Lucero v. Glynos et al

United 	States 	District Court
District of Massachusetts
Manuel 	Lucero, 	prose
Plaintiff,
v.
George 	Glynos, 	et 	al.,
Defendants.
GORTON, 	J .
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Civil Action No.
22-11823-NMG
MEMORANDUM 	& ORDER
In 	September , 	2022 , 	plaintiff 	Manuel 	Lucero , 	V.
(" plaintiff " 	or 	"Lucero " ) 	was 	taken 	into 	state 	custody 	at 	the
Essex 	County 	Sheriff ' s 	Department 	(" ECSD " ) 	as 	a 	pretrial
detainee . 	Shortly 	thereafter , 	he 	purportedly 	requested 	a 	long
list 	of 	items 	and 	accommodations 	that 	he 	avers 	are 	necessary 	for
the 	practice 	of 	his 	Wiccan 	faith .
Plaintiff 	contends 	that 	defendants 	denied 	his 	requests 	for
the 	items 	and 	accommodations 	related 	to 	his 	religiou s 	practice
notwithstanding 	the 	accommodation 	of 	other 	religious 	practices
at 	the 	facility .
I . Background
Plaintiff 	is 	a 	practitioner 	of 	Wicca , 	a 	polyt h eist i c
neopagan 	religion . 	He 	was 	init i ated 	into 	the 	religion 	in
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September , 	2018 , 	and 	has 	been 	a 	devo u t 	adherent 	ever 	since . 	As
part 	of 	their 	religious 	practice , 	Wiccans 	engage 	in 	rituals
requiring 	certain 	materials , 	such 	as 	ritual 	oils 	and 	herbs ,
candles , 	cloth , 	robes , 	an 	altar 	bow l 	and 	religious 	texts .
Upon 	his 	incarceration 	at 	the 	ECSD 	in 	September , 	2022 ,
plaintiff 	formally 	requested 	accommodations 	to 	practice 	Wicca ,
including 	the 	aforementioned 	items 	for 	rituals . 	Because 	the
materials 	were 	not 	available 	for 	purchase 	at 	the 	facility ' s
commissary , 	plaintiff 	offered 	to 	purchase 	them 	with 	his 	own
money 	if 	he 	were 	permitted 	to 	order 	them .
Soon 	thereafter 	defendant 	Ashley 	Turcotte 	(" Turcotte " ) , 	the
Assistant 	Director 	of 	Programs 	at 	ECSD , 	informed 	Lucero 	that 	his
request 	was 	denied . 	She 	then 	provided 	him 	with 	an 	introductory
guide 	for 	prisoners 	interested 	in 	converting 	to 	Wicca 	from 	the
Arizona 	State 	Prison 	System . 	Plaintiff 	filed 	a 	formal
grievance , 	which 	defenda n t 	George 	Glynos 	(" Glynos " ) , 	a 	grievance
officer , 	reviewed . 	In 	his 	Grievance 	Finding 	report , 	Glynos
wrote 	that 	" all 	religious 	requests 	must 	be 	submitted 	to 	Ashley
Turcotte " 	and 	that 	Turcotte 	had 	already 	provided 	plaintiff 	with
"religious 	literature 	printouts ," 	referring 	to 	the 	introductory
guide 	on 	converting 	to 	Wicca . 	Lucero 	appealed 	that 	Grievance
Finding 	but 	defendants 	took 	no 	further 	action .
Plaintiff 	filed 	the 	instant 	suit 	against 	defendants
Turcotte 	and 	Glynos 	in 	their 	individual 	capacities , 	alleging
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violations of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He
seeks monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
In August, 2024, this Court denied defendants' motion to
dismiss (Docket No. 29). In December, 2025, defendants moved
for summary judgment (Docket No. 81), which plaintiff timely
opposed (Docket No. 84). Defendant filed a reply to plaintiff's
opposition (Docket No. 97), which plaintiff moved to strike as a
violation of Local Rule 7. 1 (b) (3) ( D ocket No. 98). Defendant
opposed the motion to strike, noting that the applicable rule is
Local Rule 56.1, and asks the Court to consider newly raised
arguments ab initio.1
II. Legal Standard
The role of summary judgment is "to pierce the pleadings
and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a
genuine need for trial." Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d
816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc.,
895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990)). The burden is on the moving
party to show, through the pleadings, discovery and affidavits,
"that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
1 The Court will consider any arguments in the reply that were included in the
initial motion for summary judgment. See United States v. Toth, 33 F.4th 1,
19 (1st Cir. 2022) (noting that new arguments may not be made in reply
briefs) .
