault Dep. 54:22–55:5 [Doc. No. 94-14].
C. MIT’s Layoff Policy
MIT’s employee handbook provides that when a person is to be laid off, the Department
is required to send a statement of reasons to the appropriate Senior Officer. Tetreault Dep. at
ECF 166 [Doc. No. 82-2] (MIT policy included as deposition exhibit). The handbook provides
further that approval of the Senior Officer (or designee) is required prior to notifying an
employee that they will be laid off. Id.
Pursuant to the handbook, where an employee is laid off for lack of work or funds, the
employee must be provided a letter of notice that “should inform the individual of the reason for
the layoff and the length of the notice period.” Id. The handbook dictates that “[t]he period of
6 According to the job description, the Position Title was “Project Manager,” but the Job Title,
like the Job Title for Plaintiff’s SPO position, was Program/Project Administrator. Aff. of
Counsel ISO Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. E, at ECF 3 (“Project Manager Job
Description”) [Doc. No. 94-5].
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notice does not represent severance pay but rather a period during which the individual continues
to be employed at their regular salary until a specified layoff date or until the individual is
employed elsewhere, whichever comes earlier.” Id. at ECF 166–67. The handbook provides
further that “[i]t should be made clear that the individual is expected to carry out their usual
responsibilities during the notice period but that a reasonable amount of time will be allowed to
seek another position at MIT or elsewhere.” Id. at ECF 166.
The handbook also states that laid off employees are “encouraged to review job postings
for other positions at MIT for which they may be qualified” and to contact their respective
human resources officer if they applied. Id. Hiring managers in departments are also
“encouraged to consider qualified employees on layoff notice for available positions.” Id.
The handbook establishes that “[w]hen concerns about security or workplace safety
warrant, a department may relieve an employee of the obligation to report to work . . . [and] the
notice requirement may then fulfilled through a lump sum payment, salary continuation, or a
combination of both.” Id. at ECF 167. The handbook provides a further exception for relieving
an employee of the obligation to report to work on a case-by-case basis “where the interests of
MIT may be served.” Id.
D. The Elimination of the SPO Positions in MIT Health and Plaintiff’s Termination
On January 20, 2022, Tetreault sent a memorandum to an HR Officer titled “Justification
for Layoffs Due to Reorganization.” Tetreault Dep. at ECF 101 [Doc. No. 82-2]. The
memorandum identified Winn and Cafarella and compared, inter alia, their respective dates of
hire (January 2008 for Winn and September 2007 for Cafarella), age (50 for Winn and 58 for
Cafarella), asserted that that “the introduction of the [dental] electronic [records] system impacts
the work that is currently performed by a single employee,” Cafarella, and identified the different
duties that Winn would be continuing to do. Id. at ECF 101–02. Finally, the memorandum noted
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that “this layoff has been approved by the Senior Officer for MIT Medical,” Dr. Stuopis, who,
together with individuals in “central HR,” made the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s position. Id.
at ECF 102; id. at ECF 27. Although the memorandum does not state exactly when that decision
was made, Tetreault’s undisputed testimony was that it was “only a few days before [they]
actually delivered the message.” Id. at ECF 27.
Defendant informed Plaintiff of his termination on Thursday, February 3, 2022. Id. at
ECF 31. Plaintiff’s termination letter stated Plaintiff was being laid off “due to a lack of work
resulting in the elimination of [his] position[]” and that the letter was his “formal notice of
layoff[.]” Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 7 [Doc. No. 70-9] (Plaintiff’s termination letter). Although
Plaintiff’s notice period per the handbook policy was 22 weeks, Plaintiff was given an official
termination date of the following day, Friday, February 4. Id. The letter advised Plaintiff that he
would receive payment of all final wages, including 22 weeks of pay in lieu of layoff notice, and
40 days of accrued and unused vacation pay, via direct deposit on February 4, and that he was
not required to come to work that day. Id.
Because the reason given for the termination was a lack of work, Plaintiff was considered
under MIT’s handbook to have been laid off and eligible for re-hire. Def.’s Resps. to Pl.’s Local
Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts (“Def.’s Resp. SUMF”) ¶¶ 9–11 [Doc. No. 85]. The termination
letter made no mention, however, of pursuing other opportunities at MIT and instead directed
him to MIT’s benefits website, including the page for “leaving-MIT” for additional information.
Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 7 [Doc. No. 70-9] (Plaintiff’s termination letter).
The other SPO job title in MIT Health also was eliminated in the same time period, as
Winn’s job title changed in early 2022 to Senior Healthcare Systems Analyst, reflecting the new
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job duties she had taken on after being assigned the SPO position. Pls.’ Resp. SUMF ¶ 19 [Doc.
No. 92]. Winn remains employed at MIT Health. Id.
Despite MIT’s assurances, Plaintiff’s final paycheck was not deposited in Plaintiff’s bank
account on February 4, 2022. Aff. of Counsel ISO Opp’n to Def.’s MSJ Ex. B, at ECF 2
(“Plaintiff’s Bank Records”) [Doc. No. 94-2].
