Lin v. Zhong et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
JIEWEN LIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
BINGLIN 	ZHONG, 	ANT 	BICYCLE
INC., 	SEABUSINESS 	INC.,
COUREE INC.,
Defendants.
No. 21-cv-10510-GAO
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE
CABELL, U.S.M.J.
Introduction
On March 25, 2021, plaintiff Jiewen Lin brought suit against
Binglin 	Zhong 	to 	confirm 	and 	enforce 	a 	2020 	arbitration 	award
rendered 	against 	Zhong 	in 	China. 	On 	June 	14, 	2021, 	the 	court
defaulted 	Zhong 	for 	failure 	to 	appear 	and, 	on 	August 	17, 	2021,
entered default judgment against Zhong in the principal amount of
a little over three and a half million dollars. 	(D. 25).
Approximately four years later, on July 2, 2025, Zhong filed
a motion to vacate the default judgment. 	He contends that he does
not 	know 	the 	plaintiff, 	does 	not 	know 	of 	the 	arbitration 	award
entered 	against 	him 	in 	China, 	and 	asserts 	he 	promptly 	moved 	to
vacate the default upon learning of Lin’s claim against him. 	(D.
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46, 	47). 	The 	plaintiff 	opposes 	the 	motion. 	(D. 	50). 	For 	the
reasons explained below, the motion to vacate will be denied.1
Legal Standard
Zhong moves to vacate the default judgment pursuant to “Fed.
R. Civ. P. 55(c) and 60(b).” 	Rule 55(c) authorizes a court to set
aside 	a 	final 	default 	judgment 	under 	Rule 	60(b), 	which 	in 	turn
provides 	that 	a 	court 	may 	vacate 	a 	default 	judgment 	for 	the
following 	six 	reasons: 	(1) 	mistake, 	inadvertence, 	surprise, 	or
excusable 	neglect; 	(2) 	newly 	discovered 	evidence 	that, 	with
reasonable 	diligence, 	could 	not 	have 	been 	discovered 	in 	time 	to
move 	for 	a 	new 	trial 	under 	Rule 	59(b); 	(3) 	fraud 	(whether
previously 	called 	intrinsic 	or 	extrinsic), 	misrepresentation, 	or
misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based
on 	an 	earlier 	judgment 	that 	has 	been 	reversed 	or 	vacated; 	or
applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other
reason 	that 	justifies 	relief. 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	60(b)(1)-(6).
Zhong’s 	counsel 	clarified 	at 	the 	hearing 	on 	his 	motion 	that 	he
1 On March 6, 2026, the defendant filed a notice of Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 	(D.
59). 	Among other things, the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a
stay to “the enforcement, against the debtor. . .of a judgment obtained before
the [bankruptcy filing].” 	11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2). 	That provision does not apply
here because the motion to vacate does not seek to advance the enforcement of
the plaintiff’s judgment against the defendant, but rather seeks to defeat it.
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moves 	specifically 	pursuant 	to 	subsection 	(b)(1) 	(mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect).
Critically, “a motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a
reasonable 	time—and 	for 	reasons 	(1), 	(2), 	and 	(3) 	no 	more 	than 	a
year 	after 	the 	entry 	of 	the 	judgment 	or 	order 	or 	the 	date 	of 	the
proceeding.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1); Kemp v. United States, 596
U.S. 	528, 	533 	(2022). 	A 	movant 	may 	not 	use 	the 	concept 	of
“reasonable 	time” 	available 	for 	motions 	filed 	for 	reasons 	(4)
through (6) to extend the one-year limit. 	United States v. Marin,
720 	F.2d 	229, 	231 	(1st 	Cir. 	1983) 	(“[Expiration 	of 	the 	one-year
period] 	is 	an 	absolute 	bar 	to 	relief 	from 	the 	judgment.”);
Ackermann 	v. 	United 	States, 	340 	U.S. 	193, 	197 	(1950) 	(“It 	is
immediately 	apparent 	that 	no 	relief 	on 	account 	of 	‘excusable
neglect’ 	was 	available 	to 	this 	petitioner” 	for 	a 	judgment 	more
than four years old).