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the 	movant 	is 	entitled 	to 	judgment 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law ." 	Fed . 	R .
Civ . 	P . 	56(a) .
A fact 	is 	material 	if 	it 	" might 	affect 	the 	outcome 	of 	the
suit 	under 	the 	governing 	law[ . ] " 	Anderson 	v . 	Liberty 	Lobby ,
Inc ., 	477 	U. S . 	242 , 	248 	(1986) . 	A genuine 	issue 	of 	material
fact 	exists 	when 	the 	evidence , 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	material 	fact
in 	dispute , 	" is 	such 	that 	a 	reasonable 	jury 	could 	return 	a
verdict 	for 	the 	nonmoving 	party ." 	Id .
If 	the 	moving 	party 	satisfies 	its 	burden , 	the 	burden 	shifts
to 	the 	nonmoving 	party 	to 	set 	forth 	specific 	facts 	showing 	that
there 	is 	a 	genuine , 	triable 	issue . 	Celotex 	Corp . 	v . 	Catrett , 	477
U. S . 	317 , 	324 	(1986) . 	The 	Court 	must 	view 	the 	entire 	record 	in
the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	non - moving 	party 	and make 	all
reasonable 	inferences 	in 	that 	party ' s 	favor . 	O ' Connor 	v .
Steeves , 	994 	F . 2d 	905 , 	907 	(1st 	Cir . 	1 993) .
Summary 	judgment 	is 	appropriate 	if , 	after 	viewing 	the
record 	in 	the 	non - moving 	party ' s 	favor , 	the 	Court 	determines
that 	no 	genuine 	issue 	of 	material 	fact 	exists 	and 	that 	the
moving 	party 	is 	entitled 	to 	judgment 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law . 	Celotex
Corp ., 	477 	U.S. 	at 	322 - 23 , 	106 	S. 	Ct . 	2548 . 	Where 	the 	non -
movant 	bears 	the 	ultimate 	burden 	of 	proof 	at 	trial , 	he 	must
present 	enough 	" definite , 	competent 	evidence 	to 	rebut 	the
motion ." 	Greene 	v . 	Cabra l, 	323 	F . 	Supp. 	3d 	96 , 	104 	(D . 	Mass .
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2018) 	(quoting 	Vineberg 	v . 	Bissonnette , 	548 	F . 3d 	50 , 	56 	(1st
Cir . 	2008)) .
III. 	Discussion
A. Free Exercise 	Clause
The 	Free 	Exercise 	Clause 	provides 	that 	" Congress 	shall 	make
no 	law 	respecting 	an 	establishment 	of 	religion , 	or 	prohibiting
the 	free 	exercise 	thereof 	. 	II	
Prison 	re st rict i on s 	that
impinge 	on 	religious 	practices 	of 	inmates 	are 	permissible 	if
they 	are 	" reasonably 	related 	to 	legitimate 	penological
interests . " 	Kuperman 	v . 	Wrenn , 	645 	F.3d 	69 , 	74 	(1st 	Cir . 	2011)
(quoting 	Turner 	v . 	Safley , 	482 	U. S . 	78 , 	89 	(1987)) . 	In 	making
that 	determination , 	courts 	consider 	the 	four 	so - cal led 	Turner
factors :
(1) 	whether 	there 	is 	a 	valid , 	rational 	connection
between 	the 	regulation 	and 	the 	legitimate 	government
interest 	put 	forward 	to 	just if y 	it ; 	( 2) 	whether
alternative 	means 	to 	exercise 	the 	right 	exist ; 	(3) 	the
impact 	that 	accommodating 	the 	right 	will 	have 	on
prison 	resources ; 	and 	(4) 	the 	absence 	of 	alternatives
to 	the 	prison 	regulation .
Id . 	(citing 	Turner , 	482 	U. S . 	at 	89 - 90) . 	Inmates 	bear 	the
ultimate 	burden 	of 	persuasion 	in 	contesting 	a 	restriction 	or
regulation . 	Id . 	(citing 	Overton 	v . 	Bazzetta , 	539 	U. S . 	126 , 	132
(2003) .