E. 	Plaintiff’s Wage Claim, MIT’s Payment of Final Wages, and Plaintiff’s Demand
Letter
On Saturday, February 5, 2022, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a complaint alleging a violation
of the Massachusetts Wage Act with the Cambridge District Court. Aff. of Pl.’s Counsel ISO
Opp’n to Def.’s MSJ Ex. H, at 4 [Doc. No. 94-8] (Cambridge District Court complaint).
On Monday, February 7, 2022, the missing final payment was deposited in Plaintiff’s
account. Plaintiff’s Bank Records [Doc. No. 94-2].
On February 11, 2022, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a complaint with the Massachusetts
Attorney General alleging that Plaintiff’s final wages were not paid on his last date of
employment, as required by the Massachusetts Wage Act. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 9, at ECF
6 [Doc. No. 70-11] (Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office complaint).
On or about February 17, 2022, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a demand letter to Defendant
regarding his Wage Act claim. Def.’s Resp. SUMF ¶ 16 [Doc. No. 85].
F. 	The New Project Manager Position
Less than one month after Plaintiff was terminated, on March 2, 2022, Defendant posted
a job opening for a Project Manager position with MIT Health. Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶ 81 [Doc. No.
92]. The description of the Project Manager position, the qualifications and skills required for the
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role, and the duties and responsibilities of the role shared similarities with that of Plaintiff’s SPO
role, as well as some differences.7
The job description for this role stated:
PROJECT 	MANAGER, 	MIT 	Medical, 	to 	manage 	the 	coordination 	and
performance of operational administrative activities for various large, complex,
program-level projects/programs. Will be responsible for key PMO functions
related to project status roll-ups and process compliance. Projects and initiatives
span 	all 	service 	areas 	and 	often 	require 	close 	monitoring 	and 	frequent
communication. The primary responsibility will be to work directly with MIT
Medical leadership and various subproject leaders to coordinate, drive, and track
initiatives/projects that support the department's strategic objectives by using
established project management tools, philosophies, and methodologies. Will
implement 	complex 	projects 	from 	conception, 	scope 	definition, 	schedule
management, through to completion; work closely with the executive leadership
team on managing their projects as an advisor and educator; and be responsible for
administrative tasks such as generating presentations and reports, coordinating
meetings and events, scheduling travel, managing expenses, etc.
Giddarie Decl.at ECF 13–14 [Doc. No. 82-4].8
G. The March 3 Email and March 30 Demand Letter
On March 3, 2022, after this position was posted, Plaintiff emailed Defendant
withdrawing a prior settlement demand and asserting that Plaintiff had “uncovered additional
information relating to [Plaintiff’s] potential claims against [Defendant.]” Pl.’s Mot. for Summ.
J. Ex. 13, at ECF 53 [Doc. No. 70-15]. On March 30, 2022, Plaintiff issued a second demand
letter to Defendant. Def.’s Resp. SUMF ¶ 21 [Doc. No. 85]. The letter reasserted violations of
the Massachusetts Wage Act claim and added alleged violations of state and federal laws
7 The similarities and differences are discussed further below.
8 The actual posting for the March 2022 posting is not in the record but there is no dispute that
the position was “virtually identical” to the MIT Health Project Manager position posted in 2021.
Giddarie Decl. ¶ 21 [Doc. No. 82-4].
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prohibiting age discrimination. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 14 [Doc. No. 70-16] (Plaintiff’s
Second Demand Letter).
H. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Resolves a Dispute Regarding the Penalty
for Late Payments
On April 4, 2022, the Massachusetts Supreme Court determined that damages for late
payments must be calculated as treble the wages due and not merely treble the interest due.
Reuters v. City of Methuen, 489 Mass. 465, 476, 184 N.E.3d 772, 781 (2022) (“Reuters”).
I. 	The Parties Commence Settlement Negotiations
Beginning April 5, 2022, and continuing through mid-August, the parties engaged in
settlement negotiations in response to Plaintiff’s second demand letter.9
J. 	The Project Manager position is filled.
Plaintiff did not apply for the Project Manager position posted on March 3, 2022. Pl.’s
Resp. SUMF ¶ 91 [Doc. No. 92]. Plaintiff states that he “was discouraged from applying for the
position after viewing the [April 7] email sent by MIT.” Cafarella Aff. ¶ 9 [Doc. No. 93].
On June 1, 2022, Defendant hired thirty-year-old M.C. for the Project Manager position.
Def.’s Resp. Additional SUMF ¶¶ 134–35 [Doc. No. 105]. Consistent with the 2019 job
description, the “Job Title” recorded for M.C. in the hiring records for the role is
Program/Project Administrator. Aff. of Counsel ISO Opp’n to Def.’s MSJ Ex. F, at ECF 6 [Doc.
No. 94-6] (Personnel hiring records).
9 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 408, the admissibility of settlement negotiations depends on
the purpose for which they are proffered. Accordingly, details of these negotiations are excluded
from this general factual background and discussed below, as appropriate based on the purpose
for which the communications are offered.
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K. Settlement Negotiations Conclude and MIT Pays Plaintiff the Late Wage Payment
Penalty
Once it became apparent to Defendant that the parties would be unable to settle their
dispute, Defendant issued Plaintiff payment for damages under the Massachusetts Wage Act and
attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Reuters
because Plaintiff did not receive his final pay on his final day of employment. Pl.’s Resp. SUMF
¶ 75 [Doc. No. 92].
