United States of America v. McCarthy et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
UNITED STATES
v.
PETER MCCARTHY,
STEPS TO SOLUTIONS, INC.
Defendants.
No. 21-cv-11300-DLC
REVISED ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR REMITTITUR
CABELL, U.S.M.J.
I. 	INTRODUCTION
In 	2021, 	the 	government 	sued 	defendant 	Peter 	McCarthy 	under
the Fair Housing Act (FHA) on behalf of several women he reportedly
sexually harassed when they were residing or seeking to reside at
sober living homes associated with Steps to Solutions, Inc., which
McCarthy owned and operated. 	(D. 1). 	In 2024, a jury returned a
verdict in the government’s favor after a trial and awarded seven
witnesses 	a 	total 	of 	$3,805,000 	in 	damages. 	(D. 91). 	The
defendant 	subsequently 	moved 	for 	remittitur 	and 	the 	court 	issued
an order granting and denying it in part, but notably reducing the
overall damages award from $3,085,000 to $1,420,000. 	(D. 95, 145).
In 	so 	doing, 	the 	court 	altered 	the 	individual 	awards 	for 	six 	of
the witnesses: Carrie Ann MacDougall; Jill Lovely; Kelli Yeo; Mindy
Mangini; Amanda Manning; and Lauren Masse. 	Id.
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The government in turn filed a motion for reconsideration for
all 	the 	witnesses 	except 	for 	Lauren 	Masse. 	(D. 	155). 	The
government 	contended 	among 	other 	things 	that 	while 	the 	court
correctly 	looked 	to 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	3614, 	which 	sets 	out 	civil
penalties 	for 	violations 	of 	the 	Fair 	Housing 	Act 	(FHA), 	for
guidance in assessing the defendant’s motion, it did not go on to
further 	consult 	regulations 	setting 	forth 	updated 	penalties 	for
violations of several statutes, including the FHA. 	See 28 C.F.R.
§§ 	85.3(b)(3), 	85.5 	tbl. 	1. 	The 	government 	argued 	that 	a
consideration 	of 	these 	updated 	figures 	would 	support 	higher
damages awards than those determined by the court.
The 	court 	granted 	the 	government’s 	motion 	for
reconsideration, 	in 	part; 	the 	court 	did 	not 	summarily 	accept 	the
government’s proposed penalties but did indicate it would issue a
revised order with respect to the five victims at issue. 	(D. 168).
This order effectuates that purpose.
II. 	LEGAL FRAMEWORK
To obtain relief on a motion for reconsideration, “the movant
must 	demonstrate 	either 	that 	newly 	discovered 	evidence 	(not
previously available) has come to light or that the rendering court
committed 	a 	manifest 	error 	of 	law.” 	Palmer 	v. 	Champion 	Mortg.,
465 	F.3d 	24, 	30 	(1st 	Cir. 	2006). 	“Likewise, 	a 	motion 	for
reconsideration 	should 	be 	granted 	if 	the 	court 	has 	patently
misunderstood 	a 	party 	or 	has 	made 	an 	error 	not 	of 	reasoning 	but
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apprehension.” 	Ruiz 	Rivera 	v. 	Pfizer 	Pharms., 	LLC, 	521 	F.3d 	76,
82 (1st Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). 	Even so, the “district court has
substantial 	discretion 	and 	broad 	authority 	to 	grant 	or 	deny” 	a
motion for reconsideration. 	Id at 81.
In 	considering 	the 	defendant’s 	motion 	for 	remittitur, 	the
court 	considered 	several 	factors 	in 	assessing 	the 	reasonableness
of the various damages awards, including among other factors noting
the maximum civil penalties as they appear in the FHA. 	See United
States 	v. 	McCarthy, 	761 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	328, 	337 	(D. 	Mass. 	2024); 	42
U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1)(C). 	The government argued that the court erred
to 	this 	extent 	because 	the 	current 	maximum 	penalties 	are 	instead
found 	in 	regulations 	stemming 	from 	the 	Civil 	Monetary 	Penalties
Inflation 	Adjustment 	Act 	of 	1990 	(“the 	Adjustment 	Act”), 	PL 	101–
410, October 5, 1990, 104 Stat 890; 28 C.F.R. §§ 85.3(b)(3), 85.5
tbl. 	1. 	As 	such, 	the 	court 	started 	down 	the 	right 	path 	but 	did
not go far enough. 	Because this omission could materially affect
the court’s assessment (regarding some but not all damages awards),
the 	court 	agrees 	that 	a 	reconsideration 	incorporating 	this
information is warranted.