In 	the 	instant 	case , 	defe ndants 	rely 	primarily 	on 	the 	first
Turner 	factor , 	contending 	that 	the 	denial 	of 	plaintiff ' s 	request
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is 	logically 	connected 	to 	the 	prison ' s 	interest 	in 	safety . 2 ~
Although 	prisons 	undisputedly 	have 	a 	legitimate 	interest 	in
maintaining 	a 	secure 	facility , 	defendants 	have 	not 	support~d
their 	assertion 	that 	plaintiff ' s 	reque s ted 	accommodations 	a re
unacceptably 	dangerous . 	Defendants 	have 	referred 	to 	only 	two 	of
plaintiff ' s 	17 	requested 	accommodations .
Even 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	specifically 	referenced 	requests,
defendants 	fail 	to 	establish 	a 	logical 	connection 	between 	their
e xclusion 	and 	safety . 	For 	example , 	they 	argue 	that 	essential
o ils 	are 	flammable 	and 	dangerous 	but 	offer 	no 	explanation 	as 	to
wh y 	coconut 	oil , 	which 	is 	also 	flammable , 	is 	sold 	at 	the
commissary . 	Indeed , 	there 	is 	no 	evidence 	that 	prison 	officials
have 	actually 	assessed 	the 	safety 	of 	the 	accommodations 	before
labeling 	the 	items 	as 	dangerous . 	Without 	such 	an 	assessment ,
the 	Court 	cannot 	determine 	whether 	the 	denial 	of 	accommodations
is 	based 	on 	a 	legitimate 	peno l ogical 	interest 	sufficient 	to
ov erc o me 	plaintif f ' s 	f ree 	exercise 	claim . 	Se e 	Hudson 	v . 	Maloney ,
32 6 	F . 	Supp . 	2d 	206 , 	2 14 	( D. 	Mass . 	2004) ; 	see 	also 	Rouser 	v .
White , 	630 	F . 	Supp . 	2d 	1165 , 	1190 	(E . D. 	Cal . 	2009) 	(finding 	that
a 	jury 	could 	reasonably 	conclude 	that 	disparate 	treatment 	of
2 Defendants devote most 	of t h eir Tu r ne r 	a nalysis 	to t he ar gume nt t ha t
plaintif f 	h as 	failed to all e ge 	fact s d em on s t r at i ng ho w hi s 	r eli gious prac t ice
was stifle d , 	wh ich th is Co urt prev io u s l y r e jec te d 	in denying defend a nts '
Motion to Dis mi s s . 	See Docket No . 	3 4.
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similar 	religious 	accommodations 	suggests 	a 	lack 	of 	neutrality
in 	the 	justification 	offered by 	defendants) .
Under 	the 	Turner 	analysis , 	the 	Court 	must 	also 	consider
whether 	there 	are 	alternative 	means 	for 	the 	inmate ' s 	exercise 	of
the 	constitutional 	right 	at 	issue , 	the 	impact 	of 	the 	desired
accommodation 	on 	the 	prison 	and 	the 	absence 	of 	obvious
alternative 	policies . 	Defendants 	have 	not 	addressed 	such
factors 	in 	their 	memoranda 	nor 	have 	they 	proffered 	any 	evidence
on 	the 	subject. 	Defendants 	contend 	that 	they 	need 	not 	address
the 	Turner 	factors 	or 	otherwise 	justify 	their 	actions 	until
plaintiff 	meets
his 	burden 	of 	describing 	with 	specificity 	how 	each 	denied
Wiccan 	religious 	item was 	unjustified 	by 	the 	penological
safety 	interests 	of 	the 	ECSD .
That 	is 	not 	the 	law . 	Where 	the 	ultimate 	burden 	of
persuasion 	rests 	on 	the 	nonmoving 	party , 	and 	the 	movant 	has 	met
its 	initial 	burden 	of 	demonstrating 	the 	absence 	of 	a 	genuine
issue 	of 	material 	fact , 	only 	then 	does 	the 	burden 	shift 	to 	the
nonmoving 	party 	to 	show 	that 	a 	trier 	of 	fact 	could 	reasonably
find 	in 	favor 	of 	the 	nonmoving 	party . 	Skyview 	Finance 	Co ., 	LLC
v. 	Kearsarge 	Trading , 	LLC , 	616 	F . 	Supp . 	3d 	152 , 	157 	(D . 	Mass .
2022) . 	As 	previously 	noted , 	defendants 	have 	not 	demonstrated
the 	absence 	of 	a 	genuine 	issue 	of 	material 	fact 	and 	thus 	summary
judgment 	on 	this 	claim will 	be 	denied .