Discussion
The 	defendant 	argues 	that 	his 	default 	was 	the 	result 	of 	a
language barrier and his unfamiliarity with the U.S. legal system.
He 	effectively 	concedes 	that 	he 	received 	mail 	correspondence
alerting him to the present case but contends he did not know what
it 	was 	because 	his 	English 	skills 	are 	“severely 	limited”, 	and 	he
relied upon his child to help him navigate daily life in America.
(D. 47, pg. 5). 	He contends that “without an understanding of the
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U.S. 	legal 	system 	and 	the 	ability 	to 	minimally 	read 	and 	write
English, 	[he] 	did 	not 	have 	full 	knowledge 	of 	the 	claims 	against
him until after he found an attorney who can communicate with him
in 	Cantonese.” 	(Id.). 	Moreover, 	the 	defendant 	contends 	that 	he
has a potentially meritorious defense to the underlying suit, which
arises 	from 	a 	contract 	dispute, 	because 	there 	is 	evidence
suggesting 	that 	he 	did 	not 	reside 	where 	the 	contract 	alleged 	he
did, 	and 	the 	signature 	on 	the 	contract 	purporting 	to 	be 	his 	does
not 	match 	the 	signature 	on 	his 	Massachusetts 	driver’s 	license.
(Id., pgs. 5-6).
However, 	even 	assuming 	for 	the 	sake 	of 	argument 	that 	the
defendant’s 	assertions, 	if 	credited, 	could 	constitute 	excusable
neglect and suggest the possibility of a non-frivolous defense, it
still 	would 	not 	entitle 	him 	to 	relief 	on 	his 	motion. 	That 	is
because 	he 	did 	not 	file 	the 	motion 	to 	vacate 	until 	almost 	four
years after the entry of judgment, well past Rule 60(b)(1)’s strict
one-year 	deadline. 	Under 	the 	well-established 	case 	law 	noted
above, 	the 	motion 	must 	accordingly 	be 	denied 	as 	untimely. 	See
United States v. Marin, 720 F.2d at 231 (Rule 60(b) motion alleging
newly 	discovered 	evidence 	and 	fraud 	was 	time 	barred 	where 	it 	was
filed 28 months after judgment was entered); Gonzalez v. Walgreens
Co., 	918 	F.2d 	303, 	305 	(1st 	Cir. 	1990) 	(motion 	time 	barred 	where
filed 14 months after judgment was entered).
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But to be clear, the motion to vacate would fail on the merits
even 	if 	timely, 	because 	the 	defendant 	cannot 	show 	his 	failure 	to
defend 	the 	suit 	was 	the 	result 	of 	excusable 	neglect. 	A 	court’s
“evaluation of what constitutes excusable neglect is an equitable
determination, 	taking 	into 	account 	the 	entire 	facts 	and
circumstances surrounding the party's omission, including factors
such 	as 	the 	danger 	of 	prejudice 	to 	the 	non-movant, 	the 	length 	of
the delay, the reason for the delay, and whether the movant acted
in good faith.” 	Davila-Alvarez v. Escuela de Medicina Universidad
Central del Caribe, 257 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2001).
Here, 	the 	defendant 	acknowledges 	that 	he 	received 	notice 	of
the present litigation but explains that he did not understand the
import 	of 	the 	materials 	based 	on 	his 	unfamiliarity 	with 	the
American legal system and limited English skills. 	These assertions
ring somewhat hollow when considered in light of other information
in 	the 	record, 	however. 	Among 	other 	things, 	the 	defendant 	avers
that 	he 	has 	resided 	in 	the 	United 	States 	since 	2014, 	and 	the
plaintiff 	has 	submitted 	a 	filing 	from 	a 	2019-2020 	Massachusetts
Superior Court lawsuit reflecting that the defendant was operating
Ant 	Bicycle 	as 	early 	as 	November 	2018.2 	(D. 	47-1; 	50-3 	¶¶ 2-6).