To begin, courts fashioning a remittitur must comply with the
“maximum recovery rule,” which permits a reduction to the “highest
reasonable total of damages for which there is adequate evidentiary
support.” 	Marchant v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 836 F.2d 695 (1st
Cir. 	1988). 	At 	the 	same 	time, 	the 	Constitution’s 	Due 	Process
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Clause 	imposes 	a 	ceiling 	on 	the 	amount 	of 	punitive 	damages 	that
may be imposed. 	See e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509
U.S. 	443, 	453-454 	(1993) 	(“several 	of 	our 	opinions 	have 	stated
that 	the 	Due 	Process 	Clause 	. 	. 	. 	imposes 	substantive 	limits
‘beyond which penalties may not go.’”) (collecting cases); BMW of
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996).
To 	that 	end, 	the 	Due 	Process 	Clause 	prohibits 	“grossly
excessive” 	awards. 	Allen 	v. 	Rouse, 	No. 	CV 	00-10981-RWZ, 	2009 	WL
10729103, 	at 	*6 	(D. 	Mass. 	July 	17, 	2009) 	(citing 	State 	Farm 	Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003)). 	Among the
factors a court should consider when determining whether an award
is grossly excessive are (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant’s 	conduct, 	(2) 	the 	ratio 	between 	punitive 	damages 	and
compensatory damages, and (3) the civil or criminal penalties that
could 	be 	imposed 	for 	comparable 	misconduct. 	Gore, 	517 	U.S. 	at
574-575. 	These 	same 	principles 	(the 	“Gore 	factors”) 	apply 	to
courts 	weighing 	and 	determining 	remittitur. 	See 	Mendez-Matos 	v.
Municipality 	of 	Guaynabo, 	557 	F.3d 	36, 	56 	(1st 	Cir. 	2009) 	(using
the 	Gore 	factors 	to 	determine 	a 	remitted 	amount); 	Sony 	BMG 	Music
Ent. v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir. 2013) (“Gore and its
progeny 	. 	. 	. 	address 	the 	. 	. 	. 	issue 	of 	when 	a 	jury's 	award 	of
punitive 	damages 	is 	so 	excessive 	that 	it 	violates 	due 	process.”
(emphasis in original)).
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In its original order on remittitur, the court identified the
maximum civil penalties listed under the FHA as $50,000 for a first
violation 	and 	$100,000 	for 	subsequent 	violations. 	42 	U.S.C. 	§
3614(d)(1)(C); 	see 	McCarthy, 	761 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	337. 	As 	the
government points out, however, Congress amended the maximum civil
penalties available for FHA violations pursuant to the Adjustment
Act. 	See 	Pub. 	L. 	No. 	101-410, 	104 	Stat. 	890; 	28 	C.F.R. 	§§ 	85.3,
85.5. 	Per the regulations promulgated thereunder, the maximum FHA
civil 	penalty 	amounts 	depend 	on 	when 	the 	statutory 	violations
occurred. 	For 	all 	violations 	relevant 	to 	this 	case 	occurring 	on
or before November 2, 2015, the adjusted civil monetary penalties
are set out in 28 C.F.R. § 85.3; for all violations occurring after
November 2, 2015, the adjusted penalties are set out in 28 C.F.R.
§ 85.5.
These two regulations each make additional distinctions that
bear on the exact amount of maximum monetary penalties for a given
FHA violation. 	Pursuant to § 85.3, the maximum civil penalty under
the 	FHA 	for 	a 	first 	violation 	occurring 	before 	April 	28, 	2014 	is
$55,000. 	28 	C.F.R. 	§ 	85.3(b)(3)(i). 	For 	a 	first 	violation
occurring between April 28, 2014, and November 2, 2015, the maximum
civil penalty is $75,000. 	Id. 	For subsequent violations occurring
before April 28, 2014, the maximum civil penalty is $110,000; and
for subsequent violations occurring thereafter, until November 2,
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2015, 	that 	amount 	is 	adjusted 	to 	$150,000. 	28 	C.F.R. 	§
85.3(b)(3)(ii).