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B. Qualified 	Immunity
Defendants 	argue 	that 	they 	are 	entitled 	to 	qualified
immunity on plaintiff's 	Free 	Exercise 	claim. 	An 	official 	sued
under 	§1983 	is 	entitled 	to 	qualified 	immunity unless 	it 	is 	shown
that 	the 	official 	violated 	a 	statutory 	or 	constitutional 	right
that 	was 	clearly 	established at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	conduct .
Plumhoff 	v. 	Rickard, 	572 	U. S. 	765, 	778 	(2014). 	A right 	is
clearly 	established 	if 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	challenged 	conduct,
"the 	contours 	of 	the 	right 	.. . 	[were] 	sufficiently clear" 	such
that 	a 	reasonable 	official 	would 	understand 	she 	is 	violating 	the
law. 	Giragosian v. 	Bettencourt, 	614 	F.3d 	25, 	29 	(1st 	Cir. 	2010).
Officials 	can be 	on 	notice 	that 	their 	conduct 	violates
established 	law 	even 	in novel 	factual 	circumstances 	and 	a
plaintiff 	is 	not 	required 	to 	cite 	cases 	in which 	the 	precise
conduct 	at 	issue 	has 	been 	found 	unlawful. 	Cintron v. 	Bibeault,
148 	F.4th 	37, 	51-52 	(1st 	Cir. 	2025).
As 	noted 	above, 	a 	genuine 	dispute 	of 	material 	fact
precludes 	any 	summary determination 	as 	to 	whether 	plaintiff's
constitutional 	rights 	have 	been violated . 	If 	the 	fact-finder
were 	to 	conclude, 	however, 	that 	the 	denial 	of 	the 	requested
items 	was 	not 	sufficiently 	supported by 	a 	legitimate 	penological
interest, 	defendants 	would 	not 	be 	entitled 	to 	qualified
immunity. 	No 	reasonable 	officer 	could have 	believed 	that 	it 	was
constitutional 	to 	deny 	religious 	accommodations 	without
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conducting more 	than 	a 	cursory 	inquiry 	into 	whether 	the
accommodations 	pose 	a 	safety 	risk. 	The 	requirements 	of 	the
Turner 	inquiry were 	well-established at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	conduct
yet 	defendants 	have 	proffered no 	evidence 	with 	respect 	to
several 	of 	those 	factors, 	nor 	is 	there 	any 	evidence 	that
defendants 	considered 	such 	factors 	when denying 	plaintiff's
requested 	accommodation. 	Accordingly, 	defendants 	are 	not
entitled 	to 	summary 	judgment 	on 	the 	basis 	of 	qualified 	immunity.
C. Equal 	Protection 	Clause
Under 	the 	Equal 	Protection Clause, 	the 	Commonwealth 	is
obliged 	to 	treat 	similarly 	situated 	individuals 	equally. 	City 	of
Cleburne 	v. 	Cleburne 	Loving 	Ctr., 	Inc., 	473 	U . S . 	432, 	439
(1985). 	Nonetheless, 	there 	is 	no 	obligation 	in 	carceral
settings 	that 	inmates 	of 	different 	religious 	sects 	receive
identical 	services 	and amenities; 	rather, 	an 	inmate 	who 	is 	an
adherent 	of 	a 	minority 	religion must 	be 	afforded a 	reasonable
opportunity 	to 	pursue 	his 	faith 	comparable 	to 	the 	opportunity
afforded 	fellow 	prisoners 	who 	adhere 	to 	conventional 	religious
precepts. 	Cruz 	v. 	Beto, 	405 	U.S. 	319, 	322 	n.2 	(1972).
Defendants 	contend plaintiff's 	Equal 	Protection Clause
claim must 	fail 	because, 	in approving 	or 	disapproving 	of
religious 	items, 	ECSD 	considers 	only 	the 	safety of 	the 	item and
does 	not 	discriminate 	based 	on 	the 	kind 	of 	religion 	the 	inmate
practices. 	That 	argument 	does 	not 	respond 	to 	the 	contention
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that a facially neutral policy is being applied in a
discriminatory manner, an inquiry which is not answered on the
record before the Court. A genuine issue of material fact,
namely how and why ECSD makes safety determinations, precludes
allowance of defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
equal protection claim.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 81) is DENIED.
So ordered.
Nathanie�ton
Senior United States District Judge
Dated: February//, 2026
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