L. 	Defendant posts a Dental Billing Specialist Position
In 2023, after MIT decided to post an opening for a dental billing position, a dental
practice director at MIT contacted Plaintiff twice to inform Plaintiff that the position would soon
be posted and encourage him to apply. Id. ¶¶ 99–100. On February 6, 2023, Defendant posted
internally and externally an opening for a Dental Billing Specialist, a Grade Level 5 role. Id.
¶¶ 97–98; Pichette Decl. Ex. 4, at ECF 20–23 [Doc. No. 82-4] (Dental Billing Specialist job
listing). Plaintiff did not see the position on the MIT website. Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶ 101 [Doc. No.
92]; Cafarella Dep. at ECF 66–67 [Doc. No. 82-1]. Nevertheless, the parties do not dispute that
the position was posted internally and externally and that Plaintiff did not apply for it. Pl.’s Resp.
SUMF ¶¶ 98, 101 [Doc. No. 92].
The posting was removed on February 16, 2023. Id. ¶ 98.10
Plaintiff has not applied for any position with MIT since his termination. Pl.’s Resp.
SUMF ¶ 106 [Doc. No. 92].
10 The length the position was posted was similar to that of the 2021 Dental Billing Specialist
position. Pichette Decl. Ex. 4, at ECF 8–9 [Doc. No. 82-4]. In that case, the position was created
on December 13, 2021. On December 17, 2021, Tetreault requested that the listing be placed on
hold because Defendant had identified an internal candidate as a finalist. Id. at ECF 9. On
December 23, 2021, the position was modified. Id.
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II. 	Standard of Review
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate
when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material when, under
the governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Baker v. St. Paul Travelers, Inc., 670 F.3d 119, 125 (1st
Cir. 2012). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute
of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This burden can be
satisfied in two ways: (1) by submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of
the non-moving party’s claim or (2) by demonstrating that the non-moving party failed to
establish an essential element of its claim. See id. at 331.
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the
burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth facts demonstrating that a genuine dispute of
material fact remains. See id. at 321. The non-moving party cannot oppose a properly supported
summary judgment motion by “rest[ing] on mere allegations or denials of [the] pleadings.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Rather, the non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by
[his or] her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at
324 (quotations omitted). Disputes over facts “that are irrelevant or unnecessary” will not
preclude summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must take all properly
supported evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all reasonable
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inferences in the non-movant’s favor. See Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.
1990). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate
inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for
summary judgment . . . .” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
The filing of cross motions does not alter these general standards; rather, the court
reviews each party’s motion independently, viewing the facts and drawing inferences as required
by the applicable standard, and determines, for each side, the appropriate ruling. See Wightman
v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d 228, 230 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that cross-motions for
summary judgment do not “alter the basic Rule 56 standard” but rather require the court “to
determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not
disputed”).
III. 	Age Discrimination
Under the ADEA and Chapter 151B, an employer may not discriminate against
employees based on their age. See Tombeno v. FedEx Corp. Servs., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 3d 80, 86
(D. Mass. 2018).
“Because the analyses of age discrimination claims under the ADEA and Chapter 151B
are substantially similar,” the claims can be examined together in most respects using the
framework applicable to ADEA claims. Cocuzzo v. Trader Joe’s E. Inc., 121 F.4th 924, 930 (1st
Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). Where an employee does not present direct evidence of age
discrimination, as is the case here, courts apply the three-step burden-shifting framework set
forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–805 (1973) [hereinafter
McDonnell Douglas]. See Adamson v. Walgreens Co., 750 F.3d 73, 78 (1st Cir. 2014); see also
Yee v. Mass. State Police, 481 Mass. 290, 294, 121 N.E.3d 155, 160 (2019) (applying
McDonnell Douglas framework to claim brought under Chapter 151B).
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A. Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case
In the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff carries the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See Yee, 481 Mass. at 294. Where a
plaintiff alleges discriminatory termination, the plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by
showing that: “1) he was at least 40 years old at the time he was fired; 2) he was qualified for the
position he had held; 3) he was fired, and 4) the employer subsequently filled the position,
demonstrating a continuing need for the plaintiff’s services.” Velez v. Thermo King de P.R.,
Inc., 585 F.3d 441, 447 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 444 Mass. 34,
41, 825 N.E.2d 522, 531 (2005) (noting prima facie case requires evidence that plaintiff belongs
to class protected by Chapter 151b, performed job at acceptable level, was terminated, and that
employer sought to fill plaintiff’s position by hiring individual with qualifications similar to
plaintiff’s).
In a reduction-in-force case asserting a violation under the ADEA, plaintiffs must satisfy
a slightly different fourth element to state a prima facie case. For the fourth element, a plaintiff
must show that “his employer did not treat age neutrally or younger persons were retained in the
same position.” Brennan v. GTE Gov't Sys. Corp., 150 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 1998) (citations
omitted). Under Massachusetts law, where an employee is not replaced, such as in a reduction-
in-force case, plaintiffs may instead show for the fourth element that the termination occurred
under “circumstances that would raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination.”
Sullivan, 444 Mass. 34, 45, 825 N.E.2d 522, 533–34 (2005).