Section 	85.5 	provides 	the 	maximum 	civil 	penalty 	amounts 	for
all 	violations 	occurring 	after 	November 	2, 	2015. 	Although 	the
regulation further organizes those penalties according to the date
of assessment, only one such category bears on this case: amounts
listed 	for 	civil 	penalties 	assessed 	after 	February 	12, 	2024, 	but
before July 4, 2025. 	The maximum penalty for a first violation is
$127,983 	and 	the 	maximum 	penalty 	for 	subsequent 	violations 	is
$255,964. 	28 C.F.R. § 85.5 tbl. 1.
Again, 	insofar 	as 	the 	court 	relied 	(in 	part) 	on 	statutory
maximums 	in 	reaching 	a 	given 	remittitur 	determination, 	it 	should
have 	referenced 	these 	amounts 	rather 	than 	those 	set 	forth 	in 	42
U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1)(C).
III. APPLICATION
1. 	Carrie Ann MacDougall
The jury originally awarded Carrie Ann MacDougall $105,000 in
compensatory 	damages 	and 	$525,000 	in 	punitive 	damages, 	based 	on
events 	that 	took 	place 	in 	2018 	and 	2019. 	The 	court 	subsequently
reduced 	Ms. 	MacDougall’s 	punitive 	damages 	award 	from 	$525,000 	to
$105,000. 	The 	government 	argues 	the 	court 	should 	instead 	award
Ms. 	MacDougall 	$268,762 	in 	punitive 	damages. 	The 	court 	declines
to do so.
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Although 	the 	court 	acknowledges 	that 	it 	erred 	generally 	to
the extent it relied in part on an outdated statutory civil penalty
in calculating certain damages awards, it did not make that error
as it relates to Ms. MacDougall. 	That is, the statutory maximums
were 	not 	a 	significant 	factor 	in 	the 	court’s 	determination 	to
adjust 	Ms. 	MacDougall’s 	punitive 	damages 	award 	from 	$525,000 	to
$105,000. 	Rather, 	the 	court 	focused 	on 	the 	reprehensibility 	of
the defendant’s conduct and the ratio of the compensatory damages
to 	punitive 	damages, 	finding 	that 	those 	considerations 	warranted
the reduction the court imposed. 	The government moreover does not
really 	explain 	how 	it 	gets 	to 	its 	suggested 	recalculation 	of
$268,762. 	Considering 	the 	years 	of 	the 	violations 	in 	question
(2018 and 2019), § 85.5 provides for statutory maximums of $127,983
for 	a 	first 	violation 	and 	$255,964 	for 	subsequent 	violations,
neither of which would seem to align with the government’s proposed
award.
As such, the government has not shown a manifest error of law
or misapprehension on the court’s part warranting reconsideration
of Ms. MacDougall’s punitive damages.
2. 	Jill Lovely
The 	jury 	originally 	awarded 	Jill 	Lovely 	$115,000 	in
compensatory 	damages 	and 	$125,000 	in 	punitive 	damages 	based 	on
events 	taking 	place 	in 	2021. 	The 	court 	adjusted 	Ms. 	Lovely’s
punitive 	damages 	award 	from 	$125,000 	to 	$60,000. 	The 	government
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argues 	that 	the 	court 	should 	return 	the 	figure 	to 	$125,000. 	The
court agrees and will do so.
As part of its reasoning for remitting Ms. Lovely’s punitive
damages award from $125,000 to $60,000, the court stated that “an
award 	of 	$60,000 	is 	more 	in 	line 	with 	the 	amount 	of 	damages 	that
would 	be 	imposed 	for 	a 	violation 	of 	the 	statute.” 	McCarthy, 	761
F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	338. 	As 	the 	government 	correctly 	notes, 	the
“statute” 	the 	court 	was 	referring 	to 	was 	limited 	to 	42 	U.S.C. 	§
3614(d)(1)(C) and did not include a consideration of § 85.5, which
would 	call 	for 	an 	award 	of 	up 	to 	$127,983. 	The 	court 	thus 	erred
when it found that the remitted amount was “more in line with the
amount 	of 	damages 	that 	would 	be 	imposed 	for 	a 	violation 	of 	the
statute.” 	Accordingly, the court will revise Ms. Lovely’s punitive
damages award to $125,000.
