William E. Gray and Katherine M. Gray

1 In 1991, the Massachusetts legislature substituted the term “manufactured home” in place of
“mobile home” throughout the Massachusetts General Laws. 1991 Mass. Legis. Serv. 481 (West).
“Mobile home” will be used in reference to the 1990 Act which added the mobile home exemption
to § 1A. 1990 Mass. Legis. Serv. 492 (West).
1
United States Bankruptcy Court
District of Massachusetts
________________________________
)
In re: 	)
)
WILLIAM E. GRAY & 	) 	Chapter 7
KATHERINE M. GRAY, 	) 	Case No. 07-41672-HJB
)
Debtors. 	)
)
________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Before the Court is the “Trustee’s Objection to Claim of Exemption” (the “Objection”)
filed by Janice G. Marsh, the Chapter 7 Trustee (the “Trustee”). The Trustee objects to the
debtors’ claim of a homestead exemption under Massachusetts General Laws ch. 188 (the
“Massachusetts Homestead Statute,” “Massachusetts Homestead Exemption” or “MGL ch.
188") in their mobile home (“manufactured home”). 1 The issue to be determined is whether
the owner of a manufactured home, who leases the land upon which the manufactured
home rests, may claim an exemption under § 1 of the Massachusetts Homestead Statute.
I. 	FACTS AND TRAVEL OF THE CASE
There is no material factual dispute. In 1999, William and Katherine Gray (together,
the “Debtors”) purchased a 1999 Tital 028 manufactured home and have thereafter
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2 Section 1A of the Massachusetts Homestead Statute states in pertinent part:
The real property or manufactured home of persons sixty-two years of age or older,
regardless of marital status, or of a disabled person, as herein defined, shall be
protected against attachment, seizure or execution of judgment to the extent of
$500,000;...
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 188, § 1A.
3 Under § 1A, a “disabled person” is defined as follows:
an individual who has medically determinable permanent physical or mental
impairment which would meet the disability requirements for supplemental security
income under the provisions of 42 USC §1382c(a)(3)(A) and (c), which are in effect
at the time of filing.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 188 § 1A.
4 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq (the “Bankruptcy Code” or the “Code”).
5 Under the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor may exempt a limited amount of property from the
bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). Massachusetts has not opted-out of the exemptions under
2
occupied the manufactured home as their principal residence. The Debtors lease the land
upon which the manufactured home rests. 	On July 14, 2006, William Gray recorded a
Declaration of Homestead in the manufactured home, pursuant to MGL ch. 188, § 1. An
alternative declaration was made under Massachusetts General Laws ch. 188, § 1A (“MGL
ch. 188, § 1A”) if the declaration under § 1 was deemed to be invalid. 2 William and
Katherine Gray are 51 and 46 years of age, respectively, and neither is considered
“disabled” under the Massachusetts Homestead Statute. 3
On May 3, 2007, the Debtors filed for protection under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code. 4 In their bankruptcy schedules, the Debtors disclosed their interest in the
manufactured home, listing its current value as $45,000.00, subject to a secured claim of
$7,000.00. 	The Debtors also claimed an exemption in the manufactured home in the
amount of $125,000.00 under § 1 of the Massachusetts Homestead Statute. 5 The Chapter
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§ 522(d) of the Code, thus allowing Massachusetts debtors to choose between either the §522(d)
exemptions or those available under state and non-bankruptcy federal law. 	The Debtors have
elected the latter.
3
7 Trustee objects to the claimed exemption.
II. 	POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
In support of her objection to the homestead exemption claimed by the Debtors, the
Chapter 7 Trustee relies heavily on the case of In re Kelly, 334 B.R. 772 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2005). There, the court held that § 1 of the Massachusetts Homestead Statute does not
include manufactured homes within its zone of protection. 	The Trustee agrees with the
reasoning of Kelly, and maintains that this Court should follow the plain language of § 1 of
the Massachusetts Homestead Statute which is, in her view, silent with respect to the
inclusion of manufactured homes. Contrasting § 1 with § 1A of the statute, the Trustee
maintains that the latter expressly provides for an exemption for manufactured homes
owned by elderly or disabled individuals, while the former does not specifically mention
manufactured homes – and concludes that the legislature simply did not intend to include
an exemption for manufactured homes owned by those not elderly or disabled.