The burden to establish a prima facie case is “not onerous.” Santiago-Ramos v.
Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 823 (1st Cir. 1991) (internal
citations omitted). “All that is needed is the production of admissible evidence which, if
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uncontradicted, would justify a legal conclusion of discrimination.” Brennan, 150 F.3d at 26
(quoting Sanchez v. P.R. Oil Co., 37 F.3d 712, 719 (1st Cir.1994)); Kosereis v. R.I., 331 F.3d
207, 213 (1st Cir.2003) (“[P]rima facie case is a small showing that is not onerous and is easily
made.” (citations and quotations omitted)).
Defendant does not contest that Plaintiff has established the first three elements of his
prima facie case: Plaintiff was over the age of forty, while employed he met his employer’s
performance expectations, and he was terminated. Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot
establish the fourth element of his case, where, Defendant argues, MIT Health eliminated
Plaintiff’s position, and the new Project Manager position was not the same as Plaintiff’s SPO
role. Defendant contends that it therefore did not fill Plaintiff’s role when it filled the new
Project Manager position.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s hiring of a Project Manager is indicative that there was
sufficient work available because the position was posted less than one month after Plaintiff’s
termination and because it was “nearly identical to the one that Plaintiff was terminated from
allegedly due to ‘lack of work.’” Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 8 [Doc. No. 91]. But
while the positions may be similar, Plaintiff is not able to show that the positions are the same.
The positions differed in scope, with the SPO role having a narrower focus on work
primarily relating to MIT Health’s dental practice. The SPO job description noted the role’s
“[p]rojects and initiatives may span service areas or may be area specific.” Tetreault Dep. at ECF
156 [Doc. No. 82-2] (Deposition exhibit, SPO job description) (emphasis added). The Project
Manager’s job description meanwhile noted the position’s “[p]rojects and initiatives span all
service areas.” Aff. of Counsel ISO Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. E, at ECF 3 (“Project
Manager Job Description”) [Doc. No. 94-5]. And while both roles, per their descriptions, would
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work directly with MIT Medical Leadership, the SPO role would also “work[] closely with the
Practice Manager role (Nurse, Dental, etc.).” Tetreault Dep. at ECF 156 [Doc. No. 82-2]
(Deposition exhibit, SPO job description). In comparison, the Project Manager role would
“work[] closely with Executive Leadership Team members.” Project Manager Job Description at
ECF 3 [Doc. No. 94-5].
The Project Manager position also required a higher level of project management
expertise and proficiency. The SPO job description noted that it was preferred that the candidates
be proficient in Microsoft Office Suite, MS Project, and Visio (despite listing these skills in the
“Minimum Required Education and Experience” section), while the Project Manager role
required these proficiencies. Tetreault Dep. at ECF 159–60 [Doc. No. 82-2] (Deposition exhibit,
SPO job description); Project Manager Job Description at ECF 7 [Doc. No. 94-5]. The Project
Manager role also required “[s]trong working knowledge / expertise of project management
tools, methodologies, [and] processes.” Project Manager Job Description at ECF 6 [Doc. No. 94-
5]. The SPO role meanwhile listed familiarity with project management tools, methodologies,
and processes as a preferred skill. See Tetreault Dep. at ECF 160 [Doc. No. 82-2] (Deposition
exhibit, SPO job description).
Finally, the roles had different reporting structures. Though both roles would report up to
the Chief of Staff office, their immediate supervisors differed. See id. at ECF 156 (noting SPO
position had “matrix reporting to the Chief of Staff office”); Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶ 83 [Doc. No.
92] (noting Project Manager position would “report[] up through the Project Management
Office . . . led by Rosie Huntress, MIT Health’s Chief of Staff”). The SPO position would
“report[] to either Chief of Service or area Director.” Tetreault Dep. at ECF 159 [Doc. No. 82-2]
(Deposition exhibit, SPO job description). The Project Manager position meanwhile would
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“[r]eport to either the Assistant Director, Project Management and Strategic Planning or the
Director of Financial Planning and Control.” Project Manager Job Description at ECF 6 [Doc.
No. 94-5].
Given the differences in the two positions, Plaintiff has not met the fourth element for an
age-based termination claim, where he has not shown that “the employer subsequently filled the
position, demonstrating a continuing need for the plaintiff’s services.” Velez, 585 F.3d at 447
(emphasis added).
As to an age-based reduction in force claim, however, Plaintiff has met the “not onerous”
burden for a prima facie case. First, during the reorganization, MIT Health retained the other
SPO, Winn, who was 8 years younger than Cafarella. See Brennan, 150 F.3d at 26 (A plaintiff
may satisfy the fourth element under the ADEA by showing that “younger persons were retained
in the same position.”). And for purposes of a reduction of force case under Massachusetts law,
Plaintiff has demonstrated a prima facie case based on “circumstances that would raise a
reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination.” Sullivan, 444 Mass. at 35. Although Plaintiff
cannot show that the new Project Manager position and Plaintiff’s SPO role were the same
position, he can show that they shared significant similarities. Both roles were Grade Level 8
positions and had the same “Job Title” of “Program/Project Administrator.” Tetreault Dep. at
ECF 95, 97 [Doc. No. 82-2] (Plaintiff’s personnel file, appointment history); Project Manager
Job Description ECF 3 [Doc. No. 94-5]. Both positions required, at minimum, a bachelor’s
degree or equivalent work experience and at least three years of “administrative, operations,
and/or project/program management experience.” Tetreault Dep. at ECF 159 [Doc. No. 82-2]
(SPO Job Description); Project Manager Job Description at ECF 6 [Doc. No. 94-5]. The roles
required managing the coordination of projects, working directly with MIT Medical leadership to
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coordinate, drive, and track projects, and using “established project management tools,
philosophies, and methodologies.” Tetreault Dep. at ECF 156 [Doc. No. 82-2] (SPO Job
Description); Project Manager Job Description at ECF 3 [Doc. No. 94-5].
