United States of America v. Metz et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CRIMINAL ACTION
VERSUS 	No. 92-469
MARLO HELMSTETTER 	SECTION I
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is defendant Marlo Helmstetter’s (“Helmstetter”) motion1 for
reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Helmstetter also filed
a supplemental memorandum2 in support of his motion. The government filed a
response3 in opposition. With leave of Court, Helmstetter filed a reply4 and an
additional reply.5 For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Helmstetter’s
motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Helmstetter was convicted of five felony counts in 1993: conspiracy to possess
cocaine with the intent to distribute (Count 1), murder in aid of racketeering activity
(Counts 9 and 10), aggravated assault in aid of racketeering activity (Count 11), and
using and carrying a firearm in aid of drug trafficking activity (Count 15).6 The Court
sentenced Helmstetter to three life sentences for each of Counts 1, 9, and 10; 240
1 R. Doc. No. 1369.
2 R. Doc. No. 1371.
3 R. Doc. No. 1372.
4 R. Doc. No. 1376.
5 R. Doc. No. 1377.
6 R. Doc. No. 1185, at 1.
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months’ imprisonment for Count 11; and 60 months for Count 15.7 All sentences were
to be served consecutively.8 The Fifth Circuit affirmed on all counts, United States v.
Tolliver, 61 F.3d 1189 (5th Cir. 1995), but another section of the Court later vacated
his conviction and sentence as to Count 15.9 Helmstetter is currently incarcerated at
the United States Penitentiary in Beaumont, Texas.10
Helmstetter filed his first motion for compassionate release in August 2020,
citing his health ailments in light of the COVID-19 pandemic as grounds for relief.11
Helmstetter also highlighted the length of his incarceration, his youth at the time of
his arrest and conviction, his efforts at rehabilitation while in prison, and his support
network at home as reasons the Court should consider compassionate release.12 This
Court denied his motion after determining that “Helmstetter’s risk of serious illness
is 	too 	speculative 	to 	be 	compelling.”13 	This 	Court 	also 	found 	that 	“[n]either
Helmstetter’s age (49) nor his family circumstances qualify as extraordinary or
compelling under the policy statement.”14 Finally, the Court held that even if
Helmstetter had presented an extraordinary and compelling circumstance, the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) would nonetheless preclude his release.15
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 1–2 (citing R. Doc. No. 1178, at 2).
10 Inmate Locator, Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited
December 17, 2025).
11 See R. Doc. No. 1327.
12 Id.
13 R. Doc. No. 1255, at 12.
14 Id. at 9.
15 Id. at 14.
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Helmstetter filed a second motion for compassionate release in December
2022.16 His second motion asked the Court to reconsider its prior motion for
compassionate release in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion v.
United States,17 which held that the “First Step Act allows district courts to consider
intervening changes of law or fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence.”
597 U.S. 481, 500 (2022). Helmstetter argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions in
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S.
99 	(2013), 	constituted 	intervening 	changes 	in 	law 	that 	justified 	reducing 	his
sentence.18 He also argued that changes in the application of the Guidelines caused
a “gross disparity” between his sentence and those of similarly situated defendants.19
The 	Court 	also 	denied20 Helmstetter’s 	second 	motion 	for 	compassionate
release. It held that Concepcion does not alter “the threshold requirements parties
seeking compassionate release must first satisfy: a finding by the Court that the
§ 3553 factors do not warrant the defendant’s continued incarceration and the
existence 	of 	‘extraordinary 	and 	compelling’ 	circumstances 	which 	justify
compassionate release.”21 Notably, although it found that it “may consider the
defendant’s youth at the time of his offense and conviction when determining whether
extraordinary and compelling circumstances exist,”22 it also found no need to “weigh
