William T. Brooks

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CENTRAL DIVISION
In re: 	)
)
WILLIAM T. BROOKS, 	) 	Chapter 7
DEBTOR. 	) 	Case No. 07-41941-MSH
____________________________________)
ORDER ON DEBTOR’S MOTION TO VACATE ORDER ON HOMESTEAD
[# 365]
This matter is before me on the latest of a long list of motions filed by the debtor in an
effort to forestall his eviction from property sold by the trustee. Presently before me are the
debtor’s Motion to Vacate Order on Homestead [# 365] (the “Motion”) and the trustee’s
Opposition thereto [#368], and after due consideration of the Motion and the Opposition, I
hereby find and rule as follows:
1. The caption of the Motion suggests that the Debtor is seeking to vacate the order of
December 23, 2008 [# 170] sustaining the Trustee’s objection to the Debtor’s claimed homestead
exemption. The text of the Motion indicates that the Debtor is seeking to have the order of
March 13, 2009 [#182] vacated. In that order, entered in response to the Debtor’s Affidavit
Detailing the Trustee’s Refusal to Accept Evidence, Refusal to Cooperate with the Debtor with
Regard to Joint Pretrial Memorandums [sic] and Cooperate with the Debtor in a Professional
Manner to Resolve Their Case [# 178], the Court treated the Affidavit as a motion for relief from
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024. The Court denied relief from judgment, namely
the December 23, 2008 order sustaining the Trustee’s homestead objection, and concluded that
the Debtor could not show inadvertence or excusable neglect as required by Fed. R. Civ. P.
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60(b)(1), made applicable by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024, and that there was nothing in the Affidavit,
which, for the most part, simply rehashed points previously made without success, that
warranted relief from the December 23, 2008 order.
2. The Motion again seeks relief from the December 23, 2008 order as well as the March
13, 2009 order and appears to be a request for reconsideration or a new trial pursuant to either
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023 or Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024. The Motion, under either rule, again must fail.
3. A motion to reconsider is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) made applicable to
bankruptcy cases by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023 or Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 made applicable to bankruptcy
cases by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024. “[T]he purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. A party may not submit
evidence that is not newly discovered in support of a motion for reconsideration.” Harsco Corp.
v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986) (citations
omitted). A motion for reconsideration is appropriate when there has been a significant change
in the law or facts since the submission of the issue to the court; it is not a vehicle for an
unsuccessful party to rehash the same facts and same arguments previously presented. Keyes v.
National Railroad Passenger, 766 F. Supp. 277, 280 (E.D.Pa. 1991).
4. A motion for a new trial is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, made applicable to
bankruptcy cases by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(B) provides that grounds
for a new trial after a nonjury trial are “any reason for which a rehearing has heretofore been
granted in a suit in equity in federal court.” “A motion for a new trial in a nonjury case or a
petition for rehearing should be based upon manifest error of law or mistake of fact, and a
judgment should not be set aside except for substantial reasons.” C. Wright, A. Miller, and M.
Cane, 11 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE , § 2804 (2d Ed.). Motions brought under Fed. R.
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Civ. P. 59 must be made within 28 days after the entry of judgment.1 Thus if the debtor is
seeking relief under this rule, his motion is untimely.
4. More importantly, the Motion fails to allege any newly discovered evidence, any
manifest error of law, or any significant change in the law that would affect the prior outcome.
The Debtor’s complaints about the trustee, arising in no small part from the trustee’s efforts first
to sell and then evict the debtor from his home, are nothing new. Although the debtor suggests
that he did not have the opportunity until recently to advance the grounds for the Motion as he
was initially denied access to audio recordings of hearings held by my predecessor, he has these
recordings yet he has not presented any facts to support relief. Instead the Motion contains ad
hominem attacks on the judge and trustee and the solitary statement that the Debtor’s further
review of the audio recordings will reveal a basis for the Motion. This is insufficient to justify
relief from any of the orders entered in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is hereby DENIED.
Dated: July 14, 2010 	___________________________
Melvin S. Hoffman
United States Bankruptcy Judge.
1Under the prior version of the rule in effect when the orders at issue where entered, the
time to bring a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 was 10 days.
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