Defendant also terminated Plaintiff’s employment with a lump sum payment, rather than
a period of layoff notice, as per the general procedure set forth under the handbook. Had Plaintiff
continued as an employee during a twenty-two week notice period, MIT managers may have
been incentivized to hire him, saving MIT the expense of his notice pay had he been selected for
the position. See Tetreault Dep. at ECF 167 [Doc. No. 82-2] (MIT policy included as deposition
exhibit) (establishing that notice period “does not represent severance pay but rather a period
during which the individual continues to be employed at their regular salary until a specified
layoff date or until the individuals employed elsewhere, whichever comes earlier”). Defendant
deviated from its general policy without identifying any interests of MIT, such as concerns about
security or workplace safety, that would be served. While MIT has explained that there was not
enough work to support his role, that presumably would be the case in all layoff cases, and MIT
has not suggested that Plaintiff was performing no work at all.
In sum, where Defendant laid off Plaintiff rather than Winn, Plaintiff was terminated with
one day’s notice and a lump sum payment rather than 22 weeks’ notice, Defendant posted a
position just weeks after Plaintiff’s layoff that was at the same grade level and bore significant
similarities to his role, and Defendant hired a younger person for this similar position, the
circumstances reasonably support an inference of unlawful discrimination. Accordingly, Plaintiff
has met his burden of establishing a prima facie case as to a reduction-in-force case.
B. Defendant’s non-discriminatory reason
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises, and
the burden of production shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption “by articulating a
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lawful reason for its employment decision and producing credible evidence that the reason or
reasons advanced were the real reasons.” Sullivan, 444 Mass. at 50, 825 N.E.2d at 538 (cleaned
up) (citations omitted); Woodward v. Emulex Corp., 714 F.3d 632, 638 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[T]he
employer must provide ‘some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’ for terminating the
employee.” (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802)). Defendant’s “burden at this stage is
one of production and not persuasion; [a defendant] need not prove that the reasons were
nondiscriminatory.” Sullivan, 444 Mass. at 51, 825 N.E.2d at 538 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). Here, Defendant’s internal memorandum to an HR Officer titled “Justification for
Layoffs Due to Reorganization,” explained that the different electronic records systems between
the dental and medical units impacted Cafarella’s work, but not Winn’s. Tetreault Dep. at ECF
101 [Doc. No. 82-2]; see also Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶ 18 [Doc. No. 92]. Plaintiff’s termination letter
explained that his lay off was “due to a lack of work resulting in the elimination of [Plaintiff’s]
position.” Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 7 [Doc. No. 70-9] (Plaintiff’s termination letter). In
support of this justification, and in rebuttal to Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant replaced
Plaintiff with a younger employee in the same position, Defendant offered additional evidence
that the positions were different. See, e.g., Tetreault Dep. at ECF 23 [Doc. No. 82-2]
(distinguishing required qualifications for roles).11 These differences support Defendant’s
argument that the posting of the Project Manager position was not contrary to their assertion of a
lack of work for the SPO role. Defendants also offered as justification for not hiring Cafarella as
a Project Manager that Defendant was under no obligation to transfer Plaintiff to a different,
11 Though the job description does not note this distinction, the parties do not dispute that the
Project Manager role also required knowledge of other Project Management Institute (“PMI”)
protocols, tools and methodologies. Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶ 84 [Doc. No. 92].
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albeit similar, role. Def.’s Mem. ISO Mot. for Summ. J. 10–12 [Doc. No. 84]; Def.’s Resp.
SUMF ¶¶ 91, 106 [Doc. No. 92]. See Webber v. Int'l Paper Co., 417 F.3d 229, 240 (1st Cir.
2005) (citing cases for proposition that “an employer undertaking a RIF is not required to offer
an employee a transfer to another job position”).