16 See R. Doc. No. 1304.
17 See id. at 1–2.
18 R. Doc. No. 1327, at 5.
19 R. Doc. No. 1306, at 1.
20 R. Doc. No. 1327.
21 Id. at 7.
22 Id. at 11.
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all of the multiple factors which support and fail to support Helmstetter’s position”
because Helmstetter could not satisfy the § 3553(a) prong of the compassionate
release analysis.23
Spurred by semi-recent Sentencing Guidelines amendments, Helmstetter filed
the motion24 for compassionate release now before the Court in October 2025. He also
filed a supplemental memorandum25 in support of his motion. He asks the Court to
sentence him to time served or, in the alternative, to reduce his sentence to 450
months.26 The government filed a response27 in opposition accusing Helmstetter of
merely “mirror[ing] his last motion for compassionate release,” which this Court
denied.28 Additionally, the government contends that binding Fifth Circuit precedent
precludes the pathway to relief relied on by Helmstetter, notwithstanding the recent
Guidelines 	amendments.29 	On 	November 	18, 	2025, 	Helmstetter 	requested 	an
additional 21 days to file a reply, which this Court granted.30 Helmstetter filed his
reply31 on November 26, 2025, and he filed an additional reply32 on November 28,
23 See id. at 13.
24 R. Doc. No. 1369.
25 R. Doc. No. 1371
26 R. Doc. No. 1369-1, at 2.
27 R. Doc. No. 1372.
28 Id. at 1.
29 Id. at 4–5.
30 See R. Doc. Nos. 1373, 1374. Helmstetter’s motion also sought appointment of
counsel for purposes of filing his reply, but this Court denied that portion of
Helmstetter’s motion. See R. Doc. No. 1374.
31 R. Doc. No. 1376.
32 R. Doc. No. 1377.
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2025. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Helmstetter’s motion to reduce
his sentence.
II. 	STANDARD OF LAW
a. Exhaustion
Before a district court assesses the merits of a motion for compassionate
release, a defendant must show that he has “fully exhausted all administrative rights
to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s
behalf,” or that “30 days [have passed] from the receipt of such a request by the
warden of the defendant’s facility.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Fifth Circuit has
emphasized that “all requests for compassionate release must be presented to the
Bureau of Prisons before they are litigated in the federal courts.” United States v.
Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 920 (2020). Failure
to satisfy this prerequisite is not jurisdictional, but exhaustion is a mandatory claim-
processing rule that must be enforced if invoked by the government. Id. at 468–69.
The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating exhaustion. See, e.g., United States
v. Rodriguez, No. 15-198, 2020 WL 5369400, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 2020) (Feldman,
J.); United States v. Castro, No. 15-309, 2020 WL 3076667, at *2 (E.D. La. June 10,
2020) (Africk, J.).
b. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
A 	district 	court 	“may” 	grant 	a 	reduction 	in 	sentence 	if, 	in 	addition 	to
“considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] to the extent they are
applicable,” it finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
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reduction.” 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 	“[T]he 	district 	court 	may 	deny 	[the
defendant’s] motion without reaching the Section 3553(a) factors if it determines that
he has not identified ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ justifying his release.”
United States v. Jackson, 27 F.4th 1088, 1093 n.8 (5th Cir. 2022).
Before granting a motion for reduction in sentence, a court must also conclude
that “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing 	Commission.” 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 3582(c)(1)(A). 	The 	most 	relevant 	policy
statement, codified at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, was amended shortly after this Court’s
denial of Helmstetter’s second motion for compassionate release, and it became
effective on November 1, 2023. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; see also Amendments to the
Sentencing Guidelines, Policy Statements, Official Commentary, and Statutory
Index, 88 Fed. Reg. 28254, 28254 (effective Nov. 1, 2023).
As amended, policy statement § 1B1.13 applies to motions brought by the
Bureau of Prisons or by the defendant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Id.
§ 1B1.13(a). It provides that “[e]xtraordinary and compelling reasons exist under any
of the following circumstances or a combination thereof”: (1) medical circumstances
of the defendant; (2) age of the defendant; (3) family circumstances of the defendant;
(4) the defendant having been a victim of abuse while in custody; (5) “other reasons”;
(6) a change in law that would “produce a gross disparity” between the defendant’s
sentence and the sentence likely to be imposed today if the defendant has served at
least 10 years of an “unusually long sentence.” Id. §§ 1B1.13(b)(1)–(6). Section
1B1.13(c) explicitly limits a district court’s consideration of a change in the law, for
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purposes of determining whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist, to
those circumstances that satisfy § 1B1.13(b)(6). See id. § 1B1.13(c).
c. 	Dangerousness
Additionally, the policy statement requires a court to determine that “the
defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as
provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)” before reducing his term of imprisonment. U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(a)(2). The relevant § 3142(g) factors are as follows: (1) “the nature and
circumstances of the offense charged[;]” (2) “the weight of the evidence against the
person[;]” (3) “the history and characteristics of the person[;]” and (4) “the nature and
seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the
person’s release[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); see also United States v. King, No. 06-658,
2023 WL 7194866, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2023) (analyzing these factors pursuant
to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a)(2)).
d. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Factors
If a court determines that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist that
warrant a sentence reduction, the court must consider the applicable factors set forth
in § 3553(a) in fashioning a new sentence. United States v. Ciprano, No. 92-350, 2022
WL 503742, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 2022) (Fallon, J.). The burden is on the defendant
to convince the district judge to exercise its discretion to grant the motion after
considering the 3553(a) factors. Ward v. United States, 11 F.4th 354, 361 (5th Cir.