The Debtors obviously disagree with the Trustee. 	They contend that § 1 of the
Massachusetts Homestead Statute includes manufactured homes, albeit in a way different
from that in § 1A. 	The Debtors posit that, instead of explicitly mentioning the words
“manufactured home” as was done in § 1A, the statutory language in § 1, to wit, “owner or
owners of a home or one or all who rightfully possess the premises by lease or otherwise
and who occupy or intend to occupy said home as a principal residence,” covers the same
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6 See also In re Wenners, No. 05-48172 (Bankr. D. Mass. Jan. 12, 2006) (adopting the analysis
of In re Kelly).
4
territory. Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 188, § 1 (emphasis added). The Debtors further remind
this Court that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (the “SJC”) has instructed that
the Massachusetts Homestead Statute is to be interpreted with generosity toward the
protection of homeowners. Dwyer v. Cempellin, 424 Mass. 26, 29-30, 673 N.E.2d. 863,
866 (1996). They reject the notion that the Massachusetts legislature intended to exclude
manufactured homes from § 1 of the statute.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Absent a timely objection, a claim of exemption is prima facie valid. 	McNeilly v.
Geremia, 249 B.R. 576, 579 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000). 	As the objecting party, the Trustee
bears 	the 	burden 	of 	demonstrating 	that 	the 	Debtors’ 	claimed 	exemption 	in 	the
manufactured home should be disallowed. 	Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(c). 	Because the
exemption arises under state law, the Court
must rule as it believes the highest court of the state would rule. When the
highest court has not addressed the issue, the Bankruptcy Court should not
regard lower court rulings on the issue as dispositive. 	Rather, it should
attempt to predict what the highest court would do and to that end should
accord proper regard to decisions of other courts of the state.
In re Miller, 113 B.R. 98, 101 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990). Though addressed in In re Kelly 6 ,
the issue sub judice - namely, whether § 1 of the Massachusetts Homestead Statute
includes an exemption in manufactured homes - has not yet been squarely decided by the
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7 The issue has, however, been raised in dicta. See Thurston v. Maddocks, 88 Mass. (6 Allen)
427, 428 (1863), further discussed infra.
5
SJC. 7
“[A]n estate of homestead ‘is a provision by the humanity of the law for a residence
for the owner and his family’, free from attachment or levy on execution by creditors up to
the amount allowed by law.” Ladd v. Swanson, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 644, 646, 511 N.E.2d
1112, 1113 (1987) (quoting Bates v. Bates, 97 Mass. 392, 395 (1867)). Homestead laws
are “designed to benefit the homestead declarant and his or her family by protecting the
family residence from the claim of creditors.” In re Hildebrandt, 320 B.R. 40, 44 (B.A.P. 1st
Cir. 2005) (citing Dwyer, 424 Mass. at 29-30, 673 N.E.2d at 866).
As stated by the SJC in Dwyer, “[p]ublic policy dictates that exemption laws, such
as homestead provisions, should be liberally construed to comport with their beneficent
spirit of protecting the family home.” 424 Mass. at 29, 673 N.E.2d at 866; see also In re
Edwards, 281 B.R. 439, 446 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (holding that if doubt exists as to the
interpretation of the homestead statute, then such doubt is to be resolved in the debtor’s
favor). The liberal interpretation of the Massachusetts Homestead Statute flows from the
public policy behind the statute.
Homestead laws are based on public policy that favors preservation
of the family home regardless of the householder’s financial condition.