Defendant has met its burden to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
actions: namely, the lack of work for the SPO Dental position and the differences between that
position and the Project Manager position.12
C. Pretext
“If the employer meets its burden, the presumption of discrimination vanishes.” Brennan,
150 F.3d at 26. At the third step, the burden shifts back to the employee. Under the ADEA, the
employee must “present sufficient evidence to show both that the employer’s articulated
reason . . . is a pretext and that the true reason is discriminatory . . . . Plaintiffs may use the same
evidence to support both conclusions[.]” Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 5 (internal marks and
citation omitted); see also Brennan, 150 F.3d at 26. Massachusetts, meanwhile, is a pretext-only
state. See Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 681, 46 N.E.3d 24, 33 (2016) (citing
Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Bos., Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 443, 646 N.E.2d 111, 116
(1995)). Under Massachusetts law, a plaintiff therefore “need only present evidence from which
a reasonable jury could infer that ‘the respondent’s facially proper reasons given for its action
12 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff was not qualified for the job. Had Plaintiff applied for the
job and had Defendant not selected him, Defendant’s assessment of his qualifications would
have been material. And had Defendant considered Plaintiff for the Project Manager position
prior to his layoff and still laid him off, the assessment would also have been material. But where
there is no evidence in the record of any negative assessment of Plaintiff’s qualifications for the
Project Manager position prior to Plaintiff’s layoff, and where Plaintiff did not apply for the
position, the court cannot find that Plaintiff’s purported lack of qualifications for the position
was a reason for Defendant’s action.
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against him were not the real reasons for that action.’” Id. at 682 (quoting Wheelock Coll. v.
Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 130, 139, 355 N.E.2d 309, 315 (1976)).
Plaintiff contends it can show Defendant’s actions were pretextual because Defendant
“posted a position evidencing the work needed by the department that the Plaintiff was
terminated from just weeks prior” and that “[t]his position is nearly identical to the one that
Plaintiff was terminated from allegedly due to lack of work.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for
Summ. J. 8 [Doc. No. 91]. But, as noted, the SPO and Project Manager positions were not
identical.
Plaintiff claims further that Defendant’s justification was pretextual because it decided to
terminate Plaintiff in the summer of 2021, but did not inform him until February 2022, and, as a
result, Plaintiff did not apply to the 2021 Dental Billing Administrator position. See Pl.’s Opp’n
to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 11 [Doc. No. 91]. Although Plaintiff ‘s workload was under
discussion during the latter half of 2021, MIT’s handbook specifically requires that an employee
may not be notified of a layoff until the appropriate Senior Officer approves the layoff, see
Tetreault Dep. at ECF 166 [Doc. No. 82-2], and there is no evidence in the record that that
occurred prior to January 20, 2022.
Circumstantial evidence of other terminations within MIT Health also undermines
Plaintiff’s claim. Around the time Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s role, it laid off multiple other
employees, nearly half of which were below the age of forty, including one individual who was
thirty-two and laid off on the same day as Plaintiff. Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶¶ 35, 37 [Doc. No. 92];
Pichette Decl. Ex. 4, at ECF 25–26 [Doc. No. 82-4] (chart of terminated employees). During his
deposition, Plaintiff separately identified five other individuals he claimed Defendant had
terminated or pushed to resign because of their age. Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶ 107 [Doc. No. 92];
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Cafarella Dep. at ECF 47–53 [Doc. No. 82-1]. Plaintiff, however, has not, for any of these
employees, provided evidence beyond conjectures to suggest that the individuals’ terminations or
resignations were on account of their age.13
As to Plaintiff’s own termination, the record also does not support bias toward Plaintiff
by Dr. Stuopis, the final decision-maker in Plaintiff’s layoff. “[T]he discriminatory intent of
which a plaintiff complains must be traceable to the person or persons who made the decision to
fire him.” Bennett v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 507 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir. 2007). Here, Dr. Stuopis
signed a Layoff Justification Notice indicating Plaintiff’s role was terminated because of lack of
work. Pichette Decl. Ex. 2, at ECF 101–02 [Doc. No. 82-2]. Plaintiff has presented no evidence
to suggest Dr. Stuopis was instead motivated by discriminatory bias.
Finally, there is no dispute that Plaintiff did not apply for the Project Manager position
and that Defendant was not otherwise obligated by its own policies to move Plaintiff into that
role rather than lay him off. Plaintiff asserts first that he “was discouraged from applying for the
position” after viewing the April 7 email sent by Defendant. Cafarella Aff. ¶ 9 [Doc. No. 93].
But regardless of his feelings of discouragement, the record is undisputed that the MIT handbook
establishes that he was eligible for rehire and encouraged to apply. Def.’s Resp. SUMF ¶ 12
[Doc. No. 85]. Moreover, Plaintiff was aware of the position from the time it was posted (as
evidenced by Plaintiff’s counsel’s email of March 3, 2022) and still did not apply during the
more than a full month before he reviewed Defense counsel’s April 7 email.14
13 Further, during this time, Defendant also hired and did not terminate at least one individual
older than Defendant. Notably, in November 2021, Defendant hired a Project Manager, D.W.,
who is ten years older than Plaintiff. Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶ 96 [Doc. No. 92]; Giddarie Decl. ¶¶
21–22 [Doc. No. 82-4].
14 Nor can Plaintiff point to the content of that email to support a claim of age discrimination.
Federal Rule of Evidence “prohibits the introduction of settlement offers or statements made
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In sum, where the Project Manager and SPO positions were not the same position, and
where Plaintiff failed to apply for the Project Manager position, Plaintiff has not presented
sufficient evidence such that a jury could reasonably find Plaintiff’s termination from the SPO
position through a reduction in force was pretextual.
Plaintiff therefore cannot prevail on a claim of age discrimination under the ADEA or
Chapter 151B. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion summary judgment as to Counts II and IV of
Plaintiff’s complaint is granted.