2021). Those factors include:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
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(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) 	to 	provide 	the 	defendant 	with 	needed 	educational 	or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment
in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range [provided for in the
U.S.S.G.] . . .
(5) any pertinent [Sentencing Commission] policy statement—
(6) 	the 	need 	to 	avoid 	unwarranted 	sentence 	disparities 	among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
III. 	ANALYSIS
a. Exhaustion
Helmstetter sent two requests to the warden of his facility of incarceration
regarding the present motion: one on June 17, 2025, and another on August 28,
2025.33 He states in his motion that the warden has not responded to these requests.34
The government does not dispute that Helmstetter has satisfied the exhaustion
requirement.35 Because 	thirty 	days 	have 	lapsed 	since 	the 	warden’s 	receipt 	of
Helmstetter’s requests, the Court concludes that Helmstetter has satisfied the
administrative exhaustion requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
33 See R. Doc. No. 1369-2, at 2–3.
34 Id.
35 See generally R. Doc. No. 1372.
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b. Extraordinary and Compelling Circumstances
Helmstetter’s 	motion 	relies 	heavily 	on 	his 	belief 	that 	previously 	made
arguments fare better given the recent amendment to policy statement § 1B1.13 of
the 	U.S. 	Sentencing 	Guidelines. 	Indeed, 	he 	highlights 	that 	the 	amended
§ 1B1.13(b)(6) “was not available at the time [he] filed”36 his last compassionate
release motions and argues that it “now allows a finding of extraordinary and
compelling reasons in his case.”37
For example, as Helmstetter argued in his second motion for compassionate
release, he argues that Booker and Alleyne constitute changes in the law that justify
reducing his sentence, but he now argues that these decisions constitute changes in
the law for purposes of § 1B1.13(b)(6) because they produce a gross disparity between
the sentence he is serving and the sentence that would likely be imposed if he were
sentenced today.38 Specifically, Helmstetter contends that the Court would not be
faced with sentencing him to a mandatory life sentence after Booker and Alleyne
because, after Booker, the guideline ranges produced by the Sentencing Guidelines
were no longer mandatory39 and, after Alleyne, the sentencing judge would not have
been permitted to make the non-jury judicial application of the first-degree murder
cross reference to U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1, which increased his guideline range from 292–
365 months to life.40
36 R. Doc. No. 1377, at 1.
37 R. Doc. No. 1369-1, at 4.
38 Id. at 4–6; id. at 6 n. 3; R. Doc. No. 1371, at 1–3.
39 R. Doc. No. 1369-1, at 5.
40 Id. at 17; see also id. at 6 n. 3; R. Doc. No. 1371, at 1–3.
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Helmstetter also submits that extraordinary and compelling “other reasons”
should be taken into account,41 pursuant to the amended § 1B1.13(b)(5), such as his
difficult upbringing, his dedication to rehabilitation, and his youthful age at the time
of his conviction.42 As he did in his second motion for compassionate release,
Helmstetter references the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 466 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016),
as examples of how sentencing law has changed since he was sentenced.43 He argues
that 	life 	sentences 	for 	youthful 	offenders 	are 	now 	disfavored.44 	He 	also 	now
additionally cites the Youthful Offender amendment to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
policy statement § 5H1.1, which became effective after he filed his last motion for
compassionate release, arguing that if he were sentenced today, he would be eligible
for a downward departure pursuant to this policy statement due to his “youthfulness