3. 	Kelli Yeo
The 	jury 	originally 	awarded 	Kelli 	Yeo 	$150,000 	in
compensatory 	damages 	and 	$325,000 	in 	punitive 	damages 	based 	on
events 	that 	occurred 	between 	2011 	and 	2014. 	The 	court 	adjusted
Ms. 	Yeo’s 	punitive 	damages 	award 	from 	$325,000 	to 	$50,000. 	The
government 	argues 	that 	the 	court 	should 	recalculate 	the 	punitive
damages to be $127,983. 	The court agrees and will do so.
In its order remitting Ms. Yeo’s award for punitive damages,
the 	court, 	similar 	to 	its 	analysis 	with 	respect 	to 	Ms. 	Lovely,
observed that the remitted amount of $50,000 “aligns with what the
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statute 	would 	provide 	for 	if 	damages 	were 	imposed 	thereunder.”
McCarthy, 761 F. Supp. 3d at 340–41. 	Here again, the court erred
in 	referring 	to 	the 	outdated 	statutory 	maximum 	of 	$50,000 	rather
than 	the 	updated 	$127,983 	figure. 	The 	court 	thus 	adjusts 	the
remitted amount of Ms. Yeo’s punitive damages award to $127,983.
4. 	Mindy Mangini
The 	jury 	originally 	awarded 	Mindy 	Mangini 	$300,000 	in
compensatory 	damages 	and 	$875,000 	in 	punitive 	damages, 	based 	on
violations that occurred in 2009 and 2013. 	The court reduced Ms.
Mangini’s 	$875,00 	punitive 	damages 	award 	to 	$300,000. 	The
government 	argues 	the 	court 	should 	recalculate 	the 	punitive
damages to be $767,894. 	The court will slightly adjust the award
upward to $330,000.
To 	explain, 	the 	court 	noted 	that 	it 	viewed 	“the 	statutory
damages 	scheme 	as 	instructive” 	in 	reference 	to 	the 	outdated 	FHA
civil penalties of $50,000 for a first violation and $100,000 for
a 	subsequent 	violation. 	McCarthy, 	761 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	328, 	339 	(D.
Mass. 	2024). 	But 	going 	on, 	the 	court 	reasoned 	that 	in 	light 	of
the 	reprehensibility 	of 	the 	defendant’s 	conduct, 	and 	considering
there 	was 	both 	a 	first 	and 	subsequent 	violation 	in 	Ms. 	Mangini’s
case, 	“an 	award 	double 	that 	amount, 	and 	equal 	to 	the 	amount 	of
compensatory damages, is justified,” meaning $300,000. 	Id.
In arguing that the court should now impose punitive damages
of 	$767,894, 	the 	government 	seeks 	to 	have 	the 	court 	apply 	its
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double-fine 	reasoning 	to 	the 	updated 	civil 	penalties 	provision.
That 	is, 	it 	argues 	the 	court 	should, 	according 	to 	§ 	85.5, 	impose
penalties 	of 	$127,983 	and 	$255,964 	for 	multiple 	violations, 	and
then double the sum to get to $767,894.
The 	problem 	with 	this 	approach, 	though, 	is 	that 	§ 	85.5 	does
not apply to Ms. Mangini. 	Section 85.5 applies to violations that
occurred 	after 	November 	2, 	2015, 	and 	the 	violations 	in 	Ms.
Mangini’s case took place in 2009 and 2013. 	As such, her situation
falls 	within 	the 	purview 	of 	§ 	85.3, 	which 	applies 	to 	“all
violations occurring on or before November 2, 2015.” 	28 C.F.R. §
85.3 (emphasis added).1 	According to § 85.3, the civil penalties
for violations in 2009 and 2013 are $55,000 for a first violation
and 	$110,000 	for 	a 	subsequent 	violation. 	Applying 	these 	updated
figures 	to 	the 	court’s 	reasoning 	on 	remittitur, 	which 	is 	to 	say
adding 	them 	together 	and 	then 	doubling 	the 	sum, 	yields 	the
resulting 	sum 	of 	$330,000. 	The 	court 	thus 	adjusts 	the 	remitted
amount of Ms. Mangini’s punitive damages award to $330,000.