IV. 	Retaliation
Courts similarly apply the three-step burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell
Douglas in cases involving claims of retaliation, with slight modifications. Soto-Feliciano v.
Villa Cofresi Hotels, Inc., 779 F.3d 19, 30 (1st Cir. 2015). Pursuant to the framework, a plaintiff
must first “make a prima facie showing that (i) he engaged in . . . protected conduct, (ii) he was
thereafter subjected to an adverse employment action, and (iii) a causal connection existed
between the protected conduct and the adverse action.” Id. (ADEA-protected activity); see also
Figueroa v. Cactus Mexican Grill LLC, 575 F. Supp. 3d 208, 217 (D. Mass. 2021) (Wage Act
protected activity); Tombeno, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 90 (ADEA and M.G.L. c. 151B protected
activity).
during settlement negotiations ‘to prove or disprove the validity . . . ’ of that claim at a later
date.” Moreta v. First Transit of P.R., Inc., 39 F. Supp. 3d 169, 176 (D.P.R. 2014) (citing Fed. R.
Evid. 408). Plaintiff’s use of those communications to prove his age discrimination claim is thus
barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 408’s prohibition on the introduction of settlement offers or
statements made during settlement negotiations “to prove or disprove the validity” of that claim
at a later date. Fed. R. Evid. 408.
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A. Protected Activity
The record is undisputed that in February 2022, Plaintiff engaged in protected activity
under the Wage Act when his counsel filed Plaintiff’s wage complaints and sent a demand letter,
and that he engaged in protected activity under the Wage Act, the ADEA, and Chapter 151B
when counsel reiterated his Wage Act claim and added age discrimination to a demand letter on
March 30, 2022.
B. Adverse Action
At issue is whether Defendant took any adverse action against Plaintiff following his
protected conduct.
1. 	Failure to Rehire
A plaintiff alleging retaliation on account of a failure to rehire generally “must show that
(1) she applied for a particular position (2) which was vacant and (3) for which she was
qualified. In addition, she must show that she was not hired for that position.” Velez v. Janssen
Ortho, LLC, 467 F.3d 802, 807 (1st Cir. 2006). At the same time, there may be exceptions
“where the facts of a particular case make an allegation of a specific application a quixotic
requirement,” id. at 808 n.6 (citing Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 710 (2d Cir.
1998)), or where “an employer makes it clear that completing the application process is futile on
account of a potential applicant’s recent complaint of age discrimination[.]” Gonzalez-Bermudez
v. Abbott Lab’ys P.R. Inc., 990 F.3d 37, 47 (1st Cir. 2021). In such instances “the law may
require only that the plaintiff show that she would have otherwise applied for and obtained the
job.” Id.
As discussed above, that Plaintiff was “discouraged” from applying for the Project
Manager position does not excuse his failure to do so where the handbook encouraged him to do
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so and the letter from Defendant’s counsel that he found discouraging was not received until the
position had been posted for a full month.
2. 	Other Adverse Action
For purposes of a retaliation claim, an action can also be considered materially adverse if
the action must be one that could “well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting
a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006)
(Title VII Retaliation Claim). An adverse employment action could include “actions not directly
related to [a plaintiff’s] employment” or actions “causing [a plaintiff] harm outside the
workplace.” Id. at 63. Similarly, under Massachusetts law, “an action taken by an employer is an
‘adverse employment action’ where it is ‘substantial enough to have materially disadvantaged an
employee.’” Yee, 481 Mass. at 296, 121 N.E.3d at 162 (quoting Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 459
Mass. 697, 707-708, 947 N.E.2d 520, 530 (2011)). “The disadvantage must be objectively
apparent to a reasonable person in the employee’s position; subjective feelings of disappointment
and disillusionment will not suffice.” Id. at 297 (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to adverse action when Defendant changed
Plaintiff’s status from eligible for re-hire to ineligible for rehire by “institut[ing] a de facto policy
against hiring [Plaintiff] back or considering him for rehire . . . once he had made the complaints
against [Defendant].” Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 15 [Doc. No. 91]. Such a change
in status would be an objectively disadvantaged change apparent to a person in the employee’s
position regardless of whether the Plaintiff applied for another position. For example, an
individual seeking other employment is likely to be confronted with the standard job application
question of whether they are or are not eligible for rehire with their former employer.
Plaintiff’s primary evidence in support of this claim is from the parties’ settlement
communications. While Defendant points to Rule 408’s bar on settlement communications, that
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bar is “inapplicable when the claim is based upon some wrong that was committed in the course
of the settlement discussions.” Moreta, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 176 (quoting Scott v. Goodman, 961 F.
Supp. 424, 437 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)). “And a settlement offer may be used to show ‘an independent
violation . . . unrelated to the underlying claim which was the subject of the correspondence.’”
Id. at 176–77 (quoting Carney v. Am. Univ., 151 F.3d 1090, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Here, the
settlement negotiations concerned Plaintiff’s wage act and age discrimination claims, while the
alleged wrong—the retaliatory institution of a future facing policy to not rehire Plaintiff—is an
unrelated, independent violation.
But while Plaintiff is not precluded from offering the settlement communications in
support of his retaliation claim, the proffered communications here fail to support a prima facie
case of retaliation.