at the time of the offense.”45
41 R. Doc. No. 1369-1, at 8.
42 Id. at 8–9.
43 See id. at 9; see also R. Doc. No. 1327, at 9.
44 R. Doc. No. 1369-1, at 9.
45 Id. at 11. It is important to highlight that, in 2025, the United States Sentencing
Commission amended the Guidelines Manual to remove departures and policy
statements 	relating 	to 	specific 	personal 	characteristics. 	See 	U.S.S.G. 	App. 	C,
amendment 836. The Guidelines Manual explains that:
The Commission envisioned and framed this 2025 amendment to be
outcome neutral, intending that judges who would have relied upon
facts previously identified as a basis for a departure would continue to
have the authority to rely upon such facts to impose a sentence outside
of 	the 	applicable 	guideline 	range 	as 	a 	variance 	under 	18 	U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). The removal of departures from the Guidelines Manual does
not limit the information courts may consider in imposing a sentence
nor does it reflect a view from the Commission that such facts should no
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In sum, the government correctly describes Helmstetter’s motion as one that
recycles many of his previous arguments, but urges a different result based on the
fact that the Guidelines were amended.46 According to the government, binding
precedent in this Circuit—specifically, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in United States v.
Austin, 125 F.4th 688, 692 (5th Cir. 2025)—makes clear that non-retroactive changes
in the law, like the ones relied on by Helmstetter, do not constitute “extraordinary
and compelling” reasons for a reduction, notwithstanding the amendment to U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13.47 Additionally, with respect to the policy statement on youthful offenders,
the government notes that subsequent versions of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
have deleted § 5H entirely.48 The government maintains that no factors Helmstetter
cites in support of his motion have “materially changed” since he last sought early
release and, therefore, his motion “should fare no better than they did when the Court
denied his last motion for compassionate relief in April 2023.”49
In response, Helmstetter argues that the government’s interpretation of
Austin goes too far and “ignores that this court may consider a combination of factors”
when deciding a compassionate release motion.50 Helmstetter disputes that Austin
categorically bars consideration of non-retroactive changes in the law and argues that
longer inform a court for purposes of determining the appropriate
sentence.
U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A. Amendment 836 became effective on November 1, 2025. See id.
46 See R. Doc. No. 1372, at 3.
47 See id. at 4–6 (citing United States v. Austin, 125 F.4th 688, 692 (5th Cir. 2025)).
48 Id. at 5.
49 Id. at 4.
50 See R. Doc. No. 1376, at 2–3.
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“Austin held only that a non-retroactive law alone, standing by itself, cannot mandate
resentencing.”51 He submits that he, instead, asks this Court to rely on a combination
of factors that “numerous” other courts have held constitute extraordinary and
compelling circumstances justifying a sentence reduction, including, inter alia, his
youth at the time of the offense and his “extraordinary rehabilitation.”52
The Court agrees with the government’s interpretation of Austin. In United
States v. Austin, the Fifth Circuit made clear that “a non-retroactive change in the
law, . . . [is] ‘neither an “extraordinarily severe exigency” nor “unique to the life of the
prisoner,”’ and therefore ‘a non-retroactive change in the law is not an extraordinary
or compelling reason to reduce a prisoner’s sentence.’” United States v. Whitman, No.
25-20035, 2025 WL 3143791, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 10, 2025) (quoting United States v.
Austin, 125 F.4th 688, 692 (2025)). The Fifth Circuit in Austin so decided after
explicitly recognizing that the November 2023 amendments to § 1B1.13 facially allow
consideration of non-retroactive changes in the law; it stated: “True, § 1B1.13(b)(6) of
the Sentencing Guidelines says that a nonretroactive ‘change in the law . . . may be
considered in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and
compelling reason.’ But that changes nothing.” See Austin, 125 F.4th at 692 (emphasis
added). The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the Sentencing Commission “does not have
the authority to amend” settled Fifth Circuit precedent that defined extraordinary
and compelling in a way that excluded consideration of non-retroactive changes to
51 Id. at 3.
52 Id.
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the law. Id. at 691–92 (citing United States v. Escajeda, 58 F.4th 184, 186 (5th Cir.
2023)). In so holding, the Fifth Circuit abrogated its decision in United States v. Jean,
which had held that courts were permitted to consider non-retroactive changes in
sentencing law as a factor for determining whether extraordinary and compelling
reasons exist for compassionate release. See 108 F.4th 275, 282 (5th Cir. 2024).53
53 Unlike in Austin, the Fifth Circuit in Jean had based its decision on changes in the
law brought about by new judicial interpretations of sentencing law. See id. at 280–
81 (“In the years after Jean was sentenced, a series of cases redefined what could be
considered a controlled-substance offense for the purpose of [the career offender
Guideline].”). The Fifth Circuit in Austin unequivocally held that Jean “was wrongly
decided and does not control.” Austin, 125 F.4th at 692. However, it also noted that
“in any event, Jean is distinguishable,” because
There, the change in law resulted from a new judicial interpretation of
§ 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Here, however, the change in law
resulted from a new statute that explicitly said it was non-retroactive.