Furthermore, homestead laws tend to prevent debtors and their
families from becoming public charges. 	In light of the public policy
and the purpose of the statutes, this court has construed the State
homestead exemptions liberally in favor of debtors. This authority is
in keeping with authority in other jurisdictions.
Shamban v. Masidlover, 429 Mass. 50, 53, 705 N.E.2d 1136, 1138 (1999) (citations
omitted).
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8 See In re Kelly, 334 B.R. at 774 (referring to the first subsection of § 1 as “clumsy” due to the use
of “land and buildings”, “home” and “premises” all in one sentence); In re Cempellin, 175 B.R. 1,
1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (stating the statute is “not a model of clarity” and emphasizing the internal
inconsistencies of the statute with the words “owner or owners” coupled with a singular reference
to “only one owner” later in the statute; and In re Szwyd, No. 05-50837 (Bankr. D. Mass. Aug. 7,
2006) (emphasizing the complexity and counterintuitive nature of the statute which may make the
statute difficult to navigate for those without legal training and resources).
6
However, liberal construction does not mean that courts can extend the protection
of the homestead exemptions when doing so would contradict the “plain and unambiguous”
language of the statute. In re Hildebrandt, 320 B.R. at 44 (citing In re Garran, 338 F.3d 1,
6 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Masidlover, 429 Mass. at 53-54, 705 N.E.2d at 1139)). 	“Where
statutory language is clear, the courts must impart to the language its plain and ordinary
meaning.” 	Com. v. One 1987 Mercury Cougar Automobile, 413 Mass. 534, 537, 600
N.E.2d 571, 573 (1992) (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 397 Mass. 416,
420, 491 N.E.2d 1061 (1986)). The Massachusetts Homestead Statute is no exception to
that rule.
But a “plain meaning” analysis of the Massachusetts Homestead Statute is no “walk
in the park.” The wording is, in parts, awkward and seemingly hyper-technical; indeed, the
statute has repeatedly been criticized for its lack of clarity. 8 Fortunately, however, courts
have the benefit of the fundamental and well-settled purpose of the statute provided by the
SJC as well as its admonition that an approach which preserves the home for the benefit
of the family is the best guide to discover the legislative intention.
The beginning point is, as always, with the words of the statute. Section 1 states in
pertinent part,
An estate of homestead to the extent of $500,000 in the land and buildings
may be acquired pursuant to this chapter by an owner or owners of a home
or one or all who rightfully possess the premise by lease or otherwise and
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7
who occupy or intend to occupy said home as a principal residence.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 188, § 1.
The Kelly court thought that the best approach to discover meaning in those words
was to parse the statutory provision. 	It thoughtfully argued that the statute should be
interpreted as follows: the first part of the statute refers to the amount of the exemption
($500,000); the second part is the object of the homestead (“land and buildings”); the third
part refers to the claimant of the homestead (“owner or owners of a home or all who
rightfully possess the premises by lease or otherwise”); and the last section refers to the
requirement of occupation (“occupies or intends to occupy as principal residence”). In re
Kelly, 334 B.R. at 774. Based on that reading, the court held that land and buildings were
the objects of the homestead and, therefore, manufactured homes - where the building but
not the land was owned by the debtor - was not included. Id. at 775. The court further held
that the word “home” did not refer to the object of the exemption. Rather, ownership of a
home was a necessary qualifier of those who could exempt the “land and buildings”. Id.
Thus, ownership of a manufactured “home” did not alone provide the right to claim a
homestead exemption.
This Court views the statute at issue in a slightly different way. One can read the
statute’s words “land and buildings” without viewing those terms as limiting the homestead
exemption to a parcel where the declarant owns both the land and the buildings. Indeed,
this Court can find no other way to properly account for the specifically mentioned
extension of the exemption for the homestead declarant who possesses the property “by
lease.” This was the view adopted by the SJC, albeit in dicta, long ago.