From April to mid-August 2022, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations in an
attempt to resolve Plaintiff’s age discrimination and wage act claims. Gill Dep. at ECF 42 [Doc.
No. 82-6] (Exhibits from deposition of Plaintiff’s attorney); Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶ 54 [Doc. No.
92]. It was Defendant’s common practice to include No Re-Employment clauses as part of its
settlement agreements. Tetreault Dep. 91:17–92:1 [Doc. No. 70-7]. And each version of a
proposed agreement exchanged between the parties, starting with Defendant’s proposed
settlement from April 22, included a provision stating:
[Plaintiff] understands and agrees that, as a condition of the Settlement payment to
him as described in Paragraph 1, he shall not be entitled to any employment with
MIT now or at any time in the future, and he will not apply for employment with
MIT at any time in the future.
Pls. Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 13, at ECF 4 [Doc. No. 70-15] (emphasis added). On its face, this
language only applied in the context of a settlement and does not establish a broader policy that
applies outside of a settlement.
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The proposed settlement, moreover, concerned payment in exchange for the resolution of
disputed claims. That the claims were disputed is underscored by additional language in the same
agreement stating that Defendant “denied and continues to deny liability” and that Plaintiff
acknowledged that the payment under the agreement “exceeds any legal payment obligation of
MIT[.]” Id. at ECF 2. Moreover, once the parties were unable to reach a global resolution,
Defendant paid Plaintiff the penalty wages, which were no longer in dispute following the SJC’s
decision in Reuters, without conditioning that payment on a no-Reemployment demand.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant “made abundantly clear that MIT made a change to the
Plaintiff’s status . . . whether he executed the settlement agreement or not.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s
Mot. for Summ. J. 16 [Doc. No. 91] (emphasis added). But the proffered evidence does not
support this claim. Plaintiff points first to Defendant’s purported failure to respond to Plaintiff’s
settlement offer that included being rehired at MIT. See id. Defendant did make a counter-offer,
albeit without offering any employment. Aff. of Counsel ISO Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.
Ex. L, at ECF 123–125 [Doc. No. 94-12]. Regardless, a rejected or ignored settlement offer
shows nothing as to what Defendant’s position was if Plaintiff did not execute the settlement
agreement.
Plaintiff also points next to a sentence by Defendant’s outside counsel that he “has not,
on any occasion, be it by email or phone, indicated that your client is welcome to reapply for
positions at MIT for which he believed he was qualified.” Id. at ECF 228. But Plaintiff has taken
this sentence out of context. The communication occurred on August 11, 2022, when the parties
were on the cusp of a global settlement of the wage penalty and age discrimination claims.
Announcing that the no reemployment provision “must be removed” from the draft settlement
agreement, Plaintiff’s counsel claimed that she and outside counsel had discussed Plaintiff’s
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“intentions to potentially reapply, and [outside counsel] indicated that [Plaintiff] is welcome to
reapply to positions he feels qualified for.” Id. at 228–29 In response, Defendant’s outside
counsel wrote the following:
We were quite surprised to receive your email from yesterday morning. I have not,
on any occasion, be it by email or phone, indicated that your client is welcome to
reapply for positions at MIT for which he believed he was qualified. Indeed, given
how 	standard 	a 	“No 	Reemployment” clause 	is 	in 	any 	employment-related
settlement agreement, I would never, in any case, make such a representation
without express authority from my client. This is particularly true in the instant
matter where MIT has been steadfast from the beginning that any settlement
agreement would include a standard No Reemployment clause. This is something
you have known since April 22, 2022, when MIT counsel Allison Romantz sent
you a proposed Settlement Agreement and General Release . . . that included a No
Reemployment clause in Paragraph 5. That paragraph remained in the draft
agreements that have been sent back and forth throughout our direct negotiations
this week, including the draft you sent on Tuesday, August 9, 2022. Your client is
within his right to back out of this deal, but you have no basis to suggest such a
conversation occurred between you and I or that there was any kind of agreement
to exclude a No Reemployment clause.
Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 13, at ECF 663 [Doc. No. 70-15]. Where this statement clearly
references only the negotiations regarding the terms of the draft settlement agreement, it is not
probative of any change to Plaintiff’s status “whether he executed the settlement agreement or
not.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 16 [Doc. No. 91-.15
Ultimately, Plaintiff furnishes no evidence to support his contention that Defendant has
changed his status to ineligible for rehire or that Defendant seeks to subject Plaintiff to the No
Re-Employment Clause in the absence of the settlement of disputed claims.
15 Plaintiff also points to Defendant “discounting Plaintiff’s qualifications for the Project
Manager posting[,]” Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 16 [Doc. No. 91], but as discussed
above, this communication is too closely tied to the same transaction or event as the claims at
issue during the settlement negotiations to be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 408.
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Plaintiff has failed to proffer evidence sufficient to support a retaliation claim based on
either a failure to rehire or on a change in status to ineligible for rehire, and accordingly, has
failed to meet his burden as to the adverse action element of a prima facie case of retaliation.16
V. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 81] is
GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I, III, and V [Doc. No. 70]
is DENIED as MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
March 31, 2026 	/s/ Indira Talwani
United States District Judge
16 Finding no adverse action, the court does not consider whether a causal connection existed
between the protected conduct and an adverse action.
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