Thus, even if Jean could be somehow reconciled with Escajeda and its
progeny, the former could not be applied beyond the specific facts and
circumstances of that case.
Id. at 693. Helmstetter does not raise this argument. However, the Court notes that
this language may suggest the possibility of treating differently motions based on
non-retroactive changes in the law resulting from new judicial opinions rather than
statutory amendments enacted by Congress. Yet, courts in this Circuit following
Austin have consistently held that Austin precludes considering non-retroactive
changes in any law. See, e.g., Cabrera, 2025 WL 2210731, at *6; Avila, 2025 WL
2210733, at *7; Santivanez, 2025 WL 1703429, at *4; see also Whitman, 2025 WL
3143791, at *1 (treating this argument as “foreclosed” by Austin). Absent clarifying
Fifth Circuit precedent to the contrary, the Court will not ignore clear directive from
the 	Fifth 	Circuit 	that 	Jean 	“does 	not 	control” 	and 	that, 	notwithstanding 	§
1B1.13(b)(6), Fifth Circuit precedent holds that non-retroactive changes in the law
cannot be leveraged to support a compassionate release motion, see id. at 692. See
also Santivanez, 2025 WL 1703429, at *4 (rejecting an argument that changes in law
resulting from judicial interpretations survives Austin because that “argument is
rebuffed by the reasoning in Austin. . . . Indeed, the Austin Court explicitly held that
non-retroactive changes like the one considered in Jean cannot be a basis for
compassionate release—that is why it held that ‘Jean . . . was wrongly decided and
does not control.’” (quoting Austin, 125 F.4th at 692)).
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Courts in the Fifth Circuit post-Austin have consistently found that “Fifth
Circuit precedent precludes considering non-retroactive changes in any law” when
determining whether extraordinary or compelling circumstances exist pursuant to
§ 1B1.13(b)(6). United States v. Cabrera, No. 10-140, 2025 WL 2210731, at *6 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 4, 2025) (emphasis in original)); United States v. Avila, No. 09-4, 2025 WL
2210733, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2025) (same); United States v. Santivanez, No. 98-
304, 2025 WL 1703429, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2025), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 98-304, 2025 WL 1700054 (W.D. Tex. June 17, 2025) (“In the wake of
Austin, a number of district courts in this circuit have refused to consider arguments
that non-retroactive changes in the law may be considered in determining whether
extraordinary and compelling circumstances exist for a sentence reduction.”).
The 	changes 	in 	law 	identified 	by 	Helmstetter 	that 	account 	for 	any
discrepancies in his sentence are non-retroactive and, therefore pursuant to Austin,
cannot 	be 	considered 	for 	purposes 	of 	determining 	whether 	extraordinary 	and
compelling circumstances exist to reduce his sentence. See Austin, 125 F.4th at 692;
see also Santivanez, 2025 WL 1703429, at *3 (holding that Booker is a non-retroactive
change in the law); United States v. Matute-Carcamo, No. 19-494, 2025 WL 1677950,
at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 13, 2025) (“Amendment 829, the Youthful Offender Amendment
– has not been given retroactive application and cannot be considered in the
‘extraordinary and compelling reason’ calculus.”).
The Court also disagrees with Helmstetter’s contention that Austin held “only
that a non-retroactive law alone, standing by itself, cannot mandate resentencing,”
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and that the Court may consider non-retroactive changes in the law as “part of a
multi-factor 	extraordinary-and-compelling 	analysis.”54 	Austin 	is 	clear 	that 	by
definition “a non-retroactive change in the law is not an extraordinary or compelling
reason to reduce a prisoner’s sentence.” See Austin, 125 F.4th at 692; see also United
States v. McMaryion, No. 21-50450, 2023 WL 4118015, at *2 (5th Cir. June 22, 2023)
(“[A] prisoner may not leverage non-retroactive changes in criminal law to support a
compassionate release motion, because such changes are neither extraordinary nor
compelling.”). This is true whether a defendant seeks to rely on a change in the law
to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons through § 1B1.13(b)(6) or (5), or
whether a defendant seeks to rely on a change in the law alone or in combination with
other factors. See United States v. Matute-Carcamo, No. 19-494, 2025 WL 1677950,
at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 13, 2025) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that “changes in
the law [could] . . . constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence
reduction 	under 	§ 1B1.13(b)(5), 	standing 	alone 	or 	in 	combination 	with 	other