The object of this clause in St. 1855, c. 238, obviously was to create a
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8
homestead right in a house owned by the occupant, but standing on leased
land; so that the house should be exempted from attachment though it was
subject to removal, and though there was no homestead right in the land.
Thurston v. Maddocks, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 427, 428 (1863) (emphasis added). Maddocks
has never been overturned by the SJC. 	And, more recently, the court in In re Carey
explained, “the homestead statute extends the estate of homestead to the whole of the
lands and buildings that constitute the owners “home,” limited only by the dollar value of
the exemption.” In re Carey, 282 B.R. 118, 119 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002).
The Trustee further posits that within the context of the statute, the word “premise”
does not permit the inclusion of manufactured homes, because the definition of “premises”
is “a tract of land with buildings thereon.” Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary 980 (11 th
ed. 2005). However, the interpretation of words “must be construed in association with the
general statutory plan.” Comm’r of Revenue v. Wells Yachts South, Inc., 406 Mass. 661,
664, 549 N.E.2d 1131, 1134 (1990) (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 393
Mass. 490, 497, 472 N.E.2d 259 (1984)). The word “premise” is specifically used in the
statute in the context of describing the extension of the exemption to leased land - where
the homestead declarant would not, by definition, own the real property.
Finally, the Trustee argues that well-recognized rules of statutory construction
require this Court to find that the inclusion of manufactured homes in § 1A and their
omission in § 1 of the Homestead Exemption Statute compels the interpretation urged by
the Trustee.
When interpreting statutes, a court must look “to the particular statutory language
at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.” 	Sullivan v.
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9
Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 89 (1990) (quoting K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291
(1988)). The Massachusetts SJC has held that,
statutes are to be interpreted, not alone according to their simple, literal or
strict verbal meaning, but in connection with their development, their
progression through the legislative body, the history of the times, prior
legislation…[G]eneral 	expressions 	may 	be 	restrained 	by 	relevant
circumstances showing a legislative intent that they be narrowed and used
in a particular sense.
Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 163 n.11, 691 N.E.2d 935, 941
(1998) (citations omitted). This Court is aware that the SJC has also held that in situations
where the legislature has deliberately used language in one portion of a statute but not in
others addressing the same issue, the language may not be implied or assumed to exist
where it is not written. 	First Nat’l Bank v. Judge Baker Guidance Ctr., 13 Mass.App.Ct.
144, 153, 431 N.E.2d 243, 249 (1982); see also Doe v. Superintendent of Schools of
Worcester, 421 Mass. 117, 128, 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1095 (1995) (“[I]f the legislature
intentionally omits language from a statute, then no court can supply it.”). However, the
SJC also wrote in Champigny v. Commonwealth,
We [the Court] construe a statute in accord with “the intent of the Legislature
ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage
of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the
mischief 	or 	imperfection 	to 	be 	remedied 	and 	the 	main 	object 	to 	be
accomplished to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.”
422 Mass. 249, 251, 661 N.E.2d 931, 932 (1996) (citing Telesetsky v. Wight, 395 Mass.
868, 872-873, 482 N.E.2d 818 (1985) (quoting Commonwealth v. Galvin, 388 Mass. 326-
328, 446 N.E.2d 391 (1983))). And in Saccone v. State Ethics Comm’n., 395 Mass. 326,
334, 480 N.E.2d 13, 18 (1985) (quoting Holbrook v. Holbrook, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 248, 250
(1823)), the SJC wrote that if
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9 Section 1 was amended by: 1992 Mass. Legis. Serv. 286 (West), 1995 Mass. Legis. Serv. 297
(West), 2000 Mass. Legis. Serv. 174 (West), and 2004 Mass. Legis. Serv. 218 (West). Section 1A
was amended by 1991 Mass. Legis. Serv. 481 (West), 1996 Mass. Legis. Serv. 450 (West), 2000
Mass. Legis. Serv. 174 (West), 2004 Mass. Legis. Serv. 218 (West), and 2006 Mass. Legis. Serv.