These 	facts 	at 	a 	minimum 	suggest 	that 	the 	defendant, 	even 	if
2 The defendant apparently defaulted in that case as well.
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hampered 	by 	a 	language 	barrier, 	was 	sophisticated 	enough 	and
sufficiently connected to the local community and world of commerce
to 	understand 	how 	to 	create 	and 	operate 	his 	own 	business 	in
America. 	The 	court 	also 	credits 	the 	plaintiff’s 	assertion 	that
Zhong 	was 	a 	defendant 	in 	a 	civil 	commercial 	lawsuit 	in 	2020 	in
California. 	Again, even if these facts do not totally refute the
defendant’s 	assertion 	that 	he 	was 	not 	completely 	well 	versed 	in
American 	commercial 	and 	legal 	affairs, 	they 	show 	that 	he
nonetheless 	had 	considerable 	exposure 	to 	these 	facets 	of 	daily
life 	and 	would 	or 	should 	have 	appreciated 	the 	need 	to 	monitor
rather than ignore official-looking correspondence.
Significantly, 	the 	court 	also 	credits 	the 	plaintiff’s
assertion that the defendant in February 2024 was contacted by and
interacted with a representative of the plaintiff in this lawsuit,
Yongyuan Li. 	(D. 50-1). 	Although the defendant apparently refused
to 	acknowledge 	the 	validity 	of 	the 	judgment 	entered 	against 	him,
he 	did 	acknowledge 	receiving 	document 	requests 	relating 	to 	post
judgment 	collection 	efforts. 	This 	alone 	demonstrates 	that 	the
defendant 	was 	aware 	of 	the 	underlying 	lawsuit 	and 	the 	default
judgment 	more 	than 	a 	year 	before 	he 	moved 	to 	vacate 	the 	judgment
in July 2025, and it thus refutes his contention that he moved to
vacate the default judgment as soon as he became aware of it.
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In sum, the defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment
fails 	because 	it 	is 	untimely 	and 	would 	fail 	on 	the 	merits 	if
reached because he cannot show the default judgment was the result
of excusable neglect.3
Conclusion
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	“Defendant, 	Binglin 	Zhong’s,
Motion to Vacate Default Judgment” (D. 46) is DENIED.
/s/ Donald L. Cabell
DONALD L. CABELL, U.S.M.J.
DATED: 	March 23, 2026
3 The same would be true even were the defendant to recast his motion as one
filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). 	That catch-all provision authorizes courts to
grant relief from judgments for “any other reason that justifies relief.” 	To
prevent circumvention of Rule 60(b)(1)’s one-year time limit, a party may use
Rule 60(b)(6) only when the other five subsections do not apply. 	Ungar v. Pal.
Liberation Org., 599 F.3d 79, 85 (1st Cir. 2010). 	In other words, “[t]he reason
for relief set forth under 60(b)(6) cannot be the reason for relief sought under
another subsection of 60(b).” 	Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 643
(5th 	Cir. 	2005); 	Waterfall 	Victoria 	Grantor 	Trust 	Series 	II, 	Series 	G 	v.
Blodgett, 2022 WL 20726190, at *5 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2022). 	The defendant
argues that the default judgment should be vacated because he was “not familiar
with the [U.S.] legal system” and had limited English skills, but these are the
exact 	same 	reasons 	he 	argued 	at 	the 	hearing 	as 	warranting 	relief 	under
subsection (b)(1), and they therefore cannot constitute separate grounds for
relief 	under 	Rule 	60(b)(6). 	Moreover, 	the 	First 	Circuit 	has 	held 	in 	an
analogously similar case that a defendant moving for relief on the grounds that
he was a foreigner unfamiliar with the American legal system could not avail
himself 	of 	Rule 	60(b)(6), 	but 	rather 	was 	“limited 	to 	seeking 	relief 	from
judgment on grounds of excusable neglect pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1),” under which
he was barred by the one-year time limitation. 	See Claremont Flock Corp. v.
Alm, 281 F.3d 297 (1st Cir. 2002).
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