considerations” (citing Austin, 125 F.4th at 693)).55
54 R. Doc. No. 1376, at 3.
55 To be sure, as it pertains to Helmstetter’s § 1B1.13(b)(5) argument, § 1B1.13(c)
states: “Except as provided in subsection (b)(6), a change in the law . . . shall not be
considered for purposes of determining whether an extraordinary and compelling
reason exists under this policy statement.” In other words, § 1B1.13(c) explicitly
limits 	a 	district 	court’s 	consideration 	of 	changes 	in 	the 	law, 	for 	purposes 	of
determining 	whether 	extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reasons 	exist, 	to 	those
circumstances 	that 	satisfy 	§ 	1B1.13(b)(6). 	Consequently, 	to 	the 	extent 	that
Helmstetter relies on changes in the law to support his argument that “other”
extraordinary and compelling reasons exist pursuant to § 1B1.13(b)(5), that reliance
is inconsistent with the policy statement.
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Furthermore, Helmstetter has not demonstrated that these changes in the law
would produce a gross disparity between his sentence and the sentence likely to be
imposed today, as is required by § 1B1.13(b)(6). As this Court pointed out when
evaluating the compassionate release motion of one of Helmstetter’s co-defendants,
“Apprendi and Alleyne hold only that facts which increase a defendant’s statutory
maximum or mandatory minimum sentence must be determined by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. These cases do not apply to facts that increase a defendant’s
sentencing guidelines range.”56 Because “application of the first-degree murder cross-
reference 	did 	not 	increase 	[the] 	statutory 	maximum 	or 	mandatory 	minimum
sentence” 	of 	Helmstetter, 	Alleyne 	cannot 	serve 	as 	a 	basis 	for 	establishing
extraordinary and compelling reasons for a reduction in Helmstetter’s case.57 See also
United States v. Rincon-Rincon, No. 24-40414, 2025 WL 1008530 (5th Cir. Apr. 4,
2025) (holding that Alleyne and Apprendi did not constitute changes in the law for
purposes of § 1B1.13(b)(6) because they would not “produce a gross disparity between
the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the
[compassionate release] motion [was] filed” (quoting § 1B1.13(b)(6)).
Accordingly, although the amended § 1B1.13 was not available to Helmstetter
when he filed his previous compassionate release motions, it does not now help him
establish that extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying a reduction in his
56 R. Doc. No. 1353, at 11 (citing United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 412 (5th
Cir. 2014)).
57 Cf. id at 12.
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sentence exist in his case.58 The cases cited by Helmstetter that reach a different
conclusion are out-of-circuit cases that were not bound by Austin and that, in any
event, are not binding on this Court. United States v. Traweek, No. 13-712, 2025 WL
1490306, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 2025) (“Out-of-circuit opinions are, at best,
persuasive authority, not binding precedent.” (citing Garcia v. Amfels, Inc., 254 F.3d
585, 588 (5th Cir. 2001))).
c. 	§ 3553(a) factors
The 	government 	maintains 	that 	even 	if 	the 	Court 	were 	to 	find 	that
extraordinary and compelling reasons for a reduction existed, Helmstetter has
provided the Court with no new information that would justify a different finding
with respect to the § 3553(a) factors than what this Court twice previously found
when rejecting Helmstetter’s last two motions for compassionate release.59
58 When evaluating Helmstetter’s second motion for compassionate release, this
Court found that it “may consider the defendant’s youth at the time of his offense and
conviction when determining whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances
exist.” See R. Doc. No. 1327, at 11. This aligned with decisions made by other district
courts in the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Lebaron, No. 92-177-05, 2023
WL 7308116 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2023); United States v. Lee, No. 04-11, 2021 WL
3129243, at *4–5 (E.D. La. July 23, 2021). However, those cases predated the Fifth
Circuit’s opinion in Austin and otherwise relied on non-retroactive changes to the law,
which Austin deemed impermissible. See, e.g., Lebaron, 2023 WL 7308116, at *7
(relying on changing Supreme Court interpretations of sentencing law with respect
to youthful defendants). While, theoretically, a defendant’s unusually long sentence
or “youth at the time of the offense and the impact of a traumatic upbringing can
serve as extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce a mandatory life sentence
when considered in light of emerging scientific research,” id. at *8, if considered
without also considering non-retroactive changes to the law, the Court cannot
contemplate how such a consideration would work in reality.