64 (West). These amendments included the substitution of “manufactured home” for “mobile home”
throughout the Mass. Gen. Laws. 1991 Mass. Legis. Serv. 481 (West).
10 Furthermore, employing this rule of statutory instruction without the context supplied by the SJC
would require this Court to infer that the Massachusetts legislature intended to exclude from
protection the most vulnerable of its homeowners. This Court declines to make that inference. It
would be inconsistent with the purpose of the statute as described by the SJC. Rules of statutory
construction are often helpful, but, in the end, they are just guideposts to legislative meaning.
10
the general meaning and object of the statute should be found inconsistent
with the literal import of any particular clause or section, such clause or
section must, if possible, be construed according to the spirit of the act.
The Massachusetts legislature, in 1990, amended the Massachusetts Homestead
Statute in § 1A to include a homestead exemption for mobile homes of the elderly or
disabled, but made no similar change in § 1. Since 1990, §§ 1 and 1A have been amended
by the legislature four and five times, respectively.9 The Trustee contends that the
legislature could have easily added a reference to § 1 to provide for a manufactured home
exemption and the fact that the legislature did not do so is evidence that the legislature
deliberately intended to exclude a manufactured home exemption in § 1. Yet, this assumes
that the legislature was aware that the issue was in doubt. 	Maddocks suggests
otherwise. 10
Furthermore, not only were §§ 1 and 1A not drafted at the same time, they do not
use similar language in describing the property to be protected under the statute. Section
1 refers to “land and buildings” and a “home.” 	Section 1A refers to “real property or
manufactured home”. 	In Massachusetts, “real property” is “the soil of the earth and
everything erected upon it or buried beneath it.” Mass. Prac., 14B § 17.1 (3d ed. 2007)
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11 The Court takes note that many states have included specific statutory language for homestead
exemptions in mobile or manufactured homes, often without requirement that the owner be elderly
or disabled or that the manufactured or mobile home owner own the land upon which the home
rests. See Ala. Code § 6-10-2 (2007); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-1101 (2007); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 704.710 (West 2007), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-201.5 & 201.6 (West 2007), Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 52-352a (West 2007), Idaho Code Ann. § 55-1001 (2007), Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5451
(West 2007), Mont. Code Ann. § 70-32-101 (2007), Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 115.005 (West 2006),
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 480:1 (2007), Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §323.151 (West 2007), S.D. Codified
Laws § 43-31-1 & 2 (2007), Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-3 (West 2007), Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
6.13.010 (West 2007), and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-20-104 (2007).
11
(citing Drake v. Wells, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 141, 143 (1865)). Thus, “real property” on its
own does not include manufactured homes that rest upon land not owned by the
manufactured home owner. 	Because the term “real property” would not have included
manufactured homes, the legislature included a specific mention for manufactured homes.
This was not similarly required under § 1, however, as the inclusion of homes on leased
property already provided for the inclusion of manufactured homes. 11
“[I]f there are any doubts as to the interpretation of the law with respect to a
determination of the extent of the homestead estate such doubts must be resolved in favor
of the debtor... .” In re Edwards, 281 B.R. at 446 (relying on Dwyer) (emphasis added).
Given the fact that § 1 of the Homestead Exemption Statute may be interpreted in more
than one reasonable manner; there is a lack of statutory definition; the statute makes the
exemption available to a leaseholder; and the highest court in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts counsels a liberal interpretation in favor of debtors, this Court concludes
that manufactured homes are included within § 1 of the Homestead Exemption Statute.
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12
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the “Trustee’s Objection to Claim of Exemption” is
OVERRULED. A separate Order in conformity with this Memorandum of Decision shall
issue forthwith.
By the Court,
DATED: 	December 7, 2007 	Henry J. Boroff
United States Bankruptcy Judge
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