1 The government seems to implicitly argue that because the penalty here was
not “assessed” until 2024, the figures in § 85.5 would apply to the violations
in 	Ms. 	Mangini’s 	case. 	This 	is 	contrary 	to 	the 	plain 	language 	of 	the 	two
regulations. 	Section 	85.5 	contains 	no 	language 	suggesting 	it 	may 	apply 	to
violations 	before 	November 	2, 	2015; 	indeed, 	the 	title 	of 	the 	regulation 	is
“Adjustments 	to 	penalties 	for 	violations 	occurring 	after 	November 	2, 	2015.”
Meanwhile, 	§ 	85.3 	specifically 	states 	that 	it 	applies 	to 	“all 	violations
occurring on or before November 2, 2015, and for assessments made before August
1, 2016, for violations occurring after November 2, 2015.” 	Nothing in this
language 	qualifies 	the 	proposition 	that 	§ 	85.3 	applies 	to 	“all 	violations
occurring on or before November 2, 2015.”
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5. 	Amanda Manning
The 	jury 	originally 	awarded 	Amanda 	Manning $300,000 	in
compensatory 	damages 	and 	$875,000 	in 	punitive 	damages 	based 	on
events 	that 	occurred 	sometime 	between 	2012 	and 	2017. 	The 	court
reduced 	Ms. 	Manning’s 	compensatory 	damages 	from 	$300,000 	to
$50,000, and her punitive damages from $875,000 to $100,000. 	The
government argues that the court should reinstate the jury’s award
for 	compensatory 	damages 	and 	recalculate 	the 	punitive 	damages 	to
$767,894 -- the same amount the government argues should be awarded
Ms. 	Mangini 	-- 	or 	to 	otherwise 	reconsider 	its 	remittitur 	for 	Ms.
Manning’s compensatory and punitive damages in light of the errors
the government has cited.
The 	court 	declines 	to 	make 	any 	adjustments 	to 	its 	order
relating 	to 	Ms. 	Manning. 	Unlike 	with 	other 	witnesses, 	the
government 	does 	not 	attempt 	to 	argue 	that 	the 	court 	erred 	by
failing to consider the updated civil penalty figures. 	Rather, it
takes issue with the reasoning the court followed in reducing Ms.
Manning’s 	compensatory 	and 	punitive 	damages. 	Regarding
compensatory damages, the court considered the relative brevity of
the improper conduct but the government argues it ought instead to
have focused more on the nature of the harm, however brief.
With 	respect 	to 	punitive 	damages, 	the 	court 	considered 	the
Gore 	factors 	in 	reaching 	its 	determination, 	but 	the 	government
contends 	it 	misapplied 	the 	Gore 	factor 	focusing 	on 	the
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reprehensibility 	of 	the 	defendant’s 	conduct. 	Citing 	to 	Supreme
Court 	precedent, 	it 	argues 	that 	the 	court 	also 	should 	have 	taken
more 	care 	to 	consider 	whether 	the 	harm 	was 	physical 	rather 	than
economic, and whether the conduct evinced an indifference to or a
reckless 	disregard 	of 	the 	health 	or 	safety 	of 	others. 	See 	State
Farm 	Mut. 	Auto. 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Campbell, 	538 	U.S. 	408, 	409 	(2003)
(“To 	determine 	a 	defendant's 	reprehensibility—the 	most 	important
indicium of a punitive damages award's reasonableness—a court must
consider whether: the harm was physical rather than economic; the
tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard
of 	the 	health 	or 	safety 	of 	others; 	the 	conduct 	involved 	repeated
actions 	or 	was 	an 	isolated 	incident; 	and 	the 	harm 	resulted 	from
intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.”). 	In
this 	regard, 	the 	government 	argues 	that 	the 	court 	was 	incorrect
when 	it 	found 	that 	no 	physical 	contact 	occurred 	between 	the
defendant and Ms. Manning, citing testimony that McCarthy stroked
Ms. Manning’s neck. 	(D. 155 at 10 n.2). 	The court stands corrected
on 	this 	last 	point 	but 	does 	not 	find 	that 	the 	government’s
arguments warrant reconsideration.