59 See id. at 7 (“Nothing in the past two years, since Helmstetter last sought
compassionate release, counsels in favor of a different result now.”).
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Helmstetter argues that the government’s reliance on this Court’s prior
§ 3553(a) findings is inappropriate because “[e]very additional year of imprisonment,
especially after the three-decade mark, alters” the analysis of these factors.60 The
Court should instead rely on the “most up-to-date picture” of Helmstetter when
conducting the § 3553(a) analysis, which includes considering his “extensive evidence
of rehabilitation” and his “strong support network and structured release plan.”61 He
also emphasizes that legal developments, whether retroactive or not, may “inform”
the § 3553(a) analysis.62 Helmstetter states that he is a changed man and asks this
Court to give him a “second chance . . . to reclaim his life” by granting his request for
release.63
Even if the Court had found that extraordinary and compelling circumstances
existed, the § 3553(a) factors independently counsel against reducing Helmstetter’s
sentence.64 Although the Court agrees with Helmstetter that its analysis of the
§ 3553(a) factors should not be frozen in time, he has not presented this Court with
any new argument or information that was not before this Court when it last denied
60 R. Doc. No. 1376, at 6.
61 Id. at 7.
62 Id. at 4 (“These are entirely appropriate considerations under § 3553(a), regardless
of retroactivity.”); see also R. Doc. No. 1377, at 10.
63 R. Doc. No. 1377, at 24–26. Helmstetter also suggests in his second reply that the
Court could modify his sentence by reducing his period of incarceration and imposing
a period of supervised release. See id. at 24–25.
64 R. Doc. No. 1327, at 9–13 (noting that even if the Court were to consider
Helmstetter’s youth at the time of his offense and conviction when determining
whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist, his motion would be denied
because his “arguments regarding the § 3553 analysis” fail).
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Helmstetter’s motion for compassionate release in 2023.65 As this Court previously
noted:
Helmstetter 	is 	currently 	serving 	three 	life 	sentences, 	to 	be
followed by an additional 240 months, for “committing murder and other
violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity.” Tolliver, 61 F.3d at 1196.
The 	underlying 	drug 	conspiracy 	distributed 	“approximately 	1000
kilograms of cocaine” (or nearly two-and-a-quarter tons) in and around
New Orleans. Id. His sentence therefore serves the purpose of protecting
the public from future crimes—including violent crimes—that he may
commit if released. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(C). Defendant’s sentence
also reflects the seriousness of the offenses—involvement in several
murders 	and 	an 	extensive 	drug 	conspiracy. 	See 	18 	U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A). Helmstetter’s sentence may also be justified as a means
of promoting respect for the law and to deter future similar conduct. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C). In summary, the § 3553(a) factors weigh
against granting Helmstetter’s motion for compassionate release.66
While the Court commends Helmstetter’s ongoing rehabilitative efforts, the Court
continues to find that the § 3553(a) factors—particularly, (1) “the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” (2)
the need for the sentence imposed “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, [or] to
promote respect for the law,” (3) the need “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct,” 	and 	(4) 	the 	need 	to 	“protect 	the 	public 	from 	further 	crimes 	of 	the
defendant”67—counsel against granting Helmstetter’s motion for a reduction in his
sentence. Cf. United States v. Tolbert, No. 25-10430, 2025 WL 2305397 (5th Cir. Aug.
65 See R. Doc. No. 1304, at 4 (Helmstetter arguing that “[i]t would be unfair to argue
that [he] is a danger to the community today” based on “actions [he took as] a juvenile
with an undeveloped[d] brain . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)); id. (arguing that
“the need for the sentence imposed appears weaker after” he has been incarcerated
for 32 years); id. (discussing the “over 50 plus programs” he has completed while
incarcerated, including the “challenge program” and “Stop the Violence” program).
66 R. Doc. No. 1327, at 13–14.
67 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A)–(C).
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11, 2025) (finding no abuse of discretion where the court “acknowledged [the
defendant’s] rehabilitative efforts and his pursuit of education and training while in
prison” but nonetheless concluded that the balance of § 3553(a) factors weighed
against granting the motion for release).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Helmstetter’s motion68 for sentence reduction pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, December 18, 2025.
_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
68 R. Doc. No. 1369.
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