As the government itself argues, physical contact is but one
aspect of reprehensibility, and reprehensibility is but one factor
for 	the 	court 	to 	consider 	on 	remittitur. 	Further, 	the 	remainder
of 	the 	government’s 	argument 	relates 	to 	disagreements 	with 	the
court’s legal reasoning, i.e., it’s contention that the court ought
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to 	have 	emphasized 	certain 	factors 	from 	State 	Farm 	over 	others.
The 	court 	acknowledges 	the 	government’s 	argument 	but 	its
disagreement 	with 	the 	court’s 	approach 	does 	not 	merit
reconsideration 	in 	the 	court’s 	view. 	A 	movant 	seeking
reconsideration 	is 	entitled 	to 	relief 	when 	the 	court 	has 	made 	a
genuine error of apprehension, not of reasoning. See Ruiz Rivera,
521 F.3d at 82 (quoting Sandoval Diaz v. Sandoval Orozco, No. CIV.
01-1022JAGGAG, 2005 WL 1501672, at *2 (D.P.R. June 24, 2005)) (“a
motion 	for 	reconsideration 	should 	be 	granted 	if 	the 	court 	‘has
patently 	misunderstood 	a 	party 	... 	or 	has 	made 	an 	error 	not 	of
reasoning 	but 	apprehension.’”). 	Even 	assuming 	the 	government’s
proposed 	approach 	(and 	corresponding 	proposed 	damages) 	are
defensible, 	reconsideration 	is 	“an 	extraordinary 	remedy 	which
should be used sparingly” and it is thus “not a promising vehicle
for 	revisiting 	a 	party's 	case 	and 	rearguing 	theories 	previously
advanced 	and 	rejected.” 	Palmer, 	465 	F.3d 	at 	30; 	see 	also
Biltcliffe 	v. 	CitiMortgage, 	Inc., 	952 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	371, 	384 	(D.
Mass. 	2013), 	aff'd, 	772 	F.3d 	925 	(1st 	Cir. 	2014) 	(“Because
reconsideration is not the time to repeat old arguments previously
considered and rejected, the Court need not rule on them again.”)
(citations omitted).
Consequently, Ms. Manning’s remitted awards remain at $50,000
in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court revises its prior order
of 	remittitur. 	Now, 	and 	including 	all 	victim/witnesses 	whose
damages 	were 	initially 	addressed 	in 	considering 	the 	defendant’s
motion 	for 	remittitur, 	the 	court 	remits 	the 	respective 	damages
awards 	as 	follows: 	(1) 	Carrie 	Ann 	MacDougall’s 	compensatory 	and
punitive 	damages 	each 	remain 	at 	$105,000, 	for 	a 	total 	award 	of
$210,000; 	(2) 	Jill 	Lovely’s 	compensatory 	damages 	remain 	at
$115,000 and her punitive damages are adjusted to $125,000, for a
total 	award 	of 	$240,000; 	(3) 	Kelli 	Yeo’s 	compensatory 	damages
remain 	at 	$150,000 	and 	her 	punitive 	damages 	are 	adjusted 	to
$127,983, 	for 	a 	total 	award 	of 	$277,983; 	(4) 	Mindy 	Mangini’s
compensatory 	damages 	remain 	at 	$300,000 	and 	her 	punitive 	damages
are adjusted to $330,000, for a total award of $630,000; (5) Amanda
Manning’s compensatory damages remain at $50,000 and her punitive
damages remain at $100,000, for total award of $150,000; (6) Lauren
Masse’s compensatory damages remain at $50,000, for total award of
$50,000; 	and 	(7) 	Michael 	Fromer’s 	compensatory 	damages 	remain 	at
$10,000, 	and 	his 	punitive 	damages 	remain 	at 	$25,000, 	for 	total
award of $35,000. The government shall inform the court by January
12, 2026, whether it will accept the remittitur or seek a new trial
on the issue of damages.
So Ordered. 	/s/ Donald L. Cabell
DONALD L. CABELL, U.S.M.J.
DATED: 	January 2, 2026
Case 1:21-cv-11300-DLC Document 171 Filed 01/02/26 Page 14 of 14